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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the impact of corporate governance practices on the short and longer-
term sustainable returns of initial public offerings (IPOs) in China and New Zealand. In 
particular, the analysis focuses on the Shanghai, Shenzhen and New Zealand exchanges, 
providing a comparison between them. The closer trade and economic relations between 
China and New Zealand and the increasing immigration to New Zealand of relatively well-
off Chinese makes the study topical. Different political and cultural settings may give rise to 
differing relationships between IPO success and governance in these three markets and this 
will promote some interesting implications. 
 
Corporate governance involves regulatory and market mechanisms, and the roles and 
relationships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other 
stakeholders. IPOs are very important for investors, stock markets and economic growth. The 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and IPO performance has received 
attention in studied by the literature. The bulk of prior research focuses on larger and more 
developed economies. There is an increasing volume of literature relating to Chinese IPOs 
but none have focused on this key issue of IPO performance and the corporate governance 
structures of the particular companies. New Zealand by comparison to China is a small 
economy, small population and has few IPOs. However, China has become New Zealand’s 
second largest trading partner since 2008 and China became one of the major sources of 
immigrants to New Zealand from late 1990s. 
 
This thesis makes an important contribution to knowledge demonstrating that the short-term 
IPO performance is associated with different corporate governance attributes to those 
apparent for long-term performance of IPOs. The use of a wide range of governance variables 
II 
 
for the analysis as compared with prior studies provides greater confidence in the findings. 
The longer time period, up to 11 years, used in this study is helpful in reviewing the longer-
term sustainable IPO performance. China is the fastest growth economy in the world with 
rapidly developing stock markets. New Zealand, on the other hand, is a mature economy with 
a small stock market. The quality of data and analysis for two such very different economics 
provides an opportunity for careful diagnostic and specification testing. In this study a more 
robust empirical analysis, extending the commonly used OLS approach, through several 
panel data methods of generalised least square, and generalised method of moment models 
are explored. 
 
The study uses data from Shanghai, Shenzhen and New Zealand stock exchanges, covering 
the IPOs listed from 1999 to 2004. Those data are secondary data collected from the websites 
of the three stock exchanges, NZX Deep Archive, CSMAR database and individual 
companies’ annual reports. The study includes an extensive range of governance variables, 
including board size, board demographics, board leadership, board education, and board 
evaluation variables. There are three long-term dependent variables and three short-term 
dependent variables. There are a group of control variables. Various tests and suitable 
regression models are used to find that relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and the short- and long-term performance of IPOs on three exchanges. Several 
diagnostic tests including serial correlation test, over-identification test, and joint significance 
test are also used to check the validity of the regressions. 
 
The thesis finds that the panel data and cross sectional regressions explain the long and short-
term IPO performance well on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. The results indicate that the 
panel data regressions explain the long-term IPO performance well, but the cross sectional 
III 
 
regressions do not have acceptable explanatory power for the short-term IPO performance on 
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. In New Zealand the panel data regressions explain the long-
term IPO performance well, but the cross sectional regressions do not contribute a useful 
explanation for the short-term IPO performance. 
 
This thesis contributes a number of important implications. The commonality of corporate 
governance variables associated with successful performance has implications for companies 
preparing to list, exchanges arresting companies with listing, investors looking for successful 
listings and policy makers wanting an efficient capital market. The difference in variables 
similarly provides insight for companies, exchanges, investors, and policy analysts. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to the Study 
This research examines the impact of corporate governance practices on the short and longer-
term sustainable returns of initial public offerings (IPOs) in China and New Zealand. 
Corporate governance mechanisms and IPO performance have been widely studied by 
researchers are tested in both developed and developing markets. This thesis makes an 
important contribution to knowledge demonstrating that the short-term IPO performance is 
associated with different corporate governance attributes than long-term performance. This is 
important when the IPO stage in a company’s life is viewed as a transformation process. 
 
Corporate governance involves regulatory and market mechanisms, and the roles and 
relationships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other 
stakeholders. IPOs are very important for investors, stock markets and economic growth. It is 
the way by which firms raise capital from the public, and by which investors may place 
resources with new ventures promoting, potentially, growth and long-term sustainable returns. 
Table 1.1 indicates the listing of IPOs from 1999 to 2004 on the Shanghai, Shenzhen, and 
New Zealand Stock Exchanges. It is apparent the number of IPOs has increased over the 
period but there is variation from year-to-year. The success of an IPO is not only important 
for the survival of the company, it is also important for the longer-term contribution it can 
make to the economy through growth of employment. 
Table 1.1 Number of new listing IPOs over 1999 to 2004
1
 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Shanghai 46 88 75 70 67 61 
New Zealand 6 23 10 12 18 36 
Shenzhen 50 51 0 0 0 31 
 
                                                 
1
 The numbers are referring to Shanghai, Shenzhen, and New Zealand Stock Exchange Annual Statistics.  
2 
 
In 1997, the Asian economic crisis impacted adversely on the stock markets in East Asia and 
Australasia. Accordingly, the choice of sample period starts post this crash with its 
consequential regulatory reforms. The period encapsulates a period of high growth in China 
with liberalisation of investment rules providing a good sample of IPOs to consider. Other 
markets included in the sample experience growth to varying degrees. It is important that an 
adequate number of companies are available and appropriate records are accessible. Prior to 
1999 data is problematic.  
 
The countries selected for the study reflect differing degrees of market maturity, political, 
legal and cultural bases. Prior research has emphasised the difference between emerging and 
developed markets, scale, culture, legal framework and political systems and the impact they 
have upon the performance of listed stocks.  IPOs as a subset have not received 
comprehensive attention in these regards. The literature suggests that corporate governance 
mechanisms have an impact on IPO performance in developed and developing countries at 
different levels. Most studies have focused on large and developed economies, viz United 
States, United Kingdom, other European nations, Australia, and Japan. There are far fewer 
studies focused on smaller developed economics, viz New Zealand, Singapore, or even Hong 
Kong. The New Zealand economy is increasingly becoming more integrated with Asian 
economies, but culture, lifestyle, politics and legal systems are very different in East and 
North Asian countries. The tests of how corporate governance impacts on the IPOs’ returns in 
culturally different countries will enable a valuable comparison.  
 
There is also a substantial literature relating to large, developing economies, like China, India, 
Russia, and Brazil; China is now the second largest economy in the world, after the United 
States. Researchers have investigated many issues relating to the Chinese stock exchange, but 
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the material relating to corporate governance and IPOs is small. IPOs are very important for 
investors, stock markets and economic growth in most of nations, and there are some 
differences in China. IPOs are the way firms raise capital from the public but they may not be 
correlated with the economic growth China. From 1999 to 2011, on average the Chinese 
economy achieved 10% growth increase per year and during the period stock market indices 
stayed at the almost same level.   
 
The research is based on IPOs listing on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE), Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange (SZSE), and New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZSE) from 1 January 1999 to 
31 December 2009 and includes both surviving and delisted companies. A cut–off date of 31 
December 2004 IPO listings permits five years of post-listing data to be used in calculating 
returns through to 2009. This provides adequate time to consider longer-term patterns. 
 
The empirical focus of the research is to use corporate governance factors as independent 
variables and IPO performance as the dependent variables. Several metrics will be 
investigated as measure of IPO performance. The data collected will be presented as panel 
data and analysed using regressions based methods. 
 
According to Bradley, Jordan and Ritter (2003), the five day abnormal return, i.e., return 
above the market average of US IPOs is 4.1%, but they did not indicate the longer-term IPO 
performance. Examination of both the long and short-term is required to test IPO 
performance. The significance of this research lies in increasing an understanding of what 
factors drive the return risk relationship in an IPO, promoting its sustainable future. 
Corporate equity flotation for new companies is significant in terms of the sums of money 
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involved, although this has not been the case in New Zealand.
2
 A clear understanding of the 
attributes of success is important for international investment and may assist in formulating 
local policies to promote sustainable corporate listings in New Zealand. 
Table 1.2 Percentage Change of Market Capitalisation in Chinese Stock Markets over 2000-2008 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
SHSE 85% 2% -8% 18% -13% -11% 210% 277% -64% 
SZSE 78% -25% -19% -2% -13% -15% 91% 222% -58% 
 
Table 1.2 presents the growth of market capitalisation in China from 1999 to 2008. The 
Chinese stock market is a developing and fast growing market which differs from other 
markets around whole world. After the economic reforms of the 1980s many Chinese 
companies were privatised. The purpose of the privatisation was to improve the performance 
of the companies, but state-owned enterprises (SOEs) continued to play an important role in 
most listed companies through significant block holdings. This is a distinctive difference 
between Chinese companies and those in other countries. According to Cheung, Jiang, 
Limpaphayom, and Lu (2008), one of the unique features of the Chinese stock market is that 
approximately two-thirds of China’s listed companies are controlled by SOEs.  The primary 
goal of these companies is to achieve policy goals rather than maximise shareholders' wealth; 
their goals may conflict with the interests of minority (outside) shareholders. Multiple issues 
concerning the “agency theory” impacts through governance attributes raise concerns about 
the sustainable return of such IPOs. 
1.2 The Chinese and New Zealand Stock Exchanges 
The SHSE is one of the two stock exchanges in mainland China, which is located in Shanghai 
Pudong. The SHSE was officially opened on 19
th
 December 1990. The SHSE is a non-profit 
organization and under the direct management of the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission. Its main functions include providing a place for securities trading, formulating 
                                                 
2
 Refer to Table 1.2. 
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the operational rules of the stock exchange, supervising the IPO listing arrangement and 
applications, organizing and monitoring the securities trading, regulating listed companies 
and investors, managing and disclosing the market information. The SHSE is the member of 
the International Organization of Securities, the Asia and Oceania Exchange Association, the 
World Federation of Exchange. Until the end of 2009, the SHSE had 870 listed companies, 
1351 securities, and the total market value was more than 18 trillion yuans. Overall, the 
SHSE was a very fast growing security market during the decade 1999-2010.  
 
The SZSE was officially founded on 1
st
 December, 1990. It formally opened for business on 
3
rd
 July, 1991. After 1
st
 April, 1993, the SZSE was managed by the Shenzhen Securities 
Management Committee. The SZSE provides a centralised trading place for securities. It also 
organises and supervises those securities trading under the direct supervision and 
management of the China Securities Regulatory Commission.  The main functions of the 
exchange include developing the trading rules, arranging IPO listings, supervising IPO 
listings, organising and monitoring securities trading, supervising the investors and listed 
companies, administering and disclosing market information, and any other functions 
licensed by China Securities Regulatory Commission. Supported by the development of the 
SHSE, the SZSE stopped issuing new shares in 2000. The small and medium sized 
enterprises (SME) board was established by the SZSE on 17
th
 May, 2004, and eight 
companies were post listed on the SME board on 25
th
 June, 2004. After 2004 SZSE 
beginnings restored new IPOs, but only on SME board.  
 
In 1915 the 5 stock exchanges of Dunedin, Otago, Auckland, Wellington and Thames 
established the Stock Association of New Zealand. The national New Zealand Stock 
Exchange was established in 1983. NZSE became a member of the World Federation of 
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Exchanges in 1984. In 1987, the NZSE share prices reached the highest point in its history 
with 309 companies listed on the exchange at that time. In 1991 the exchange introduced 
NZSE40 and NZSE30 indices as the measurements of market performance. In 2003, the 
NZSE IPO was listed on its own exchange with a trading code “NZX”. In the NZX, the major 
investors are individuals. They hold about 50% of stocks. Compared with the Chinese stock 
exchanges, the NZSE capital gains are relatively small, but the dividend payments are 
relatively higher. The NZSE included four major markets: NZX Main Board (NZSX), NZX 
Alternative Market (NZAX), NZX Debt Market (NZDX) and NZX Derivatives (NZCX).    
1.3 Objective and Research Questions 
The aim of this research is to examine the impact of corporate governance practices on the 
short and longer-term sustainable returns of IPOs in China and New Zealand. The focus of 
the investigation is not premium paid on listing, but rather the sustained returns post-listing.  
The study uses data from Shanghai, Shenzhen, and New Zealand stock exchanges, covering 
the IPOs listed from 1999 to 2004. The study included all possible governance compositions, 
viz board size, board demographics, board leadership, board education, and board evaluation 
variables. There are three long-term sustainable dependent variables, viz yearly abnormal 
return, long-term Tobin’s Q, and long-term ROA. There are also three short-term dependent 
variables, viz first day abnormal return, short-term Tobin’s Q and short term ROA. There are 
a group of control variables between independent and dependent variables, viz size, beta, 
labour, market factors, industries, and years of listings. SHSE is a much larger exchange than 
SZSE and NZSE in terms of market capitalisation, number of listings, and number of 
investors. Differences between the exchanges are expected to enhance our understanding.  
The study considered five basic potential research questions. 
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1. Is long-term sustainable IPO performance related to corporate governance mechanisms in 
SHSE, SZSE, and NZSE? 
2. Is short-term IPO performance related to corporate governance mechanisms in SHSE, SZSE, 
and NZSE? 
3. Is Chinese IPO performance related to different governance mechanisms, because of the size 
and participants difference of stock exchanges? 
4. Are Chinese and New Zealand IPO performance related to different governance mechanisms, 
because of the different institutional systems (viz board structure difference, CEO and 
chairman age and qualification, SOE ownership) and exchange regulations difference of 
countries? 
5. Are SZSE and NZSE IPO performance related to similar governance mechanisms, because of 
the similar size? 
1.4 The Significance of the Study 
The goal of this research is to examine whether corporate governance influences the 
performance of IPOs over time and across a number of selected countries. Corporate 
governance has been widely tested using various characteristics as independent and control 
variables in regression models. The short-term performance of IPOs has been investigated 
using these approaches. Long-term performance of IPOs has not been comprehensively 
studied using these corporate governance variables. Prior research informs the research 
design and method for this study. First, analysis of IPO performance has used multiple 
metrics in measuring IPO performance, such as abnormal yearly return, Tobin’s Q (Tobin, 
1969), return on assets (ROA), and abnormal first day return. Second, the link between 
corporate governance and performance is a developing area of study. Third, the link between 
corporate governance and IPO performance is an emerging area of research with the focus on 
the short-term rather than sustainable longer-term returns. This research will fill the gap in 
the literature. 
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Prior research has focused on the returns of IPOs on listing, the longer-term returns of IPOs 
and, recently, on the impact of attributes of companies’ boards of directors on listing 
performance.  However, the impact of corporate governance upon the longer-term 
performance, and the pattern of returns as the companies move forward from new listing, 
remain unclear and warrant investigation.   
 
The study makes several contributions to the current literature. Linking corporate governance 
theory to empirical variables is important. Many prior studies, pursuing a positivist track have 
neglected the theory literature. The links are explicitly explored in section 2.3. 
 
Through the use of a wide range of governance variables, the analysis is broader than prior 
work and provides greater confidence in the findings. The study adds to the understanding of 
how different forms of governance impact the short and long-term IPO performance. 
Secondly, most prior studies test either short-term or long-term IPO performance over a 
specific period.  The current study tests the yearly long-term sustainable IPO performance, 
for periods up to 11. Thirdly, earlier works have focused on large and developed economies, 
viz United State, United Kingdom, other European nations, Australia, and Japan. This study 
provides evidence from China, which is the fastest growth economy with developing stock 
markets. New Zealand is a mature economy with a small stock market. Fourthly, most 
previous literature tests the impaction of corporate governance on IPO and firm performance 
in one market, but this study offers a comparison between two Chinese stock markets, and 
even comparisons between two countries. Fifth, the merits of the Chinese supervisory board 
system are reflected in differing views in prior studies. This thesis concludes that the 
supervisory board is significantly positively related to the long-term IPO performance for 
SHSE and SZSE.  Finally, this study uses a more robust empirical analysis, extending the 
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commonly used OLS approach, with careful diagnostic testing and then applying a more 
appropriate model as appropriate. 
1.5 The Structure of the Study 
The remainder of the study is included as following chapters. Chapter 2 provides a review of 
the corporate governance and IPO performance literature relevant to the current study. The 
chapter provides the major findings of the corporate governance and IPO performance studies, 
relating to both the short and longer-term.  
 
Chapter 3 covers two hundred years of Chinese stock market history starting with the late 
Qing Dynasty, and also provided the brief information about different classes of Chinese 
shares. The chapter also introduces the establishment and growth of Shanghai, Hong Kong 
and Shenzhen stock markets.  
 
Chapter 4 covers the background and the development of the New Zealand Stock Exchange. 
 
Chapter 5 introduces the methodologies and research methods of the study. The chapter 
includes the initial research questions, hypotheses, models, potential independent and control 
variables, statistical tests, and suitable regression formulations. First, it provides the research 
framework and the conceptual framework of the study. Second, it describes the hypotheses of 
the study. Third, it introduces the potential dependent, independent and control variables to 
be tested in the later stages. Finally, it provides the statistical test and suitable regressions of 
the study.  
 
Chapter 6 discusses information on the data used in this study. 
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Chapter 7 presents the descriptive, econometric tests and the empirical results and findings in 
relation to corporate governance mechanisms and the short and long-term performance of 
IPOs on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. Chapter 8 covers the same material as Chapter 7 in 
respect of the Shenzhen. Chapter 9 covers the New Zealand exchange in a similar manner to 
chapter 7 and 8.  
 
Chapter 10 presents the comparison study of SHSE, SZSE, and NZSE’s corporate 
governance and short- and long-term IPO performance.  
 
Chapter 11 summarises the findings and their implications. 
1.6 Conclusion 
Corporate governance mechanisms and IPO performance have been widely studied by 
researchers. The literature suggests that corporate governance mechanisms have an impact on 
IPO performance in developed and developing countries at different levels. Most studies have 
focused on large and developed economies, viz United States, United Kingdom, other 
European nations, Australia, and Japan. This research examines the impact of corporate 
governance practices on the short and longer-term sustainable returns of IPOs in China and 
New Zealand. The research is based on IPOs listing on the SHSE, SZSE, and NZSE from 1 
January 1999 to 31 December 2009 and includes both surviving and delisted companies. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This research examines whether corporate governance influences the performance of IPOs 
over time and across a number of selected countries. The influence of corporate governance 
has been widely tested using various characteristics as independent and control variables in 
regression models. The short-term performance of IPOs has been investigated using these 
approaches, but long-term performance of IPOs has not been comprehensively studied using 
these corporate governance variables. This research will fill the gap in the literature. 
 
Prior research informs the research design and method for this study. First, the performance 
of IPOs has been measured using multiple metrics, such as Tobin’s Q (Tobin, 1969), 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR), buy and hold abnormal return (BHAR), ROA, and first 
day return in discount. Second, the link between corporate governance and performance is a 
developing area of study. Third, the link between corporate governance in IPO performance 
is an emerging area of research with the focus on the short-term rather than sustainable 
longer-term returns. 
 
In the literature there are three key themes: corporate governance and IPO performance, 
theories of corporate governance, and studies of supervisory boards in Chinese markets. 
Within the corporate governance and IPO performance theme, there are papers analysing IPO 
performance, corporate governance, and also IPO performance in corporate governance areas. 
In IPO performance and corporate governance studies researchers have considered IPO 
performance which involved long-run and short-run analyses in developed and developing 
markets. Studies have also investigated corporate governance analysing CEO characteristics, 
board characteristics, ownership characteristics, audit characteristics, and accounting 
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characteristics components. Corporate governance researchers have used a range of 
theoretical approaches including agency theory, stewardship theory, tournament theory, 
institutional theory, stakeholder theory, managerial hegemony theory, and resource dependent 
theory. Most supervisory board studies have been undertaken by domestic Chinese 
researchers. The following columns show the structure of the literature review and the areas 
where prior studies have focused.  
 
Table 2.1 Structure of Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction   
2.2 IPO Performance   
 
2.2.1 Developed Markets 
  2.2.2 Developing Markets 
2.3 Corporate Governance 
 
 
2.3.1 CEO Characteristics 
 
2.3.2 Board Characteristics 
 
2.3.3 Ownership Characteristics 
 
2.3.4 Accounting Characteristics 
2.4 IPO Performance and Governance    
 
2.4.1 Developed Markets 
 
2.4.2 Summary of Developed Markets 
 
2.4.3 Developing Markets 
 2.4.4 Summary of Developing Markets 
2.5 Theories of Corporate Governance   
 
2.5.1 Agency Theory 
 
2.5.2 Stewardship Theory  
 
2.5.3 Tournament Theory  
 
2.5.4 Institutional Theory  
 
2.5.5 Stakeholder Theory  
 
2.5.6 Managerial Hegemony Theory  
 
2.5.7 Resource Dependence Theory  
2.6 Studies of Supervisory Board    
  China 
2.7 Conclusion   
 
In the sections which follow the key issues are noted and a precis of several leading papers 
provided. This approach followed is to identify the location of the study, the sample size and 
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other components as they impact the generalizability of the findings. This is important for the 
current study given the market size, time periods and maturity of the economies involved.   
2.2 IPO Performance 
An IPO is the issue of shares by a company to the public for the first time and is typically an 
important component of its capital raising. When a company has a listing price for its shares 
greater than the issue price, then this is known as a premium on listing. Premiums on listing 
of an IPO may be considered a signal of likely future success. Some investors speculate on 
making gains on listing and they are referred to as stags. The capacity of the company to 
generate sustainable returns over the medium term, say five years, may not translate into 
reality even given a good bonus to the stags.  
 
IPO performance has been widely tested by researchers in developed and developing markets. 
Normally, these studies select several IPOs in a country through a chosen time period and 
then analyse the short- or long-term performance. Prior research has focused on the returns of 
IPOs on listing, and the longer-term returns of IPOs.  Therefore, these independent variables 
may also significant for the current study as indicators in the Chinese and New Zealand 
markets. The markets, sample sizes, time periods, variables, and major findings are discussed 
in the later stage of developed and developing markets’ sections.  
 
2.2.1 IPO Performance in Developed Markets 
Long-term performance of IPOs has been tested by researchers in developed markets. 
McConaughy, Dhatt and Kim (1995) compare some of the economic and accounting ratios in 
the US from 1985 to 1992, and find a significant improvement in operating efficiency five to 
six years after the IPO. They indicate that agency costs do not increase through time; the 
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markets discipline entrepreneurs with incentives to maintain pre IPO performance. Poor stock 
performance is attributed to investors overpaying.  
 
Florin (2005) examines whether venture capital (VC) affects IPO performance and founder 
returns in the two years post-listing. The sample of 277 IPOs in the US begins in 1996. The 
independent variables include founder, top management (TMT), pre IPO venture, and 
industry characteristics, viz venture capital equity, number of founders, startup experience, 
TMT experience, TMT education, firm age, pre IPO income, pre IPO sales, hotness of IPO, 
IPO proceeds, assets at IPO, income at two years after IPO, sales growth, assets growth, ROA, 
return in sales (ROS), share growth, founder wealth, and CEO at two years after IPO. Florin 
indicates that venture characteristics pre IPO and venture performance post IPO are not 
significantly different when comparing performance with and without VC backing.  
 
Westerman, Geiger and Cyr (2008) examine the effects of VC involvement on long-term IPO 
performance. They select 402 IPOs from year 1993 in the US with 242 of non-VC backed 
firms and 160 VC backed. One of their hypotheses is that VC is more interested in the long-
term stock price performance. They choose a dummy for VC backing, and combine with firm 
risk, company age, the number of employees, IPO offering price, net income over share, and 
CEO ownership as the independent variables. They suggest VC backing and incentive stock 
options have a positive effect on the three years performance following the IPO. 
 
The long-term IPO performance of German and Spanish family-owned firms is investigated 
by Jaskiewicz, Gonzalez, Menendez and Schiereck (2005). Their sample consists of 153 
German and 43 Spanish firms which had been listed during the period 1990 to 2001. They 
choose 36 months BHAR as the measure of long-term performance. They use a dummy for 
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listing year, market value, percentage of family ownership, firm age, firm size, and a dummy 
for country as the control variables. They indicate firm age has a negative influence on long-
term IPO performance in Germany and Spain.  They also indicate that firm size has a positive 
influence on the long-term performance of IPOs and strong family involvement has a positive 
impact on long-term stock market performance.  
 
Goergen, Khurshed and Mudambi (2007) examine the relationship between three-year post 
IPO performance and pre IPO financial performance for firms. Their sample consists of 134 
post-listed IPOs on the London Stock Exchange from 1991 to 1995. They subdivide the 
sample into two groups based on size, viz small firms and large firms, to investigate the 36 
month BHAR.  They indicate the proxy for the quality of managerial decisions and degree of 
multi-nationality have a positive effect on the long-term stock return. Pre IPO accounting 
performance and agency cost have a negative effect on the long-term stock return.   
 
Dong, Michel and Pandes (2011) examine the relationship between underwriter quality and 
long-term IPO performance in Canada. They employ the number of managing underwriters, 
underwriter reputation, and absolute price adjustment to indicate the underwriter quality. The 
sample includes 7,407 IPOs listed in Toronto Stock Exchange from 1980 to 2006.They find 
that higher underwriter quality predicts the better long-term IPO performance. 
 
Levis (2011) examines three years aftermarket performance of private IPOs in United 
Kingdom. He selects 1,595 IPOs listed in London Stock Exchange from 1992 to 2005. He 
finds that private IPOs achieved better operating and market performance when compared to 
other IPOs in the three years following the public listing. 
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Thomadakis, Nounis and Gounopoulos (2012) investigate the long-term performance of 254 
Greek IPOs were listed from 1994 to 2002 by cross-sectional dataset. They use three year 
BHAR and CAR as the measurements of long-term IPO performance. They find that IPOs 
are outperformed in the first and second years, but underperformed in the third year. 
 
A combined testing of short and long-term performance of IPOs has been undertaken in 
developed markets. Ljungqvist (1997) selects 189 German IPO firms from 1970 to 1993 
using initial return as the short-term IPO performance and BHAR as the long-term metric for 
IPO performance. Several control variables, viz the inverse of real gross proceeds, fraction of 
share capital retained by insiders after IPO, firm market movement before and after IPO, and 
a dummy for year are used in a regression model.  He indicates short-term underpricing is 
positively related with the stock market, macroeconomic conditions, insider retention rates, 
and the inverse of real gross proceeds. The long-term performance of German IPOs is poor. 
 
The competitive posture of 168 high technology firms that completed an IPO in 1992 and 
their short- and long-term performance are analysed by Wilbon (2003). He uses Tobin’s Q as 
the IPOs’ performance measure. He indicates that having a more pioneering posture matters 
with regards to short-term IPO performance using Tobin’s Q measure in high technology 
firms, and he does not find a relationship between competitive posture and long-term IPO 
performance. He has also indicates the research uses a large sample size which exceeds other 
studies and thus provides more robustness to the statistical analysis.  
 
Guo, Lev and Shi (2006) use research and development (R&D) to explain short and long-
term IPO anomalies in the US. Their sample consists of 2,696 US IPOs listed between 1980 
and 1995. They use first day IPO return as a measure of short-term return and then examine 
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long-term performance via time-series regression. They use natural log of issue proceeds, 
revision in offer price, underwriter reputation measure, pre-offer demand, percentage of 
insider ownership, and VC backing as the independent variables. They indicate R&D 
intensity is positively associated with short- and long-term IPO performance. 
 
A further US-based study covering 1990-1998 by Johnston and Madura (2006) selects 58 
stockholder owned thrifts, including 20 mutual holding companies (MHC). They examine 
dependent variables of initial returns and long-run returns in the regressions through several 
control variables, viz underwriter, size, market run up, interest rate environment, and time 
periods. They indicate that MHCs experience lower initial returns; their long-term 
performance is not statistically different from the subsample of stockholder owned thrifts.  
 
Stevenson (2006) examines the short- and long-term performance of UK privatisation, 
including public utilities with conventional IPO, with a sample of 757 IPOs in the UK market 
between 1981 and 1998. He uses first day abnormal return, seven day abnormal return, and 
30 days abnormal return to indicate the short-term IPO performance; 3 years CAR, 5 years 
CAR, 3 years BHAR, and 5 years BHAR as the long-term IPO performance. The 
performance of privatisations significantly outperforms that of listed companies over the 
short term. The long-term performance of privatisations, especially the utility firms, provides 
a higher return than other firms.  
 
Carow, Cox and Roden (2007) use a sample of 347 demutualising thrifts from 1991 to 2004 
in the US and examine whether inside participation influences IPO performance. Their 
dependent variables include inside participation, percentage of first day price change, the log 
of proceeds, price to book ratio, book value of assets, level of unanticipated inside 
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participation, change of ROA, and industry adjusted 3 years CAR excluding first day return. 
They use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to correlate those respective dependent 
variables with several control variables, viz the log of firms’ total assets, percentage growth 
in assets, ROA, industry average price-to-book ratio, core capital ratio, the dummy of New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), AMEX or NASDAQ listing, returns on the thrift index, six 
weeks change in interest rate, and ten year constant maturity treasury rate.  They find that 
first day returns are higher with the percentage of insider purchasing, but no evidence in 
relation to future performance. The offer size reduces the first day return and enhances 
expected return. They also indicate unanticipated levels of managerial participation are 
negatively related to the size of the offer. 
 
Gonzalez and James (2007) examine bank relationship for technology and non-technology 
companies in terms of post IPO performance. Their data consists of 529 technology and 142 
non-technology post-listing IPOs during 1996 to 2000 in the US. Their dependent variables 
include firm size, dummy of technology industry, first day returns, year 1 returns, year 2 
returns, and year 3 returns. They apply the dependent variables to the regression with several 
control variables, viz tangible assets, log of age, EBITDA/sales, log of sales, debt/assets, 
dummy of internet, and VC backing. They indicate that firms having a longer-term 
relationship with a bank are more profitable, have lower losses, and are more likely to attract 
VC than firms without banking relations for technology firms. There is a positive association 
between post IPO operating performance and the existence and size of pre IPO banking 
relations. 
 
Chahine and Filatotchev (2008) examine the effects of VC affiliation to underwriters on 
short- and long-term IPO performance in France. Their sample includes 230 small and 
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medium size companies listed in France from 1996 to 2002. They examine IPO performance 
through several variables, viz initial underpricing, adjusted earnings surprise, BHAR and the 
monthly BHAR. Their main explanatory variables are VC-backed IPOs dummy, underwriter 
reputation, market return, market volatility, and bubble period dummy. They suggest that 
IPOs with affiliated VCs in general, and particularly those affiliated with more prestigious 
underwriters, have a higher long-term abnormal return than both non-affiliated and non-VC 
backed IPOs. 
 
There are also several papers that consider short- and long-term performance in Asian 
developed markets. Cheng, Cheung and Tse (2006) test the performance of IPOs before and 
after 1994 regulatory change in Hong Kong. They use first day return, buy-and-hold market 
adjusted 1 year, 2 years and 3 years return, and subscribe-and-hold market adjusted 1 year, 2 
years and 3 years return as metrics for short- and long-term IPO performance. Their findings 
show that IPOs listed before and after the regulatory change provide a similar first day return. 
Their results also indicate there is no significant difference in long-term performance between 
IPOs listed before and after the change. ROA, abnormal long-term return, Tobin’s Q and first 
day return appear most frequently in prior research as the long- and short-term IPO 
performance indicators in developed markets. This research follows the present literature by 
choosing those variables to be the standard for IPO performance in New Zealand. 
 
2.2.2 IPO Performance in Developing Markets 
There are several papers investigating IPO long-term performance in Asian developing 
markets. Allen, Morkel–Kingsbury and Piboonthanakiat (1999) examine long-term IPO 
performance in Thailand. They use a sample of 150 IPOs listed on the Thai Stock Exchange 
for the years 1985 to 1992. Their dependent variables are two year stock return, two year 
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equally weighted adjusted return, and two year value-weighted adjusted return. They apply 
dependent variables to the multiple regressions individually, with several control variables, 
viz initial return, market return, issue size, volume, and firm age.  They indicate that IPOs 
with a higher initial return tend to have the worst aftermarket performance in Thailand. They 
also indicate smaller issues tend to perform better than larger issues in the long term, while 
the younger firms have lower initial return but higher long-term return.  
 
Durukan (2002) examines the relationship between performance of IPOs and factors that may 
affect IPO returns in Turkey.  His sample consists of 173 IPOs from 1990 to 1997 on the 
Istanbul Stock Exchange. He uses initial returns, opening price return, intraday return, and 
market adjusted abnormal returns to indicate short-term IPO performance, and then uses 12 
month, 24 month and 36 month raw aftermarket returns to indicate long-term IPO 
performance. Several independent variables are investigated: firm size, firm age, privatization, 
ratio of total public share offering, gross proceeds from IPO, dummy of foreign investors 
remaining, debt to equity (D/E) ratio, price to earnings (P/E) ratio, and method of IPO. He 
indicates long-term return is negatively related to short-term return; opening price return is 
negatively related to initial return; and long-term IPO performance does not underperform the 
market performance. Durukan also indicates D/E ratio and firm age are positively related to 
short-term IPO performance, but firm size and total public IPO offerings are negatively 
related to long-term IPO performance. The results seem at variance with those from some 
developed markets. 
 
Ghosh (2005) examines the post-listing performance of IPOs in the Indian banking industry 
selecting 24 bank IPOs that listed in the 1990s in India. He tests long- and short-term 
performance of IPOs based on 1, 3, 6, 12, 18, 24, 30, and 36 month index data. His dependent 
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variables include monthly BHAR, ROA, the ratio of operating profit to working fund, the 
ratio of interest income to working fund, the ratio of non-performing assets to net advances, 
profit per employee, and total capital to risk weighted asset ratio. He indicates that there is no 
significant evidence for the IPOs based on BHAR and other dependent variables. But the 
accounting factors show improvement of long-term IPO performance in the post-listing years. 
These results are the opposite of findings for the Chinese stock markets, (Kao, Wu and Yang, 
2009). 
 
Long- and short-term performance of IPOs has been widely tested by researchers in mainland 
China. Chen, Firth and Kim (2000) examine the post-issue market performance of IPOs in 
China. Their sample consists of 277 A-share IPOs and 65 B-share IPOs which had post-listed 
on SHSE and SZSE over the period 1992-1995. The post-listing performance of IPOs 
involves tests over two intervals, the first day initial return and two- or three-year returns. 
Finally, they use initial return, market-adjusted BHAR, and wealth relative up to a holding 
month, and three years of post-listing performance as the dependent variable of short- and 
long-term IPO performance. They use three years post-listing performance as the dependent 
variable in the regression with several independent variables, viz log of total assets, log of 
firm age, initial period return, the rate of earning growth in three years, percentage of 
institutional shareholdings, dummy of foreign shareholdings, dummy of SHSE listing, and 
dummy of listing year. They indicate A-share IPOs are more severely underpriced during the 
initial return period than B-share IPOs; the initial returns of A-shares are extremely high and 
exceed most other countries. B-share IPOs underperform A-share IPOs during long-term 
performance. They also indicate that economic factors determining the post-issue 
performance of IPOs differ across the A-share and B-share samples. 
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Kao, Wu and Yang (2009) examine the relationship between regulations, earnings 
management and post IPO performance on the Chinese stock market. Their sample consists 
of 366 firms that issued A-shares for the first time from January 1, 1996 through February 11, 
1999. They measure firm performance by ROA, abnormal first day return (ARET), and CAR. 
They select pricing period performance dummy, aggressive dummy, market, size, leverage, 
and industry as the control variables. They find that, on average, Chinese IPO firms report a 
decline in post-IPO profitability and poor long-term stock performance. Their results also 
indicate that some of the IPO firms that make extremely optimistic forecasts decrease after 
the introduction of penalty regulations. IPO firms with overoptimistic earnings forecasts are 
likely to have lower first day returns and worse post-IPO performance than others.  Their 
findings indicate that the short-term performance of Chinese IPOs outperforms, in most of 
cases, the long-term IPO performance. But Ghosh (2005) provides confounding evidence, 
finding no similar evidence for IPOs when using BHAR. 
 
The use of regression models is the predominant approach for assessing short- and long-term 
performance, viz, Ljungqvist (1997), Allen, Morkel–Kingsbury and Piboonthanakiat (1999), 
Chen, Firth and Kim (2000), Durukan (2002), Wilbon (2003), Ghosh (2005), Cheng, Cheung 
and Tse (2006), Jaskiewicz, Gonzalez, Menendez and Schiereck (2005), Guo, Lev and Shi 
(2006), Johnston and Madura (2006), Goergen, Khurshed and Mudambi (2007), Carow, Cox 
and Roden (2007), Gonzalez and James (2007), Chahine and Filatotchev (2008), and Kao, 
Wu and Yang (2009). All the above researchers examine IPO performance as dependent 
variables through regressions. 
 
Jewartowski and Lizinska (2012) study short- and long-term IPO performance in Poland. 
Their dataset includes 195 IPOs listed between 1998 and 2008 in Poland. They employ 
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ordinary least square regression and suggest that early market volatility, issuer’s size, growth 
opportunities, and profitability before listing can partly explain the differences of initial 
return and the long-term underperformance issue. 
 
ROA, abnormal long-term return, Tobin’s Q and first day return appear most frequently in 
prior research as the long- and short-term IPO performance indicators in developing markets. 
This research follows the present literature by choosing those variables to be the standard for 
IPO performance in China. However, prior studies predominantly test either short-term or 
long-term IPO performance over a specific period.  This study will fill the gap in the 
literature and will extend an understanding of the sustainable relationship between the IPO 
performance and corporate governance. The current study will test the yearly sustainable 
long-term IPO performance for periods of up to 11 years. 
2.3 Corporate Governance on Firm Performance 
Key foci of corporate governance are the reduction of agency problems in companies, the 
improvement of companies’ performance, and an emphasis on shareholders’ wealth. 
Corporate governance also includes the relationships among internal and external 
stakeholders and involves balancing the interests of those stakeholders and the goals by 
which the corporation is governed. Internal stakeholders are the management, the board of 
directors and block shareholders. External stakeholders are outside shareholders, creditors, 
auditors, customers, suppliers, committees, regulators, etc.  
 
Several recent papers have tested CEO, board, ownership, and accounting characteristics on 
firm performance. 
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2.3.1 Prior Findings regarding CEO Characteristics  
CEO structures have been widely tested by present researchers; most of them focus on the 
effect of CEO duality and compensation, also gender, on firm performance. The markets, 
sample sizes, time periods, variables, and major findings are discussed in the later stage of 
section. These are important issues as they impact the generalizability of the findings. These 
factors may also significant for the current study in the Chinese and New Zealand markets. 
 
Kren and Kerr (1997) examine the effect of outside directors and board shareholdings on the 
relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance in US. Their sample consists 
of 268 firms; 107 post-listed in 1987 and 161 post-listed in 1989. They select log of cash 
compensation, log of cash and option, and log of value of equity as the dependent variables, 
and examine those variables by regression analysis with several independent variables and 
control variables, viz ROA, return on common stock, outside board member percentage, 
board stock ownership, outsider stock ownership, and CEO stock ownership over firm market 
value. They find that CEO compensation is more positively related to corporate performance 
in high board ownership and high outsider board firms than low board ownership and low 
outsider board firms.   
 
Lippert (1999) examines CEO compensation and corporate governance of multinational and 
domestic corporations in a sample of 430 domestic and 177 multinational firms in the US in 
1992. He uses salary, bonus, equity holdings and executive stock options as dependent 
variables regressed against standard deviation of returns on equity, average capital 
expenditure in one year, dummy of finance industry, percentage of inside directors, log of 
total assets, foreign tax over total tax, and interactive of multinational times average capital 
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expenditure. He finds that CEO compensation of multinational firms is less aligned to equity 
performance than domestic firms.  
 
McKnight, Tomkins, Weir and Hobson (2000) examine the relationship between CEO age 
and top executive pay in the UK. Their sample is from 100 UK origin and publicly held firms, 
and the data were gathered from annual reports and Financial Analysis Made Easy. They 
investigate executive pay using CEO age, CEO turnover and turnover by age, shareholder 
return, and shareholder by age, to explain company performance measured by three different 
dependent variables, viz salary, bonus and stock options. They indicate that the relationship 
between CEO salaries and age is significant but weakens over time, and the relationship 
between CEO age and bonus appears to be non-linear. From age 53, the proportion of bonus 
as a percentage of salary begins to decrease at an increasing rate. 
 
Davidson III, Nemec and Worrell (2006) examine the relationship between board 
demographics, such as age and CEO selection. The analysis draws on a sample of 244 CEO 
successions from CEOs included in Business Week’s 1992 report. In their model, the 
dependent variable is CEO age, and the independent variables are board data, viz board size, 
director age, director tenure, insider director age, proportion of inside directors, insider 
director tenure, outside director age, proportion of outside directors, outside director tenure, 
affiliated director age, proportion of affiliated directors, affiliated director tenure, block share 
ownership, board and manager votes, number of board meetings, and prior firm performance. 
They find that boards tend to hire CEOs of an age similar to their own, and this similarity of 
attraction is stronger in better performing firms, suggesting that its use in board selection of 
CEO successors may be related to financial outcomes. 
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Sierra, Talmor and Wallace (2006) examine the relationship between governance and firm 
performance/executive compensation. Their sample consists of 76 bank holding companies 
from 1992 to 1997 and their data is collected from Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp database. 
Their dependent variables are log of executive compensation, ROA, dummy of board strength 
score, and change in executive compensation. They use three-stage least regressions to 
investigate those variables by several independent and control variables, viz percentage of 
insider ownership, percentage of outside directors, percentage of directors who have 
relationships with CEO, percentage of outside directors who sit on at least two other boards, 
percentage of outside directors who are over 65, dummy of duality, board size, dummy of 
rating for those companies, risk-priced funding over total assets, sensitivity of CEO stock and 
option, one year holding period return, log of total assets, standard deviation of ROA in five 
years, market to book ratio, and CEO experience. They indicate a strong board is positively 
associated with higher firm performance, lower levels of executive pay and lower growth 
rates of executive pay. They also indicate higher levels of firm performance and ROA are 
positively associated with higher pay. 
 
Dorata and Petra (2008) examine the relationship between CEO compensation and especially 
corporate control characteristics, and CEO duality in the US. The sample of 220 post-listed 
firms in 2003 represents 143 non-merger/acquisition firms and 77 merger/acquisition firms. 
They select a percentage of a CEO’s performance pay to the total compensation as the 
dependent variable to indicate CEO compensation, and then investigate it through OLS with 
several independent and control variables, viz dummy of CEO duality, log of total sales, ROE, 
dummy of acquisition, the interaction between duality and sales, and the interaction between 
duality and acquisition. Their results indicate CEO compensation is positively associated with 
firm size, but unaffected when associated with CEO duality for merging firms. They also find 
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that CEO compensation is positively associated with firm size and performance. CEO duality 
is also positively associated with firm performance and CEO compensation in non-merging 
firms. 
 
Lam and Lee (2008) examine the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance 
through the effects of family control factors in Hong Kong. Their sample consists of 128 
post-listed public-tradable firms in 2003. Their dependent variables are ROA, ROE, return on 
capital employed, and market to book value of equity. They investigate those variables 
through OLS individually with several control variables, viz dummy of CEO duality, 
percentage of outside directors, dummy of remuneration committee, dummy of nomination 
committee, log of board size, dummy of firm history whether before 1997, percentage of 
minority interest in consolidated balance sheet, percentage of individual largest shareholding, 
current ratio, D/E ratio, dummy of dual listing, dummy of utilities, log of total assets, log of 
market capitalization, and log of net sales. They find that CEO duality and accounting 
performance are positively related in non-family firms, but negatively related in family 
controlled firms. They suggest that CEO duality is good for non-family firms and non-duality 
is good for family controlled firms. Braun and Sharma (2007) examine the relationship 
between CEO duality and shareholder return on US-based family-controlled public firms. 
They find that when family ownership is low, CEO duality is beneficial in terms of stock 
return.  
 
Lee, Lev and Yeo (2008) examine the relationship between dispersion of top management 
compensation and firm performance in the US. Their sample consists of 12,197 observations 
of 1,855 firms post-listed in the period 1992-2003. They measure firm performance by 
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Tobin’s Q and firms’ stock returns, and they find that Tobin’s Q and stock returns are 
positively associated with the pay dispersion of top management. 
 
Adams, Gupta and Leeth (2009) test the financial performance of US corporates between 
1992 and 2004 to test whether female CEOs would place the firm in a precarious financial 
condition. They selected more than 1500 firms from the US, which included 61 women who 
served as CEOs of 63 firms. They compare the male and female CEOs’ leadership through 
several firm performance variables, viz market value, total assets, sales, employees, earning 
per share, return on assets, and return on equity. Their results indicate that firm performance 
preceding CEO appointments tends to favour females, implying that female CEOs are 
appointed to the position largely when the firms are in better financial condition. 
 
From present papers, the studies of CEO characteristics are based more on developed markets, 
viz UK and US, rather than developing markets. CEO age is U-shaped associated with their 
pay and firm performance in the UK. The positive relationship between CEO compensation 
and firm performance, measured by ROA, is less aligned in multinational firms than domestic 
firms in the US. CEO pay dispersion is positively associated with firm performance; TMT 
stock based pay is significantly associated with firm performance in the US. CEO duality and 
accounting performance are positively related in non-family firms, but negatively related in 
family controlled firms in Hong Kong and the US. CEO duality has no significant effect on 
firm performance in Malaysia. Administrative expense ratio is positively associated with the 
probability of financial distress in China. CEO duality and board compensation have no 
significant effect on firm performance in Hong Kong. Potentially CEO age, CEO 
compensation, CEO salary, and CEO compensation may be important for the current study as 
they were found to be significant in prior studies in developed and developing markets. 
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2.3.2 Prior Findings regarding Board Characteristics  
Board structures have been widely tested by present researchers; most of them focus on the 
effect of outside directors, board size, and female directors’ impact on firm performance. The 
markets, sample sizes, time periods, variables, and major findings are discussed in the later 
stage of section. These are important issues as they impact the generalizability of the findings. 
These factors may also significant for the current study in the Chinese and New Zealand 
markets. 
 
Abdullah (2004) examines the relationship between firm performance, CEO duality and 
board composition in Malaysia. His sample consists of 313 companies from 1994, 321 
companies from 1995, and 318 companies from 1996; all of them were post-listed in the 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE). He uses profit margin ratio, ROE, ROA, and 
earnings per share (EPS) to indicate firm performance. He finds that board independence and 
CEO duality have no significant effect on firm performance, and outside directors dominate 
boards in Malaysia.  
 
Bonn (2004) examines the relationship between board structure and firm performance in 
Australia. He uses the sample of 84 manufacturing firms in 1999 and the data were collected 
from the Aspect Fin Analysis database. The dependent variables of ROE and market-to-book 
ratio were investigated individually through OLS, with several independent and control 
variables, viz board size, percentage of female directors, percentage of outside directors, 
director age, and total sales. The results indicate the percentage of outside directors and 
female directors are positively associated with firm performance, but find no relationship 
between board size and firm performance.  
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Bonn, Yoshikawa and Phan (2004) examine the effect of board structure on firm performance 
in Japan and Australia. The sample of 169 manufacturing firms from the Nikkei 300 Index of 
Japan and 104 manufacturing firms from top 500 companies in Australia were selected as the 
data for their study. Their dependent variables are ROA and market-to-book ratio in 1999, 
and they select board size, percentage of female directors, percentage of outside directors, 
firm age, and director age in 1998 as the independent variables. They find that board size and 
director age are negatively associated with firm performance, but the percentage of outside 
and female directors have no influence on firm performance in Japan. They also find that the 
percentage of outside and female directors is positively associated with firm performance in 
Australia. 
 
Dimovski and Brooks (2006) examine the gender composition of boards after an IPO in 
Australian markets. They chose 108 new IPOs listed on the Australian Stock Exchange from 
1994 to 1997. Of these, 54 were listed as top 500 companies in 2002. Their hypotheses are 
that the proportion of women directors on a company’s board increases as the company 
develops; the proportion of women directors on a company’s board is greater in industrial 
companies and in larger companies. They use proportion of male directors and proportion of 
female directors as dependent variables to run two ordinary least square regressions. They use 
three independent variables, viz the firm is industrial as dummy variable, the data on directors 
is taken at the time of the IPO as dummy variable, and the log of market capitalization of the 
company. Their results indicate there is no significant change in the numbers or proportions 
of male or female directors from the IPO event; industrial companies hire more female 
directors and larger companies are likely to hire female directors. 
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Mclntyre, Murphy and Mitchell (2007) examine the relationship between board composition 
variables and firm performance. Their sample consists of 151 firm boards from the Canadian 
Toronto Stock Exchange 300 Composite Index in 2001.  Their dependent variables are 
Tobin’s Q, economic value added, and ROA. They investigate those variables individually 
through several independent and control variables, viz standard deviation of board member 
tenure, standard deviation of member age, board size, average tenure of the member on a 
board, the percentage of board members who are also members of another board, the 
percentage of board members who are also an officer of another board, number of employees, 
dummy of CEO duality, and the percentage of outside directors. They find that a high level of 
experience, appropriate board size, moderate director age, and moderate tenure are positively 
associated with firm performance.  
 
Staikouras, Staikouras and Agoraki (2007) examine the relationship between bank 
performance and board size/composition on short-term and three-years’ bank performance. 
They use a sample of 58 large European banks with 174 observations over the period 2002 to 
2004. They use ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q as the dependent variables, and investigate them 
with several dependent and control variables, viz board size, board composition, loan to total 
assets ratio, loan loss provisions to loans, equity to assets, ratio of operating expense to total 
assets, log of total assets, and bank specific variables for credit institution. They find that 
board size is significantly and negatively associated with bank performance, but board 
composition is insignificantly positively associated with bank performance. 
 
Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008) examine the relationship between the gender of directors 
and firm financial performance in Spain. Their sample consists of 68 companies and 408 
observations from 1995 to 2000. Their independent variables are Tobin’s Q, percentage of 
32 
 
female directors, Blau index of diversity, and Shannon index of diversity. They apply these 
variables to the OLS and 2SLS regressions individually, with several independent and control 
variables, viz Tobin’s Q, percentage of female directors, dummy for female directors, Blau 
index of diversity, Shannon index of diversity, board size, log of board size, leverage, ROA, 
and log of the book value of total assets. They find that percentage of female directors has a 
positive association with firm value.  
 
From present papers, female directors are positively associated with firm performance in 
Spain, US, New Zealand and Australia, but have no influence in Japan. Firm valuation is 
significantly associated with board structure in the US. Outside directors are positively 
associated with firm performance in Australia, New Zealand and Europe, but have no 
influence in Japan and Malaysia. Independent directors are negatively associated with the 
probability of financial distress in China. Firms with higher managerial membership on the 
board tend to pay lower cash dividends in China and Hong Kong. Board size is negatively 
associated with firm performance in Japan, Taiwan and Europe, but positively associated 
with firm performance in India, with no influence in Australia and Malaysia. Director age is 
negatively associated with firm performance in Japan. High levels of experience, appropriate 
board size, moderate director age, and moderate tenure are positively associated with firm 
performance in Canada. A board would benefit from professional numbers, such as people 
with backgrounds in finance, accounting and marketing in the US. Board compensation has 
no significant effect on firm performance in Hong Kong. Firms with a large percentage of 
outside directors are less likely to face financial distress in Taiwan. Potentially number of 
female directors, percentage of independent directors, number of directors, chairman age, and 
chairman experience may be important for the current study as they had been found to be 
significant in prior studies in developed and developing markets. 
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2.3.3 Prior Findings regarding Ownership Characteristics  
Ownership characteristics have also been widely tested by present researchers; most of them 
focus on managerial, institutional, and state ownership and their effect on firm performance. 
The markets, sample sizes, time periods, variables, and major findings are discussed in the 
later stage of this section.  
 
Chen (2001) examines the relationship between corporate performance and ownership 
structure in China. His sample consists of 434 manufacturing firms post-listed on SHSE and 
SZSE in 1997. He uses Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable to indicate governance 
performance, and applies it through OLS with several independent variables, viz percentage 
of one shareholder holding, percentage of ten shareholders’ holding, percentage of Bureau of 
State Property Management (BSPM), percentage of legal person share, percentage of 
domestic legal person share, percentage of top management share, tradable share, dummy of 
listed year, log of total book assets, average sale growth over past three years, standard 
deviation of sales over past three years, ROA, and total liability divided by total book assets. 
Chen’s results indicate there is a strong relationship between corporate performance and 
ownership concentrations, viz firm size, leverage ratio, variance of sales, growth of sales and 
firm age. He also indicates SOE share is negatively associated with corporate performance, 
but domestic institutional and managerial ownership improves firm performance. 
 
Dwivedi and Jain (2005) examine corporate governance and firm performance in India. Their 
sample consists of 340 large post-listed Indian firms for the period 1997 to 2001. They select 
Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable to indicate the firm performance, and investigate it 
through regression with several independent and control variables, viz board size, advertising 
intensity, research and development intensity, gross fixed assets, current year return on 
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capital employed (ROCE), previous year ROCE, D/E ratio, foreign shareholding, financial 
institution shareholding, directors’ shareholding, public shareholding, and trading activity. 
They find that foreign shareholding and board size are positively associated with firm value 
and shareholder wealth, and directors’ shareholding and public shareholding have a negative 
association with firm value and shareholder wealth.  
 
Li, Lam, Qian and Fang (2006) examine the effect of institutional ownership on corporate 
governance and firm performance in Hong Kong. Their sample consists of 433 publicly 
traded firms from Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEX) and those companies were post-listed 
from 1996 to 1998. Their dependent variables are short-term ROA, manager compensation 
over profit, and dummy of institutional ownership. They investigate those variables 
individually through OLS, with several independent and control variables, viz ownership 
concentration, percentage of institutional ownership, CEO duality, profit fluctuation, board 
compensation, firm size, firm age, and percentage of family ownership. They find 
institutional ownership has significant influence on board compensation, CEO duality, 
leadership diversity, and ownership concentration, but has no significant effect on 
institutional ownership or short term firm performance. They also indicate CEO duality and 
board compensation have no significant effect on firm performance. 
 
Chou, Wu and Chen (2007) examine the relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
performance in Taiwan from 1997 to 2002. Their sample consists of 256 firms with 1,530 
year-observations in the Taiwan Exchange and the data are collected from the Taiwan 
Economic Journal data bank. Their dependent variables are Tobin’s Q and managerial 
ownership of low, middle and high percentage managerial ownership firms. They use three-
stage-least regressions to investigate those variables with several independent and control 
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variables, viz Tobin’s Q, percentage of managerial ownership, annual advertising expenditure 
to sales, annual research and development expenditure to sales, debt to book value of total 
assets, log of book value of assets, standard deviation of a firm stock price, beta, dummy 
variable of affiliated enterprise, and firm age. They find that managerial ownership is 
positively associated with firm performance for middle percentage managerial ownership 
firms, but managerial ownership is negatively associated with firm performance for high 
percentage managerial ownership firms. Hu and Zhou (2008) also indicate firms with 
significant managerial ownership outperform firms whose managers do not own equity shares, 
but the link between firm performance and managerial ownership is non-linear. 
 
Hu and Zhou (2008) examine the effect of managerial ownership on non-listed Chinese firms’ 
performance. They use a sample of 1500 non-listed Chinese firms from five cities, viz 
Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou, Tianjin and Chengdu, and ten industries, viz apparel leather 
goods, consumer goods, electronic components, electronic equipment, vehicles and vehicle 
parts, accounting and related services, advertising and marketing, business logistics, 
communication services, and information technology services through the period 1998-2000. 
They use ROA and value added as the dependent variables, and apply  the regression with 
some independent variables, viz percentage of managerial ownership, managerial ownership 
dummy, log of assets, log of labour, firm age, debt to equity ratio, external auditor dummy, 
percentage of legal person shares, legal person shares/state shares, percentage of individual 
shares, and individual shares dummy. They find that firms with significant managerial 
ownership outperform firms whose managers do not own equity shares. But their results 
indicate the link between firm performance and managerial ownership is non-linear. 
Managerial ownership is negatively associated with firm performance when the ownership is 
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above 50%. They use this result as the basis for a hypothesis that the inflection point occurs 
at an ownership far above 50% for listed firms
3
. 
 
From present papers, there is a strong relationship between corporate performance and 
ownership concentrations. SOE share is negatively associated with corporate performance. 
Managerial ownership is positively associated with firm performance for middle percentage 
managerial ownership firms, but managerial ownership is negatively associated with firm 
performance for high percentage managerial ownership firms. The link between firm 
performance and managerial ownership is non-linear in China and Taiwan. Institutional 
ownership improves the firm’s performance in China, but there is no significant effect on 
firm performance in Hong Kong. In India, foreign shareholding has a positive association 
with firm value and shareholder wealth, and directors’ shareholding and public shareholding 
are negatively associated with firm value and shareholder wealth. Ownership concentration, 
state ownership, and ultimate owner are negatively associated with the probability of 
financial distress, but managerial ownership has no effect in China. Insider ownership has a 
negative effect on firms’ performance in New Zealand. Block ownership has a positive effect 
on firm performance in New Zealand. Firm valuation is significantly associated with 
percentage of institutional and blockholder ownership in US. Potentially blockholder 
ownership, largest shareholding, insider ownership, SOE ownership, and legal person 
ownership may be important for the current study as they were found to be significant in prior 
studies in developed and developing markets. 
 
                                                 
3
 The hypothesis establishes on the level of monitoring and regulation. 
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2.3.4 Prior Findings regarding Accounting Characteristics  
Audit characteristics are also important to explain firm performance. Ballesta and Garcia-
Meca (2005) examine the relationship between audit qualifications and corporate governance 
in Spanish firms.  Their sample consists of non-financial firms post-listed on the Madrid 
Stock Exchange over the period 1999-2002. Their dependent variable is the dummy of 
qualified audit opinion; they investigate it through OLS with several independent and control 
variables, viz ROA, leverage, log of total sales, board size, dummy of family board member, 
percentage of blockholder ownership, percentage of insider ownership, and current assets 
over current liabilities. They find that higher insider ownership provides better corporate 
governance and these firms are less likely to receive qualified audit reports. A high 
percentage of family board members increases the possibility of obtaining a qualified report. 
 
Lin and Liu (2009) examine the impact of corporate governance on auditor choice in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen A share markets. They chose the A-share firms listed from 2001 to 
2004, and then separated all auditors into two groups: the largest 10 auditors to proxy for 
high quality auditors and others as low quality auditors. Their hypotheses are that the firms 
with higher percentage of large block shareholding will result in a company being less likely 
to hire high quality auditors; the firms with fewer supervisory board members are less likely 
to hire high quality auditors; and the firms with duality of the positions of CEO and 
chairperson are less likely to hire high quality auditors. They chose 184 samples. They use 
dummy of quality auditors choice as dependent variable, and then apply independent 
variables, viz the percentage of largest owner’s shareholding to the total shares, number of 
supervisory board, CEO duality, log of total assets, asset turnover ratio, return on assets, 
current assets on total assets, total liabilities on total assets the absolute value of beta and the 
firm listing years to the regression. From the results, they indicate that firms with larger 
38 
 
controlling shareholders, smaller supervisory boards, and when the CEO and chairperson are 
the same person, are more likely to choose low quality auditors. Their results correspond with 
their three hypotheses. 
 
From present papers, firms with larger controlling shareholders, smaller sized supervisory 
boards and when the CEO and chairperson are the same person, the more likely they are to 
choose low quality auditors in developing markets. Higher insider ownership provides better 
corporate governance and less likelihood of receiving a qualified audit report; a high 
percentage of family board members increases the possibility of obtaining a qualified report. 
Auditors’ opinion is negatively associated with the probability of financial distress in China. 
Audit committees have a positive effect on firm performance in New Zealand. 
 
Accounting characteristics and other factors also affect firm performance. Morck, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1989) examine the alternative mechanisms for corporate control on companies’ 
performance. They select a sample of publicly traded 500 firms from 1980 in US. They also 
select three different measures of firm performance as the dependent variables, viz Tobin’s Q, 
stock market abnormal returns, and the employment growth rates. They apply those variables 
to the multiple regression with several independent variables, viz log of total market value, 
age of the CEO, equity stake of CEO, industry, industry abnormal return, industry 
employment growth and so on. Their results indicate that when a firm significantly 
underperforms in its industry, top management are more likely to turnover. The results also 
indicate that boards are not the main force behind removing unresponsive managers in poorly 
performing industries.  
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Firth (1997) examines the takeover process and measure returns of target firms, acquiring 
firms, and overall performance in New Zealand. His sample consists of 162 corporate 
takeovers during the period 1970 to 1987. The dependent variable is CAR of target firms, and 
the control variables are square root of percentage of insider ownership, dummy of contested 
by the target firm, and dummy of whether or not the takeover is successful. Their results 
indicate significant positive returns to target shareholders and negative abnormal returns to 
the acquirers, and acquiring firm directors’ shareholdings has a positive association with 
abnormal returns. 
 
Eldenburg and Krishnan (2003) compare the governance of municipal district hospitals and 
private non-profit hospitals with their operational performance. Their sample consists of 14 
district hospitals and 30 non-profit hospitals over 1981 to 1998 in California. Their dependent 
variables are operating margin and its change, expense and its change, number of days from 
admission to discharge and its change, CEO compensation, and net revenue per patient day. 
They apply those variables to the regression individually with several control variables, viz 
district hospital dummy, proportion of Medicare patients and Medi-Cal patients, staff beds, 
average number of days from admission to discharge, population, unemployment rate, per 
capita income, number of births, proportion of outpatients, and year dummy. Their results 
indicate CEO compensation in district hospitals is lower than in the profit hospitals, and has a 
positive relationship with operating margin. They suggest that the district board would 
benefit from professional numbers, such as people with backgrounds in finance, accounting 
and marketing.  
 
Sanders and Boivie (2003) examine the relationship between corporate governance 
characteristics and market valuation of new US internet firms. Their sample consists of 184 
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IPOs post-listed from 1993 to 1999. They use market capitalization as the dependent variable 
to indicate the market valuation, and then investigate the variable by longitudinal models with 
several independent variables, viz percentage of TMT, outsider, director, blockholder, 
venture capital and institutional ownership, TMT stock based pay, percentage of outside 
directors, dummy of listing years, venture capital equity sold, firm size, sales growth, net 
income, firm age, dummy of software and services, dummy content, and  dummy of internet 
service providers. They find firm valuation is significantly associated with TMT stock based 
pay, percentage of institutional and blockholder ownership, board structure, venture capital 
participation, and firm age. 
 
Bauer, Guenster and Otten (2004) examine the effect of corporate governance on stock 
returns, firm value and performance in Europe. Their sample consists of 249 firms in 2000 
and 269 firms in 2001 from FTSE Eurotop 300. They use Tobin’s Q and ROE as the 
dependent variables, and investigate them individually through OLS with several independent 
and control variables, viz log of firms’ governance rating, log of the book value of assets, log 
of firm age in years, current ROE, present year ROE, dummy of sector, dummy of country, 
and log of book to market ratio. They find a strong relationship between governance and firm 
value, and the excess returns to corporate governance should translate into a higher firm 
valuation for better governed firms in the long run. 
 
Ting (2006) investigates whether corporate governance adds firm value during poor 
economic conditions in Taiwan. The sample consists of 207 post-listed IPOs on the Taiwan 
Stock Exchange from 1992 to 2002. The dependent variables are EPS, ROA, ROE and 30, 90, 
180 days market returns, and he investigate those variables individually through OLS with 
several control variables, viz percentage of managerial shares, percentage of blockholder 
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shares, board size, number of block holding directors, long-term and short-term investment 
over total assets, dummy of big four auditors, dummy of CEO duality, economics, dummy of 
high technology industry, log of total assets, listed date, leverage, total export over total 
assets, and agency cost. He finds positive effects of corporate governance on firm 
performance, which indicates the importance of corporate governance during poor economic 
conditions. 
 
Shekhar and Stapledon (2007) examine governance structures of IPOs in Australia. They 
select 334 companies listed on the Australian Stock Exchange from 1996 to 2001, sub-
dividing the sample into 285 non-VC backed companies and 49 VC backed companies. They 
also separated the sample into four industry groups, viz metals, services, finance and 
insurance, consumer products. Their dependent variables are board size, percentage of non-
executive directors and number of outside blockholders. First they apply industries as dummy 
independent variables to the regressions, and find that service, finance and insurance and 
consumer product industries are statistically significant to explain the dependent variables, 
viz board size and percentage of non-executive directors. They then use VC, CEO ownership, 
log of total assets, firm profitable (dummy), PPE, firm age and industry (dummy), bonus 
grant and option grant as the independent variables to explain the dependent variables, viz 
board size, percentage of non-executive directors and outside blockholders. Their results 
indicate that board structures are influenced by the industry of the firm, and venture capital 
firms are more likely to have larger boards and a higher number of outside directors. CEOs in 
VC backed firms have higher CEO ownership, and CEO ownership is negatively related to 
board size and outside blockholders.  
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Gao and Kling (2008) choose many observations listed at Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges through 1998 to 2002. Their sample of 695 in 1998 increases to 1108 in 2002 
providing 4559 observations in total. They examine dependent variable tunnelling by some 
independent variables, viz single dummy (if one blockholder owns more than 50% shares), 
multi dummy (if two blockholders own more than 10% shares separately), board size, board 
meetings per year, percentage of outside directors, management ownership, audit dummy, big 
five audit dummy (if the audit firms are one of the big five), B or H-shares listing dummy, 
state controlled dummy, percentage of institution ownership, either blockholder is 
institutional, log of sales, leverage, eastern coastal region dummy, and firm operates in a 
protected industry dummy. The results indicate that four mechanisms of corporate 
governance could help to improve internal and external governance structures in China, 
including more high quality audits, increasing the stock ownership of senior managers, 
increasing the number of block shareholders, and decreasing the effect of SOEs. A company 
that belongs to a business group and issues B- or H-shares also leads to good performance. 
 
Li, Wang and Deng (2008) examine the influence of ownership structure, board structure, 
agency costs, and audit opinion on firm financial distress in China. Their sample compares 
404 firms in financial distress, one year and two years before their financial distress with 404 
healthy firms. All firms are post-listed from 1998 to 2005 in China. They use dummy of 
financial distress at prior one and two years as the dependent variables, and investigate them 
individually through logistic regression with several control variables, viz percentage of 
largest shareholder’s ownership, Herfindahl index of ownership concentration, ownership 
balancing degree, percentage of SOE, percentage of managerial ownership, ultimate owner, 
percentage of independent directors, administrative expense ratio, auditor’s opinion, financial 
leverage, current ratio, and sales margin. Their results indicate that ownership concentration, 
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state ownership, ultimate owner, independent directors and auditors’ opinion are negatively 
associated with the probability of financial distress. They also find that administrative 
expense ratio is positively associated with the probability of financial distress, but managerial 
ownership has no effect. 
 
Reddy, Locke, Scrimgeour, and Gunasekarage (2008) examine the effect of corporate 
governance on small-cap companies’ financial performance. With a sample of 355 companies 
in New Zealand from 2001-2005, they investigate governance changes using insider 
ownership, block ownership, board size, board independence, debt, dividend, and board 
committees to explain company performance measure by three different dependent variables, 
viz Tobin’s Q, operating income and return on assets. The number of female directors, firm 
size, risk, audit committee, remuneration committee, dividend/assets ratio, standard deviation 
of the return on assets, and industry are also named as control variables. They apply those 
variables to OLS and two stage least squares regression. Insider ownership and block 
ownership are determined as dependent variables in the first stage, and then the value 
determined in the first stage OLS regression are used to determine the performance, viz 
Tobin’s Q, operating income and return on assets. They find that insider ownership, firm size 
and the use of a remuneration committee have a negative effect on firm performance. Board 
independence, audit committee, block ownership, leverage, female directors and dividends 
have a positive effect on firm performance. 
 
Zhang (2008) compares the cash policy of Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong and on the 
Mainland. Choosing 123 firms from H-share and red chip firms listed in Hong Kong, she 
then selects 123 industries and size controlled A-share companies listed in Shanghai and 
Shenzhen as a matching sample from 1999 to 2003. She investigates dividend policy using 
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several different board factors, ROE, sales growth, firm size, cash balance, debt to asset, 
fixed effects, control for the need of capital, fixed payment pattern, and ownership 
concentration dummy to explain dividend policy measure by dependent variable dividend to 
earnings ratio, and then applies it to the second stage regression to explain the dependent 
variable of Tobin’s Q. Her results indicate firms that have higher managerial membership on 
the board tend to pay lower cash dividends in both Mainland- and Hong Kong-listed 
companies and insiders may take advantage from outside shareholders. Zhang also finds that 
the pricing mechanism of Hong Kong-listed Chinese firms appears to encourage managers to 
pay dividends, but the same mechanism is not found to exist in the Mainland A-Share listed 
firms. High dividend payment is a way for agency theory to control managers and solves the 
agency problem, and controlling shareholders in the mainland reduce the agency cost of free 
cash flows. 
 
Chang (2009) examines whether corporate governance characteristics correlate with financial 
distress in Taiwan. The sample consists of 104 financial distressed firms and pairs each one 
of them with a non-financial distressed firm, making a total of 208 firms from 2002 to 2007. 
The research selects a dummy of financial distress as the dependent variable, and investigates 
it through OLS with several control variables, viz number of outside directors, CEO duality, 
dummy of insiders who have 0% equity ownership, number of female directors, board size, 
number of directors on two or more boards, dummy of director with over nine years of tenure, 
number of employees, market capitalization, and percentage of outside directors. The results 
indicate that firms with a large percentage of outside directors are less likely to face financial 
distress, but large board size is more likely to be correlated with financial distress.  
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Chen and Dempere (2009) examine the relationship between key corporate governance 
characteristics and IPO bank acquisitions. Their sample consists of 128 post-listed bank 
holding companies between 1996 and 2004. They use a dummy of acquisition event as the 
dependent variable and apply it to the logit regression model with several control variables, 
viz CEO duality, insider reputation, dummy of equity based incentive plan for insiders, board 
size, percentage of outside directors, percentage of insider ownership, log of total assets, firm 
age, underwriter reputation, first day abnormal return, and a dummy for offering method. 
Their results indicate insider ownership, total assets, and tangible assets are significantly 
positively related to bank acquisition. They also find that the equity based compensation 
plans for insiders significantly reduce the likelihood of IPO banks being acquired. 
 
Firm performance can be explained by many factors, especially accounting factors. Firm 
valuation is significantly associated with venture capital participation and firm age in the US. 
Firm size and the use of a remuneration committee have a negative effect on firm 
performance in New Zealand. A strong relationship between governance and firm value and 
the excess returns to corporate governance should translate into a higher firm valuation for 
better governed firms in the long run in Europe. Four mechanisms of corporate governance 
could help to improve internal and external governance structures in China; they are more 
high quality audits, increasing the stock ownership of senior managers, increasing the number 
of block shareholders, and decreasing the effect of SOEs. Leverage and dividends have a 
positive effect on firm performance in New Zealand. Total assets and tangible assets are 
significantly positively related to bank acquisition.  
 
There are also several papers that focus on information transparency and VC effects. Sheu 
and Lin (2006) examine the relationship between information transparency and the role of 
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VC in Taiwan IT IPOs. The sample consists of IT IPOs post-listed in 2001, 2002 and 2003, 
and each study period is discussed separately. Their dependent variable is total scores of 
information disclosures. They investigate the variable by the OLS with several control 
variables, viz dummy of venture capital, percentage of shareholding of VC, number of VCs, 
dummy of VC acts as director or supervisor, company size, and ratio of long term debts to 
shareholders’ equity. Their results indicate dummy of VC, the percentage of shareholding of 
VC and number of VCs are significantly positively related with information transparency in 
2001, 2002, and 2003.  
 
According to Cheung, Jiang, Limpaphayom, and Lu (2008), one of the unique features of the 
Chinese stock market is that approximately two-thirds of China’s listed companies are 
controlled by SOEs.  The primary goal of these companies is to achieve policy goals rather 
than maximise shareholders' wealth; their goals may conflict with the interests of minority 
(outside) shareholders. Most of the IPOs were SOEs and if they are mostly controlled by 
other SOEs this raises interesting issues about governance, such as managerial hegemony 
versus shareholder wealth maximisation.  The researchers examine the quality of corporate 
governance practices of the 100 largest Chinese listed firms in 2004. Their sample is based on 
the total revenue of all Chinese firms listed around the world, including domestic and 
overseas markets. The data sources include annual reports, articles of association, 
memorandums of association, notices to call shareholder meetings, annual general meeting 
minutes, company websites and analyst reports. The results show that Chinese firms have 
been making progress in corporate governance reform. Another distinctive finding is that the 
overseas listed Chinese firms tend to show more regard for the role of stakeholder 
transparency than domestically-listed Chinese firms, viz A- and B-shares. 
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Recent studies have broadened in coverage to include many countries which are emerging 
market. Cheung, Jiang, Limpaphayom and Lu (2010) examine the progress of corporate 
governance practice of Chinese listed companies. Their sample includes 100 of the largest 
listed firms in China from 2004 to 2006. Their investigation reveals that Chinese companies 
are making progress in corporate governance reform. They also find a positive relationship 
between market valuation and governance practices. Yang, Chi and Young (2011) provides a 
review of Chinese corporate governance. They indicate that most of the governance 
mechanisms are less effective in China; even those mechanisms that are deemed to be 
effective in developed nations. They believe that the large percentage of SOE ownership, 
strong political connections between firms and government, and lack of independent judicial 
system causing such problem. 
 
Shan and McIver (2011) investigate the relationship between corporate governance 
instruments and firm financial performance in non-financial Chinese firms. Their panel 
dataset includes 120 A-Shares listing from 2001 to 2005. Their dependent variable is Tobin’s 
Q and explanatory variables are independent directors, professional supervisors, and 
ownerships. They indicate that board independence is positively significant on the 
performance of large companies while supervisory board does not have a significant impact 
on firm performance in China. 
 
The monitoring and interest assimilation of 613 Taiwanese listed firms from 2005 to 2010 in 
corporate governance, using panel data, are analysed by Yang, Lin and Yen (2012). They 
indicate that greater divergence between the number of board seats controlled and voting 
rights leads to a higher opportunity for better corporate performance. They also find that the 
interest of external shareholders may be taken over by large shareholders. 
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The more recent findings for China are not surprising given results from analyses in other 
countries. Pant and Pattanayak (2010) test the combination of market competition and 
corporate governance impact on firm performance in India. They select 1807 firms for the 
years 2000 to 2003. Major governance variables in their study relate to ownership. They find 
that insider ownership, domestic institutional, and foreign ownership have a positive impact 
on the firm productivity. They also indicate that debt intensity has a negative impact on firm 
productivity.  
 
Braga-Alves and Shastri (2011) examine the relationship between corporate governance, 
valuation, and operating performance in Brazil. The sample includes 236 non-financial firms 
listed from 2001 to 2005 on the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange. They find that higher scores of 
governance are related to greater market value, but not related to better operating 
performance in Brazil.  
 
Kawaguchi and Nishitani (2012) examine the relationship between corporate governance and 
the female full-time employees in Japan. The sample includes 2531 Tokyo Stock Exchange 
listed firms in 2005. They find that institutional ownership is positively related to female 
workplace, strong institutional investors are correlated with more female full-time employees 
and managers.  
 
Jiraporn, Kim and Kim (2011) investigate the relationship between dividend policy and 
corporate governance in the United States. Their data sample includes 16,013 observations 
from 2001 to 2004. They employ a two-stage least square model and find that corporate 
governance quality has a significant impact on the dividend policy decisions. 
 
49 
 
In this study, the main independent corporate governance characteristics will be CEO, board, 
and ownership variables; accounting performance and audit factors will also apply to the 
2SLS regressions as the control variables. Potentially audit committee, board committee, 
remuneration committee, and number of committees may be important for the current study 
as they were found to be significant in prior studies in developed and developing markets.  
2.4 IPO Performance and Corporate Governance 
The relationship between IPO performance and corporate governance has been widely tested 
in both developed and developing markets in recent years. This section summarizes those 
papers across different countries and markets. Most previous studies focused on large and 
developed economies, such as the United States, United Kingdom, other European nations, 
Australia and Japan. This study provides evidence from China, which is the world’s fastest 
growing economy and which has developing stock markets, and also included New Zealand, 
which is a small developed economy.  
 
2.4.1 IPO Performance & Corporate Governance Studies in Developed Markets 
There are many papers examining the relationship between IPO performance and corporate 
governance in developed stock markets, especially the US. Ritter (1991) examines the long-
term performance of IPOs in the US with a sample of 1,526 IPOs from 1975 to 1984. His 
dependent variable is three years BHAR and the research applies the dependent variable to 
the regression with several control variables, viz market adjusted initial return, log of firm 
age, three years value weighted total market return, annual volume of IPOs in the first year, 
dummy of oil industry, and dummy of banking industry. Ritter could not resolve the 
relationship between long-term underperformance and short-term underpricing, but he 
indicates that the offering price is not too low and the initial return is very high. He also 
indicates that investors are overoptimistic about young IPO firms’ earning potential. 
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Brau and Osteryoung (2001) examine the relationship between successful micro-IPOs and 
small corporate offering registration (SCOR) documents, which include corporate governance 
factors. Their sample consists of 73 SCORs from 1988 to 1998 from Washington State in the 
US. Their independent variable is the dummy of IPO success. They select several governance 
characteristics as the control variables, viz number of directors, largest block percentage, 
maximum percentage of insider holding, minimum percentage of insider holding, dummy of 
insider family relationship, and firm market capitalization. Their control variables also 
include number of employees, after tax earnings, tangible book value, total debt, 
remuneration, stock price and several marketing mechanisms and expenses factors. They use 
logistical regression to explain dummy of success by those control variables. Their results 
indicate that ownership and governance variables are the best determinants to explain the 
success of micro IPOs. 
 
Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) test the relationship between management quality, 
certification and various aspects of IPO and post-IPO performance.  Their sample consists of 
1,446 IPOs from the US between 1993 and 1996, and the sample is collected from the 
Platinum New Issue database. Their dependent variables include the log of offer size, the 
reputation of the underwriting syndicate, underwriting spread as a percentage of the offer 
price, other offering expenses as a percentage of the offer size, the first day return, and 
institutional holdings of shares offered at the end of the first quarter. They test those variables 
individually through regressions by some independent variables, viz size of the firm’s top 
management team, book value of the firm’s assets, log of the book value of assets, book 
value square, industry dummy, percentage of management team with MBA degree, 
percentage of professional staff with backgrounds in law or accounting, average tenure of the 
management team, log of firm age, number of non-profit boards, number of outside directors, 
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and so on. Their results indicate better and more reputable managers have larger IPO offer 
size; more reputable underwriters are associated with firms of higher management quality and 
reputation; underwriting expenses are negatively related to management quality; high 
management quality attracts more institutional investors; management quality and reputation 
are negatively related to IPO underpricing. They also indicate that management quality and 
reputation explain the long-term and operating performance of IPOs. 
 
Daily, Certo and Dalton (2005) examine the factors generally considered to impact IPO 
performance to assess the extent to which investment bankers may use the information to 
determine the offering price and spread. Their sample consists of 192 IPOs from 1996 and 
1997 in the United States. Their dependent variables are offer spread and offer price. Their 
independent variables include dummy variable of high technology industry, dummy variable 
of founder CEO, CEO retained equity, board composition, board size, board prestige, venture 
capital equity, firm size, firm age, and firm return. The assumption is that investment bankers 
will utilize publicly available information in setting the offer price range and the offer price 
for IPO securities. But their results indicate that there is no evidence that the independent 
variables are related to either IPO offer price spread or IPO offer price. 
 
Jain (2005) examines the relationship between post-listing IPO performance and the 
financing decision of founder versus non-founder CEOs. His sample consists of 258 post-
listing IPOs in 1997 in the US. He separates the samples into two groups, founder CEO firms 
and non-founder CEO firms. He chooses four dependent variables, viz post IPO capital 
expenditures, post IPO research and development investment, propensity to issue equity, and 
change in leverage. Their independent variables are CEO age, CEO functional experience, 
same CEO duality, CEO board influence, venture capital participation, post IPO equity 
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financing, firm size in millions of dollars, research and development intensity at IPO, capital 
expenditure intensity at IPO, debt over assets at IPO, asset intensity at IPO, and operating 
cash flow over assets at IPO. His results indicate that founder CEO firms have higher post 
IPO capital expenditures and lower research and development expenditure compared to non-
founder CEO firms. The results also indicate founder CEO firms become more leveraged post 
IPO and have a lower propensity to issue equity after IPO compared with non-founder CEO 
firms. 
 
Jain and Martin Jr (2005) examine whether audit quality affects post-IPO survival in the US. 
Their sample includes 800 IPO firms listed from 1980 to 1990, and their analysis extends to 
the end of 1996. Of those 800 firms, 653 chose top eight auditing firms and the rest of them 
chose non-prestigious auditors. Their analysis includes two stages. In the first stage, they 
conduct a parametric analysis to determine whether prestigious auditors significantly affect 
IPO survivals. In the second stage, they conduct a semi-parametric analysis. They also 
separate the sample into two groups, survivors and non-survivors. Their independent 
variables include gross proceeds, investment bank prestige, issued age, initial returns, 
percentage of ownership retention, analyst following, venture capital participation, pre IPO 
operating cash flow over assets, pre IPO operating return on assets, pre IPO return on sales, 
pre IPO cash flows over sales, and pre IPO sales growth. Their results indicate that 
investment in a high quality audit leads to a significantly lower post IPO failure rate, and the 
association between audit quality and post-IPO survival is stronger when investment bank 
prestige is low. 
 
Dempere (2007) examines the impact of corporate governance on bank IPOs. The sample 
consists of 128 bank holding IPOs during 1997 to 1999. His dependent variables are first day 
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abnormal return and six months average BHAR. He then investigates them individually to the 
OLS with several control variables, viz dummy of CEO duality, independent audit, 
independent nominating, independent compensation committees, dummy of insider insurance, 
board size, percentage of outside directors, percentage of insider ownership, number of 
outside directors, percentage of insider knowledge and experience in banking industry 
(excluding CEO), bank age, dummy of underwriter, and dummy of best efforts method. Their 
results indicate that compensation committee, percentage of outside directors, insider 
compensation plan, bank age, and bank size have a positive relationship with short-term IPO 
performance. They find that nominating committee independence and directors’ knowledge 
and experience have a positive relationship with long-term IPO performance, and percentage 
of outside board, CEO duality, percentage of insider ownership and underwriter reputation 
have a negative relationship with long-term IPO performance. 
 
Kroll, Walters and Le (2007) examine the impact of board composition and TMT ownership 
on long-term IPO performance in young entrepreneurial firms in the US. Their sample 
includes 524 IPOs over 1996 and 1997. Their dependent variable is 24 month holding period 
return (HPR). Their control variables are underwriter prestige, TMT human capital, venture 
capitalist board members and their ownership, prior performance, TMT size, industry 
adjusted market-to-book ratio, firm size, year of IPO listing, industry average holding period 
returns, original TMT board members and their ownership, support specialist board members, 
advice and counsel business expert board members, and monitoring business expert board 
members. They find that TMT board ownership and TMT common stock holdings are 
positively associated with long-term IPO performance. They suggest the board of a young 
firm that has recently gone public is best comprised of a majority of original TMT members 
rather than independent outsiders. 
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Nikbakht, Shahrokhi and Martin Jr (2007) examine the relationship between executive 
compensation and IPO pricing in US. Their sample consists of 51 stocks from NYSE and 45 
from NASDAQ. Their dependent variable is percentage of underpricing, which they 
investigate through logistic and multiple regressions with four control variables, viz 
percentage of CEO ownership, CEO salary, CEO bonus, and number of CEO options. They 
find that CEO salary and CEO ownership are positively related with IPO pricing in a three 
month time period.  
 
Hartzell, Kallberg and Liu (2008) select a sample of 200 Real Estate Investment Trusts 
(REITs) for the period 1991 to 1998. They examine the relationship between returns of IPOs 
and corporate governance. They find that REITs with stronger corporate governance 
structures have higher initial IPO valuations and also outperform their peers in the long-term. 
 
Kor, Mahoney and Watson (2008) examine how differences in demand, competition and 
technological uncertainty in the industry influence the level of monitoring of IPO firms by 
boards of outsiders and institutional investors. They selected 84 US IPO firms from 24 
industries for 1995. They use the percentage of institutional ownership in the IPO firm and 
the outsiders on the IPO firm board as the dependent variables and then apply the variables to 
the regressions with other control variables, viz demand uncertainty, competitive uncertainty, 
technological uncertainty, ratio of board outsiders, percentage of institutional ownership, 
percentage of management bonus, percentage of management ownership, firm size, 
management age, firm age, number of risk factors, profitability, and market capitalization. 
Their results indicate that industry effects on IPO firms’ board monitoring and institutional 
investor ownership are strongest in industries characterised by demand and competitive 
uncertainty.  
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The relationship of venture capital and IPO with corporate governance has also been 
examined by researchers in the US. Bouresli, Davidson III and Abdulsalam (2002) examine 
the relationship between venture capital and IPO corporate governance. Their sample consists 
of four years data of 293 IPOs from the NASDAQ and NYSE from 1995 to 1998, of VC 
backed and non-VC backed IPOs. They compare the percentage of outsider blockholder 
ownership, VC ownership, CEO ownership, and directors and officers’ ownership of the VC 
backed and non-VC backed IPO ownership. They also compare the percentage of insiders, 
outsiders, affiliated, venture capitalist board members and board size. They find that insiders 
control fewer board seats when there is VC backing before and after IPOs. They also find 
CEOs of venture capital backed firms own a low percentage of stocks and VC financing is 
associated with a more independent governance structure. 
 
Engel, Gordon and Hayes (2002) examine the relationship between firms’ corporate 
governance decisions and managerial performance. Their sample consists of 464 IPOs post-
listing on the NASDAQ from 1996 to 1999, which included 173 internet IPOs, 91 
manufacturing IPOs, and 157 technology IPOs. Their dependent variables are log of CEO 
compensation, log of total compensation, log of total cash compensation, log of total stock 
compensation, and CEO turnover. They apply those variables individually to the logistic 
regressions with several control variables, viz dummy of technology or manufacturing 
industry, accounting performance, stock returns, log of market value, CEO tenure, dummy of 
CEO founder, CEO age, firm age, dummy for a new CEO in the IPO year, dummy of zero 
cash policy, percentage of CEO ownership, standard deviation of monthly stock returns, fixed 
assets over total assets, research and development expenses over total assets, and book-to-
market ratio. Their results indicate accounting based measures are positively related to pay 
for non-internet industries, and stock returns are positively related to pay for internet 
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industries. They also find that compensation grants of low venture capital IPOs are more 
significantly associated with accounting and stock performance than high VC IPOs. 
 
Carpenter, Pollock and Leary (2003) examine the relationship between governance 
mechanisms and firm internationalization of high technology IPO firms. Their sample 
consists of 73 firms post-listed from 1990 to 1999 in the US. Their dependent variables are 
internationalization prior and after IPOs, which are calculated by foreign sales over total sales. 
They apply the variables to the OLS with several independent variables, viz global strategic 
intent, firm age, number of employees, net income, percentage of outsiders’ holding, board 
size, top management size, dummy of VC backing, percentage of TMT holdings prior to IPO, 
VC international experience, TMT international experience, and board international 
experience. They find that high technology IPO firms are less likely to have extensive global 
sales when they are VC backed. But VCs are indeed risk seeking when VC backing is 
complemented by the international experience of TMT and board. 
 
Campbell and Frye (2009) examine the relationship between monitoring and VC and 
governance. Their sample includes 437 IPOs from 1993 and 444 IPOs from 1996, the 
governance data are two years and four years after offering. They delete the data of delisted 
IPOs after two or four years. Their dependent variables are monitoring indices of VC backed 
and non-VC backed firms, which are measured by the percentage of monitoring directors. 
Their control variables include dummy of VC backed, dummy of founder, size, risk, tangible 
assets, growth opportunities, firm age, industry adjusted Q, corporate control activity, and 
leverage. Their results indicate that in a very short time,  high quality VC backed firms have 
higher levels of monitoring at the time of IPO over those low quality VC backed firms, and 
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while VC backed firms decrease monitoring after the IPO, non-VC backed firms increase 
monitoring after the IPO. 
 
There are also several papers based on other markets, viz European countries, Australia and 
Canada. Balatbat, Taylor and Walter (2004) examine the relationship between the operating 
performance of Australian IPOs and corporate governance. Their sample consists of 313 
IPOs from 1976 to 1993 for a five year post-listing period. Their data is annual. They use 
profit before interest and tax, divided by total asset of IPO firm, less the profit before interest 
and tax, divided by total asset of control firm (AOR) as the dependent variable and apply it to 
the regression with several control variables, viz share ownership, percentage of outside 
directors, CEO duality, percentage of institutional ownership, dummy of blockholders 
existence, number of years of operating, percentage of retained ownership, total liabilities 
over total assets, and percentage of tangible assets to total assets. And then they use share 
ownership and AOR as the dependent variable of regression of a two stage regression. Their 
results indicate that IPO performance is significantly positively associated with insider 
ownership in years four and five, but not in the first three years. They find a positive 
relationship between institutional ownership and IPO performance in five years’ time, and 
also a positive relationship between CEO duality and IPO performance. But they find board 
composition has no impact on IPO performance, which is not same as other researchers’ 
findings.  
 
Audretsch and Lehmann (2005) examine the effects of experience, ownership and knowledge 
on IPO survival in Germany. Their sample consists of 341 post-listed IPOs on the Neuer 
Markt from 1997 to 2002, which includes 74 delisted IPOs. Their dependent variable is 
hazard rate, and control variables are firm age, number of employees before and after IPO, 
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growth rate, percentage of executive ownership, percentage of board ownership, percentage 
of friend and family ownership, percentage of venture capitalist ownership, percentage of 
human capital ownership, firm patents, CEO patents, executives’ education, and human 
capital executives. They indicate executive ownership has no influence on firm survival when 
introducing measurements of human capital and intellectual property rights.  
 
Roosenboom and van der Goot (2005) examine whether ownership and control variables 
influence market valuation at the time of IPO in Holland from 1984 to 2001. Their sample 
includes 118 IPOs on Euronext Amsterdam. They use first day market-to-book ratio of equity 
as the dependent variable, and apply the dependent variable to the regression with several 
independent variables, viz price to book ratio, price to sales, IPO proceeds, percentage of 
managerial ownership, percentage of managerial ownership square, dummy of share 
certificates, dummy of priority shares, dummy of preference shares, dummy of voting caps, 
percentage of independent directors, dummy of large shareholder monitoring, total assets, 
percentage of sales growth, return on sales, percentage of stock market conditions, dummy of 
technology industry, dummy of manufacturing industry. Their results indicate sales growth, 
return on sales before IPO, managerial ownership, percentage of independent directors, and 
large outside monitoring are positively related to IPO firm value, and they also may reduce 
agency costs. If agency costs are increased, they will reduce the price of IPOs that outside 
investors are willing to pay. 
 
Roosenboom and van der Goot (2006) also examine samples of IPO firms in Holland from 
1985 to 2000; they find that the returns to ownership decrease after the IPO. Their dependent 
variable is option grants and their independent variables are market to book ratio, profit 
growth, cumulative stock return, retained ownership, VC monitoring, independent board 
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monitoring, number of takeover defences, cash per employee, pay-out ratio, sales per 
employee, after year-1992 dummy, volatility, IT industry dummy, and log of number of 
employees. Their initial sample includes 126 companies; but some IPOs were without options 
and some data are missing so there are 54 remaining IPOs examined. Their results indicate 
there is a robust relationship between option grants and market and accounting returns. Their 
results also indicate that employees are more willing to be compensated by options when the 
company has outperformed its historical performance. The granting of options is more 
common when employees are of greatest benefit to the firm, such as when the labour market 
is tight.  
 
Chahine (2007) examines a sample of 163 of a total of 355 French firms’ IPOs from 1996 to 
2000. He finds that block ownership is negatively associated with firm performance in the 
first year. Family ownership level has a non-linear relationship with first year BHAR. It is 
positively associated with returns when the percentage of family ownership is small, but it is 
negatively associated with returns when the percentage of family ownership is large. Chahine 
and Filatotchev (2008) examine the effect of information disclosure and corporate 
governance on IPO performance in France. Their sample consists of 140 French IPOs during 
the period 1996 to 2000. They use log of adjusted price-to-book ratio, log of adjusted price-
to-sales ratio, first day abnormal return, and the closing price at one year, two year and three 
year periods as the dependent variables. They then investigate those variables into OLS 
individually with several control variables, viz information index, board independence, 
dummy of comparable firm, log of age, log of sales revenue, dummy of high technology 
industry, percentage of manager ownership, dummy of market, underwriter reputation, and 
percentage of VC ownership. They find that board independence has a positive effect on the 
IPO offer price and also reduces the underpricing and agency cost. They also indicate 
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information disclosure leads to a U-shape relationship with IPO discount; and information 
disclosure may damage the firm’s competitive advantage.  
 
Goergen and Renneboog (2007) examine the relationship between ownership and long-term 
IPO performance in UK and Germany. They select 62 samples of UK IPOs and match by size 
and industry with German IPOs from 1981 to 1988, and extend six years’ IPO performance 
until 1994. Their dependent variables are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 years IPO operating performance, 
and their control variables are operating performance of present year, initial shareholders’ 
vote right, the type of largest shareholder in present year, dummy of countries listed,  and 
family, domestic, foreign, bank and investor ownership. Their results indicate that post-IPO 
evolution of control in German and UK IPOs differs significantly, but with no significant 
change in the long-term operating performance, and they also find long-term IPO 
performance cannot be explained by agency conflict. 
 
Bedard, Coulombe and Courteau (2008) examine the relationship between audit committees 
and IPO in Quebec, Canada. Their sample consists of 246 firms that had post-listed on the 
Toronto Stock Exchange during the period 1982 to 2002. Their dependent variables are 
underpricing of IPO and the percentage of forecast error. They then investigate those 
variables through the regression individually with several control variables, viz dummy of 
audit committee existence, dummy of whether audit committee is independent and competent, 
board size, CEO duality, percentage of pre-IPO stock return, underwriter reputation, dummy 
of major international audit firm remaining, firm age, financial leverage, the number of risk 
factors listed in the prospectus, IPO price, dummy of IPO unit offering, pre IPO total assets, 
tax deduction, dummy of year listing, dummy of the prospectus including an earnings 
forecast, average revenue growth in three years, dummy of audited forecast, time of forecast, 
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and number of assumptions on the earning forecast. Their results indicate that independent 
and experienced audit committees significantly decrease the level of underpricing of the IPO, 
with no significant effects of audit committee presence or characteristics on management 
forecast precision. They also indicate that an independent and competent audit committee is a 
cost effective way to reduce the underwriting cost, rather than hiring a big four audit firm. 
This is different from the results in China.  
 
Krishnan, Ivanov, Masulis, and Singh (2011) examine the relationship between VC firm’s 
reputation and the long-term performance of IPOs in United States. VC reputation is 
measured by past market share of VC-backed IPOs, and the sample includes IPOs listed from 
1993 to 2004. They observe that the VC reputation has a positive relationship with long-term 
IPO performance. 
 
Yu (2011) examines the relationship between corporate governance and stock price 
informativeness in 22 developed countries. Yu selects 5744 observations from 2002 to 2005. 
He employs regression and robustness tests and determines that a firm’s corporate 
governance rating is positively related to the stock price informativeness. The rating of audit 
practices is positively related to the stock return-earnings.  
 
Switzer and Bourdon (2011) examine the relationship between management quality and IPO 
operating performance in Canada.  The sample covers 95 non-foreign IPOs listed from 1996 
to 2006. They indicate that the operating performance is positively related to the management 
team’s tenure, size, and the inclusion of chartered accountants. They also indicate that MBAs 
are negatively related to the operating performance.  
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2.4.2 Summary of IPO Performance & Corporate Governance Studies in Developed 
Markets 
Corporate governance highly affects IPO performance in developed markets. According to 
Ritter (1991), the initial return of an IPO is very high, which means investors are over 
optimistic about young IPO firms’ earning potential in the US. Hartzell, Kallberg and Liu 
(2008) also indicate REITs with stronger corporate governance structures have higher initial 
IPO valuations and also outperform their peers in the long term in the US. 
 
CEO characteristics play an important role in explaining IPO performance. According to 
Engel, Gordon and Hayes (2002) and Nikbakht, Shahrokhi and Martin Jr (2007), TMT pay is 
positively related to stock returns, accounting based measures, and short-term IPO 
performance in the US. Dempere (2007) indicates that CEO duality has a negative 
relationship with long-term IPO performance in the US. But Balatbat, Taylor and Walter 
(2004) indicate that CEO duality is positively associated with long-term IPO performance in 
Australia. Audretsch and Lehmann (2005) indicate managerial ownership has no influence on 
firm survival when introducing measurements of human capital and intellectual property 
rights in Germany.  
 
Board characteristics also play an important role in explaining IPO performance. According 
to Roosenboom and van der Goot (2005), outside directors are positively related to IPO firm 
value in Holland. Dempere (2007) also indicates that outside directors have a positive 
relationship with short-term IPO performance, but a negative relationship with long-term IPO 
performance in the US. Directors’ knowledge and experience has a positive relationship with 
long-term IPO performance. However, Daily, Certo and Dalton (2005) provide some 
different results; they indicate that board composition, board size, and board prestige have no 
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effect on IPO offer price in high technology industry in the US. Balatbat, Taylor and Walter 
(2004) also indicate board composition has no impact on IPO performance in Australia. 
Board independence has a positive effect on the IPO offer price.  
 
Ownership characteristics also play an important role in explaining IPO performance. 
According to Brau and Osteryoung (2001), ownership and governance variables are the best 
determinants to explain the success of micro IPOs in the US. According to Kroll, Walters and 
Le (2007) and Nikbakht, Shahrokhi and Martin Jr (2007), managerial ownership is positively 
associated with long- and short-term IPO performance in the US. Balatbat, Taylor and Walter 
(2004) support their result, finding that insider ownership and institutional ownership are 
positively associated with long-term IPO performance in Australia. Roosenboom and van der 
Goot (2005) also indicate that managerial ownership is positively related to IPO firm value in 
Holland. But Dempere (2007) indicates insider ownership has a negative relationship with 
long-term IPO performance. Chahine (2007) finds that block ownership is negatively 
associated with firm performance in the short term, and family ownership level has a non-
linear relationship with first year short-term IPO performance in France. These findings 
conflict with results in developing markets. However, rules and regulations are different. For 
example, Asian countries have concentrated ownership whereas most Western countries have 
dispersed ownership.  
 
Audit characteristics have also been used to explain IPO performance. According to Jain and 
Martin Jr (2005), investment in a high quality audit leads to a significantly lower post-IPO 
failure rate, and the association between audit quality and post-IPO survival is stronger when 
investment bank prestige is low in the US. Bedard, Coulombe and Courteau (2008) indicate 
that an independent and experienced audit committee significantly decreases the level of 
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underpricing of the IPO, and find no significant effect of audit committee presence or 
characteristics on management forecast precision in Canada.  
 
Some accounting variables and the participation of VC have been used to test IPO 
performance. According to Dempere (2007), firm age and firm size have a positive 
relationship with short-term IPO performance. Nominating committee independence has a 
positive relationship with long-term IPO performance, and underwriter reputation has a 
negative relationship with long-term IPO performance in the US bank industry. But Daily, 
Certo and Dalton (2005) indicate VC equity, firm size, firm age, and firm return are related to 
either IPO offer price spread or IPO offer price in high technology industry in the US. 
Roosenboom and van der Goot (2005) indicate sales growth and return on sales before IPO 
are positively related to IPO firm value in Holland. Bouresli, Davidson III and Abdulsalam 
(2002) indicate insiders control fewer board seats when there is VC backing before and after 
IPOs. They also find that CEOs of VC backed firms own low percentage of stocks, and VC 
financing is associated with a more independent governance structure in the US. Engel, 
Gordon and Hayes (2002) find that compensation grants of low VC IPOs are significantly 
associated with accounting and stock performance than high VC IPOs in the US. 
 
2.4.3 IPO Performance & Corporate Governance Studies in Developing Markets 
There are also several papers that examine the relationship between IPO performance and 
corporate governance in developing stock markets, especially China and Taiwan. Chen and 
Kao (2005) test the conflict between agency theory and corporate control on managerial 
ownership in the Taiwan Stock Market. They collected 133 IPOs listed on the Taiwan Stock 
Exchange between 1992 and 1999. Firstly they have two dependent variables, viz IPO 
performance with initial return and without initial return. They apply those variables to the 
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regressions with several independent variables, viz level change of ownership of board of 
directors, percentage change of ownership of board of directors, level change of institutional 
ownership, percentage change of institutional ownership, industry change of ownership, 
auditor reputation, underwriter prestige, size risk premium, book to market risk premium, 
factor mimicking portfolio, and return on assets. And then they use the above control 
variables with two other variables; firm age and initial return, to test dependent variable stock 
performance. Their results indicate that increasing managerial ownership decreases stock 
performance, and that the corporate control effect dominates the agency effect or signalling 
effect of managerial ownership. 
 
Yang and Sheu (2006) examine the relationship between managerial ownership and IPO 
survivability. They select 522 survivors and 38 delisted post-listed IPOs from the Taiwan 
Stock Exchange Corporation and the Over–The-Counter (OTC) Securities Exchange from 
1992 to 2000, and each IPO is tracked until 2003. Their dependent variable is number of 
months an IPO traded; they investigate the variable by OLS with several control variables, 
viz dummy of censor, percentage of insider ownership, top offer to insider holding ratio, ratio 
of director to insider holding ratio, blockholder to insider holding ratio, firm age, first day 
initial return, size of IPO, IPO activity in given quarter, market level, and industry dummy. 
Their results indicate the likelihood of IPO survival first decreases and then increases with 
the percentage of insider ownership at the offering time, forming a U-shaped relationship. 
They also suggest increased insider ownership, especially top officers, will help to reduce 
agency cost and improve the IPO survivability. 
 
Chahine and Tohme (2009) test the existence and behaviour of IPO performance in the 
context of emerging markets of 12 Arab countries in the Middle East and North Africa. They 
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select 127 IPOs from those countries over the period 2000-2007. They select several firms, 
offering, underwriter, and market characteristics to be the control variables, viz CEO 
ownership, log of total asset, log of firm age, privatization dummy, Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) dummy, hi-tech dummy, participation ratio, dilution factor, over subscription rate, 
listing lag, underwriter reputation, market return, bubble dummy, dual structure dummy, 
strategic ownership, foreign strategic dummy, and domestic strategic dummy. They use OLS 
to examine the effect of those corporate governance control variables on the dependent 
variables log of IPO underpricing. Their results indicate that IPO underpricing is lower with 
increases to both CEO duality and strategic shareholder ownership. 
 
There are a number of papers, mostly written by domestic researchers, examining the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance for companies listed on the 
Chinese stock market. Gu (2003) selects a sample of 68 companies of IPOs in 1994, which 
were traded on the SHSE, and then applies percentage of SOEs and issue year revenue to the 
regression to explain the dependent variables, viz short- and long-term performance. Gu 
indicates that Chinese IPOs of 1994 demonstrate extremely high short-term returns, which 
are caused by the lack of alternative investment opportunities, the bandwagon effect, and the 
agency problem. And the returns decrease over time and long-term performance is poor. The 
results also indicate SOE is significantly negatively connected to the first day return and firm 
size is positively connected to the first day return. The IPOs in China are systematically 
underpriced. 
 
Wang (2005) examines the changes in operating performance of Chinese listed companies 
with IPOs between 1994 and 1999. Their sample includes a total of 747 firms; 369 of them 
from SHSE and 378 of them from SZSE. He uses return on assets, percentage of SOE, 
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percentage of legal person shares, percentage of individual shares, percentage of 
concentration of ownership (top 10 largest shareholdings), percentage of non-SOE 
concentration, size, and leverage, to explain operating performance measure by three 
different dependent variables, viz return on assets, operating income to assets, and sales to 
assets. He chooses percentage of the state, legal and individual shares as the dependent 
variables separately, trying to explain those variables by some of the control variables. He 
separately tests the explanatory of power of control variables by choosing percentage of 
concentration of ownership and non-state ownership concentration as the dependent variables. 
He finds a decline in operating performance of Chinese IPOs. His results indicate neither 
state ownership nor concentration of ownership are associated with performance changes, but 
there is a curvilinear relationship between legal person shareholding and operating 
performance and between concentration of non-state ownership and operating performance. 
Wang suggests the reason maybe Chinese stock markets are emerging markets and the 
external governances are weak, so the managers can focus on their own interest and the 
controlling shareholders have the opportunity to take the benefits from the non-controlling 
shareholders. 
 
Fan, Wong and Zhang (2007) select 790 new listed A-Share IPO companies (73% of IPO 
firms in China) on the SHSE and SZSE from 1993 to 2001. They use long and short-term 
CAR, change in return on sales, growth in sales, and growth in earnings as the dependent 
variables of post-IPO performance, and then measure those variables by the regression with 
other independent variables, viz whether CEO is politically connected, percentage of largest 
shareholder’s ownership, market-to-book ratio, leverage, log of total assets, and regulated 
industry. Their CEO and board characteristics also include CEO age, gender, education, 
professional background, employment history; board size, number of manager directors, 
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politically connected directors, professional directors, directors with law, accounting or 
finance backgrounds, directors with unaffiliated business experience, directors with an 
academic background, female directors, and director age.  Their results indicate a CEO’s 
political ties are negatively associated with post-IPO returns, earning growth, sales growth 
and change in returns on sales, because politically connected CEOs are more likely to have 
boards populated by current or former government bureaucrats rather than professionals. 
 
Li and Naughton (2007) examine the relationship between board characteristics and 
aftermarket performance of IPOs in the Chinese market. They use 314 samples of listed 
companies from 1999 to 2001 to test the long- and short-term performance of those 
companies. Their hypotheses are that board independency is negatively related to IPO 
underpricing and positively related to IPO long-term performance; the separation of CEO and 
chairperson is negatively related to IPO underpricing and positively related to IPO long-term 
performance; the level of board size is negatively related to IPO underpricing and positively 
related to IPO long-term performance. They use short and long-term performance as the 
dependent variables in separate ordinary linear regressions, and examine the dependent 
variables by some independent variables, viz board composition, leadership structure dummy, 
board size, year of issue dummy, firm size, ballot rate ratio, offer size, legal person ownership, 
tradable A-shares ownership, and industry dummy. They find that board size is positively 
associated with under-pricing in the short term, and the degree of CEO duality is positively 
associated with aftermarket performance in the longer term. Their results indicate that board 
characteristic variables do have some explanatory power on IPO aftermarket performance so 
there is an increasing level of maturity in the Chinese market. 
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Chi, Wang and Young (2010) test the three years’ outperformance of Chinese IPOs. Chi et al. 
select 897 A-Share IPOs from 1996 to 2002 on the SHSE and SZSE. Cross-sectional study 
finds that reducing of SOE ownership reduces the IPOs attractiveness in the long run. Cheung, 
Stouraitis and Tan (2010) examine the relationship between the quality of corporate 
governance and firm valuation/risk in Hong Kong, using 168, 168, and 174 companies 
respectively in 2002, 2004, and 2005. They indicate that family firms and firms with 
concentrated ownership structures are associated with bad governance and note that the 
quality of corporate governance is very important in terms of explaining future stock return 
and risk. 
 
2.4.4 Summary of IPO Performance & Corporate Governance Studies in Developing 
Markets 
Corporate governance highly affects IPO performance in developing markets. CEO 
characteristics play an important role in explaining IPO performance. According to Fan, 
Wang and Zhang (2007), CEOs’ political ties are negatively associated with post IPO returns 
and other accounting characteristics, because politically connected CEOs are more likely to 
have boards populated by current or former government bureaucrats rather than professionals 
in China. Li and Naughton (2007) find that CEO duality is positively associated with long-
term IPO performance in China. Chahine and Tohme (2009) indicate CEO duality is 
negatively related with short-term IPO underpricing in Arabian countries.  
 
Board characteristics also play an important role in explaining IPO performance. Li and 
Naughton (2007) find that board size is positively associated with under-pricing in the short 
term. Their results indicate board characteristics variables do have some explanatory power 
on IPO aftermarket performance in the Chinese market.  
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Ownership characteristics also play an important role in explaining IPO performance. Gu 
(2003) indicates that state ownership is significantly negatively connected to short-term IPO 
performance in China. Chen and Kao (2005) indicate the increase of managerial ownership 
decreases the stock performance in Taiwan. Chen and Kao (2005) suggest increased insider 
ownership, especially top officers, will help to reduce agency cost and improve the IPO 
survivability in Taiwan. Wang (2005) indicates that neither SOE nor concentration of 
ownership are associated with performance changes, but there is a curvilinear relationship 
between legal person shareholding and operating performance, and between concentration of 
non-state ownership and operating performance in China. Yang and Sheu (2006) indicate that 
insider ownership first decreases and then increases the likelihood of IPO survival at the 
offering time, forming a U-shaped relationship in Taiwan. Chahine and Tohme (2009) 
indicate insider ownership is negatively related with IPO underpricing in Arabian countries.  
 
Gu (2003) indicates that firm size is positively connected to short-term IPO performance in 
China. The IPOs in China are systematically underpriced; the return on Chinese IPO 
decreases over time and long-term performance is poor. Wang (2005) also finds a decline in 
operating performance of Chinese IPOs. Most previous literature tests the impaction of 
corporate governance on IPO and firm performance in one market, but this study offers a 
comparison between two Chinese stock markets, and even comparison between two countries. 
2.5 Theories of Corporate Governance  
Several theories of corporate governance have been promoted in the literature.  In this section 
seven theories are briefly described and then reconciled with the empirical research discussed 
above.  The list is not intended to be exhaustive but sufficient to form a bridge between the 
empirical research undertaken in this thesis and the more conceptual frameworks concerning 
corporate governance. 
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2.5.1 Agency Theory 
Agency theory was original introduced by Jensen & Meckling (1976). Agency theory is one 
of the most important theories in corporate governance. Extant literature uses the agency 
theory viewpoint to investigate the relationship between provider of resources (shareholder or 
principal) and allocator of those resources (agent) in a company. According to the agency 
theory, the owner of the resource is the principal, and the person responsible for the use and 
control of the resources is the agent. In an owner-controlled company, the owner-manager 
owns all profits of the company. Under this situation, the agency problem does not exist. 
Agency costs arise when there is a separation of the principal and agent roles, and the agent 
will maximise his/her own benefit at the expense of the principal (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
According to Smith (1776), managers cannot be “expected” to manage other people’s money 
like their own money. Jensen & Meckling (1976), argue that agency costs increase the 
monitoring expenditure by the principal, the bonding expenditure by the agent, and the 
residual loss.  
 
This study investigates the performance of IPO firms from China and New Zealand. When 
management issues stocks publicly and absorbs the new resource from outside, it increases 
the probability of managers increasing on-the-job consumption, relaxing, and reducing work 
strength. Obviously, the behaviour of management will be significantly different with the 
change of the stock ownership. The debt issuance will also cause an agency problem. 
 
According to Zahra & Filatotchev (2004), information asymmetry arises when a party has 
information but the counterparty does not. If the agent has more information than the 
principal, the information asymmetry may affect the efficiency of the monitoring and hurt the 
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benefits of the principal. The agent will search all possible opportunities to increase their own 
wealth.  
 
In order to reduce the risk of agency problem and maximize their own interests, the principal 
will pay the supervision costs, such as external audit costs. On the other hand, compliance 
costs are necessary. The agent needs to set up the internal audit and allow the principal to 
fully understand the behaviour of the manager; such action can help the manager to 
consolidate their position and also maintain their salaries and benefits. According to Adams 
and Crocker (1991), the agent costs are reflected in the salaries of managers. Under self-
serving consideration, the agent needs to set up the internal supervisions, like internal audit, 
to let the principal understand the effort level of managers, and reduce the risk of 
management compensation adjustment. According to Weisbach (1988), the independence of 
board is the key to efficient monitoring. 
 
2.5.2 Stewardship Theory  
Stewardship theory was investigated by Donaldson (1990) and Barney (1990). Stewardship 
theory reveals a relationship exists between the agent and principal from the opposite 
perspective of agency theory and provides a new way to solve corporate governance 
problems. According to stewardship theory, the assumptions of agency theory are not 
appropriate. Agents’ dignity, faith, and job satisfaction will enable them to work hard, and the 
interests of agents and principals are consistent. Under stewardship theory, the core concept 
is that agents can be trusted to achieve the maximum interest of principals (Donaldson, 1990; 
Huse, 2007; Muth & Donaldson, 1998). The major difference between agency theory and 
stewardship theory is the hypothesis of human nature. Different hypotheses will inevitably 
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lead to governance structure and mechanism differences, and produce different theories of 
governance. 
 
The research on stewardship theory includes four aspects. First, the analyses and hypotheses 
of agents’ human nature by separate individualism, opportunism, self-interest “agents” with 
collective and trustable “housekeeper”. Second, whether the management structure of the 
company, established by the independent directors, have external supervision or increased 
internal directors and created a fully trusted environment that provide adequate supervision. 
Third, whether the governance mechanism, introduces the control and material or non-
material incentive-based compensation plans. Fourth, whether there is any relationship 
between the stewardship theory and the agency theory, and explain whether one theory 
outperforms another or both theories are relevant in explaining some cases. According to 
Caldwell & Karri (2005), stewardship theory is more appropriate compared to the agency 
theory in explaining the basic of the organization and long-term interest prospect.  
 
2.5.3 Tournament Theory  
Tournament theory was invented by Lazear & Rosen (1981). According to Lazear & Rosen 
(1981), tournament theory is used to describe certain situations where the salary differences 
are based not on productivity but upon relative differences of individuals. The theory has also 
been explored by many researchers (Bull, Schotter & Weigelt, 1987; Ehrenbreg & Bognanno, 
1990; Knoeber & Thurman, 1994; Lazear, 1999).  
 
The major incentive object of tournament theory is the CEO.  According to tournament 
theory, the increasing salary gap between CEO and other senior management members will 
reduce monitoring costs for the principal, provide a strong incentive for the convergence of 
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interests between the principal and agent, and also improve firm performance. The theory 
promotes improved firm performance by meeting two conditions. First, the object (CEO) has 
certain management ability and guides the firm to achieve higher performance objectives. 
Second, the salary gap can stimulate the incentive of the object. There is a positive 
correlation between the enthusiasm of the object and salary gap. 
 
2.5.4 Institutional Theory  
Institutional theory investigates aspects of social structure. No matter what kind of policy 
system, the government authority is the public policy maker and implementer; various 
systems will inevitably affect the policy choice, content, and outcome. According to Scott 
(2004), institutional theory considers the processes by which structures, including rules, 
norms and routines, become established as authoritative guidelines for social behaviour.  
 
Institutional theory provides the theoretical basis for system analysis; the system model has 
gradually become the main method of policy analysis. System analysis is not necessary to 
lead to a certain action.  According to Scott (2004), institutional theory explores how these 
elements are created, diffused, adopted, adapted, and also declined and disused.  
 
2.5.5 Stakeholder Theory  
Stakeholder theory was investigated by Freeman (1984). Stakeholder theory refers to the 
comprehensive interests of all stakeholders, not just shareholders. Compared with the 
traditional maximum shareholder wealth theory, stakeholder theory proposes that a company 
cannot be separated from stakeholders’ participation; the company is in the pursuit of the 
interests of all stakeholders, not only shareholders.  
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According to Freeman (1984), there are three groups of stakeholders. First, a person is 
holding stock, such as director, shareholder, or manager, is called an ownership stakeholder. 
Second, a person in a relevant group within or associated with the company, viz employee, 
creditor, consumer, competitor, supplier, local community, is known as an economically 
dependent stakeholder. Third, a person or party who has social interest, like a government 
agency, media or other special group, is called a social stakeholder.  
 
2.5.6 Managerial Hegemony Theory  
Managerial hegemony theory holds that the directors are appointed and dominated by 
management and that management has effective control of the board (Kosnik, 1987). 
According to Kosnik, the board’s role is inefficiency with little contribution made to decision 
making. Prior studies find the monitoring of independent directors is passive and inefficient 
(Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Baysinger, Kosnik & Turk, 1991), so the board is not a 
mechanism for aligning management and shareholder interests. 
 
2.5.7 Resource Dependence Theory  
Resource dependence theory was introduced by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). Resource 
dependence theory notes the board of directors are important for establishing the relationship 
between the company and external environment, and to help obtain significant information, 
resource and legitimacy.   According to resource dependence theory, a company would like to 
establish interlocking director relationships with other companies. Resource dependence of 
director is the key reason for small and family firms’ success (Daily & Dalton, 1994). In 
summary, seven theories in the corporate governance studies are discussed. All exploratory 
variables are selected regarding these theories.  
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Seven theories which bear directly on the corporate governance of IPOs are noted in Table 
2.1 and discussed below. An IPO is a transition process from one ownership structure to 
another, and changes in governance practices need to be undertaken to respect the new 
ownership requirements and new commercial and social contexts. The columns show the 
theories where the variables have been tied to an explicit theory. None of these variables are 
inconsistent with an agency theory approach. 
Table 2.2 Comparison of Theoretical Perspectives on Variables 
Variables AT ST TT IT STT MHT RDT 
CEO Age 
   
Yes 
  
 CEO Gender 
   
Yes 
  
 CEO Qualification 
   
Yes 
 
Yes 
 CEO Experience 
 
Yes Yes 
  
Yes 
 CEO Salary Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 Top managers' salaries Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 CEO Duality 
 
Yes 
  
Yes Yes 
 Chairman Experience 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Chairman Qualification 
   
Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Number of Directors 
    
Yes Yes Yes 
Independent Director Percentage Yes 
   
Yes Yes Yes 
Female Director Number 
   
Yes Yes 
 Yes 
Number of Supervisors Yes 
   
Yes Yes Yes 
Board Meetings per Year Yes 
   
Yes 
 
 Supervisor Meetings per Year Yes 
   
Yes 
 
 Block Shareholding 
    
Yes 
 
 Management Shareholding 
    
Yes 
 
 State Owned Shareholding 
   
Yes Yes 
 
 Legal Person Shareholding 
   
Yes Yes 
 
 Inside Shareholding 
    
Yes 
 
 Non-trading Shareholding 
    
Yes 
 
 Largest Shareholding 
    
Yes 
 
 Committees Yes 
   
Yes 
 
 Size 
    
Yes 
 
 Beta 
    
Yes 
 
 Labour         Yes     
Note: AT, ST, TT, IT, STT, MHT and RDT, indicate agency theory, stewardship theory, tournament theory, 
institutional theory, stakeholder theory, managerial hegemony theory, and resource dependence theory, 
respectively. 
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2.6 Supervisory Board Studies 
China differs from New Zealand, in that China has supervisory boards as part of the corporate 
governance structure. These are explained more fully in section 5.5.2 below. These boards 
are not unique to China and are present in Europe, in France and Germany for example, and 
also in Japan.  
 
This model of co-determination models endeavours to include all parties related to improving 
company performance.  They include employees, customers other stakeholders, as well as 
shareholders. Many prior studies have suggested that the key role of corporate governance is 
to meet all related parties’ expectations and all related benefits shall be under consideration. 
(Freeman, 1983; Freeman, 1984; Cochran and Wartick, 1988; Thompson, Brown, Kay, and 
Titterington, 1991; Hill and Jones, 1992; Clarkson, 1994; Monks and Minow, 1995; 
Donaldson and Preston, 1995).  
 
According to Renaud (1875), the supervisory board is responsible for monitoring the 
implementation of the board’s decisions while staying independent from the board of 
directors. Schumacher (1937) observes that the supervisory boards represent the interests of 
small and medium shareholders in Germany. Simon & Winfried (2000) examine 500 public 
firms in Germany, finding that the supervisory board should include external supervisors, not 
just representatives of shareholders, banks, and related parties. 
 
The Chinese supervisory board role and impact has been considered in prior governance 
studies (Li and Wang, 2004; Li and Wang, 2005; Wang and Liu, 2006). Gao and Luo (2004) 
indicates that the supervisory boards represent the benefits of small- and medium- 
shareholders’ litigation in China. Xiao, Dahya, and Lin (2004) interview the directors and 
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supervisors of 21 listed firms. He finds that the supervisory board is very important for 
overseeing the financial condition and monitoring management and the board of directors. 
According to Li and Wang (2005), the supervisory board’s contribution to governance 
performance is negatively related to the larger shareholder ownership.  
 
According to the Japanese Company Act 2002, the supervisory board is no longer necessary 
in the Japanese corporate governance system. If more than half of the independent directors 
agree, the board of directors may remove the supervisory board from the company. China 
maintains the requirement for both independent directors and a supervisory board as key 
components of the corporate governance system. Prior studies do not provide unanimous 
support for the status quo. Some researchers believe that the supervisory board should be 
removed. Yu and Ma (2000) indicate that the Chinese supervisory board is inefficient. They 
propose that the board of directors should be responsible for monitoring and decision making 
and the supervisory board should be removed. Shao (2003) shares a similar view, suggesting 
that independent directors, audit committee and other committees are more efficient than a 
supervisory board. Cao (2004) records that there are conflicts between supervisory boards 
and independent directors in China. 
 
The alternative view that the supervisory board is legitimate, rational and complementary to 
the board is also widely expressed. Wang, Wang and Liu (2002) investigate the independent 
directors’ system in the US and the supervisory board system in China. They encourage more 
strengthening of the supervisory board in China. Li and Wang (2005) also indicate the 
importance of strengthening supervisory boards. Wang and Liu (2006) believe that the 
independent directors and supervisory board have complementary advantages in the Chinese 
governance system. He (2001) and Wen, Xu and Jiang (2003) also support the 
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complementary relationship of independent directors and supervisory boards in China. The 
current study investigates the influence of supervisory board in IPOs on the Chinese stock 
exchanges. 
2.7 Conclusion 
 
Prior research emphasises the difference between emerging and developed markets, and the 
impact that scale, culture, legal framework and political systems have upon the performance 
of listed stocks.  IPOs as a subset have not been the focus of such attention. This study will 
address this gap through considering use of a wide range of governance variables, the 
analysis is broader than prior work and provides greater confidence in the findings. The study 
adds to the understanding of how different forms of governance impact the short and long-
term IPO performance. Secondly, most prior studies test either short-term or long-term IPO 
performance over a specific period.  The current study tests the yearly long-term sustainable 
IPO performance, for periods up to 11. Thirdly, earlier works have focused on large and 
developed economies, viz United States, United Kingdom, other European nations, Australia, 
and Japan. This study provides evidence from China and New Zealand. Fourthly, most 
previous literature tests the impaction of corporate governance on IPO and firm performance 
in one market, but this study offers a comparison between two Chinese stock markets, and 
even comparisons between two countries. Fifth, the merits of the Chinese supervisory board 
system are reflected in differing views in prior studies. This thesis provides new evidence on 
the long-term IPO performance for SHSE and SZSE.   
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CHAPTER 3 BACKGROUND TO THE CHINESE STOCK 
EXCHANGES 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter presented the literature on corporate governance and IPO performance. 
Chapter 3 covers Ming & Qing Dynasty history, the introduction of the Qing Dynasty stock 
market and Hong Kong stock history, the introduction of the Shenzhen, Shanghai and Hong 
Kong stock exchanges, and the relationship between Chinese and international stock markets. 
This chapter will also cover the introduction of A, B, H, S, N and red chip classes of shares. 
3.2 Introduction of the Ming & Qing Dynasty History 
China’s stock history can be traced back to the Warring States period 2000 years ago. For the 
early modern age, China’s stock history can be traced back to the 16th century, at the end of 
the Ming Dynasty. Zhu Yuanzhang led a rebellion against Mongol rule (Mote and Denis, 
1998) and founded his kingdom, the Ming Dynasty in 1368. His reign is considered one of 
China’s golden ages (Li & Zheng, 2001). During the Ming Dynasty, many industries financed 
themselves through private capital, replacing capital managed by the state.  At the same time, 
foreign trade had started to open up and connections were being made between East and West. 
Between 1405 and 1433, the Ming government sponsored seven naval expeditions. The 
Yongle Emperor designed the expeditions to establish a Chinese presence, impose imperial 
control over trade, impress foreign people and extend the Ming's tributary system (Deng, 
2005). Towards the end of the Ming Dynasty, high risk industries that required relatively 
large capital, but generated high profit, such as the sand industry in Shanghai, the salt 
industry in Sichuan, mining in Yunnan and Guangdong and the finance industry in Shanxi, 
were all operating using a  “fund raising partnership” business form. 
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China's last imperial dynasty, the Qing Dynasty, was founded by the Manchus who had been 
subjects of the Ming and had earlier founded the Jurchen Jin Dynasty (Spence, 1990). When 
farmer rebel forces rebelled in Beijing and the last Ming Emperor committed suicide when 
the city fell in 1644, the Manchu Qing Dynasty seized control of Beijing. After taking over 
the capital of the Ming Dynasty, it wasn’t long – just a few decades – before Qing took 
control of the whole of China in 1863 (Wakeman, 1985). By the end of the 17
th
 century the 
Chinese economy had recovered from the devastation caused by previous wars and the 
resulting breakdown of order. The Qing economy significantly developed and markets 
continued to expand during the 18th century, but it failed to keep pace with the economies of 
European countries in the Industrial Revolution (Li & Zheng, 2001).   
3.3 Introduction of Qing Dynasty Stock History 
Before the opium trade, Qing enjoyed a favourable balance of trade with Britain. Qing’s 
major foreign trade products included tea, china, and silk fabric. From the 17
th
 century to the 
19
th
 century, 48 tons of silver was transferred to China by Europeans through foreign trade 
surpluses (Song, 2011). Because of the trading deficit, annual silver circulation in Europe 
decreased by 50% from 1649 to 1694. In 1816, Britain established the Golden Standard 
financial system. At the same time, the Qing Dynasty had the biggest Silver Standard 
financial system in the world. 
From 1790 to 1838, 400,000 units of opium were smuggled to Qing by the East India 
Company, valued at 230 million taels silver
4
. From 1781 to 1850, the national silver treasury 
of Qing decreased from 70 million taels to 8 million taels. After the First Opium War in 1840, 
the Qing Dynasty opened up Guangzhou, Xiamen, Fuzhou, Ningbo, and Shanghai as the 
trading ports for foreigners; and then the government allowed foreign banks to enter China 
                                                 
4
 In 1840, 1 British Pound = 5 Taels Silver. In 1920, 1British Pound = 10 Taels Silver. According to purchasing 
power parity, 1 Tael Silver in 1840 = 200 Chinese Yuans or 40 New Zealand Dollars in 2010.  
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and start doing business. Foreign investment helped to establish all kinds of joint stock 
companies in China, and introduced new methods of production management and stock 
financing that had generally been adopted by Western counties. The Hong Kong and 
Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) had been established by Thomas Sutherland in Hong 
Kong in 1864. Major shareholders included Messrs Sassoon Sons & Corporation, Messrs 
Dent & Corporation, and Messrs Aug Heard & Corporation. HSBC was the first western 
bank to establish its headquarters in China. According to Ma (2007), HSBC attracted many 
rich and loyal customers. For the long-term saving service, there were five accounts with 
more than 20 million taels silver in savings, 20 accounts with more than 15 million taels 
silver savings, and 130 accounts with more than 10 million. In 1872, HSBC became the 
settlement bank for all foreign banks in Qing, and became the “Chinese Bank of England” 
(Song, 2011). 
 
As the Qing Dynasty began its economic reforms, shareholding systems started to be 
introduced rapidly. With the difficult financial situation, the government relied on private 
capital to bolster national resources, and built a few private and state owned joint capital 
Chinese modern civil enterprises. In 1872, the Minister of Commerce Li Hongzhang was 
planning and constructing the Shanghai Ship Investment Promotion Bureau. Following the 
shipping industry, joint stock companies became more common - in insurance, mining, textile, 
and communication industries. From the early 1880s, Qing set up 15 mining enterprises, and 
all of them issued stock. This period is known as the “Westernization Movement” reform. 
 
The formation of the foreign concession areas in Shanghai was the result of the Treaty of 
Nanking of 1842 and subsequent agreements between the Qing Dynasty and Britain were 
crucial to the development of foreign trade in China and the foreign community in Shanghai. 
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Private Stock trading was born. According to historical records, there were some stock 
transaction activities between foreign business people in Shanghai before 1861. When the 
colonial economy became prosperous after the 1860s, foreign stock trading became very 
active in Shanghai. Stock trading needs also led to the rise of financial service companies. 
The first securities trading company was established by the British in 1869. In 1891 during 
the boom in mining shares, foreign businessmen founded the "Shanghai Share Brokers’ 
Association" headquartered in Shanghai as China's first stock exchange, to trade enterprise 
stocks set up by foreigners in China. That was the forerunner of today’s Shanghai Stock 
Exchange. 
 
Domestic Chinese merchants started stock trading in the 1870s. At first, they had no clearing 
house and no corresponding trading rules. Most transfers were between relatives and friends, 
but the transaction prices were considered by the foreign securities market. Later on, with the 
expansion of stock issuance and increasing numbers of investors, stock trading became a 
commercial requirement for local investors. The Shanghai Pingzhun Securities Trading 
Company was established in September 1882, and set the precedent for future Chinese-
organised securities markets. The company also developed a distinct internal trading 
association and provided conveniences for stock trading. According to historical sources, 
mining industry market capitalization was three million taels silver, and industry turnover 
was ten million taels silver. But the stock market wealth dream was destroyed by the Sino-
French War in 1883. During the war, French warships were placed in the Shanghai harbour, 
and the stock market fell immediately and many investors and banks were bankrupted. 
 
The Chinese securities market entered its initial stage in 1895, the late stage of the Qing 
Dynasty. Qing had been defeated by the Japanese in 1895, resulting in the Treaty of 
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Shimonoseki; Qing paid two hundred million taels silver indemnity to Japan, financing it 
through the international financial market, the largest loan order of that time. Qing issued a 
large amount of government bonds, and that, plus the issuance of foreign funded enterprises 
meant the Shanghai stock market had been stimulated.  
 
Compared with transactions before 1883, the domestic Chinese stock market was not 
particularly active in the 1880s. Along with the foreign capital banks, mining enterprises and 
railway enterprises set up in China, the scale of foreign capital stock issuance expanded even 
more in 1880s. At the same time, the Qing government promulgated a series of laws and 
regulations for commercial and industrial development, and adopted some measures to 
encourage the establishment of domestic banks and enterprises. It took the second economic 
reform of Chinese modernization after 1895, especially the development of banking and 
railway industries, for stock trading to gradually improve. After the state-owned Commercial 
Bank had been established in Shanghai in 1897, the Qing government also set up two state-
private joint banks, known as the Bank of Great Qing and the Bank of Communication. In 
addition, there were also a number of local government-owned banks and private banks 
established in this period. Those new banks issued a large number of stocks and their stocks 
were very popular in the market. In 1903, the government advocated merchants establish 
railway companies and issued stock to raise capital for railway companies. Then 18 state-
private joint and private railway companies were established between 1903 and 1907 and 
those companies issued a lot of railway stocks. From 1901 to 1911, Qing set up 386 new 
types of enterprises and domestic Chinese companies achieved fast development in 
manufacturing, electricity, mining, textile, banking and other industries. Then number of 
listings also greatly increased during the period. 
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The Shanghai Sharebrokers’ Association was registered in Hong Kong in 1904, known as the 
Shanghai Securities Exchange, not only trading Chinese government bonds, but also 
involving the stocks of foreign companies that were registered in China and the Far East; 
rubber stocks all over the Southeast Asia and municipal bonds of Shanghai City Hall, which 
ultimately led to the bull market in the years 1908-1909. The office used membership based 
rules; only members could participate in securities trading. Members included 87 Western 
businessmen and 13 Chinese businessmen. In 1909, the USA was running into the 
automobile age and the rubber industry of Southeast Asia became attrition to global 
investment. The Shanghai Securities market became the preferable financing place with 
nearly one third of Southeast Asian rubber enterprises choosing to list in Shanghai. Rubber 
enterprises absorbed 40 million taels silver of domestic Chinese funds, equalling nearly half 
of the Qing Dynasty government’s annual income. Even many private banks lowered their 
loan threshold, provided credit loans to speculators, and accepted stock collateral loans. A 
more serious problem was that some private banks used their credit advantage, issued their 
own bank cheques (equate to printing the notes), and became directly involved in stock 
speculation. Many private and state-owned investments through banks were absorbed into 
Shanghai, and the Shanghai stock market became like a national gambling casino, or perhaps 
a Mah-jong table. Whether state-owned, foreign, or state-private joint ownership enterprises, 
no investor paid attention to business management, financial status and other basic 
information about the enterprises. Investors traded stocks in a similar vein to playing 
gambling games. 
 
In March 1910, the rubber industry stock prices had risen up to 27 times their face value, 
institutional and foreign investors sold out at high price and absconded with the money.  
Many investors went bankrupt, more than 20 private banks closed down, and the market 
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panic caused much financial agitation. Later on, when the London stock market crashed, so 
too did the Shanghai stock market. Those banks which speculated also closed down. A more 
serious problem was that some banks misappropriated large repositories of state-owned 
capital; it even caused problems for the Qing Dynasty and their payment of  reparations to 
Japan and other countries. Despite remedial action, more and more private banks fell over. 
The financial market was out of control and the collapse was a crucial reason behind the fall 
of the Qing Dynasty.  
 
Overall, Chinese stocks and securities markets had experienced 40 years of infancy from the 
1840s, and finally reached the initial stage in the late of 1890s. In China, the first modern 
stock was issued by foreigners, and the first stock trading was also between foreign 
businessmen. Later, domestic stock and stock trading appeared. Chinese securities markets 
began in two different market systems, one system created by foreigners, and the other 
created by locals. 
In 1920 and 1921, the "Shanghai Securities Exchange" and "Shanghai Chinese Merchant 
Exchange" started operating. An amalgamation eventually took place in 1929, and the 
combined markets operated thereafter as the "Shanghai Stock Exchange". By the 1930s, 
Shanghai had emerged as the financial centre of the Far East, where all domestic and foreign 
investors could trade stocks, government bonds and futures. The operation of the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange came to an abrupt halt after Japan occupied the Shanghai International 
Settlement in 1941. In 1946, the Shanghai Stock Exchange resumed its operations before 
closing again three years later in 1949, after the Communist Party took Shanghai. When the 
Cultural Revolution ended, China re-opened to other countries in 1978.  
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3.4 Introduction of Hong Kong Stock History 
Stock trading in Hong Kong can be traced back to the 1860s. British businessmen had 
established joint capital companies in Hong Kong, and they transferred their shares through 
private transaction via agents. The Hong Kong Brokers’ Association was formally established 
in 1891, and renamed the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 1914. For a start, it wasn’t very 
active. When the Communist Party revolution took Shanghai in 1949, many brokers shifted 
capital and talent from Shanghai to Hong Kong. In the 1960s, only around sixty stocks had 
been listed on the HKEX. There were few brokers and very limited transactions. Stock 
trading began to pick up in the 1970s. The Far East Exchange, Gold and Silver Exchange, 
and Kowloon Stock Exchange were established in the 1970s and increased public 
participation.  At that time, the minimum investment was Hong Kong Dollar (HKD) 10,000 
and all transactions had to be through brokers. Brokerage commission was 0.75-1%; they also 
offered the margin trading service. 
 
From 1962 to 1973, Hong Kong’s annual GDP growth rate was 9.4%, and GDP increased 
from HKD 8.6 billion to HKD 23.1 billion. The Hang Seng Index was 107 points in early 
1969, but had risen to 1,775 points by March 1973. There were a lot of IPOs listed on the 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange from 1971 to 1973, and after the listings prices increased more 
than 20 times the IPO price. At this time, the real estate industry was emerging in Hong Kong, 
which was responsible for the stock market bubble in 1973, but because of the Hong Kong 
stock market crash in the same year, the Hang Seng Index had fallen to 150 points by the end 
of 1974.  
88 
 
3.5 Introduction of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
The earliest beginnings of the SZSE can be traced back to 1986. The Shenzhen Development 
Bank started the first security trading through its securities company counter. After the 
Shenzhen City Investment Securities and the Bank of China Securities Department opened, 
several companies also issued and traded stocks, and then the rudimentary form of SZSE was 
established. 
 
In November 1989 Shenzhen City Hall made the decision to build up the SZSE and it was 
officially founded on 1 December, 1990. It formally opened for business on 3 July, 1991. The 
SZSE was regulated by the Shenzhen branch of the People’s Bank of China. After 1 April, 
1993, the SZSE was managed by the Shenzhen Securities Management Committee. 
 
With SZSE trading gradually becoming active, the number of listed companies gradually 
increased. Because of the competition between the SZSE and the SHZE in the bull market in 
1996, in 1997 the State Council decided to place the SZSE under the direct management of 
the China Securities Regulatory Commission. The SZSE management structure included a 
general manager and a deputy general manager of the exchange, appointed by the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission, and a chairman and a vice-chairman, nominated by the 
Commission. 
 
The SZSE provides a centralized trading place for securities. It also organizes and supervises 
those securities trading under the direct supervision and management of the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission.  Being committed to multi-level security market construction, the 
SZSE strives to create an open and fair market environment. The main functions of the 
exchange include developing the trading rules, arranging IPO listings, supervising IPO 
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listings, organizing and monitoring securities trading, supervising the investors and listed 
companies, administering and disclosing market information, and any other functions 
licensed by the China Securities Regulatory Commission. 
 
In the early days of the SZSE, transactions were mainly computer transactions by accredited 
representatives in the exchange trading hall. Due to overcrowding in the trading hall, the 
SZSE has twice extended the building and set up more offices for transactions. In the early 
days,   investors had to fill and submit their application forms at the local security companies’ 
counters. Once the application was accepted, counter staff contacted the representatives in the 
trading hall by telephone. Representatives inputted the transaction requests to the exchange 
terminal, and then they reported the transactions to the counter staff. With this method of 
transmitting information there were a lot of mistakes, and those local security companies had 
to deal with these errors by setting up a special ‘fault tolerant’ account. Also, some 
representatives colluded with counter staff and took illegal advantages from investors. In 
order to solve these problems, the SZSE officially began to use a fully automated computer 
auction system and by February 1992 manual bidding was eliminated.   
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Table 3.1 Summary of the SZSE 1999-2010
5
 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Number of Listing Firms 463 514 508 508 505 536 
New Listing Firms 50 51 0 0 0 31 
Stock Market Capitalization (trillion 
RMB) 
1.189 2.116 1.593 1.297 1.265 1.104 
Stock Trading Volume (trillion RMB) 1.435 2.945 1.560 1.103 1.129 1.586 
Investor Accounts (million accounts) 22.013 28.429 32.206 33.172 34.014 35.014 
Capital Rising (billion RMB) 37.922 63.972 23.473 14.246 8.722 19.671 
Number of Listing Stocks 504 557 550 551 548 578 
Number of A-Shares 450 499 494 494 491 484 
Number of B-Shares 54 58 56 57 57 56 
Market P/E Ratio 36.300 56.040 39.790 36.970 36.190 24.630 
Securities Investment Fund 16 18 25 29 29 30 
       
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Number of Listing Firms 544 579 670 740 830 1169 
New Listing Firms 8 35 91 70 90 339 
Stock Market Capitalization (trillion 
RMB) 
0.933 1.779 5.730 2.412 5.928 8.642 
Stock Trading Volume (trillion RMB) 1.243 3.265 15.512 8.668 18.948 24.132 
Investor Accounts (million accounts) 35.747 38.615 68.998 75.754 85.708 94.336 
Capital Rising (billion RMB) 3.028 62.083 117.521 125.036 171.269 410.061 
Number of Listing Stocks 586 621 712 782 872 1211 
Number of A-Shares 481 464 455 454 455 473 
Number of B-Shares 55 55 55 55 54 54 
Market P/E Ratio 16.360 32.720 69.740 16.720 46.010 44.690 
Securities Investment Fund 39 46 48 48 55 93 
 
 
The number of listing firms and stocks increased between 1999 and 2010, especially after 
2004.
6
 According to Table 3.1, the SZSE market capitalization and trading volume were also 
increasing regarding the increased number of listed stocks and number of investors. The 
average P/E ratios were very high and indicated that investors were not rational. Overall, the 
SZSE was a very fast growing security market in the decade 1999-2010. 
 
Supported by the development of the SHSE, the SZSE stopped issuing new shares in 2000. 
The plate of SME board was established by the SZSE on 17 May, 2004, and eight companies 
                                                 
5
 Refers to Shenzhen Stock Exchange fact books 1999-2010. 
6
 As the distinction of functions of the SZSE and the SHZE, the SZSE no longer issued A-Shares after 2000. 
The SZSE beginnings offered SME board in 2004 and attracted small and medium size enterprises. 
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were post listed on the SME board on 25 June, 2004. After 2004 SZSE began listing new 
IPOs but only on the SME board. As one of the two stock exchanges on the China mainland, 
the SZSE has grown with other China securities markets. After 22 years’ development, the 
SZSE has successfully built a national-level securities market in a new city
7
 through the use 
of modern technology. Now the SZSE is playing a very important role in establishing the 
modern enterprise system, promoting the adjustment of economic structure, optimizing the 
allocation of resources, and spreading the knowledge of market economy.  
3.6 Introduction of the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
The SHSE is one of two stock exchanges in mainland China, and is located in Shanghai 
Pudong. The SHSE was founded on 26 November, 1990 and officially opened on 19 
December 1990. The SHSE was entirely unlocked on 21 May, 1992. By market guiding, the 
average market stock price raised 570% in three days. That May-day is known as the real 
birthday of the Chinese stock markets. 
 
The SHSE is a non-profit organization and under the direct management of the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission. Its main functions include providing place for securities 
trading, formulating the operational rules of the stock exchange, supervising the IPO listing 
arrangements and applications, organizing and monitoring the securities trading, regulating 
listed companies and investors, managing and disclosing the market information. The SHSE 
uses electronic auction trading for market transactions and all transactions must be approved 
by the terminal computer under the principle of price and time priority. 
 
                                                 
7
 Shenzhen is PR China’s first special economic zone, which was established under the approval of the State 
Council on 26
th
 August, 1980. 
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The SHSE is a member of the International Organization of Securities, the Asia and Oceania 
Exchange Association, the World Federation of Exchanges. After sustained development 
over many years, the Shanghai securities market ranks number one on the mainland. The 
number of listed companies, stocks, market capitalization, market value, stock turnover, stock 
transactions and bond transactions and other indicators are ranked top in mainland China. 
Until the end of 2009, the SHSE had 870 listed companies, 1,351 securities, and the total 
market value was more than 18 trillion yuans. A large number of national enterprises, key 
enterprises, fundamental industries, and high technology enterprises have raised funds and 
transformed their operational mechanisms through listings.  
Table 3.2 Summary of the SHSE 1999-2010
8
 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Number of Listing Firms 484 572 646 715 780 837 
New Listing Firms 46 88 75 70 67 61 
Stock Market Capitalization (trillion 
RMB) 
1.458 2.693 2.759 2.536 2.981 2.601 
Stock Trading Volume (trillion RMB) 1.697 3.137 2.271 1.696 2.082 2.647 
Investor Accounts (million accounts) 
  
34.296 35.557 36.436 37.870 
Capital Rising (billion RMB) 
  
95.749 61.430 56.096 45.690 
Number of Listing Stocks 579 668 744 759 824 881 
Number of A-Shares 525 614 690 705 770 827 
Number of B-Shares 54 54 54 54 54 54 
Market P/E Ratio 37.090 58.220 37.710 34.430 36.544 24.231 
Securities Investment Fund 
  
23 25 25 25 
       
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Number of Listing Firms 834 842 860 864 870 894 
New Listing Firms 3 13 25 6 9 28 
Stock Market Capitalization (trillion 
RMB) 
2.310 7.161 26.984 9.725 18.466 17.901 
Stock Trading Volume (trillion RMB) 1.924 5.782 30.543 18.043 34.651 30.431 
Investor Accounts (million accounts) 38.560 41.010 71.305 79.729 89.654 98.510 
Capital Rising (billion RMB) 2.997 171.441 670.133 89.291 334.315 553.214 
Number of Listing Stocks 878 886 904 908 914 938 
Number of A-Shares 824 832 850 854 860 884 
Number of B-Shares 54 54 54 54 54 54 
Market P/E Ratio 16.330 33.301 59.238 14.850 28.732 21.610 
Securities Investment Fund 26 26 17 16 18 25 
 
                                                 
8
 Refers to Shanghai Stock Exchange fact book 2001-2010. 
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The number of listing firms and stocks increased from 1999 to 2010. According to Table 3.2, 
the SHSE market capitalization and trading volume also increased regarding the increased 
number of listed stocks and number of investors. The average P/E ratios were very high and 
indicated the investors were not rational. Overall, the SHSE was a very fast growing security 
market during the decade 1999-2010.  
 
In 2007 and 2008, many irrational speculative traders rushed into the market and made SHSE 
temporarily the world’s second largest market in terms of trading volume. The Shanghai 
Stock Composite Index reached a record high of 6,124 points in October 2007, but the index 
went down 65% in 2008 due to the impact of the global economic crisis in the middle of that 
year. 
 
In 2009, the Chinese government promulgated a huge stimulus plan, the Central Bank 
released a huge amount of currency and the Shanghai Composite Index increased from 1664 
to 2,478 points; the yearly growth rate ranked at the top of the global capital markets. Chinese 
stock markets become a more important player which influenced the global stock markets. 
 
The Shanghai Composite Index had risen to 2,245.43 points on 14 June, 2001 and had fallen 
back to the same level in 2011. According to well-known financial expert, Professor Hong 
Hao of Beijing Jiaotong University, the Chinese GDP grew nearly 500% over the period but 
A-Share markets had no increase in ten years; the conclusion being that Chinese stock 
markets lost their function as the country’s economic barometer. Professor Hong believed 
complete distortion of the market value and unlimited IPO expansion were the major reasons 
for markets falling. 
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3.7 Introduction of Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
The HKEX had always been committed to leading the Hong Kong financial services industry 
and breaking geographical boundaries, and it remains an important member of the global 
financial market. The HKEX itself was post listed as a company in June 2000. As a listed 
company, the HKEX is grasping opportunities to develop its business regionally and all 
around the world. HKEX is considered in order to give a holistic picture of the growth of the 
Chinese Stock Exchanges. Even though HKEX was not analysed in the study, it is important 
because politically these two jurisdictions are interrelated. The Hong Kong market may 
indicate how open China markets may be in years to come. 
 
The HKEX operates under the direct management of managers and board of directors. The 
highest policy making body is the board of directors, which is responsible for main strategy, 
operating matters and the formulation of relevant policies. 
 
The HKEX is committed to fulfilling its functions, ensuring that market trading is fair and 
orderly with prudent risk management. The HKEX organization made its market operation 
more effective under the supervision of the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission. 
The capital market regulatory mechanism has changed from a regulatory review gradually 
shifting toward the disclosure of market information. The purpose of the review was to 
ensure that comprehensive regulation disclose of all important facts is fair with all investors 
being fully informed and able to make investment decisions. The HKEX board includes no 
more than six directors appointed by the Hong Kong financial secretary, no more than six 
directors elected by the shareholders, and a CEO. 
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The HKEX provides extensive investment services before and after trading. Its departments 
include a market division, settlement department, business development department, an 
investor service department, information service department, and an information technology 
department. Those departments are committed to providing service to investors, market 
intermediaries and listed companies. Revenue was 2.39 billion HKD in 2004, and net profit 
was 1.1 billion HKD in 2004. Currently, it is the most profitable exchange out of all listing 
exchanges in China and the profits of pan European, Swedish, Australian, and Singapore 
stock exchanges are relatively inferior when compared to the HKEX. 
 
In a mature international market, the HKEX derivatives market can satisfy the needs of 
investors. The market currently has four types of futures and options. First, the stock market 
indices, including Hang Seng index future, mini Hang Seng index future, and China free 
investment index future. Traded options include three stock index options, viz Hang Seng 
Index Option, mini Hang Seng Index Option, and H-Share Index Option, as well as 37 
designated stock options.  Secondly, the stock products, including 29 stock futures, 31 stock 
options, 20 international stock futures and 20 international stock options. Thirdly, interest 
rate products, including one month HKD interest rate future, three months HKD interest rate 
future, and three year foreign currency bond future. Fourthly, foreign exchange products, 
including Euro, British Pound, and Japanese Yen rolling exchange rates. The Hang Seng 
index future has the longest history and the largest trading volume, accounting for about 40% 
of the total trading volume. The H-Share index future was launched at the end of 2003. Due 
to institutional investors, share holdings increased substantially and derivative products were 
created to hedge risk for those investors. The future trading volume trended steadily upwards 
and accounted for about 15% of the total trading volume.  
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Table 3.3 Summary of HKEX 1999-2010
9
 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Number of Listing Firms 708 790 867 978 1037 1096 
New Listing Firms 38 90 88 117 73 70 
Stock Market Capitalization (trillion 
HKD) 
4.735 4.862 3.946 3.611 5.548 6.696 
Stock Trading Volume (trillion HKD) 1.920 3.132 1.990 1.643 2.584 3.974 
Capital Rising (billion HKD) 149.703 467.337 64.428 110.514 213.760 281.800 
Number of H-Shares (Main board) 
   
54 64 72 
Number of Red Chips (Main board) 
      
Market P/E Ratio 26.770 12.950 12.300 14.980 19.080 18.800 
New Securities Investment Fund 23 21 22 9 8 10 
       
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Number of Listing Firms 1135 1173 1241 1261 1319 1413 
New Listing Firms 67 62 84 49 73 113 
Stock Market Capitalization (trillion 
HKD) 
8.180 13.338 20.698 10.299 17.874 21.077 
Stock Trading Volume (trillion HKD) 4.520 8.376 21.666 17.653 15.515 17.210 
Capital Rising (billion HKD) 301.706 524.538 590.846 427.248 642.118 858.721 
Number of H-Shares (Main board) 80 95 104 110 116 128 
Number of Red Chips (Main board) 86 86 89 89 92 97 
Market P/E Ratio 15.610 17.390 22.560 7.270 18.190 16.720 
New Securities Investment Fund 13 15 26 33 52 79 
 
The number of listing firms and stocks increased from 1999 to 2010. According to Table 3.3, 
the HKEX market capitalization and trading volume also increased due to the increased 
number of listed stocks, especially the increased H-share and red chip companies. The 
average P/E ratios were low. Compared with the SHSE and the SZSE, the P/E ratios 
indicated that HKEX investors were relatively rational. The possible reasons being that the 
HKEX is a mature and more internationally based market. Overall the HKEX was a fast 
growing security market, but not as fast as the SZSE and the SHSE.  
 
The HKEX is the most effective channel for Chinese enterprises to raise international capital. 
The partnership between HKEX and other stock markets is meaningful for the Chinese 
economy. In the development of global financial markets, the HKEX has the potential to 
                                                 
9
 Refers to Hong Kong Stock Exchange fact book 1999-2010. 
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become a major international market with high flow of capital and relatively low transaction 
costs. The HKEX didn’t just ensure that Hong Kong maintains the most important market 
position in China, it also provides funds to support the economic development of China. Up 
until 2010, 592 Chinese IPOs post listed on the HKEX, including 128 H-Shares firms, 97 red 
chip firms and 301 private firms. Overall mainland China based stocks represent 57% market 
capitalization and 66% of trading volume on the HKEX. 
3.8 Supervisor 
Supervisory boards in China differ from those in some other countries like Germany. 
Members are appointed by government. Supervisors are responsible for overseeing the 
financial condition of the company, monitoring the implementation of top management and 
board of directors, and implementing other supervisory duties prescribed by the company 
constitution. According to the Chinese Company Act, the composition of the supervisors, 
known as the board of supervisors, is the necessary organization for each company. Usually 
the board of supervisors is made up of shareholders and employee representatives. Directors 
and top managers cannot concurrently serve as supervisors. 
 
According to the Chinese Company Act (2005) article 118, a limited stock company must 
have a board of supervisors with at least three members.  The board of supervisors must 
include shareholder representatives and an appropriate proportion of company employee 
representatives. The percentage of employee supervisors shall be no less than one third. 
Employee supervisors should be appointed by the employee congress or other forms of 
democratic election. The chairman of the board of supervisors shall be elected by supervisors 
and convenes and presides at supervisor meetings. Relatively smaller companies need not 
establish a board of supervisors, but they must have one or two supervisors. 
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According to the Chinese Company Act (2005) article 71, a state-owned company must have 
a board of supervisors with at least five members. The board of supervisors includes 
representatives appointed by the state-owned assets regulatory institution and no less than a 
third of the board must be employee representatives. The chairman of the board of 
supervisors should be appointed by the state-owned assets regulatory institution. 
 
Foreign investment companies based in China have been required to establish a board of 
supervisors since 1 January, 2006. 
 
According to the Chinese Company Act (2005) article 120, the board of supervisors must 
hold at least once every six months. When the board of supervisors passes a motion, it must 
be favoured by more than half of the board.   
 
Any supervisor may propose to hold interim meetings. According to the Chinese Company 
Act (2005) article 53, each term of office of the supervisors shall be three years. The 
supervisors may, after the expiry of their term of office, hold a consecutive term upon 
reappointment.  
 
According to the Chinese Company Act (2005) article 54, boards of supervisors have several 
functions. First, supervisors have the right to censor the financial affairs of the company. 
Second, they supervise the duty-related acts of the directors and top managers, and may put 
forward proposals on the removal of any officers who violate laws, administrative regulation, 
any bylaw or any resolution of the shareholders’ meeting. Third, they may demand any 
director or senior manager to make corrections if his/her act has injured the interests of the 
company. Fourth, they may call interim shareholder’s meetings, to call and preside over 
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shareholders’ meetings when the board of directors does not exercise the function as 
prescribed in this law. Fifth, they may put forward proposals at shareholders’ meetings. Sixth, 
they may initiate actions against directors or senior managers according to the Chinese 
Company Act (2005) article 152. Finally, the board undertakes other duties as provided for 
by the bylaw. 
 
The descriptions above show that the supervisor is an important position in the Chinese 
company corporate governance system. Hence, the number of supervisors and supervisors’ 
meetings each year was selected as a potential independent variable which may affect short- 
and longer-term IPO performance.  
3.9 Relationship between Chinese and International Stock Markets 
The SZSE, the SHSE, the HKEX and US stock markets influence each other. The China 
economy is an emerging but fast growing economy, and also, the A-Share market is a closed 
market and many investors are not rational investors. In its peak period, the market average 
stock P/E ratio was close to 70, but there were still many investors who wanted to enter the 
markets; people invested in the stock market just like gambling. And in the trough period, 
even well-performing stocks received just an average P/E ratio of 8. The HKEX is an 
international stock exchange with capital from mainland China entering this market in 1993. 
The HKEX is a relatively more mature market; investors’ risk preference is far smaller than 
mainland investors.  
 
Twenty years ago, from the initial stage of development, almost no foreign investors paid 
attention to the A-Share markets. A-Share markets were very ordinary stock markets, had 
very few stocks and the trading volume was very small. Even in China, only a few Chinese 
newspapers published the stock market information in the corner of their newspapers, and 
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most Chinese didn’t care about stocks. But A-Shares began to impact on global capital 
markets after 20 years’ development. As a result of direct international investment and the 
interlink with international capital markets, many A-Share investors began to feel the impact 
of New York, London, Hong Kong and many other markets on Chinese stock markets after 
2007. And many domestic investors started the habit of waiting for global market information 
at night or early in the morning, wanting to know how the global financial information would 
affects their investments in the SZSE and SHSE.  
 
On 31 August 2009, A-share markets suffered a rare slump; the Shanghai Composite Index 
fell 6.74%, and the Shenzhen Composite Index fell 7.55%, reacting to the market rumours 
that the monetary policy would be adjusted. The A-Share tumble immediately triggered a 
global stock market plunge; the Hang Seng Index fell 4.84%, other major Asian stock 
markets also fell deeply. Even the Dow Jones Index fell 1.74% and Nasdaq Composite Index 
fell 1.06% in a day. The major European stock indices also fell about 1%.  That A-share 
markets were affecting the international capital market was becoming more and more obvious. 
3.10 Introduction of A-Shares 
Chinese listed shares are differentiated as A-Shares, B-Shares, H-Shares, N-Shares, and S-
Shares. The distinction between shares depends on the different markets, investors, company 
or business type, and trading currencies. A-Share has the official name of Renminbi (RMB) 
trading shares. It is the ordinary share of domestic Chinese companies, where the subscription 
and trading is in RMB. Investing is by domestic institutions, organizations of investors, and 
individual investors (excluding Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao investors).  A-Shares have a 
10% price movement limitation per trading day.  
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In 1990, there were just 10 A-Shares listed in Chinese stock markets. At the end of 1997, the 
number had increased to 720, with a total value of 1.8 trillion RMB, equal to 22.7% of the 
current year’s national GDP. And the trading volume was 3 trillion RMB.  
 
A-Shares have the following characteristics. First, they are issued within the territory of 
China and only domestic investors are allowed to subscribe to RMB. Secondly, A-Shares 
account for the largest proportion of trading shares and turnover is relatively high. But 
normally, A-Shares are not the largest proportion of shares held by many listed companies, 
because most listed companies have large amounts of un-trading state-owned shares and legal 
person shares. Thirdly, the commonly held view is that A-Share investors only focus on profit 
distribution and historical performance, and do not pay attention to other shareholders’ rights. 
3.11 Introduction of B-Shares 
B-Share markets were established in 1992. B-Shares are traded on the SHSE and SZSE. B-
Share is the official name of the RMB’s denominated special shares but are bought and sold 
by USD on the SHSE, and HKD in the SZSE. Those B-Share issued firms are registered in 
China and listed on Chinese stock markets. In their early stage, only foreign investors, 
including Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan investors, could invest in B-Shares, but after 2001, 
mainland residents who held legitimate foreign currencies could also invest in B-Shares. As 
with A-Shares, B-Shares also have a 10% limitation of price movement per day. 
3.12 Introduction of H-Shares 
H-Shares are issued by state-owned enterprises registered in the mainland but post listed in 
the HKEX (H is the first letter of Hong Kong). So H-Shares are more closely related with the 
growth of the Chinese economy. There is no price movement limitation for H-Shares.  
 
102 
 
H-Shares are state-owned enterprise shares that are approved by China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) and then listed in the HKEX. H-Shares and red chips are both listed on 
the HKEX with mainland background, but H-Shares are different from red chips. If a 
mainland background IPO is not registered in the mainland, but registered in Hong Kong or 
any other countries, and its IPO had been listed in HKEX, then it would be divided into red 
chips. If the company is registered in the mainland, it would be divided into H-Shares. In fact, 
red chips are the shares of subordinated enterprises registered in HKEX, but their parent 
companies are state-owned enterprises on the mainland.  
 
H-Shares are only available to foreign investors and Chinese institutional investors; they are 
not for Chinese individuals. Tsingtao Beer became the first H-Share and post listed in HKEX 
in 1993.  More than 80 enterprises listed on the HKEX main board and Growth Enterprise 
Market (GEM) board over ten years and raised a total volume of 150 billion HKD until 2003.  
For H-Share firms, the major purpose is fund raising. Another important purpose is that 
CSRC hoped those H-Share listed companies would enter the international market through 
international stock market competition and finally establish multinational co-operations. In 
fact, over ten years, H-Share enterprises’ management, accounting, and transparency levels 
have greatly improved, and they are not very far away from world class standard after ten 
years. 
 
The Hang Seng China Enterprise index is also known as the H-Shares index, which is the 
weighted average price index of all H-Shares listed on the HKEX. The H-Shares index was 
launched in 1994 after ten H-Shares had been listed on the HKEX. The objective of the H-
Shares index is to provide a reflection of Chinese companies’ performance to HKEX 
investors.  
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3.13 Introduction of Red Chips 
If a company was registered outside the Chinese mainland but listed overseas, and the largest 
shareholder was directly or indirectly subordinated to mainland enterprises, the company was 
classified as a red chip company. From a Chinese perspective, red chips belong to the 
domestic shares. 
 
The red chips concept was born in the HKEX in the early 1990s. The People’s Republic of 
China was called Red China by Hong Kong and by international investors at that time and 
consequently those offshore registered companies listed in the HKEX with Chinese mainland 
backgrounds were known as red chips. Red chips can be distinguished by business scope and 
type of shareholders. If a company is registered outside China and listed on the HKEX, but its 
major business and most of its profit is gained from mainland China, it is a red chip company. 
And if a company is registered outside of China and listed on the HKEX, but the major 
shareholders have a Chinese background, it is also defined as a red chip company. 
 
Before 1997 the Hong Kong capital market had been exhibited both British and Chinese 
characteristics reflecting Hong Kong’s long international history. When China resumed 
sovereignty of Hong Kong, the Hong Kong and mainland economies became more closely 
linked. Mainland companies gradually began to enter into the HKEX, and then formed the 
third group of companies, which are Chinese funded enterprises.  
 
Red chips entered into the stage of rapid development after 2000. Twelve red chips were post 
listed in 2000. There are 84 red chips listed in the HKEX until 2004.
10
  
 
                                                 
10
 Refers to SHSE research office. 
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Chinese enterprises began listing on the Singapore Stock Exchange in 1993. In both 2003 and 
2004, there were 12 Chinese enterprises listed in Singapore; most of those companies were 
private companies and red chip companies. A total of 47 Chinese companies had been listed 
in Singapore during the decade 1992 to 2012, also known as “Dragon Chips”. Chinese 
enterprises began listing in the US in 1992; most of the listed stocks are red chips. In addition, 
there are small amounts of red chips in London, Toronto and Tokyo Stock Exchanges.  
 
During the 1990s, some mainland Chinese-funded companies acquired the small- and 
medium-sized Hong Kong listed companies and reformed them as red chips. In recent years 
Chinese-funded companies have reorganized and registered their subordinate companies in 
Hong Kong and then listed their subordinated companies on the HKEX as red chips. Red 
chips have become an important channel for Chinese companies to enter international capital 
markets – similar to H- and B-shares. The rise and development of red chips has also had a 
positive impact on the HKEX. 
3.14 Difference between H-Shares and Red Chips 
Thus both red chips and H-Shares are listed on the HKEX, but the fundamental difference is 
that red chips are registered and managed overseas, and H-shares are registered and managed 
in mainland China. For red chip stock, 100% of shares can be traded. For H-Share stock, 
some of the shares are state-owned shares or are legal person shares so they are un-tradable. 
If a company wants to issue new shares, red chips may have greater flexibility while H-
Shares may take a relatively longer time and have a higher risk. On the issuance of new 
shares and bonds, red chip companies do not needs to meet the mainland legal procedures but 
H-Share companies do and their issuances have to be approved by the relevant state 
departments.  
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3.15 Introduction of S-Shares 
S-Shares refer to the listing shares of companies registered and operating their core business 
in mainland China, but are listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange. 
3.16 Introduction of N-Shares 
N-shares refer to the listing shares of companies registered and operating their core business 
in mainland China, but are listed on the New York Stock Exchange. 
3.17 Conclusion 
This chapter examines the introduction of the Qing Dynasty stock market and Hong Kong 
stock market history, the introduction of the Shenzhen, Shanghai and Hong Kong stock 
exchanges, and the relationship between Chinese and international stock markets. This 
chapter also explains the introduction of A, B, H, S, N and red chip classes of shares. While it 
is true that Chinese stock markets are developing they also have a long time history. The next 
chapter covers the background and progress of the New Zealand Stock Exchange. 
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CHAPTER 4 BACKGROUND TO THE NEW ZEALAND 
STOCK EXCHANGE 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter provided background about the growth of Chinese stock markets over 
the last 200 years along with brief information about the different classes of shares. This 
chapter covers the background and progress of the New Zealand Stock Exchange. 
4.2 Introducing New Zealand’s stock trading history (19th Century) 
Compared with Chinese stock markets, the New Zealand stock market is small, has less 
trading volume, fewer listings but a far more developed market. The New Zealand Banking 
Company was established by influential settlers in 1840, the first New Zealand-founded bank. 
Later on, other banks were established in New Zealand and offered bank shares to the public, 
but the only place for investors to purchase those shares was from their head offices, and they 
were normally located in the UK or Australia. Most of the investors were also located in UK. 
Insurance companies also started to sell shares in 1859. 
 
The gold rushes of the 1860s led to more active share trading in New Zealand; actually the 
New Zealand Stock Exchange emerging from a group of regional exchanges. At that time 
many quartz mining industry corporations were established and those companies needed to 
attract capital. The Otago Pioneer Quartz Mining Company was founded in 1864; it raised a 
total of 12,000 pounds capital. At the same time, stock trading became active in Shanghai and 
HSBC was established in Hong Kong. In 1867, Dunedin stock agents Connell and Moodie 
established the first stock exchange in New Zealand, named Dunedin Brokers’ Association, 
which not only traded in mining stocks, but also bank, insurance, and shipping stocks or 
government debentures. The Otago Brokers’ Association was formed in 1868. In 1868, after 
a rich lode of gold was discovered at Thames, the very first New Zealand stock boom began. 
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Brokers traded shares for more than 300 mining corporations in the Auckland area, but the 
boom had faded by 1873.   
 
The Auckland Brokers’ Association was established in 1872. The association traded mining, 
shipping, bank and insurance shares. In 1880, corporations dredging for gold in Otago led to 
the second New Zealand stock market boom. The Otago Brokers’ Association became the 
Dunedin Stock Exchange in 1893. The Wellington Sharebrokers’ Association had been 
established in 1882, and became the Wellington Stock and Sharebrokers’ Association in 1896.  
4.3 Introducing New Zealand’s stock trading history (20th Century) 
In 1915 the five stock exchanges of Dunedin, Otago, Auckland, Wellington and Thames 
established the Stock Association of New Zealand. The head office was set up in Wellington 
and Arthur Bate became chairman of the association. The Taranaki exchange joined the 
association in 1916, Invercargill joined in 1920, and Gisborne joined in 1922. 
 
During the Second World War there was no active share trading on the New Zealand stock 
market. Only government bonds, municipal debentures and bonds were traded in the markets. 
At the same time, Shanghai Stock Exchange and Hong Kong Stock Exchange were also 
closed because of war. At the 1949 election, New Zealand’s National Party government came 
to power, repealed the war regulations and removed the income tax from stock holdings 
capital gain.  
 
In 1976 the Stock Association of New Zealand investigated the formation of a national 
exchange. The Christchurch and Invercargill exchanges merged in 1978. The national New 
Zealand Stock Exchange was established in 1983. The NZSE became a member of the World 
Federation of Exchanges in 1984. The remaining three independent local exchanges were 
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merged in 1989. Bill Foster became the first managing director of the NZSE in the same year, 
and the head office of the exchange remained in Wellington. At the same time, Shenzhen 
City Hall made the decision to build up the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in China.  
 
The first six years of the 1980s was a “golden age” for the NZSE. The market capitalisation 
was 44 billion New Zealand dollars (NZD).  In that period, the New Zealand stock market 
was the best performing market in the world. From 1982 to 1987, the New Zealand stock 
market rose about 600%. In 1987, NZSE share prices reached the highest point in its history 
with 309 companies listed at that time. But along with the rest of the world, the New Zealand 
market collapsed on “Black Friday” 20 October, 1987.  During the first two years after the 
market crash, more than 200 companies delisted and market capitalization decreased to 20 
billion dollars. Following the 1990 election, the government cut the fiscal deficit, alleviated 
the pressure of inflation, and also approved interest rate cuts. The stock market reawakened. 
In 1991 the exchange introduced NZSE40 and NZSE30 indices as measurements of market 
performance. In 1993, only 140 companies had survived and remained listed. By 2000, there 
were 224 listed stocks and the market capitalization was 46.8 billion NZD. That was 13 years 
after the market crash and even taking inflation into consideration the NZSE still had not 
reached the high point it experienced before the crash. In contrast to other developed stock 
markets, the New Zealand stock market did not rebound from the trough before the 21
st
 
century. The former exchange chairman Sir Eion Edgar related the poor performance to 
sluggishness in listed companies’ performance. However a former Finance Minister Labour’s 
Dr Michael Cullen believed that stock performance did not reflect the local economic growth, 
and that the stock market had a “structure problem”.  
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4.4 Introducing New Zealand’s stock trading history (21st Century) 
Mark Weldon was appointed as CEO of the NZSE in 2002. On 31 December 2002, the NZSE 
became a limited liability trading company. In 2003, the NZSE IPO had been listed on its 
own exchange with a trading code “NZX”. Now the NZSE has four trading halls in the 
country, located in Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin. Historically, these 
were the local stock exchanges. In the NZSE, the major investors are individuals; they hold 
about 50% of stocks. NZSE uses a fully computerised trading system. The system can 
provide trading information to investors, and also disclose important company information. 
All transactions are operated in NZD; a trading unit includes 100 shares. Compared with 
Chinese stock exchanges, capital gains are relatively small on the NZSE, but the dividend 
payments are relatively higher. 
Table 4.1: Summary of the NZSE 2002-2010
11
 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Number of Listing Stocks   224   153 170 204 
New Listing Stocks 
    
25 40 
Market Capitalization (billion 
NZD) 
    
50.340 61.340 
Stock Trading Volume (billion 
NZD) 
25.000 32.000 29.000 22.000 20.400 26.000 
Number of Trades 650000 720000 680000 520000 558393 636500 
NZX50 Index 
 
1926.380 2115.430 1955.450 2304.870 2684.110 
New NZDX Listing 
    
6   5 
New NZAX Listing         9 10 
       Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Number of Listing Stocks 
 
130 144 
   New Listing Stocks 
      Market Capitalization (billion 
NZD) 
      Stock Trading Volume (billion 
NZD) 
31.640 
     Number of Trades 649230 
     NZX50 Index 2752.410 3150.280 2997.970 1904.780 2140.420 2081.770 
New NZDX Listing 
      New NZAX Listing             
 
                                                 
11
 Refers to NZX Company Research Database, NZX annual reports 2003-2010, many factors are unavailable. 
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The NZSE includes four major markets: NZSX, NZAX, NZDX and NZCX.   NZAX is the 
marketplace for small and medium sized growing IPOs. NZDX is designed for corporate 
bonds, government bonds, and fixed income securities.  
 
The NZSX provides nine portfolio indices: NZX50 is the headline index, comprising the 50 
largest companies in the NZSX. NZX20 comprises the 20 largest companies and NZX15 
comprises the 15 largest companies in the NZSX. NZX50 portfolio comprises the 50 largest 
companies in the NZSX, but limits the weight of each security to 5% of index market 
capitalization. The SciTech index includes companies with a significant business interest in 
new technologies and innovation; all participants are from NZSX and NZAX. NZX10 
comprises the 10 largest companies in the NZSX. NZX MidCap comprises all medium sized 
companies in NZX50 but excludes NZX10 companies. NZX Small Cap comprises all NZSX 
companies but excludes NZX50 companies. The NZX is comprised of all NZX listed 
companies.  
 
Since 2010 the NZSE has moved to expand securities traded by moving into the futures and 
option market, which it denotes as NZCX. NZCX is designed for options and futures 
products based on dairy and equity contracts. When the NZSE launched its futures and option 
market for dairy, it was the first in the world.  Dairy products trading is based on fundamental 
products and dominated by five commodities: Whole Milk Powder (WMP), Skim Milk 
Powder (SMP), Butter, Anhydrous Milk Fat (AMF) and Cheese. WMP and SMP are more 
traded than others. As New Zealand is the largest dairy product exporter in the world, dairy 
futures and options are very important for domestic farmers and exporters to manage their 
products’ price risk and also provide a forward view of price for dairy industry participants. 
The major contracts include WMP futures, WMP options, SMP futures, and AMF futures. 
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NZSE also established NZX Agri, which is a major provider of data and information services 
for the farmer and agriculture business participants. It focuses on dairy, meat and other 
agricultural commodities grown in New Zealand. NZX Agri helps people working in the 
agricultural sector to acquire the important and relevant news, market data, publications, and 
analysis from New Zealand and the rest of the world. 
 
The listing corporations must meet the listing requirements of the stock exchange. The NZSE 
requires all listed companies to promptly disclose all relevant information to the exchange 
and investors, in order to ensure market participants get all information at any time. The 
listed firms must sign the listing agreement with the stock exchange, and submit semi-annual 
reports and annual reports on time. The listed companies also have responsibility to report 
their sales turnover, profit, ROA, ROE, director information and other important factors in 
the annual report.  
4.5 Similarities of the New Zealand and Chinese stock markets 
New Zealand and China are very different countries; reflected in their size, population, and 
legal and political systems. Even from an economic perspective, those countries have very 
different economic standards, such as degrees of market maturity, GDP, GDP per capita, 
export, import, and so on. But there are still some interesting similarities in their stock 
markets. 
 
First, both countries began modern stock trading in the 1860s coming from a colonial 
economy background. That is because when the colonial economy became prosperous, stock 
trading was introduced by British businessmen into Shanghai, Hong Kong, and also New 
Zealand. For both countries, stock trading started from banks and insurance companies, and 
then moved on to include raw material and utilities. 
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Secondly, the development of stock markets was stopped by war. During the Second World 
War time, only government bonds, municipal debentures and bonds were traded on the New 
Zealand stock markets. At the same time, Shanghai Stock Exchange and Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange were closed because of Japanese aggression. 
 
Thirdly, the local exchanges were finally merged into a national exchange in 1989 in New 
Zealand. Chinese stock exchanges were established in 1990, almost at the same time. 
 
Fourthly, both New Zealand and Chinese stock markets are not very attractive to foreign 
IPOs. Unlike the exchanges of New York, Tokyo and Singapore, there are no foreign IPOs 
listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen, even though these exchanges are two of the top ten 
exchanges in the world in trading volume. Even on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, most 
foreign IPOs listed there are from mainland China. There are not many foreign IPOs listed in 
New Zealand, except IPOs from Australia. So the performance of stock markets in New 
Zealand and China may be an important standard for indicating each country’s domestic 
economic situation. 
 
In more recent years, the New Zealand economy has become more integrated with Asian 
economies. The tests of how corporate governance impacts on IPO returns in New Zealand 
and China will enable a valuable comparison.  
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter covers the background and progress of the New Zealand Stock Exchange. The 
next chapter provides the research questions, hypotheses, models, variables, statistical tests 
and suitable regression formulations for this research. 
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CHAPTER 5 METHODOLOGY 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous two chapters presented the background to the Chinese and New Zealand stock 
markets. It also provided brief information about the different classes of Chinese and New 
Zealand shares.  
 
In Chapter 5 the methodology and research method are discussed. These include the initial 
research questions, hypotheses, models (including potential independent and control 
variables), statistical tests and suitable regression formulations to test the relationship 
between corporate governance and the short- and longer-term IPO performance. 
 
Corporate governance mechanisms and IPO performance have been widely studied by 
researchers and tested in both developed and developing markets. IPOs are very important for 
investors, stock markets and economic growth, because they are the way that firms raise 
capital from the public. Investors may place resources with new ventures promoting potential 
growth and long-term sustainable returns. The success of IPOs is not only important for the 
survival of the company, it is also important for the longer-term contribution IPO can make to 
the economy through employment, growth, etc. 
 
Prior research has focused on the returns of IPOs on listing, the longer-term returns of IPOs 
and, recently, on the impact of attributes of board directors on companies’ listing 
performance.  However, the impact of corporate governance upon the longer-term 
performance, and the pattern of returns as the companies move forward from new listing 
remain unclear.  The importance of governance to longer-term sustainable IPO performance 
is a key issue for the research method developed below. 
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5.2 Research Framework  
The previous literature suggests that corporate governance mechanisms have an impact on 
IPO performance in developed and developing countries at different levels. However, most 
studies have focused on large and developed economies, viz United States, United Kingdom, 
other European nations, Australia and Japan. There are very few studies focused on smaller 
developed economics, viz New Zealand, Singapore, or even Hong Kong. The New Zealand 
economy is increasingly becoming more integrated with Asian economies, but culture, 
lifestyle, politics and legal systems are very different in East and North Asian countries.  
 
There is also substantial literature relating to large but developing economics, viz China, 
India, Russia and Brazil. China is now the second largest economy in the world, after the 
United States. Researchers have investigated many issues relating to the Chinese stock 
exchange, but the material relating to corporate governance and IPOs is small. IPOs are very 
important in most nations, but there are some differences in China. IPOs are the way firms 
raise capital from the public but they may not be correlated with the economic growth of 
China. From 1999 to 2011, on average, the Chinese economy achieved 10% growth increase 
a year and during that period stock market indices stayed at almost same level.   
 
The aim of this research is to examine the impact of corporate governance practices in China 
and New Zealand on the short- and longer-term sustainable returns from IPOs. The countries 
selected for the study reflect differing degrees of market maturity, political, legal and cultural 
bases. The tests of how corporate governance impacts on IPO returns in culturally different 
countries will enable a valuable comparison. Furthur, the separate studies of the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange may provide different results regarding size, 
target, and participants. 
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Prior researchers have emphasised the difference between short-term and long-term IPO 
performance.  According to Allen, Morkel–Kingsbury and Piboonthanakiat (1999) and 
Durukan (2002), the short-term IPO performance is negatively related to long-term IPO 
performance. Kao, Wu and Yang (2009) indicate that short-term Chinese IPOs are 
overestimated by investors. Most prior research employs a single long-term IPO return, viz 
three years or five years buy-and-holding abnormal return (BHAR). But corporate 
governance mechanisms may change every year or even less than a year, perhaps when a new 
CEO is appointed, directors resign, shareholders buy and sell, or any other changes. This 
study employs yearly long-term IPO performance to indicate the relationship between yearly 
corporate governance mechanisms and sustainable IPO performance.  
 
Prior researchers have also emphasised the relationship between corporate governance and 
firm performance. Abdullah (2004) finds that board independence and CEO duality have no 
significant effect on firm performance, and outside directors dominate the firm board in 
Malaysia. Chen (2001) indicates SOE share is negatively associated with corporate 
performance, but domestic institutional and managerial ownership improves firm 
performance in China. Dwivedi and Jain (2005) find that foreign shareholding and board size 
are positively associated with firm value and shareholder wealth, and directors’ shareholding 
and public shareholding have a negative association with firm value and shareholder wealth 
in India. Ting (2006) finds positive effects of corporate governance on firm performance, 
which indicates the importance of corporate governance during poor economic conditions in 
Taiwan. Chang (2009) indicates that firms with a large percentage of outside directors are 
less likely to face financial distress, but large board size is more likely to correlate with 
financial distress in China. Most prior studies tested only a part or some parts of governance 
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mechanisms, viz directors, management, or ownership variables. This study includes all 
possible governance compositions, viz board size, board demographics, board leadership, 
board education, and board evaluation variables. 
 
The study is based on five research questions. 
1. Is long-term IPO performance related to corporate governance mechanisms in the 
SHSE, SZSE and NZSE? 
2. Is short-term IPO performance related to corporate governance mechanisms in the 
SHSE, SZSE and NZSE? 
3. Is Chinese IPO performance related to different governance mechanisms, associated 
with the size and participant differences between the stock exchanges? 
4. Are Chinese and New Zealand IPO performance related to different governance mechanisms, 
because of the different institutional systems (viz board structure difference, CEO and 
chairman age and qualification, SOE ownership) and exchange regulations difference of 
countries? 
5. Is IPO performance on the SZSE and NZSE related to similar governance 
mechanisms because of their similar size? 
The study extends and makes several contributions to the current literature. First, compared 
with previous studies, the study employs a wide range of governance variables. The study 
adds to the understanding of how different governance mechanisms impact the short- and 
long-term IPO performance. Secondly, most prior studies test either short-term or long-term 
IPO performance over a specific period.  This study tests the IPO performance for as many as 
11 years. Thirdly, most previous studies have focused on large and developed economies, viz 
United States, United Kingdom, other European nations, Australia and Japan. This study 
provides evidence from China, which is the world’s fastest growing economy and has 
developing stock markets, and evidence from New Zealand, which has a developed but small 
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stock market. Fourthly, most previous literature tests the impact of corporate governance on 
IPO and firm performance in one market, but this study offers a comparison between two 
Chinese stock markets, and even comparisons between two countries. Fifthly, this study uses 
a more robust empirical analysis, extending the commonly used OLS approach, with careful 
diagnostic testing and then applying a more appropriate model as appropriate. 
5.3 Conceptual Framework 
Figure 1 provides the conceptual framework for the study. On the left hand side are the 
corporate governance mechanisms selected from Chinese and New Zealand stock markets. 
These variables are organised into five groups of governance compositions, which from the 
literature have been shown to be potentially important and significant for short- and long-
term IPO performance. These independent variables include board size, board demographics, 
board leadership, board education, and board evaluation. There are three long-term dependent 
variables, viz yearly abnormal return, long-term Tobin’s Q, and long-term ROA. There are 
also three short-term dependent variables, viz first day abnormal return, short-term Tobin’s Q 
and short term ROA. The control variables such as size, beta, labour, market factors, 
industries, and years of listings may also impact corporate governance and IPO performance.  
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Figure 5.1 Conceptual Framework: A model of Corporate Governance Mechanisms and IPO 
performance in China and New Zealand 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.4 Hypotheses  
Prior research has considered many independent variables. These are tested using correlation 
analysis. Further development into multiple regressions will follow as appropriate. 
 
According to McKnight, Tomkins, Weir and Hobson (2000), CEO age is U-shape, associated 
with pay and firm performance in the UK. Bonn, Yoshikawa and Phan (2004) indicate that 
director age is negatively associated with firm performance in Japan. 
Hypothesis 1: CEO’s age is positively associated with IPO performance. 
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Hypothesis 2: Chairperson’s age is positively associated with IPO performance. 
Hypothesis 3: CEO’s qualification is positively associated with IPO performance. 
Hypothesis 4: Chairperson’s qualification is positively associated with IPO performance. 
 
Dempere (2007) indicates that directors’ knowledge and experience has a positive 
relationship with long-term IPO performance in the US. Mclntyre, Murphy and Mitchell 
(2007) suggest that high-level board experience is positively associated with firm 
performance in Canada. 
Hypothesis 5: CEO’s experience is positively associated with IPO performance. 
Hypothesis 6: Chairperson’s experience is positively associated with IPO performance. 
 
Adams, Gupta and Leeth (2009) indicate that firm performance preceding CEO appointments 
tends to favour females, implying that female CEOs are appointed to the position when the 
firms are in better financial condition at the time of flotation. 
Hypothesis 7: The female CEO is positively associated with IPO performance. 
 
According to Engel, Gordon & Hayes (2002), Lee, Lev & Yeo (2008) and Nikbakht, 
Shahrokhi & Martin Jr (2007), TMT pay is positively related to IPO performance in the US. 
Kren & Kerr (1997) and Lippert (1999) indicate a positive relationship between CEO 
compensation and firm performance.  
Hypothesis 8: CEO salary is positively associated with IPO performance. 
Hypothesis 9: Top management salary is positively associated with IPO performance. 
 
The relationship of CEO duality and firm performance is investigated by Balatbat, Taylor and 
Walter (2004) indicating that CEO duality is positively associated with long-term IPO 
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performance in Australia. Li and Naughton (2007) find that CEO duality is positively 
associated with long-term IPO performance in China. Chahine and Tohme (2009) indicate 
CEO duality is negatively related with short-term IPO underpricing in Arab countries. 
 
Dempere (2007) indicates that CEO duality has a negative relationship with long-term IPO 
performance in the US.  Lam & Lee (2008) and Abdullah (2004) indicate that CEO duality 
has no significant effect on firm performance in Hong Kong and Malaysia. Lam & Lee (2008) 
and Braun & Sharma (2007) indicate that CEO duality and accounting performance are 
positively related in non-family firms, but negatively related in family controlled firms in 
Hong Kong and the US. This may be when one person holds both CEO and chairman 
position in non-family firms they behave as steward and increase firm financial performance. 
On the other hand from an agency theory perspective this duality role removes information 
asymmetry and increase IPO performance. 
Hypothesis 10: CEO duality is positively associated with IPO performance. 
 
According to Abdullah (2004); Bonn (2004); Bonn, Yoshikawa & Phan (2004); Daily, Certo 
& Dalton (2005), Dwivedi & Jain (2005); Staikouras, Staikouras & Agoraki (2007), and 
Chang (2009), board size is negatively associated with firm performance in Japan, Taiwan 
and Europe, but positively associated with firm performance in India, and has no influence in 
Australia, the US and Malaysia. Li and Naughton (2007) find that board size is positively 
associated with under-pricing in the short term in China. According to the agency theory if 
board size increase, it provides more opportunities for free-rider problems. 
Hypothesis 11: Board size is negatively associated with IPO performance. 
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Abdullah (2004), Balatbat, Taylor & Walter (2004), Bonn (2004), Bonn, Yoshikawa & Phan 
(2004), Roosenboom & van der Goot (2005); Reddy, Locke, Scrimgeour & Gunasekarage 
(2008), suggest outside directors are positively related to firm value in Holland, Australia and 
New Zealand, but have no influence in Japan and Malaysia. Dempere (2007) also indicates 
that outside directors have a positive relationship with short-term IPO performance, but a 
negative relationship with long-term IPO performance in the US. According to Chang (2009) 
and Li, Wang & Deng (2008), independent directors are negatively associated with the 
probability of financial distress in Taiwan and China. Shan and McIver (2011) indicate that 
board independence is positively significant on the performance of large companies in China. 
Hypothesis 12: Outside directors’ participation is positively associated with IPO 
performance. 
 
According to Bonn (2004), Bonn, Yoshikawa & Phan (2004), Campbell & Minguez-Vera 
(2008), and Reddy, Locke, Scrimgeour & Gunasekarage (2008), female directors are 
positively associated with firm performance in Spain, US, New Zealand and Australia, but 
have no influence in Japan. 
Hypothesis 13: The number of female directors is positively associated with IPO 
performance. 
 
Gao and Kling (2008) use the number of board member meetings a year as a corporate 
governance independent variable. 
Hypothesis 14: The number of board meetings a year is positively associated with IPO 
performance. 
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The relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance is considered by Kroll, 
Walters & Le (2007), Nikbakht, Shahrokhi & Martin Jr (2007), Balatbat, Taylor & Walter 
(2004), and  Roosenboom & van der Goot (2005), suggesting that managerial ownership is 
positively associated with IPO performance in the US, Australia and Holland. But Dempere 
(2007) indicates insider ownership has a negative relationship with long-term IPO 
performance in the US.  
 
Firth (1997) and Reddy, Locke, Scrimgeour & Gunasekarage (2008) indicate that insider 
ownership has a negative effect on firm performance in New Zealand. Chen and Kao (2005) 
indicate the increase of managerial ownership decreases stock performance in Taiwan. Yang 
and Sheu (2006) indicate that insider ownership first decreases and then increases the 
likelihood of IPO survival at offering time, forming a U-shaped relationship in Taiwan.  Pant 
and Pattanayak (2010) find that insider ownership has a positive impact on the firm 
productivity in India. 
 
Carow, Cox and Roden (2007) indicate that first day returns are higher with the percentage of 
insider purchasing, but there is no evidence in regard to future performance. Chou, Wu & 
Chen (2007) and Hu & Zhou (2008) indicate that managerial ownership is positively 
associated with firm performance for a middle percentage of managerial ownership of firms, 
but managerial ownership is negatively associated with firm performance when there is a 
high percentage of managerial ownership in the firms; the link between firm performance and 
managerial ownership is non-linear in China and Taiwan.  
Hypothesis 15: Insider ownership has a positive relationship with IPO performance.  
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Gu (2003) indicates that state ownership is significantly negatively connected to the short-
term IPO performance in China. Chen (2001) indicates that the size of SOE share ownership 
is negatively associated with corporate performance. According to Li, Wang and Deng (2008), 
state ownership is negatively associated with the probability of financial distress in China. 
Yang et al. (2011) indicate that the large percentage of SOE ownership, strong political 
connections between firms and government, and lack of independent judicial system causing 
governance mechanisms less effective in China. Chi et al. (2010) find that reducing of SOE 
ownership reduces the IPOs attractiveness in the long run. 
Hypothesis 16: SOE ownership is negatively associated with IPO performance. 
 
Chahine (2007) finds that block ownership is negatively associated with firm performance in 
the short-term in France. Reddy, Locke, Scrimgeour and Gunasekarage (2008) indicate that 
block ownership has a positive effect on firm performance in New Zealand. 
Hypothesis 17: Block ownership is negatively associated with IPO performance.  
Hypothesis 18: Non-trading ownership is negatively associated with IPO performance.  
Hypothesis 19: The percentage of largest ownership is negatively associated with IPO 
performance.  
 
Balatbat, Taylor & Walter (2004) and Li, Lam, Qian & Fang (2006) find that institutional 
ownership is positively associated with IPO performance in Australia and China, but has no 
significant effect on firm performance in Hong Kong. Pant and Pattanayak (2010) find that 
domestic institutional ownership has a positive impact on the firm productivity in India. 
Hypothesis 20: Institutional ownership is positively associated with IPO performance. 
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Wang (2005) indicates that a curvilinear relationship exists between legal person 
shareholding and operating performance, and between concentration of non-state ownership 
and operating performance in China. Levis (2011) finds that private IPOs achieved better 
operating and market performance when compared to other IPOs in the three years following 
the public listing in United Kingdom. 
Hypothesis 21: Legal person ownership is positively associated with IPO performance.  
 
Gao (2004) indicates that the supervisory boards represent the benefits of small- and 
medium- shareholders’ litigation in China. Xiao et al. (2004) finds that the supervisory board 
is very important for overseeing the financial condition and monitoring management and the 
board of directors. According to Li & Wang (2005), the supervisory board’s contribution to 
governance performance is negatively related to the larger shareholder ownership. Li and 
Wang (2005) also indicate the importance of strengthening supervisory boards. Wang and 
Liu (2006) believe that the independent directors and supervisory board have complementary 
advantages in the Chinese governance system. He (2003) and Wen et al. (2003) also support 
the complementary relationship of independent directors and supervisory boards in China. 
Hypothesis 22: Supervisory board size is positively associated with IPO performance.  
Hypothesis 23: Supervisor meetings per year is positively associated with IPO performance.  
 
According to Jain and Martin Jr (2005), investment in a high quality audit leads to a 
significantly lower post-IPO failure rate in the US. Bedaed, Coulombe and Courteau (2008) 
indicate the independent and experienced audit committee decreases significantly the level of 
underpricing of IPOs in Canada. According to Li, Wang and Deng (2008), auditor opinion is 
negatively associated with the probability of financial distress in China. Reddy et al. (2008) 
indicate that an audit committee has a positive effect on firm performance in New Zealand. 
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Yu (2011) find that the rating of audit practices is positively related to the stock return-
earnings in 22 developed countries.  
Hypothesis 24: Audit committee is positively associated with IPO performance. 
Hypothesis 25: Remuneration committee is positively associated with IPO performance. 
Hypothesis 26: Board committee is positively associated with IPO performance. 
5.5Variables 
5.5.1 Dependent Variables  
Performance analyses of IPOs have used multiple metrics in measuring IPO performance, 
such as Tobin’s Q, CAR, BHAR, ROA, ROE, and also short-term IPO return, all of which 
have been discussed in several articles. In this paper, long- and short-term IPO performance 
are analysed using sustainable yearly abnormal return, long-term Tobin’s Q, long-term ROA, 
and also first day abnormal return, short-term Tobin’s Q, and short-term ROA. 
 
Abnormal return is a widely employed metric across different countries and markets and is 
commonly used for long-term IPO performance, e.g. three years abnormal return, five years 
abnormal return, or even ten years abnormal return. It is used in developed markets (Ritter, 
1991; Jaskiewicz et al., 2005; Goergen et al., 2007; Stevenson, 2006; Ljungqvist, 1997) and 
developing markets (Cheng et al., 2006; Ghosh, 2005).  
This study focuses on the long-term sustainable yearly return during a five-to-ten year period, 
using panel data  to analyse IPO performance. Abnormal yearly return is estimated as: 
                                        ] 
    
        
  
 
where YSR is the yearly stock return, P1 is the current stock price, D1 is the current dividend, 
and P0 is the last year stock price.  Rf is the annually normal interest rate. β indicates the beta 
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of the company at the current year. Rm (market return) is the yearly return of the major 
indices in those markets (SSE200, SZSE200, and NZX50).  
 
Short- and longer-term Tobin’s Q as the IPO performance measurement is widely used as a 
dependent variable in the literature (Wilbon, 2003; Reddy et al., 2008). Tobin’s Q is 
computed by dividing the sum of stocks’ market value and debt book value by the book value 
of total assets. Hewa-Wellalage and Locke (2012) indicates that emerging market firms have 
high Tobin’s Q values.   
         
     ⁄        ⁄     
           
 
where MV (the market value) is the result of the company’s current stock price and the total 
number of shares (including non-trading shares in the Chinese stock exchanges). L/T Debt is 
the book value of long-term liabilities. S/T Debt is the book value of short-term liabilities.  
 
Short- and longer-term ROA as the IPO performance measurement is widely used as a 
dependent variable in the literature (Carow et al., 2007; Florin, 2005; Ghosh, 2005; Kao et al., 
2009; Reddy et al., 2008). ROA is computed by dividing the firm’s net income by the book 
value of total assets. 
    
          
            
 
First day abnormal return is widely employed across different countries and markets for 
short-term IPO performance (Stevenson, 2006; Chahine et al., 2008; Durukan, 2002; Ghosh, 
2005; Chen et al., 2000; Kao et al., 2009).   
                                           ] 
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where FDSR (the first day stock return) is calculated by the capital gain and dividend divided 
by the previous year’s stock price at the current IPO listing date. Rf is the daily normal 
interest rate at the current IPO listing date. β indicates the beta of the company at the current 
IPO listing year. Rm (market return) is the current IPO listing date daily return of the major 
indices in those markets (SSE200, SZSE200, and NZX50).  
 
5.5.2 Explanatory Variables 
5.5.2.1 Board 
According to the Chinese Company Act (2005) article 45, the board of directors established 
by a limited liability company shall be composed of 3 to 13 members. According to the 
Chinese Company Act (2005) article 51, a relatively small limited liability company may 
have a managing director and no board of directors. According to the Chinese Company Act 
(2005) article 109, the board of directors established by a limited joint stock company shall 
be composed of 5 to 19 members. 
 
The managing director may concurrently hold the post of the company manager. If a limited 
liability company is established by two or more state owned enterprises, the board of 
directors shall include employee representatives as stated under the Chinese Company Act 
(2005) article 109. The employees’ representatives on the board shall be democratically 
elected by the employees of the company through the general assembly of the representatives 
of employees, or other ways. However, this study finds there are very few companies that 
appoint their grass roots employees as directors.  
 
The chairman and deputy chairman of the board are elected by more than half of all the 
directors. According to the Chinese Company Act (2005) article 111, the board of directors 
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shall convene at least two meetings every year. No meeting of the board of directors may be 
held unless more than half the directors are present. When the board of directors makes a 
resolution, it will be adopted if more than half of the directors support it.  
 
According to the Securities Law of China article 47, to prohibit insider trading and agency 
cost problems, where any director, supervisor and senior manager of a listed company, or any 
shareholder who holds more than 5% of the shares of a listed company, sells the stocks of the 
company as held within six months after purchase, or purchases any stock as sold within six 
months thereafter, the proceeds generated will be incorporated into the profits of the relevant 
company. The board of directors of the company shall withdraw the proceeds.  
 
5.5.2.2 Independent Director 
According to the “Establishment of Independent Director Systems by Listed Companies 
Guiding Opinion”12, an independent director of a listed company means a director who does 
not hold any position in the company other than director and who has no relationship with the 
listed company engaging him or its principal shareholders that could hinder his making 
independent and objective judgements. An independent director should, pursuant to the 
requirements of the relevant laws and regulations, the Guiding Opinions and the company's 
articles of association, conscientiously perform his duties and responsibilities, safeguard the 
company's overall interests and, in particular, pay attention that the lawful rights and interests 
of small and medium shareholders are not prejudiced. In principle, an independent director 
should not simultaneously hold the position of independent director in more than five listed 
companies. 
 
                                                 
12
 Issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission on 16 August, 2001. 
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According to the Guiding Opinion, each Chinese listed company should amend its articles of 
association and engage suitable persons as independent directors. At least one independent 
director should be a professional accountant with a senior accountant position or have 
qualifications as a certified accountant. As of 30 June 2002, each listed company should have 
at least two independent directors on its board. As of 30 June 2003, at least one third of the 
members of the board of directors should be independent directors. 
 
The term of office of independent directors is the same as for other directors of the listed 
company. At the expiration of their first term, they may continue to serve as independent 
directors if reappointed, but the additional time in office may not exceed six years.  
 
5.5.2.3 Information Disclosure 
According to Securities Law of China article 65, a company whose shares or bonds have been 
listed for trading shall, within two months as of the end of the first half of each accounting 
year, submit to the securities regulatory authority under the State Council and the stock 
exchange a midterm report indicating the following contents and announce it:  
(1) The financial statements and business situation of the company; 
(2) Any major litigation involving the company; 
(3) The particulars of any change concerning the shares or corporate bonds thereof as already 
issued; 
(4) The important matters as submitted to the general assembly of shareholders for 
deliberation; and 
(5) Any other matter as prescribed by the securities regulatory authority under the State 
Council. 
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According to Securities Law of China article 66, a listed company whose shares or bonds 
have been listed for trading shall, within four months as of the end of each accounting year, 
submit to the securities regulatory authority under the State Council and the stock exchange 
an annual report indicating the following contents, and announce it: 
(1) A brief account of the company's general situation; 
(2) The financial statement and business situation of the company; 
(3) A brief introduction to the directors, supervisors, and senior managers of the company as 
well as the information regarding their shareholdings; 
(4) The information on shares and corporate bonds as already issued, including the name list 
of the top 10 shareholders who hold the largest numbers of shares in the company as well as 
the amount of shares as held thereby; 
(5) The actual controller of the company; and 
(6) Any other matter as prescribed by the securities regulatory authority under the State 
Council. 
 
5.5.2.4 Audit Committee 
Audit committees are responsible for the internal accounting control, financial statements and 
other matters of financial supervision. The committees are special institutions established by 
the board of directors, whose major responsibilities include the communication between 
internal and external auditing, monitoring and verification of company performance.  The 
audit committee is composed of three directors, two independent and one executive director. 
The audit committee’s main goal is to provide effective financial reporting, and control, 
identify, and manage all factors of financial status.  
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All variables and explanations are reported in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 Dependent, independent and control variables 
Variable Code Variable Explanation 
Dependent   
IR First day abnormal  return, which is the first day return of IPO minus the current day 
market return 
Yearly Return Yearly abnormal return, which is the yearly return of IPO minus the current year market 
return 
Tobin’s Q Sum of equity market value and liabilities book value over sum of equity book value 
and liabilities book value for one year 
ROA Return on asset 
Independent  
MDA CEO age 
MDG CEO gender 
MDQ CEO qualifications, 1 indicates bachelor degree, 2 indicates master degree, 3 indicates 
MBA, and 4 indicates PhD, 0 otherwise 
MDE CEO experience, which is years of working experience as CEO in the current firm 
Top Three Officer 
Pay 
Sum of salaries for top three officers (only for China) 
MDP Salary of CEO (only for NZ) 
MDSC CEO duality, dummy of whether CEO separate from chairperson, 0 indicates same 
person 
BOE Experience of chairman, which is years of working experience as chairman in the 
current firm 
CMQ Chairman qualifications, 1 indicates bachelor degree, 2 indicates master degree, 3 
indicates MBA, and 4 indicates PhD in business, 0 otherwise.  
BOS Number of directors 
OBO Percentage of independent directors 
BOF Number of female directors 
SOS Number of supervisors (only for China) 
MPY Number of board meetings per year 
MPYS Number of  supervisors  meetings per year (only for China) 
BH Dummy of block holder existence, 1 indicates the firm has block holder which is/are 
holding more than 5% shares 
MOS Percentage of insider ownership 
SOE Percentage of state ownership (only for China) 
LP Percentage of legal person ownership (only for China) 
IS Percentage of institutional ownership 
US Percentage of non-trading shares (only for China) 
LSH Percentage of  largest shareholding 
BOC Dummy of 1 indicates board committee existence (only for NZ) 
RC Dummy of 1 indicates remuneration committee existence (only for NZ) 
IA Dummy of 1 indicates independent audit existence (only for NZ) 
NOC Number of committees (only for China) 
Control  
Size Total sales per year 
Beta Beta of the company for the current year (only for China) 
Labour Number of employees (only for China) 
PCL Percentage change of listing number of IPOs per year (only for China) 
PCC Percentage change of market capitalization per year (only for China) 
PCTV Percentage change of market trading volume per year (only for China) 
PCA Percentage change of trading accounts per year (only for China) 
PCAS Percentage change of A-Shares listings per year (only for China) 
PCPE Percentage change of market P/E ratio per year (only for China) 
Industry Dummy of 1 indicates the IPO belongs to industry  
Commercial Dummy of 1 indicates the IPO belongs to commercial 
Property Dummy of 1 indicates the IPO belongs to property 
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Public Service Dummy of 1 indicates the IPO belongs to public service 
Composite Dummy of 1 indicates the IPO belongs to composite 
1999 Dummy of 1 indicates the IPO listed in year 1999 
2000 Dummy of 1 indicates the IPO listed in year 2000 
2001 Dummy of 1 indicates the IPO listed in year 2001 
2002 Dummy of 1 indicates the IPO listed in year 2002 
2003 Dummy of 1 indicates the IPO listed in year 2003 
2004 Dummy of 1 indicates the IPO listed in year 2004 
 
 
5.6 Model Analysis  
5.6.1 Description of variables 
The first step summarizes the variables and describes the observation, mean, standard 
deviation, skewness, and kurtosis of observations. As explained in the data section of this 
study, some of the variables are hand collected from NZX Deep Archive website; those 
datasets have not been cleaned and corrected by professionals. It is very important to describe 
the variables, find out how many observations are missing and which variables have 
infrequent extreme outliers. The study uses missing data and outliers fixed theories to fix 
those problems. For real numeric variables, viz salary, sales, number of directors, age, 
experience, etc., this study uses their log values to replace the original values.  
 
Descriptive statistics for the three markets to be analysed provide guidance concerning the 
size, distribution and assumption of normality, potential impact of outliers and counts of 
missing values. 
 
When considering the descriptive statistics for the three markets, consideration is given to the 
observations, mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, skewness, and kurtosis. 
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5.6.2 Correlation Test 
The correlation of dependent, independent and control variables are investigated using Stata. 
In this study, we assume two independent variables are highly correlated with each other if 
the absolute value of their correlation is larger than 0.6. In this study, one of the two variables 
may be dropped from the estimation process as necessary. 
 
5.6.3 Normality Test 
Normality is tested to ensure variables are likely to be random and normally distributed. The 
study tests the skewness and kurtosis of the variables again by Jarque-Bera test. Skewness is 
a measurement of asymmetry of the probability distribution of a variable. A positive 
skewness indicates that the probability of variables existing in the right side is higher than in 
the left side. A negative skewness indicates that the probability of variables existing in the 
left side is higher than in the right side. Both positive and negative skewnesses indicate the 
values are not well randomly. Kurtosis is another measurement of dataset; higher kurtosis 
indicates infrequent extreme values or outliers exist in the variables. Both skewness and 
kurtosis tests are important for the study to find out how those variables may affect the 
analysis. A Jarque-Bera test determines whether those variables have the skewness and 
kurtosis to match a normal distribution. For the short-term case, if necessary, we use a 
histogram graph to test whether distributions are normal.  
 
5.6.4 Poolability Test 
The poolability test is undertaken under the assumption of  
µ - N (0, S
2
 I, VT) 
This test uses the F statistic: 
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Where e'e is the sum of squared residuals (SSE) of the pooled OLS and e'ei is the SSE of the 
OLS regression for group i. If the null hypothesis is rejected, the panel data are not poolable. 
 
5.6.5 Heteroskedasticity Test 
From the ordinary least square (OLS) estimation assumption, the error term must be 
homoscedastic; in other words, the variance of the error term must be constant, and each error 
term observation comes from the same probability distribution. Heteroskedasticity is the 
absence of homoscedasticity.  Heteroskedasticity is a common problem that occurs in a cross-
sectional dataset; when heteroskedasticity is present the error term observation comes from 
the different probability distributions (Halcoussis, 2005). In this study, most regressions use 
panel data but it is appropriate to test for heteroskedasticity. According to Halcoussis (2005), 
heteroskedasticity makes the error term of the OLS estimation too small, and also makes the 
t-statistics value of the estimate too large. If heteroskedasticity is present, then OLS is no 
longer unbiased. There are many tests for heteroskedasticity, the two common and classic 
tests being the Park test and the White test. This study employs the Wald test approach, 
which is the panel data heteroskedasticity test recommended by Stata.  Where 
heteroskedasticity is present, the study will employ generalized least-squares (GLS) 
estimation. If there is no heteroskedasticity, then the study will employ OLS estimation. 
Dynamic panel generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation is the potential method if 
both heteroskedasticity and endogeneity are present, consistent with previous corporate 
governance study literature. 
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5.6.6 Multicollinearity Test 
When two or more independent variables are highly correlated in linear fashion 
multicollinearity exists. The study investigates variables in the dynamic panel data using 
Arellano-Bond regression, and tests the effect of each independent variable on the dependent 
variables. Arellano-Bond regressions are also very useful to test whether those variables have 
a multicollinearity problem. If variables have multicollinearity, we will delete them.  
 
5.6.7 Endogeneity Test 
Endogeneity arises when two or more variables are jointly determined in the behavioural 
model. This occurs naturally in the context of a simultaneous equations model, such as a 
supply-demand system in economics, where price and quantity are jointly determined in the 
market for that good or service.  The study will employ the Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test 
to test whether endogeneity exists. When the study runs those independent variables by 
groups separately, variables from other groups will become the potential endogeneity 
(instrument) variables for the regressions. Then the study tests the effect of independent and 
control variables on dependent variables by GLS and dynamic GMM estimation linear 
regression models (Hewa-Wellalage, 2012; Fauzi, 2013). 
 
5.6.8 GLS/Dynamic GMM estimation linear regression models with robust test 
As recounted in the data section, there are 26 potential independent variables and 20 potential 
control variables available for the regressions. Many variables in the same regression will 
cause some econometric problems, such as multicollinearity; those problems may affect the 
explanatory power of the study. As many independent variables have been selected, the study 
groups those variables, and applies them separately into regressions with control variables. 
Board composition are discovered and investigated by many prior studies (Callen, Klein, and 
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Tinkelman, 2003; Chabotar, 1989; Chaganti and Sharma, 1985; de Andres, Azofra, and 
Lopez, 2005; Erhardt, Werbel, and Shrader, 2003; Kang, Chen, and Gray, 2007; Kiel and 
Nicholson, 2003; Reddy, Locke, and Fauzi, 2013; Rose, 2007; Sheridan and Milgate, 2005; 
Wan and Ong, 2005; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Board composition is constituted by five 
groups of governance variables, including board size, board demographics, board leadership, 
board education, and board evaluation. Another potential benefit of grouping is where 
endogeneity exists. If this study tests independent variables by separate groups, variables 
from other groups will become the potential instrument variables for the current group’s 
regression.  Board size variables include number of directors, percentage of independent 
directors, number of supervisors, number of committees, dummy of board committee, 
dummy of independent audit committee, dummy of remuneration. Board demographics 
variables include CEO gender, CEO age, and number of female directors. Board leadership 
variables include CEO duality, percentage of insider ownership, percentage of state 
ownership, percentage of legal person ownership, percentage of un-trading ownership, 
percentage of institutional ownership, percentage of largest shareholding ownership, and 
dummy of block holder existence. Board education variables include CEO qualification and 
chairman qualification. Board evaluation variables include CEO experience, chairman 
experience, CEO salary, top three officers’ salaries, board meetings per year, and supervisors 
meetings per year. After testing those variables by different board compositions, the study 
employs all variables into a single regression. 
Gender, separation, block holder existence, board committee, remuneration committee, and 
independent audit will be investigated through the use of dummy variables in the regression 
models. 
Y= α + βi-n*Xi,t + Ɛ                                              (1)                      
Where  
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Y = dependent variables, viz abnormal first day return, abnormal yearly return, Tobin’s Q, or 
ROA.  
Xit= independent variables and control variables in ith firm and t time. 
Βi-n = parameters to be estimated. 
Ɛ= error term with zero mean.  
The regression analysis starts with a GLS or dynamic GMM on the original panel data and 
the data after adjustment for missing data and outliers. The following regressions indicate the 
regressions including all independent and control variables.  
 
Short Term: 
IP = constant + β1*MDA1 + β2*MDG2 + β3*MDQ3 + β4*MDE4 + β5*Top three officers pay5 
+β6*MDP6 +β7*MDSC7 +β8*BOE8 +β9*CMQ9 +β10*BOS10 +β11*OBO11 +β12*BOF12 
+β13*SOS13 + β14*MPY14 + β15*MPYS15 + β16*BH16 + β17*MOS17 + β18*SOE18 
+β19*LP19+β20*IS20 +β21*US21 +β22*LSH22 +β23*BOC23 +β24*RC24 +β25*IA25 +β26*NOC26 
+β27*control variables (sales, beta, number of employees, industries, listing years, % of 
market factors’ change ) 27 + error                                                                                      (2) 
Where IP = IPO performance measured by abnormal first day return, Tobin’s Q and ROA. 
Long Term: 
IP = constant + β1*MDA1 + β2*MDG2 + β3*MDQ3 + β4*MDE4 + β5*Top three officers pay5 
+β6*MDP6 +β7*MDSC7 +β8*BOE8 +β9*CMQ9 +β10*BOS10 +β11*OBO11 +β12*BOF12 
+β13*SOS13 + β14*MPY14 + β15*MPYS15 + β16*BH16 + β17*MOS17 + β18*SOE18 
+β19*LP19+β20*IS20 +β21*US21 +β22*LSH22 +β23*BOC23 +β24*RC24 +β25*IA25 +β26*NOC26 
+β27*control variables (sales, beta, number of employees, industries, listing years, % of 
market factors’ change ) 27 + error                                                                                  (3) 
Where IP = IPO performance measured by abnormal yearly return, Tobin’s Q and ROA. 
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5.6.9 Specification Test 
It is important to ensure the proposed models have the highest level of explanatory power 
possible. Various specification problems can arise relating to general specification, 
autocorrelation, over identification, and joint significance. There are carefully addressed and 
as result the estimated relationships are superior to those in prior research where such 
checking has not been undertaken. Hausman (1978) introduces a class of specification tests, 
which make use of the difference between parameter estimates which impose and do not 
impose a null hypothesis. According to Hausman and Taylor (1980), the specification test 
examines the effect of imposing the restrictions on the estimator. The parametric restriction is 
important for improving the estimator by removing irrelevant variables and retaining only 
relevant variables.  
 
5.6.9.1 Autocorrelation Test 
An autocorrelation, also referred to serial correlation, occurs when the error term εit 
observations in a regression are correlated. Autocorrelation is a common problem in time-
series regressions and often found in repeating patterns when the past values effect the future 
values. In this study, most regressions use panel data and for consistent estimation, the panel 
data estimators require that ε it be uncorrelated.  The study examines autoregressive level 1 
and autoregressive level 2 statistics to test the first and second order correlation. To be 
confident ε it is not serially correlated it is important that both first and second order test 
statistics are satisfactory.   
 
5.6.9.2 Over Identification Restriction Test 
Where GMM is the more appropriate method of estimation an over identification restriction 
test is important as it provides the parameters of the model. In a GMM model, if the number 
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of moment conditions is greater than the parameters to be estimated, then the model is likely 
to be over identified. Over identification tests are often referred to as Hansen’s test (Hansen, 
1982), Sargan’s test (Sargan, 1958), and Hansen-Sargan test.   
 
5.6.9.3 Joint Significance Test 
When GLS or GMM methods are used it is important to establish the explanatory power of 
the independent and control variables. The joint significance test is to establish whether some 
variables can be omitted. The Wald test is a classic statistical test with a great variety of uses 
and according to Agresti (1990), Agresti (2002) and Polit (1996), the Wald test is useful to 
establish the explanatory power of a group of explanatory variables. If the joint significant 
test is significant then those variables have exploratory power and all of them can be used in 
the regression.  
5.7 Conclusion  
This chapter presented the research framework, conceptual framework and hypotheses. 
Explanations of the variables and a list are also given. The analytic models and specification 
tests are introduced. The next chapter explains the data selection of the study.  
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CHAPTER 6 DATA 
6.1 Overall  
The previous chapter presented the hypotheses, variables, analytic models and specification 
tests for this study. Data are drawn from Shanghai, Shenzhen, and New Zealand stock 
exchanges, covering the IPOs listed from 1999 to 2004. The cut–off date of 2004 permits a 
minimum five years of sourced post-listing data to be used in calculating returns through to 
2009. The data are from public domain records and subscriber databases. Specifically, from 
the websites of the three stock exchanges, NZX Deep Archive, CSMAR database and 
individual companies’ annual reports. The data is compiled as panel data.  
 
The analysis addressed both long-term and short-term time periods. Tobin’s Q, ROA, and 
yearly return are the dependent variables of the regression that indicate the long-term IPO 
performance. First day return, ROA, and Tobin’s Q are the dependent variables in the 
regression relating to short-term IPO performance.  
 
The study considered a range of independent variables guided by prior research. CEO gender, 
qualifications, CEO experience in the company, CEO separation from chairperson, 
chairperson qualifications and experience, number of directors, number of female board 
members, percentage of independent directors, directors meetings per year, percentage of 
insider ownership and largest shareholder ownership. These eleven variables are the common 
independent variables for all markets. Block holder ownership, management term ownership, 
institutional ownership, dummy of board committee, dummy of remuneration committee, and 
dummy of independent audit existence are only available for New Zealand database. CEO 
age, top three officers’ pay, the number of supervisors, supervisors’ meeting frequency, SOE 
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ownership, legal person ownership, shares not for trading, and number of committees are 
only available for Chinese stock exchanges. Different variables are selected for three reasons. 
First, there are some variables unique to China; variables related to supervisors are not 
available in New Zealand. Second, some independent variables may be important for one 
market but not others. For example, the dummy variable block holder ownership is important 
to indicate the share dispersion in New Zealand, but does not work in China because every 
Chinese company has somebody who owns more than 5% of shares. Many Chinese 
companies have SOE ownership, which is not common in New Zealand. The third reason is 
data limitation. We collected those variables from two databases, and some variables are only 
available in one database and not in the other.  
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Table 6.1 Variables available cross all markets 
Variables New Zealand Shanghai Shenzhen 
MD Age 
 
Available Available 
MD Gender Available Available Available 
MD Qualification Available Available Available 
MD Experience Available Available Available 
MD Salary Available 
  
Top Three Officer Pay 
 
Available Available 
CEO Duality Available Available Available 
Chairman Experience Available Available Available 
Chairman Qualification Available Available Available 
Number of Directors Available Available Available 
Independent Director Percentage Available Available Available 
Female Director Number Available Available Available 
Number of Supervisors 
 
Available Available 
Board Meeting per Year Available Available Available 
Supervisors Meeting per Year 
 
Available Available 
Block Holder Existing Available 
  
Institutional Shareholding Available 
  
Insider Shareholding Available Available Available 
SOE Shareholding 
 
Available Available 
Legal Person Shareholding 
 
Available Available 
Non-trading Shareholding 
 
Available Available 
Number of  Committees 
 
Available Available 
Board Committee Available 
  
Remuneration Committee Available 
  
Independent Audit Available 
  
Largest Shareholding Available Available Available 
Size Available Available Available 
Beta 
 
Available Available 
Labour 
 
Available Available 
Market Related Variables 
 
Available Available 
Industries Available Available 
 
Years of listings Available Available Available 
 
Table 6.1 indicates the independent and control variables available in the three markets. 
Additional information relating to governance, compared to that in New Zealand, is available 
in the Chinese databases.  Further independent variables can therefore be tested for statistical 
significance.  CEO age is potentially important for China given a continuing general 
reverence given to older people who are viewed as having acquired more wisdom.  This may 
also explain why all presidents of the Communist Party in China have been over 60 years of 
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age.  The majority of Chinese companies do disclose age which differs from New Zealand 
where such details are viewed as personal and not published. 
 
The CEO salary is not available from the CSMAR database.  However, the salaries of the top 
three are available and can be used as a proxy variable for CEO salary. 
 
In China there is a position contributing to corporate governance known as supervisors.   
Listed companies are required to establish a board of supervisors, consisting of not less than 
three members, which must meet at least every six months.  Supervisors have a term of three 
years which may be renewed.  The roles of supervisors entail five main responsibilities.  First, 
supervisors are responsible for supervising directors and management and ensuring their 
behaviour has not violated any laws, regulations and the articles of association of the 
company and the resolution of the shareholders' assembly. Second, they are responsible for 
the inspection of financial status and other accounting documents. Third, they are responsible 
for checking the accounting reports, business reports, profit distribution and financial data 
that boards of directors submit to the shareholders' meetings. Fourth, they have the right to 
access company management and put forward suggestions. Fifth, they are responsible for the 
resolution of the shareholders' meetings and commitment to their job is comprehensive and 
responsible. As mentioned in section 5.5.2, supervisors play a key role. The number of 
meetings each year may represent the supervisory effort expended. 
 
Two significant parties that own corporate shares in China are SOEs and legal persons.  
Corporate legal persons are defined by "People's Republic of Enterprise Legal Person 
Registration Regulations" and "Republic of China Company Registration"; the individuals 
and organizations refers to the national law with the amount of money, business name, 
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articles of association, organization, address and other statutory requirements, ability to 
independently bear civil liability, approved and registered by the competent authorities to 
obtain legal personality.  In many corporates, SOEs and legal persons own more than 60% of 
shares.  This study expected a highly correlation between SOE and legal person ownership 
variables, as government officers are the legal persons of many of listed companies. 
Accordingly, the non-traded share percentage may become important.   
 
The CSMAR database does not provide information on key board committees, e.g., audit 
committee by name or members.  However, the number of committees is signalled and these 
range between 1 – 4. Industry factor and sale is the common control variable for all markets. 
Beta and labour information is only available from the CSMAR database; beta and labour 
information for New Zealand listed companies are not available from existing databases. 
 
Missing data raises a number of issues. Some NZ IPO governance variables are collected 
from annual reports and in some instances the required information is missing. Tables 1, 2, 
and 3 indicate the number of total observations and the number of missing observations for 
each variable in New Zealand, Shenzhen and Shanghai. Many missing observations could 
highly affect the analysis results, so those variables with high numbers of missing 
observations from the regressions have been ignored.  
 
There were 105 New Zealand IPOs listed from 1999 to 2004. Corporate governance 
information is not available from NZX Deep Archive and other websites for 23 IPOs, which 
leaves 82 IPOs in the sample. They include 61 surviving and 21 delisted companies, which 
results in 542 observations. There are 494 observations to test long-term IPO performance, 
and 82 observations to test short-term IPO performance. The long-term performance and 
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governance data are compiled as unbalanced panel data, and the short-term performance and 
governance data are compiled as cross-sectional data. All observations are reported in Table 
6.2. 
Table 6.2 Number of Missing Observations of Dependent and Independent Variables in New Zealand 
  Long Term Short Term 
Total Observations 494 82 
Name of Variables Missing Observations Missing Observations 
First Day Initial Return n/a 0 
Yearly Return 0 n/a 
ROA 1 0 
Tobin's Q 0 0 
MD Gender 0 6 
MD Qualification 233 37 
MD Experience  26 6 
MD Salary 111 27 
MD Separation 25 6 
Chairman Experience From Listing 2 2 
Chairman Qualification 192 33 
Number of Directors 3 4 
Independent Director Percentage 18 5 
Female Director Number 15 5 
Board Meeting per Year 234 48 
Block Holder Existing 10 9 
Institutional Shareholding 12 10 
Insider Shareholding 22 13 
Board Committee 23 6 
Remuneration Committee 23 6 
Independent Audit 5 3 
Largest Shareholding 11 10 
 
In the New Zealand case, Tobin’s Q is the only variable which has no missing observations. 
Both the financial dependent variables, namely ROA and Tobin’s Q, are calculated from the 
accounting statements provided in companies’ annual reports and NZX Deep website. There 
are some serious abnormal values in those variables, for example, a value of 1900% in yearly 
return, a value of 105.89 in Tobin’s Q, a value of 4545.45 in D/E ratio, and other odd values, 
which impact the results of regression analysis. 
 
In Shenzhen, 142 IPOs have been post listed from 1999 to 2004. All corporate governance 
variables are available from the CSMAR database. In Shenzhen’s case, this includes 140 
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surviving and two delisted companies, which results in 542 observations. There are 1,139 
observations to test the long-term IPO performance, and 142 observations to test the short- 
term IPO performance. The long-term performance and governance data are compiled as 
unbalanced panel data, and the short-term performance and governance data are compiled as 
cross-sectional data. All observations are reported in Table 6.3. 
Table 6.3 Number of Missing Observations of Dependent and Independent Variables in Shenzhen 
  Long Term Short Term 
Total Observations 1139 142 
Name of Variables Missing Observations Missing Observations 
First Day Initial Return n/a 0 
Yearly Return 0 n/a 
ROA 0 0 
Tobin's Q 56 4 
MD Age 2 1 
MD Gender 1 1 
MD Qualification 277 51 
MD Experience  1 1 
Top Three Officer Salary 50 63 
MD Separation 0 0 
Chairman Experience 0 0 
Chairman Qualification 260 49 
Number of Directors 0 0 
Independent Director Percentage 1 1 
Female Director Number 0 0 
Number of Supervisors 2 1 
Board Meetings per Year 52 85 
Supervisor Meetings per Year 52 85 
Insider Shareholding 22 0 
SOE  0 0 
Legal Person 0 0 
Non-trading  0 0 
Number of Committees 0 7 
Largest Shareholding 0 0 
 
In Shanghai, 409 IPOs have been post-listed from 1999 to 2004. All corporate governance 
variables are available from the CSMAR database. In Shanghai’s case, this includes 404 
surviving and five delisted companies, which results in 3218 observations. There are 2,966 
observations regarding long-term IPO performance, and 409 observations regarding short- 
term IPO performance. The long-term performance and governance data are compiled as 
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unbalanced panel data, and the short-term performance and governance data are compiled as 
cross-sectional data. All observations are reported in Table 6.4. 
Table 6.4 Number of Missing Observations of Dependent and Independent Variables in Shanghai 
  Long Term Short Term 
Total Observations 2966 409 
Name of Variables Missing Observations Missing Observations 
First Day Initial Return n/a 0 
Yearly Return 0 n/a 
ROA 0 0 
Tobin's Q 140 8 
MD Age 12 1 
MD Gender 10 1 
MD Qualification 722 117 
MD Experience  11 1 
Top Three Officer Salary 93 84 
MD Separation 8 1 
Chairman Experience 2 0 
Chairman Qualification 718 127 
Number of Directors 0 0 
Independent Director Percentage 0 0 
Female Director Number 0 0 
Number of Supervisors 1 0 
Board Meetings per Year 47 86 
Supervisor Meetings per Year 50 84 
Insider Shareholding 0 0 
SOE  0 0 
Legal Person 0 0 
Non-trading  0 0 
Number of Committees 249 12 
Largest Shareholding 0 0 
 
Unlike the NZSE study, missing variables and outlier variables are not a major problem for 
the Chinese cases.  Chinese IPO governance variables are provided by the CSMAR database, 
and have been investigated by many researchers. But there are still some missing variables 
across observations.  
6.2 Outliers and Missing Data 
Outliers and missing data are a problem in New Zealand’s case. Some of the governance 
variables collected from company annual reports has missing observations. Consequently, 
five variables are omitted from the regressions. There are also some missing variables across 
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observations in the Chinese cases. For some variables there are occasional observations 
missing and to compensate, various statistical processes are used.   
 
Missing data 
Three ways to deal with missing data appear to be commonly used. The first is to do nothing, 
which means leaving the original data with the missing value in place. This is a common 
approach. 
 
The second approach is to delete those cases with missing values, which means deleting all 
cases where there is a missing observation. The current sample includes 82 IPOs and 542 
observations. The long-term performance and governance data are compiled as unbalanced 
panel data, and the short-term performance and governance data are compiled as cross-
sectional data. The dataset includes three dependent and 18 independent variables; almost 
every variable has a small amount of missing data. The sample would contain very few 
observations if case-wise deletion were to be used.  
 
The third approach is to replace the missing values with an imputed value. The most common 
imputation is to use the mean or median value of the variable to replace missing values. 
Twisk and de Vente (2002) suggest several longitudinal imputation methods, such as last 
value carried forward and linear interpolation. The last value carried forward method assumes 
that the variable is constant over a short period. For example, impute the missing value at 
time t with the available value at time t+1. Linear interpolation imputation is the method that 
replaces the missing value with the average value of the previous and next available value. 
For example, impute the missing value at time t with the average value of the available value 
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at time t-1 and t+1. The study selected the third approach, which is to replace the missing 
values with an imputed value, because less than 10% of values are missing. 
 
Outlier 
Several methods have been proposed in prior research to test whether or not a single or series 
of values is an outlier.  
(1). The first method is to find the upper quartile value (UQ) and the lower quartile value (LQ) 
of the variable and then calculate the difference (D) between them.  
D = UQ - LQ 
If a value is 1.5*D greater than the UQ or 1.5*D lower than LQ, it is defined as an outlier. 
(2). An outlier may also operationally be defined as a value at least three standard deviations 
above or below the mean of the variable.  
(3). The third method is also to find the upper quartile value (UQ) and the lower quartile 
value (LQ) of the variable, and then calculate the difference (D) between them.  
D = UQ - LQ 
If a value is 3*D greater than the UQ or 3*D lower than LQ, it defines as outlier. 
(4). If the value is larger or smaller than 99% confidence level, it is an outlier.  
The current study tests method three to access the respective impact on the data.  
6.3 Data Transformation 
Outliers may cause the distribution of variables to exhibit a non-normal distribution. A data 
transformation method may resolve this problem. Three common data transformation 
methods are a square root transformation, log transformation, and inverse transformation.  
The square root transformation takes the square root of every value of a variable but it cannot 
take the square root of a negative value. In this study, there are many variables with negative 
observations, e.g. yearly return, ROA and ROE. The square root transformation is rejected as 
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inappropriate for this study. Inverse transformation takes the inverse of a value, for example, 
to take the inverse of 10 to compute 1/10. It results in small numbers becoming relatively 
large and large numbers becoming small. This was found not to be helpful for the current 
study. Log transformation requires computation of the logarithm value of the variables. Other 
transformations noted in the literature include pruning the top and bottom 5% value and then 
ignoring the outlier samples or replacing those outlier values by the mean or median of the 
current variable. This study uses log transformation to deal with several independent and 
control variables; namely salary, sales, and labour. 
6.4 Conclusion 
To process, the current study tests the outliers by histograms first and then uses median 
imputation, last value carried forward imputation and linear interpolation imputation to 
replace missing and outlier values. If the dataset is non-normal after these tests, log 
transformation may be used to resolve this issue.  
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CHAPTER 7 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IMPACT ON IPO 
PERFORMANCE: SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Previous chapters offered information on the methodology and data for this study. This 
chapter presents the descriptive statistics, econometric tests and the empirical results and 
findings about the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and the short and 
long term performance of IPOs on the Shanghai Stock Exchange.  
 
Section 2 provides a discussion of the descriptive statistics and normality test results of the 
original and transformed variables. Section 3 provides the results of correlation tests. Section 
4 provides the results of heteroskedasticity tests, multicollinearity tests, autocorrelation tests, 
and linearity tests. Section 5 provides the results of endogeneity tests. Section 6 provides the 
results of long-term OLS/GLS/Dynamic GMM tests. Section 7 provides the results of long-
term specification tests. Section 8 provides the results of short-term OLS/GLS tests. Section 9 
provides the results of short-term specification tests. Section 10 provides the conclusion of 
chapter 7. 
 
7.2 Descriptive and Normality Analysis 
The data sample includes 409 IPOs post-listed on the SSE from 1999 to 2004. There are 
2,966 observations regarding long-term IPO performance and governance mechanisms which 
are compiled as unbalanced panel data. There are 409 observations regarding short-term IPO 
performance and governance mechanisms and these are compiled as cross sectional data.  
This section gives the key descriptive statistics of the original sample, including the number 
of observations, mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum. The section also 
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provides the results of normality tests, which indicate skewness and kurtosis. The sample 
includes three dependent variables, 20 independent variables and 20 control variables. The 
sample also includes eight variables that are transformed to log values: two dependent 
variables, four independent variables, and two control variables. 
 
Descriptive statistics for the three markets to be analysed provide guidance concerning the 
size, distribution and assumption of normality, potential impact of outliers and counts of 
missing values. When considering the descriptive statistics for the three markets, 
consideration is given to the observations, mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, 
maximum, skewness, and kurtosis. Descriptive statistics are important for this study for four 
reasons. First, the study selected three markets so it is important to provide the differences 
between markets and find out the potential reasons for the differences. This chapter does not 
just provide the key statistics for the Shanghai market. A comparison between the Shanghai 
and the other two markets and findings from the literature are also reported. Second, 
descriptive statistics are important in providing key information for every variable. For 
example, the mean of abnormal yearly return is 0.1606, well above 0. From that number, the 
study concludes the sample IPOs’ longer-term performances are well above other IPOs in the 
same market. Third, descriptive statistics helps to find the outliers by minimum and 
maximum values of variables. For example, the maximum value of Tobin’s Q is 20.8233, 
which is most likely an outlier, and the study addresses the outlier; otherwise the outlier will 
affect the regression results. Finally, descriptive statistics give the normality test results. If the 
absolute values of skewness and kurtosis values are too high, the study will use logarithm 
values as the potential replacement for the original values.  
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7.2.1 Long-Term Data Descriptive Statistics 
7.2.1.1 Descriptive Statistics of Long-Term Sample 
The distribution of each variable was checked to ensure if it was approximately normal by 
median, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis. The risk is those missing values and 
outliers will significantly affect the sample data. The study will provide the descriptive 
statistical of variables after fixing missing values and outliers in the Table 7.1. From the 
results, all variables offered normally-distributed skewness and minimal kurtosis. 
Table 7.1 Summary of Dependent and Independent Variables Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
Log Yearly Return 2966 0.301 0.302 0.143 -0.449 0.820 -0.133 6.506 
Tobin's Q 2966 1.950 1.589 1.078 0.547 5.753 1.717 5.868 
ROA 2966 0.035 0.034 0.053 -0.133 0.195 -0.616 5.744 
Log  MD Age 2966 1.658 1.653 0.062 1.431 1.875 -0.076 3.028 
MD Gender 2966 0.038 0.000 0.192 0.000 1.000 4.802 24.058 
MD Qualification 2966 1.183 1.000 0.837 0.000 4.000 0.958 4.793 
MD Experience 2966 2.684 2.000 2.375 0.000 13.000 0.914 3.380 
Log  Pay 2966 5.727 5.739 0.398 4.176 7.383 -0.011 3.525 
MD Duality 2966 0.873 1.000 0.333 0.000 1.000 -2.243 6.031 
Chairman Experience 2966 3.192 3.000 2.568 0.000 16.000 0.808 3.295 
Chairman Qualification 2966 1.239 1.000 0.897 0.000 4.000 1.008 4.626 
Log Number of Directors 2966 0.977 0.954 0.095 0.301 1.279 -0.110 5.292 
Independent Director Percentage 2966 0.327 0.333 0.092 0.000 0.750 -1.956 8.579 
Female Director Number 2966 1.025 1.000 1.004 0.000 5.000 0.866 3.356 
Number of Supervisors 2966 4.208 3.000 1.600 0.000 13.000 1.405 5.476 
Log Board Meeting per Year 2966 0.883 0.903 0.163 0.301 1.556 0.100 3.419 
Supervisors Meeting per Year 2966 3.881 4.000 1.728 1.000 16.000 0.980 6.163 
Insider Shareholding 2966 0.022 0.000 0.107 0.000 1.000 6.253 46.921 
SOE Percentage 2966 0.305 0.315 0.266 0.000 0.850 0.124 1.489 
Legal Person Percentage 2966 0.189 0.055 0.233 0.000 0.880 0.950 2.534 
Non-trading Percentage 2966 0.517 0.572 0.205 0.000 0.908 -1.104 3.594 
Number of  Committees 2966 3.036 4.000 1.633 0.000 7.000 -1.108 2.622 
Largest Shareholding 2966 0.417 0.411 0.167 0.045 0.852 0.114 2.136 
 
There are key descriptions for all dependent and independent variables after fixing for 
missing data and outliers as shown in Table 7.1. Abnormal yearly return includes 2966 
observations and there is no missing value. The mean is 0.1606, which is significantly above 
0. This indicates IPOs’ longer-term performances being well above IPOs listed before 1999 
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and after 2004. The median is 0.0024. The standard deviation is 0.8292 which is not large. 
The abnormal return range is from -1.6435 to 8.3592, suggesting that some IPOs have very 
active trading in the stock. The log abnormal yearly return also includes 2966 values. The 
mean is 0.3010, the median is 0.3016, and the standard deviation is 0.1427. The standard 
deviation is very low. The range is from -0.4488 to 0.8203. The skewness is -0.1333 and the 
kurtosis is 6.5056. Table 7.1 also presents the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, 
maximum, skewness, and kurtosis values for the entire long-term dependent and independent 
variables.  
 
The mean of Tobin’s Q is 1.9504, which is significantly above 1, indicating the market values 
of listed firms are far above the underlying asset values, and it is more likely their stock 
prices are irrationally high and overvalued.  The mean of ROA is 0.0347. The value indicates 
that most listing Chinese firms are just surviving. The mean managing director age is 45.91; 
the value indicates that Chinese CEOs are relatively young compared with top government 
officials. The median age is 45 with the youngest CEO aged 27 and the oldest 75. The data 
show those CEOs who are less than 30 years old all have at least a bachelor degree and none 
of them have duality as chairman. A most likely explanation for this result is that those 
relatively younger CEOs are from family-owned companies and they are working as CEO 
under older generation supervision. The mean of managing director qualifications is 1.1834; 
indicating that the average qualification of CEOs is higher than a bachelor degree.  The mean 
of managing director experience is 2.6841. It shows most CEOs do not stay in their positions 
for a long time. For many state owned companies, their CEOs are appointed by local 
governments every three to five years.  
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The top three officers’ salaries include 2874 observations and there are 92 missing values. 
The mean is RMB832079.6
13
 per year, which is nine times the average income in China. The 
median is RMB554550. The value range is from 15000 yuans to 24.2 million yuans.  Some 
top level managers are only earning the basic salaries from their firms, as they hold more than 
one position, being both CEO and government official.    The mean of the female director 
number is 1.0253, the median is 1 and the standard deviation is 1.0044. This indicates that on 
average there is only one female director out of every ten directors in Chinese firms. The 
mean of supervisors meetings per year is 3.8813 and the median is 4. The value range is from 
1 to 16; some supervisors are just meeting once a year.  
 
Compared with the statistics before data transformation, Tobin’s Q, log of CEO age, CEO 
gender, CEO qualification, CEO experience, log of pay, CEO duality, chairman experience, 
chairman qualification, number of supervisors, log board meeting per year, supervisors 
meeting per year, and number of committees have been updated by filling the missing values. 
The outliers for abnormal yearly return, log of abnormal yearly return, Tobin’s Q, ROA, and 
log of ROA had been removed and given replacements. After all, abnormal yearly return, log 
of abnormal yearly return, Tobin’s Q, ROA, log of ROA, log of CEO age, CEO gender, CEO 
experience, and chairman qualification provided more normal variants.  
 
7.2.1.2 Long-Term Control Variables Descriptive Statistics 
The distribution of each variable was checked to ensure it was approximately normal by 
median, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis. The risk is those missing values and 
outliers significantly affect the sample data. The study will provide the descriptive statistics 
                                                 
13
 RMB832079.6 = 160015NZD, or 53339.44 NZD per person. China income per capita is MB31418.4 per year 
in 2011, or 6042NZD. 
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of variables after fix missing and outliers in Table 7.2. From the results, all variables offered 
normally distributed skewness and also minimal kurtosis. 
Table 7.2 Summary of Control Variables Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
Log Size 2966 9.328 9.223 0.538 7.734 12.316 1.786 8.704 
Beta 2966 0.995 1.027 0.225 -2.276 1.781 -1.476 18.147 
Log Labour 2966 3.234 3.233 0.518 1.176 5.622 0.153 4.429 
Percentage change of Listing 2966 0.038 0.010 0.046 -0.004 0.182 1.022 2.949 
Percentage change of Capitalization 2966 0.672 0.025 1.163 -0.640 2.768 0.739 2.029 
Percentage change of Trading 
Volume 
2966 0.900 0.271 1.542 -0.409 4.283 1.267 3.322 
Percentage change of Accounts 2966 0.162 0.064 0.233 0.018 0.739 1.951 5.096 
Percentage change of A-Shares 2966 0.032 0.010 0.041 -0.004 0.170 1.341 3.860 
Percentage change of P/E Ratio 2966 0.160 -0.087 0.646 -0.749 1.039 0.148 1.450 
Industry 2966 0.710 1 0.454 0 1 -0.926 1.857 
Commercial 2966 0.032 0 0.175 0 1 5.347 29.586 
Property 2966 0.023 0 0.149 0 1 6.426 42.292 
Public Service 2966 0.105 0 0.307 0 1 2.574 7.624 
Composite 2966 0.131 0 0.337 0 1 2.194 5.814 
Year 1999 2966 0.087 0 0.282 0 1 2.924 9.547 
Year 2000 2966 0.168 0 0.374 0 1 1.774 4.146 
Year 2001 2966 0.297 0 0.457 0 1 0.887 1.786 
Year 2002 2966 0.142 0 0.355 0 1 2.056 5.227 
Year 2003 2966 0.148 0 0.355 0 1 1.986 4.945 
Year 2004 2966 0.155 0 0.362 0 1 1.902 4.618 
 
There are key descriptions for all control variables after fixing those missing and outliers as 
shown in Table 7.2. The log size includes 2966 observations. The mean is 9.3278, the median 
is 9.2231 and the standard deviation is 0.5383. The value range is from 7.7338 to 12.3155. 
The skewness is 1.7862 and the kurtosis is 8.7040. Table 7.2 also presents the mean, median, 
standard deviation, minimum, maximum, skewness, and kurtosis values for the entire long-
term control variables. The mean of beta is 0.9953; the average beta of sample is very close 
to the market beta. The mean of labour is 4426 employees, a lot larger than the average 
employee number of New Zealand IPOs. The value range is from 15 persons to 418,871 
persons. Compared with the statistics before data transformation, only log of labour was 
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updated by filling the missing values and then offered a normal distribution. The updated data 
provided a normally distributed dataset similar to the original sample dataset.  
 
7.2.2 Short-Term Data Descriptive Statistics 
7.2.2.1 Descriptive Statistics of Short-Term Sample 
Table 7.3 Summary of Dependent and Independent Variables Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
Log First Day Return 409 0.489 0.477 0.105 0.286 0.810 0.681 3.334 
Tobin's Q 409 2.514 2.237 1.171 0.955 7.826 1.279 5.298 
ROA 409 0.049 0.046 0.027 -0.064 0.159 0.456 5.487 
Log  MD Age 409 1.646 1.644 0.068 1.431 1.833 0.036 2.328 
MD Gender 409 0.039 0.000 0.194 0.000 1.000 4.754 23.603 
MD Qualification 409 1.066 1.000 0.788 0.000 4.000 0.967 5.087 
MD Experience 409 1.208 1.000 1.128 0.000 7.000 0.857 4.308 
Log  Pay 409 5.483 5.505 0.375 4.301 6.568 -0.215 3.000 
MD Duality 409 0.863 1.000 0.344 0.000 1.000 -2.112 5.462 
Chairman Experience 409 1.342 1.000 1.127 0.000 7.000 0.781 4.286 
Chairman Qualification 409 1.120 1.000 0.839 0.000 4.000 1.119 5.334 
Log Number of Directors 409 0.974 0.954 0.105 0.602 1.279 -0.196 3.938 
Independent Director Percentage 409 0.197 0.222 0.163 0.000 0.556 -0.104 1.468 
Female Director Number 409 0.976 1.000 1.034 0.000 5.000 1.022 3.798 
Number of Supervisors 409 4.394 5.000 1.621 1.000 11.000 1.065 4.019 
Log Board Meeting per Year 409 0.771 0.778 0.168 0.301 1.279 -0.106 3.131 
Supervisors Meeting per Year 409 3.176 3.000 1.315 1.000 9.000 0.969 4.501 
Insider Shareholding 409 0.030 0.000 0.129 0.000 0.997 5.033 29.136 
SOE Percentage 409 0.384 0.485 0.279 0.000 0.850 -0.296 1.496 
Legal Person Percentage 409 0.250 0.116 0.268 0.000 0.800 0.624 1.801 
Non-trading Percentage 409 0.672 0.671 0.074 0.438 0.908 0.175 3.561 
Number of  Committees 409 0.883 0.000 1.578 0.000 5.000 1.325 2.894 
Largest Shareholding 409 0.464 0.471 0.170 0.061 0.986 -0.110 2.190 
 
There are key descriptions for all dependent, independent variables after fixing for missing 
data and outliers as shown in Table 7.3. Abnormal first day return includes 409 observations 
and there is no missing value. The mean is 1.3451, which is 134.51% above the current day 
market return on average, indicating that IPOs’ short-term performances are irrational in 
China. The abnormal return range is from -0.0664 to 34.8549, suggesting that some IPOs 
have extreme performances during the listing date. Log abnormal first day return also 
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includes 409 values. The mean is 0.4889, the median is 0.4773, and the standard deviation is 
0.1046. The range is from 0.2864 to 0.8098. The skewness is 0.6810 and the kurtosis is 
3.3339. Table 7.3 also presents the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, 
skewness, and kurtosis values for the entire short-term dependent and independent variables. 
 
Tobin’s Q includes 409 observations and there are eight missing values. The mean is 2.5138, 
which is significantly above 1, indicating those stock prices are irrationally high and 
overvalued.  The mean of ROA is 0.0491. The value indicates that most Chinese firms are 
surviving in a difficult situation caused by the recent global economic recession.    
 
Compared with the statistics before data transformation, Tobin’s Q, log of CEO age, CEO 
gender, CEO qualification, CEO experience, log of pay, CEO duality, chairman qualification, 
log board meeting per year, supervisors meetings per year, and number of committees have 
been updated by filling the missing values. Outliers of the abnormal first day return, log of 
abnormal first day return, Tobin’s Q, ROA, and log of ROA have been removed and replaced. 
After all, abnormal first day return, log of abnormal first day return, Tobin’s Q, ROA, log of 
ROA, log of CEO age, and log of pay provided more normal variants. CEO qualification, 
chairman qualification, log meeting per year, supervisors meeting per year provides slightly 
worse normal variants. Others offer similar normal variants. Overall, the results indicate that 
all data are normally distributed except CEO gender and insider shareholding. The updated 
data provide a better and more normal distributed dataset than the original sample dataset.  
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7.2.2.2 Short-Term Control Variables Descriptive Statistics 
Table 7.4 Summary of Control Variables Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
Log Size 409 9.096 9.007 0.446 8.332 11.570 2.511 12.213 
Beta 409 1.163 1.077 0.509 -1.105 2.653 0.601 5.575 
Log Labour 409 3.149 3.137 0.467 1.681 5.622 0.517 5.012 
Percentage change of Listing 409 0.113 0.107 0.034 0.073 0.182 0.774 2.759 
Percentage change of Capitalization 409 0.114 0.025 0.309 -0.127 0.847 1.687 4.470 
Percentage change of Trading Volume 409 0.121 0.228 0.377 -0.276 0.849 0.560 2.387 
Percentage change of Accounts 409 0.103 0.039 0.094 0.025 0.297 1.024 2.701 
Percentage change of A-Shares 409 0.097 0.092 0.043 0.022 0.170 -0.076 2.512 
Percentage change of P/E Ratio 409 -0.112 -0.337 0.314 -0.352 0.570 1.214 3.240 
Industry 409 0.721 1 0.449 0 1 -0.983 1.967 
Commercial 409 0.029 0 0.169 0 1 5.578 32.114 
Property 409 0.022 0 0.147 0 1 6.517 43.467 
Public Service 409 0.107 0 0.310 0 1 2.533 7.416 
Composite 409 0.122 0 0.328 0 1 2.306 6.319 
Year 1999 409 0.066 0 0.249 0 1 3.496 13.219 
Year 2000 409 0.137 0 0.344 0 1 2.112 5.462 
Year 2001 409 0.262 0 0.440 0 1 1.085 2.177 
Year 2002 409 0.144 0 0.352 0 1 2.025 5.101 
Year 2003 409 0.171 0 0.377 0 1 1.746 4.049 
Year 2004 409 0.220 0 0.415 0 1 1.352 2.827 
 
There are key descriptions for all control variables after fixing those missing and outliers as 
shown in Table 7.4. The log size includes 409 observations. The mean is 9.0964, the median 
is 9.0068 and the standard deviation is 0.4464. The value range is from 8.3320 to 11.5701. 
The skewness is 2.5106 and the kurtosis is 12.2131. Table 7.4 also presents the mean, median, 
standard deviation, minimum, maximum, skewness, and kurtosis values for the entire short-
term control variables. The mean of beta is 1.1633; the average beta of sample is very close 
to the market beta. Compared with the statistics before data transformation, log of labour, 
percentage change of listing, percentage change of capitalization, percentage of trading 
volume, percentage change of accounts, percentage change of A-shares, and percentage 
change of P/E ratios have been updated by filling the missing values. Outliers of beta had 
been removed and then given replacements. After all, beta and percentage change of 
capitalization provide more normal distribution.  The remainder provide similar levels of 
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variants. The updated data provides a better and more normal distributed dataset than the 
original sample dataset. 
 
7.3 Pair-Wise Correlation Test Results 
7.3.1 Pair-Wise Correlation Test Results for Long-Term Sample 
The correlation matrix for long-term variables, shown as Table 12.1 in the appendices, gives 
all the correlations between dependent and explanatory variables. Most independent and 
control variables are significantly correlated with the level of abnormal yearly return, Tobin’s 
Q and ROA. These results indicate that corporate governance factors have an impact on stock 
performance and financial performance on Shanghai Stock Exchange IPOs. A few market 
value based control variables are highly correlated with each other. So the study pays 
attention to those variables by carrying out further multicollinearity tests.   
 
7.3.2 Pair-Wise Correlation Test Results for Short-Term Sample 
The correlation matrix for short-term variables, shown as Table 12.2 in the appendices gives 
all the correlations between dependent and explanatory variables. Most of the control 
variables are significantly correlated with the level of abnormal first day return, Tobin’s Q, 
and ROA. Some independent variables are significantly correlated with the level of abnormal 
first day return, Tobin’s Q, and ROA. These results indicate that corporate governance factors 
have relatively less impact on short-term IPO performance than on long-term IPO 
performance. A few of the market value based control variables are highly correlated with 
each other. The study pays attention to those variables by carrying out further 
multicollinearity tests.  
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7.4 Multicollinearity/Heteroskedasticity/Panel and Cross Sectional Data 
OLS Regression Results 
 
7.4.1 Multicollinearity/Heteroskedasticity/Panel Data OLS Regression Results for Long 
Term IPO Performance 
The study tests the relationship between corporate governance and control variables using 
abnormal yearly return by panel data OLS regression. The estimations include five 
attributions of governance estimations, viz size, demographics, leadership, education, and 
evaluation. This last estimation shows the estimated coefficients when all governance and 
control variables are included in the regression. A control variable in the form of a dummy 
for composite is dropped by Stata automatically due to a multicollinearity problem. Each 
regression provides similar results for independent and control variables, indicating that those 
results are not affected by addition or deletion of the variables which exhibit multicollinearity. 
The abnormal yearly return is significantly positively related to top three officers’ pay, and is 
significantly negatively related to the percentage of independent directors. However, the 
results shown for all regressions are problematic as diagnostic testing indicates the presence 
of heteroskedasticity; GLS regressions or Dynamic GMM regressions are likely to be more 
robust. 
 
Similarly, the study tests the relationship between corporate governance and control variables 
using Tobin’s Q by panel data OLS regression. The estimations include five attributions of 
governance estimations similar to the abnormal yearly return analysis. The same 
multicollinearity issues arise as reported for governance above. Tobin’s Q is significantly 
positively related to CEO age, CEO gender, CEO qualification, top three officers’ pay, 
supervisors’ meeting per year, and largest shareholding. Tobin’s Q is significantly negatively 
related to the percentage of independent directors. The regressions exhibit heteroskedasticity, 
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so GLS regressions or Dynamic GMM regressions are likely to yield superior results in 
following analysis. 
 
The study also tests the relationship between corporate governance and control variables 
using ROA by panel data OLS regression. The same five attributions of governance 
estimations are used. Multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity were present. ROA is 
significantly positively related to CEO gender, top three officers’ pay, chairman experience, 
supervisors’ meeting per year, the percentage of non-trading shareholdings and largest 
shareholding. GLS regressions or Dynamic GMM regressions will be investigated in the 
following analysis. 
 
7.4.2 Multicollinearity/Heteroskedasticity/Panel Data OLS Regression Results for Short 
-Term IPO Performance 
The study tests the relationship between corporate governance and control variables using 
abnormal first day return by panel data OLS regression. The estimations include five 
attributions of governance estimations, viz size, demographics, leadership, education, and 
evaluation. This last attribution shows the estimated coefficients when all governance and 
control variables are included in the regression. The control variables in the form of 
percentage change of listing, percentage change of capitalization, percentage change of 
accounts, percentage change of A-shares, and dummy for commercial are dropped by Stata 
automatically due to a multicollinearity problem. Each regression provides similar results for 
independent and control variables, indicating that those results are not affected by addition or 
deletion of the variables exhibiting multicollinearity. The abnormal first return is significantly 
positively related to state share ownership, and is significantly negatively related to the 
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percentage of largest shareholding. However, the results for all regressions show no 
heteroskedasticity; OLS regressions are likely to be robust. 
 
Similarly, the study tests the relationship between corporate governance and control variables 
using Tobin’s Q by panel data OLS regression. The estimations include five attributions of 
governance estimations similar to the abnormal first day return analysis. The same 
multicollinearity issues arise as reported for governance above. Tobin’s Q is significantly 
positively related to top three officers’ pay, number of directors, legal person share ownership, 
non-trading share ownership, and largest shareholding. Tobin’s Q is significantly negatively 
related to CEO duality. The regressions exhibit heteroskedasticity, so GLS regressions or 
2SLS regressions are likely to yield superior results in following analysis. 
 
The study also tests the relationship of corporate governance and control variables with ROA 
using panel data OLS regression. The same five attributions of governance estimations are 
used. Multicollinearity was present. ROA is significantly positively related to top three 
officers’ pay, un-trading share ownership, and largest shareholding. ROA is also significantly 
negatively related to CEO age, percentage of independent directors, and number of 
supervisors. GLS regressions or 2SLS regressions are investigated in the following analysis. 
 
7.5 Endogeneity Tests 
The test for endogeneity between corporate governance variables and IPO performance 
variables is necessary in the study. If there are endogeneity problems between governance 
and IPO performance variables, the study has to ignore OLS or GLS regressions. If 
endogeneity exists and the instrument variables are available, the study uses 2SLS or 3SLS 
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estimations. If endogeneity exists and the instrument variables are not available, the study 
employs dynamic panel GMM estimation.  
 
The study uses the Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) (Wu, 1973; Hausman, 1978) test to analyse 
the endogeneity relationship between dependent and independent variables. According to the 
DWH test, if the P-value is less than 10%, then there is evidence of variable endogeneity. 
 
7.5.1 Endogeneity Test Results for Abnormal Yearly Return 
Table 7.5 includes five attributions of governance estimations, which are size, demographics, 
leadership, education, and evaluation estimations. The last column shows the estimation 
coefficients when all governance and control variables are included in the regression. The 
presence of heteroskedasticity necessitated the use of GLS estimation for the regressions of 
“demographics” and “education”. Diagnostic testing indicated the presence of 
heteroskedasticity and endogeneity in “size”, “leadership”, “evaluation” and “all estimation” 
and a dynamic GMM estimation is used. However, the study almost selected all possible 
corporate governance variables, so finding instrument variables other than from this dataset is 
problematic.  Hence the study uses dynamic panel GMM estimation.   
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Table 7.5 The DWH Test for Endogeneity of Abnormal Yearly Return 
  Governance Compositions 
 
Size Demographic Leadership Education Evaluation All 
Independent and Control Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
MD Age 
 
0.612 
   
0.555 
MD Qualification 
   
2.626 
 
2.700 
MD Experience 
    
1.231 1.112 
Top Three Officer Pay 
    
10.204*** 9.489*** 
Chairman Experience 
    
0.137 0.364 
Chairman Qualification 
   
0.088 
 
0.039 
Number of Directors 0.150 
    
0.070 
Independent Director Percentage 0.716 
    
0.919 
Female Director Number 
 
0.127 
   
0.150 
Number of Supervisors 6.511** 
    
6.024** 
Board Meeting per Year 
    
6.314** 4.015** 
Supervisors Meeting per Year 
    
4.973** 3.327* 
Insider Shareholding 
  
3.030* 
  
2.839* 
SOE Shareholding 
  
3.304* 
  
3.311* 
Legal Person Shareholding 
  
2.107 
  
1.840 
Non-trading Shareholding 
  
1.187 
  
1.270 
Number of  Committees 8.116*** 
    
5.063** 
Largest Shareholding     6.395**     6.243** 
Note: ***, **, and *, indicate that the p-value is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
7.5.2 Endogeneity Test Results for Tobin’s Q 
Table 7.6 presents the endogeneity test results between governance variables and dependent 
variable Tobin’s Q. The table includes five attributions of governance estimations, which are 
size, demographics, leadership, education and evaluation estimations. The last column shows 
the endogeneity test results when all governance and control variables are included in the 
regression. The presence of heteroskedasticity necessitates the use of GLS estimation for the 
regressions of “demographics” and “education”. Diagnostic testing indicates the presence of 
heteroskedasticity and endogeneity in “size”, “leadership”, “evaluation” and “all estimation” 
and a dynamic GMM estimation is used.  
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Table 7.6 The DWH Test for Endogeneity of Tobin’s Q 
  Governance Compositions 
 
Size Demographic Leadership Education Evaluation All 
Independent and Control Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
MD Age 
 
0.012 
   
0.001 
MD Qualification 
   
0.247 
 
0.040 
MD Experience 
    
2.997* 2.863* 
Top Three Officer Pay 
    
0.905 1.214 
Chairman Experience 
    
0.331 0.025 
Chairman Qualification 
   
0.054 
 
0.027 
Number of Directors 3.259* 
    
3.461* 
Independent Director Percentage 0.318 
    
0.499 
Female Director Number 
 
0.439 
   
0.630 
Number of Supervisors 0.777 
    
0.702 
Board Meeting per Year 
    
1.556 0.698 
Supervisors Meeting per Year 
    
4.000** 2.853* 
Insider Shareholding 
  
1.544 
  
1.089 
SOE Shareholding 
  
3.287* 
  
1.606 
Legal Person Shareholding 
  
8.373*** 
  
4.039** 
Non-trading Shareholding 
  
2.788* 
  
2.516 
Number of  Committees 3.694* 
    
2.920* 
Largest Shareholding     1.935     1.142 
Note: ***, **, and *, indicate that the p-value is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
7.5.3 Endogeneity Test Results for ROA 
Table 7.7 presents the endogeneity test results between governance variables and dependent 
variable ROA. There are no endogeneity problems between ROA and board 
size/demographic/education variables, so the study employs GLS estimation on those three 
regressions. The presence of heteroskedasticity necessitated the use of GLS estimation for the 
regressions of “size”, “demographics” and “education”. Diagnostic testing indicated the 
presence of heteroskedasticity and endogeneity in “leadership”, “evaluation” and “all 
estimation” and a dynamic GMM estimation is used.  
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Table 7.7 The DWH Test for Endogeneity of ROA 
  Governance Compositions 
 
Size Demographic Leadership Education Evaluation All 
Independent and Control Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
MD Age 
 
0.837 
   
0.640 
MD Qualification 
   
0.796 
 
0.011 
MD Experience 
    
1.681 1.532 
Top Three Officer Pay 
    
3.734* 2.403 
Chairman Experience 
    
0.665 0.224 
Chairman Qualification 
   
0.314 
 
0.320 
Number of Directors 2.527 
    
2.260 
Independent Director Percentage 0.547 
    
0.438 
Female Director Number 
 
1.073 
   
1.723 
Number of Supervisors 2.641 
    
2.349 
Board Meeting per Year 
    
6.198** 3.663** 
Supervisors Meeting per Year 
    
0.007 0.333 
Insider Shareholding 
  
0.677 
  
2.535 
SOE Shareholding 
  
8.447*** 
  
1.354 
Legal Person Shareholding 
  
7.332*** 
  
0.653 
Non-trading Shareholding 
  
0.022 
  
0.001 
Number of  Committees 0.909 
    
0.379 
Largest Shareholding     0.000     0.007 
Note: ***, **, and *, indicate that the p-value is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Tables 7.8 and 7.9 present the conclusion of heteroskedasticity tests, endogeneity tests, and 
potential regression estimations of long- and short-term SZSE IPO performance models. 
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Table 7.8 The Heteroskedasticity, Endogeneity Results and Final Estimations of Long-Term Performance 
Abnormal Yearly 
Return 
Governance Compositions 
Specification Test Size Demographic Leadership Education Evaluation All 
Heteroskedasticity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Endogeneity Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 
Estimation 2SLS GLS 2SLS GLS 2SLS Dynamic GMM 
       
Tobin's Q Governance Compositions 
Specification Test Size Demographic Leadership Education Evaluation All 
Heteroskedasticity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Endogeneity Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 
Estimation 2SLS GLS 2SLS GLS 2SLS Dynamic GMM 
              
ROA Governance Compositions 
Specification Test Size Demographic Leadership Education Evaluation All 
Heteroskedasticity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Endogeneity No No Yes No  Yes Yes 
Estimation GLS GLS 2SLS GLS 2SLS Dynamic GMM 
 
Table 7.9 The Heteroskedasticity, Endogeneity Results and Final Estimations of Short-Term 
Performance 
Abnormal First Day 
Return 
Governance Compositions 
Specification Test Size Demographic Leadership Education Evaluation All 
Heteroskedasticity No No No No No No 
Endogeneity Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 
Estimation 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS GLS 
              
Tobin's Q Governance Compositions 
Specification Test Size Demographic Leadership Education Evaluation All 
Heteroskedasticity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Endogeneity Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 
Estimation 2SLS GLS 2SLS GLS 2SLS 2SLS 
              
ROA Governance Compositions 
Specification Test Size Demographic Leadership Education Evaluation All 
Heteroskedasticity No No No No No No 
Endogeneity No No Yes No  Yes Yes 
Estimation OLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS GLS 
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7.6 Long-Term Final Estimations 
7.6.1 Long-Term Final Estimations for Abnormal Yearly Return 
Table 7.10 Panel Data GLS Regression/Dynamic GMM Regression Results for Dependent Variable 
Abnormal Yearly Return 
  Governance Compositions 
 
Size Demographic Leadership Education Evaluation All 
 
GMM GLS GMM GLS GMM GMM 
Independent and Control Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Constant 1.004*** 0.280*** 0.584** 0.298 0.946*** 0.983*** 
L114 -0.102*** 
 
-0.087*** 
 
-0.066** -0.079*** 
MD Age 
 
0.010 
   
-0.022 
MD Gender 
 
0.000 
   
0.009 
MD Qualification 
   
0.003 
 
-0.003 
MD Experience 
    
0.002 0.002 
Top Three Officer Pay 
    
-0.139** -0.555 
CEO Duality 
  
-0.001 
  
-0.005 
Chairman Experience 
    
0.005* 0.005* 
Chairman Qualification 
   
0.000 
 
0.011 
Number of Directors 0.015 
    
0.019 
Independent Director Percentage -0.222*** 
    
-0.227*** 
Female Director Number 
 
-0.002 
   
-0.004 
Number of Supervisors 0.003 
    
0.008 
Board Meeting per Year 
    
-0.230** -0.127* 
Supervisors Meeting per Year 
    
0.004 0.006 
Insider Shareholding 
  
-0.002 
  
-0.034 
SOE Shareholding 
  
0.041 
  
0.000 
Legal Person Shareholding 
  
0.001 
  
-0.036 
Non-trading Shareholding 
  
0.036 
  
0.062 
Number of  Committees -0.013*** 
    
-0.006 
Largest Shareholding 
  
0.098 
  
0.019 
Size -0.035 0.010** -0.012 0.009** 0.070* 0.008 
Beta -0.107*** -0.114*** -0.107*** -0.113*** -0.115*** -0.112*** 
Labour -0.034 0.003 -0.028 0.004 -0.043 -0.035 
Percentage change of Listing -0.770*** -0.279*** -0.501*** -0.275*** -0.445** -0.856*** 
Percentage change of Capitalization -0.290*** -0.191*** -0.237*** -0.191*** -0.269*** -0.323*** 
Percentage change of Trading 
Volume 
0.099*** 0.027*** 0.039*** 0.027*** 0.069*** 0.110*** 
Percentage change of Accounts 0.455*** 0.568*** 0.610*** 0.569*** 0.590*** 0.504*** 
Percentage change of A-Shares -0.197** 0.001 -0.101 -0.001 -0.371** -0.254* 
Percentage change of P/E Ratio 0.221*** 0.178*** 0.226*** 0.178*** 0.225*** 0.251*** 
Industry 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.001 
  
Commercial 
 
0.000 
 
0.001 
  
                                                 
14
 L1 is the lag variable which used in dynamic panel GMM. According to my dataset I used L1 as a previous 
year data. For example, L1 for 2009 abnormal yearly return is 2010 abnormal yearly return. 
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Property 
 
0.016* 
 
0.017* 
  
Public Service 
 
-0.025*** 
 
-0.025*** 
  
Year 1999 
 
0.017** 
 
0.016** 
  
Year 2000 
 
0.013** 
 
0.011* 
  
Year 2001 
 
0.018*** 
 
0.016*** 
  
Year 2002 
 
0.024*** 
 
0.022*** 
  
Year 2003 
 
0.036*** 
 
0.034*** 
  
Year 2004 
 
0.028*** 
 
0.026*** 
  
R2 
 
0.362 
 
0.362 
  
AR(1) -12.013*** 
 
-12.040*** 
 
-12.356*** -12.600*** 
AR(2) -0.687 
 
-0.649 
 
0.194 -0.136 
J-statistics  145.793 
 
147.516 
 
164.258 246.369 
Chi2 608.310***  1211.750*** 592.970***  1194.170*** 576.130*** 682.350*** 
Note: ***, **, and *, indicate that the p-value is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
The results presented in Table 7.10 show the relationship of corporate governance and control 
variables with abnormal yearly return. The table includes five governance estimations, which 
are size, demographics, leadership, education, and evaluation estimations. The last column 
shows the estimation coefficients when all governance and control variables are included in 
the regression. The presence of heteroskedasticity necessitates the use of GLS estimation for 
the regressions of “demographics” and “education”. Diagnostic testing indicates the presence 
of heteroskedasticity and endogeneity in “size”, “leadership”, “evaluation” and “all 
estimation” and a dynamic GMM estimation is used. Three governance variables and seven 
control variables are observed as significantly impacting the abnormal yearly return.  
 
CEO and the abnormal yearly return 
CEO gender and experience are positively related to the long-term abnormal yearly return, 
but not at a significant level. CEO age, CEO qualification, top management salary and CEO 
duality are negatively related to the abnormal yearly return, and again are not at a statistically 
significant level.  
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Board and the abnormal yearly return 
Chairman experience is positively related to the abnormal yearly return at the 10% significant 
level. This may be attributable to investors’ behaviour reflecting an understanding that more 
experienced chairmen have more knowledge in the current industry and will make a 
consistent contribution to the company. This finding is consistent with the study of Dempere 
(2007). He found that directors’ knowledge and experience has a positive relationship with 
long-term IPO performance in the US. This finding is also in line with Mclntyre et al. (2007). 
They suggested that high-level board experience is positively associated with firm 
performance in Canada. The proportion of independent directors is negatively related to the 
abnormal yearly return, at the 1% significant level. This finding is opposite to some prior 
studies. Abdullah (2004), Balatbat et al. (2004), Bonn (2004), Bonn et al. (2004), 
Roosenboom  et al. (2005) and Reddy et al. (2008) suggest outside directors are positively 
related to firm value in Holland, Australia and New Zealand, but have no influence in Japan 
and Malaysia. This may be attributable to investors’ behaviour reflecting a concern that 
independent directors lack a professional background and will not make a consistent 
contribution to the company. 
 
The number of board meetings per year is negatively related to the abnormal yearly return, at 
the 10% significant level. The high frequency of board meetings may be because board 
efficiency is low. It may also indicate that the company has a lot of issues.  Chairman 
qualification, number of directors, number of supervisors, and supervisors meeting per year 
are positively related to the abnormal yearly return, but not at a significant level. The number 
of female directors is negatively related to the abnormal yearly return, and also not at a 
significant level. 
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The number of directors and number of female directors are not significantly related to the 
long-term abnormal yearly return in this study.  
 
Ownership and the abnormal yearly return 
State ownership, non-trading ownership and the largest shareholding are positively related to 
the abnormal yearly return, but not at a significant level. Insider ownership and legal person 
ownership are negatively related to the abnormal yearly return and are not significant. 
 
Control variables and the abnormal yearly return 
Beta, change of listing and change of capitalization are negatively related to the abnormal 
yearly return, at the 1% significant level. Change of trading volume, change of investor 
accounts, and change of P/E ratio are positively related to the abnormal yearly return at the 1% 
significant level. Change of A-Shares listing is negatively related to the abnormal yearly 
return at the 10% significant level. The results indicate that investors prefer low risk IPOs on 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange.  
 
7.6.2 Long-Term Final Estimations for Tobin’s Q 
Table 7.11 Panel Data GLS Regression/ Dynamic GMM Regression Results for Dependent Variable 
Tobin’s Q 
  Governance Compositions 
 
Size Demographic Leadership Education Evaluation All 
 
GMM GLS GMM GLS GMM GMM 
Independent and Control Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Constant 15.316*** 7.430*** 11.383*** 8.964*** 10.432*** 13.378*** 
L1 0.157*** 
 
0.118*** 
 
0.095** 0.076* 
MD Age 
 
0.961*** 
   
1.881*** 
MD Gender 
 
0.241 
   
0.110 
MD Qualification 
   
0.056** 
 
0.017 
MD Experience 
    
0.041 -0.055 
Top Three Officer Pay 
    
0.122 0.108 
CEO Duality 
  
0.010 
  
0.035 
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Chairman Experience 
    
0.007 0.022 
Chairman Qualification 
   
0.008 
 
0.028 
Number of Directors -4.345* 
    
-4.370*** 
Independent Director Percentage -1.999*** 
    
-2.047*** 
Female Director Number 
 
-0.015 
   
0.023 
Number of Supervisors 0.039 
    
0.088** 
Board Meeting per Year 
    
-0.310 -0.493** 
Supervisors Meeting per Year 
    
0.107*** 0.137*** 
Insider Shareholding 
  
-1.232 
  
-0.622 
SOE Shareholding 
  
-1.139 
  
0.964 
Legal Person Shareholding 
  
-1.217* 
  
0.780 
Non-trading Shareholding 
  
-0.079 
  
-0.772 
Number of  Committees 0.002 
    
0.005 
Largest Shareholding 
  
1.012** 
  
0.009 
Size -0.927*** -0.605*** -0.968*** -0.608*** -1.001*** -1.139*** 
Beta -0.397*** -1.023*** -0.457*** -1.018*** -0.466*** -0.448*** 
Labour -0.043 -0.072 -0.140 -0.073 -0.084 -0.035 
Percentage change of Listing 0.469 2.931*** 4.091*** 2.896*** 2.585** 0.126 
Percentage change of Capitalization -0.703*** 0.169** 0.167 0.174** -0.027 -0.580*** 
Percentage change of Trading 
Volume 
-0.017 -0.861*** -0.554*** -0.869*** -0.579*** -0.075 
Percentage change of Accounts 3.033*** 4.999*** 3.599*** 5.025*** 4.051*** 3.004*** 
Percentage change of A-Shares -0.316 1.124** -0.427 1.107** 1.203 1.295 
Percentage change of P/E Ratio 1.361*** 1.108*** 0.799*** 1.114*** 1.081*** 1.199*** 
Industry 
 
-0.088 
 
-0.066 
  
Commercial 
 
-0.399*** 
 
-0.321** 
  
Property 
 
-0.527*** 
 
-0.511*** 
  
Public Service 
 
-0.271*** 
 
-0.243** 
  
Year 1999 
 
-0.577 
 
-0.587 
  
Year 2000 
 
-0.669 
 
-0.672 
  
Year 2001 
 
-0.556 
 
-0.575 
  
Year 2002 
 
-0.489 
 
-0.498 
  
Year 2003 
 
-0.470 
 
-0.490 
  
Year 2004 
 
-0.462 
 
-0.496 
  
R2 
 
0.447 
 
0.453 
  
AR(1) -10.011*** 
 
-9.174*** 
 
-9.385*** -9.454*** 
AR(2) 0.435 
 
0.008 
 
-0.482 -0.792 
J-statistics  333.860 
 
398.514 
 
345.683 339.895 
Chi2 1177.730***  1429.570*** 1207.060***  1399.020*** 1235.710*** 1273.850*** 
Note: ***, **, and *, indicate that the p-value is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
The results presented in Table 7.11 show the relationship of corporate governance and control 
variables with long-term Tobin’s Q. The table includes five governance estimations, which 
are size, demographics, leadership, education, and evaluation estimations. The last column 
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shows the estimation coefficients when all governance and control variables are included in 
the regression. The presence of heteroskedasticity necessitates the use of GLS estimation for 
the regressions of “demographics” and “education”. Diagnostic testing indicates the presence 
of heteroskedasticity and endogeneity in “size”, “leadership”, “evaluation” and “all 
estimation” and a dynamic GMM estimation is used. Six governance variables and five 
control variables are observed as significantly impacting the long-term Tobin’s Q.  
 
CEO and the long-term Tobin’s Q 
CEO age is positively related to long-term Tobin’s Q, at the 1% significant level. According 
to McKnight, Tomkins, Weir and Hobson (2000), CEO age is U-shape, associated with their 
pay and firm performance in the UK. The current study finding goes further, noting that CEO 
age is positively related with the long-term Tobin’s Q in China. A plausible reason is that 
CEO age is important for China given a continuing general reverence given to older people 
who are viewed as having acquired more wisdom. The older CEOs are more likely to have 
more experience in the industry.  CEO gender, qualification, duality and top management 
salary are positively related to the long-term Tobin’s Q, but while intuitively appealing the 
correlation is not at a significant level. CEO experience is negatively related to the long-term 
Tobin’s Q, and again, not at a statistically significant level.  
 
Board and the long-term Tobin’s Q 
The number of directors is negatively related to long-term Tobin’s Q at a 1% significant level. 
According to Abdullah (2004), Bonn (2004), Bonn et al. (2004), Daily et al. (2005), Dwivedi 
et al. (2005), Staikouras et al. (2007), and Chang (2009), board size is negatively associated 
with firm performance in Japan, Taiwan and Europe, but positively associated to firm 
performance in India, and has no influence in Australia, the US and Malaysia. The current 
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study finding goes further, noting that the number of directors is negatively related to long-
term Tobin’s Q in China. A plausible reason is that a large board decreases effective 
communication and co-ordination between shareholders. Another possible reason is that 
investors may be concerned that the directors lack a professional background. Board meeting 
per year is negatively related to the long-term Tobin’s Q at the 5% significant level. The high 
frequency of board meetings may be because board efficiency is low. It may be also indicate 
that a company has a lot of issues. 
 
The proportion of independent directors is negatively related to the long-term Tobin’s Q at 
the 1% significant level. This finding is the opposite of some prior studies. Abdullah (2004), 
Balatbat et al. (2004), Bonn (2004), Bonn et al. (2004), Roosenboom  et al. (2005) and Reddy 
et al. (2008) suggest outside directors are positively related to firm value in Holland, 
Australia and New Zealand, but have no influence in Japan and Malaysia. This may be 
attributable to investors’ behaviour reflecting a concern that the independent directors lack a 
professional background and will not make a consistent contribution to the company. 
Actually, many Chinese independent directors are government officials, academics, and also 
foreigners and perhaps they do not have a reasonable understanding of a company’s current 
situation. Before 2002, each listed company only needed to include two independent directors 
on its board. Due to their small number, independent directors are marginalized and find it 
hard to influence board decision-making.  
 
The number of supervisors is positively related to long-term ROA at the 5% significant level. 
Supervisors’ meeting per year is positively related to long-term Tobin’s Q at the 1% 
significant level. As mentioned in section 5.5.2, supervisors play a key role. The investors 
may believe that more supervisors and a more active supervisory group will help the 
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company achieve better performance, protect shareholders’ benefits, and reduce agency costs. 
The chairman’s qualification, the chairman’s education, the number of female directors, and 
the number of committees are positively related to the long-term Tobin’s Q, but not at 
significant levels. The number of female directors is not significantly related to the long-term 
Tobin’s Q in this study.  
 
Ownership and long-term Tobin’s Q 
SOE ownership, legal person ownership, the number of committees, and the largest 
shareholding are positively related to the long-term Tobin’s Q, but not at significant levels. 
Insider ownership and non-trading ownership are negatively related to the long-term Tobin’s 
Q, though not significantly. 
 
Control variables and long-term Tobin’s Q 
Size, beta, and change of capitalization are negatively related to the long-term Tobin’s Q at 
the 1% significant level. These results indicate that Chinese investors were likely to invest in 
small and low risk industry IPOs. The change of investor accounts and the change of P/E 
ratio are positively related to the long-term Tobin’s Q at the 1% significant level. The results 
indicate that one of the investors’ trading strategies is to hold stocks and enjoy the capital 
gain when stock prices rise.  
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7.6.3 Long-Term Final Estimations for ROA 
Table 7.12 Panel Data GLS regression/Dynamic GMM Regression Results for Dependent Variable ROA 
  Governance Compositions 
 
Size Demographic Leadership Education Evaluation All 
 
GLS GLS GMM GLS GMM GMM 
Independent and Control Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Constant -0.097** -0.111** -0.258* -0.083* -0.175 -0.350** 
L1 
  
0.224*** 
 
0.233*** 0.211*** 
MD Age 
 
0.015 
   
-0.010 
MD Gender 
 
0.020** 
   
0.018 
MD Qualification 
   
0.001 
 
0.000 
MD Experience 
    
0.001 0.001 
Top Three Officer Pay 
    
0.008* 0.035*** 
CEO Duality 
  
-0.007 
  
-0.006 
Chairman Experience 
    
0.001 0.001 
Chairman Qualification 
   
0.003** 
 
0.005** 
Number of Directors 0.029* 
    
-0.010 
Independent Director Percentage -0.025 
    
-0.028 
Female Director Number 
 
0.000 
   
0.001 
Number of Supervisors 0.001* 
    
0.002* 
Board Meeting per Year 
    
0.051 0.035 
Supervisors Meeting per Year 
    
-0.001 -0.001 
Insider Shareholding 
  
0.027 
  
0.031 
SOE Shareholding 
  
-0.054 
  
-0.011 
Legal Person Shareholding 
  
-0.083 
  
-0.008 
Non-trading Shareholding 
  
0.066 
  
0.027 
Number of  Committees 0.001* 
    
-0.001 
Largest Shareholding 
  
0.042* 
  
0.044** 
Size 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.037** 0.021*** 0.030 0.020 
Beta -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.034*** -0.041*** -0.033*** -0.031*** 
Labour 0.000 0.000 -0.017 0.000 -0.017 -0.013 
Percentage change of Listing 0.157*** 0.156*** 0.148*** 0.150*** 0.159** 0.182** 
Percentage change of Capitalization 0.010* 0.012*** 0.011 0.012*** 0.015* 0.024** 
Percentage change of Trading 
Volume 
-0.008 -0.010*** -0.005 -0.010*** -0.007 -0.016* 
Percentage change of Accounts 0.026** 0.032*** 0.010 0.031*** -0.002 0.022 
Percentage change of A-Shares 0.049** 0.052** 0.037 0.054** 0.096* 0.092 
Percentage change of P/E Ratio 0.000 0.000 -0.003 0.000 -0.007 -0.006 
Industry 0.019*** 0.017*** 
 
0.018*** 
  
Commercial 0.008 0.005 
 
0.007 
  
Property 0.005 0.004 
 
0.005 
  
Public Service 0.015* 0.016** 
 
0.016** 
  
Year 1999 -0.066*** -0.066*** 
 
-0.066*** 
  
Year 2000 -0.069*** -0.070*** 
 
-0.070*** 
  
Year 2001 -0.063*** -0.064*** 
 
-0.064*** 
  
Year 2002 -0.053*** -0.054*** 
 
-0.053*** 
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Year 2003 -0.055*** -0.056*** 
 
-0.056*** 
  
Year 2004 -0.051*** -0.051*** 
 
-0.051*** 
  
R2 0.125 0.119 
 
0.122 
  
AR(1) 
 
-7.477*** -7.477*** 
 
-7.430*** -7.181*** 
AR(2) 
 
0.493 0.493 
 
0.386 0.238 
J-statistics  
 
106.900 106.900 
 
104.716 90.438 
Chi2  245.300*** 236.040*** 151.040***  230.250*** 132.490*** 185.230*** 
Note: ***, **, and *, indicate that the p-value is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 7.12 presents the relationship of corporate governance and control variables with the 
long-term ROA. The table includes five governance estimations, which are size, 
demographics, leadership, education, and evaluation estimations. The last column shows the 
estimation coefficients when all governance and control variables are included in the 
regression. The presence of heteroskedasticity necessitates the use of GLS estimation for the 
regressions of “size”, “demographics” and “education”. Diagnostic testing indicates the 
presence of heteroskedasticity and endogeneity in “leadership”, “evaluation” and “all 
estimation” and a dynamic GMM estimation is used. Four governance variables and four 
control variables are observed as significantly impacting the abnormal yearly return.  
 
CEO and the long-term ROA 
Top management salary is positively related to the long-term ROA, at the 1% significant 
level. This finding is consistent with Engel et al. (2002), Lee et al. (2008) and Nikbakht et al. 
(2007), who find that top management salary is positively related to IPO performance. The 
result is also consistent with Kren et al. (1997) and Lippert (1999), who indicate a positive 
relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance. The current study’s finding 
goes further by noting that top management salary is also positively related with long-term 
ROA in China. A plausible reason is that most of high income managers are from larger 
companies, those companies in China have relatively low risk and they offer better ROAs. 
CEO age, CEO qualification and CEO duality are negatively related to the long-term ROA, 
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but not at a significant level. CEO gender and CEO experience are positively related to the 
long-term ROA, and also not at a significant level.  
 
Board and the long-term ROA 
Chairman’s qualification is positively related to the long-term ROA, at the 5% significant 
level. This finding indicates these higher educated chairmen are more likely to help the 
company achieve better long-term performance. Number of supervisors is positively related 
to the long-term ROA, at the 10% significant level. As mentioned in section 5.5.2, 
supervisors play a key role. More supervisors are likely to help the company achieve a better 
performance reduce the agency cost. Chairman experience, the number of female directors 
and board meetings per year are positively related to the long-term ROA, but not at 
significant levels. The number of directors, the proportion of independent directors, 
supervisor meetings per year and the number of committees are negatively related to the 
long-term ROA, but not at a significant level. 
 
Ownership and long-term ROA 
The percentage of largest shareholding ownership is positively related to the abnormal yearly 
return, at the 5% significant level. This may be because a state shareholder or founder is 
likely to enhance monitoring of management and improve company performance. Insider 
ownership and the non-trading ownership are positively related to the long-term ROA, but 
not at a significant level. SOE ownership and legal person ownership are positively related to 
the long-term ROA, but not at a significant level. 
 
 
 
180 
 
Control variables and long-term ROA 
Beta is negatively related to long-term ROA at the 1% significant level, and the change of 
trading volume is negatively related to long-term ROA at the 10% significant level. Change 
of IPO listing and change of capitalization are positively related to the long-term ROA at the 
5% significant level.  
 
Insignificant independent variables 
There are some very important variables in prior studies but they are not significantly related 
to the long-term IPO performance in this SHSE study. CEO gender, experience and duality 
are not significantly related to the long-term IPO performance in this study. CEO gender is an 
important variable in prior financial performance studies. Adams et al. (2009) find a positive 
relationship between female CEO and firm performance. But CEO gender is not significantly 
related to the long-term abnormal yearly return in this study. First, this may be attributable to 
investors’ behaviour reflecting that female CEOs are not considered an important signal. 
Second, according to the data description, only 2% of CEOs are female. It is very hard to find 
the relationship between female CEOs and long-term IPO performance from such a small 
sample.  
 
CEO duality is also an important variable in prior IPO and firm performance studies. But this 
study finds it is not significant in the SHSE. Balatbat et al. (2004), Chahine et al. (2009), 
Dempere (2007), Lam et al. (2008) and Braun et al. (2007) indicate that CEO duality is 
significantly associated with IPO performance in Australia, some Arab countries and the US.  
Lam et al. (2008) and Abdullah (2004) indicate that CEO duality has no significant effect on 
firm performance in Hong Kong and Malaysia. This may be because of the specific role of 
Chinese chairmen. In western developed listing firms, most of the chairmen are independent 
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directors, but many Chinese chairmen are also the legal persons or the largest shareholders of 
the companies; they not only monitor firm performance, they also take a managing role in the 
company. Therefore, CEO duality is no longer important.  
 
The number of female directors is an important variable in prior financial performance 
studies. Bonn (2004), Bonn et al. (2004), Campbell et al. (2008), and Reddy et al. (2008) find 
that female directors are positively associated with firm performance in Spain, US, New 
Zealand and Australia, but have no influence in Japan. It is the same with the CEO gender 
issue; there are very few female directors in the SHSE, so it is hard to find the relationship 
between female directors and long-term IPO performance from such small sample. 
 
Insider ownership, SOE ownership, legal person ownership and non-trading ownership are 
not significantly related to the long-term IPO performance in this study. Insider ownership is 
an important variable in prior IPO and financial performance studies. For the developed 
market studies, Kroll et al. (2007), Nikbakht et al.(2007), Balatbat et al. (2004), and  
Roosenboom et al. (2005) suggest that managerial ownership is positively associated with 
IPO performance in the US, Australia and Holland. Dempere (2007), Firth (1997) and Reddy 
et al. (2008) indicate that insider ownership has a negative effect on firms’ performance in 
New Zealand. For the developing market studies, Chen et al. (2005) indicate the increase of 
managerial ownership decreases the stock performance in Taiwan. Chou et al. (2007) and Hu 
et al. (2008) indicate that the link between firm performance and managerial ownership is 
non-linear in China and Taiwan. This may be attributable to investors’ behaviour reflecting 
that they are not concerned about insider ownership. It may also be because private 
companies have a higher level of insider ownership and lower levels of ROA. 
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SOE ownership is an important variable in prior Chinese IPO and financial performance 
studies.  Gu (2003) indicates that state ownership is significantly negatively connected to the 
short-term IPO performance in China. Chen (2001) indicates that the size of SOE share 
ownership is negatively associated with corporate performance. This study finds it is not 
significantly related to the long-term IPO performance on the SHSE. A plausible reason is 
that most SHSE listing IPOs are state owned.  
 
7.7 Long-Term Specification Tests Results 
7.7.1 Serial correlation test 
First, the study examines autoregressive level 1 and autoregressive level 2 statistics to test the 
first and second order correlation. If ε it is serially uncorrelated, we expect to reject at the first 
order but not at the second order.  Table 7.10 provides the results for the long-term abnormal 
return. AR (1) and AR (2) for abnormal yearly return and board size explanatory variables are 
0 and 0.4919. So the result rejects order 1 serial correlation, because p=0<0.05. The second 
order and original error are serially uncorrelated because p=0.4919>0.05. AR (1) and AT (2) 
for abnormal yearly return and board leadership explanatory variables are 0 and 0.5162. So 
the result rejects order 1 serial correlation, because p=0<0.05. The second order and original 
error are serially uncorrelated because p=0.5162>0.05. AR (1) and AR (2) for abnormal 
yearly return and board evaluation explanatory variables are 0 and 0.8465. So the result 
rejects order 1 serial correlation, because p=0<0.05. The second order and original error are 
serially uncorrelated because p=0.8465>0.05. AR (1) and AR (2) for abnormal yearly return 
and all explanatory variables are 0 and 0.8921. So the result rejects order 1 serial correlation, 
because p=0<0.05. The second order and original error are serially uncorrelated because 
p=0.8921>0.05. Therefore, there are no serial correlations in the original error εit in the 
abnormal yearly return estimations, as desired.  
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Table 7.11 provides the results for the long-term Tobin’s Q. AR (1) and AR (2) for Tobin’s Q 
and board size explanatory variables are 0 and 0.6640. So the result rejects order 1 serial 
correlation, because p=0<0.05. The second order and original error are serially uncorrelated 
because p=0.6640>0.05. AR (1) and AR (2) for Tobin’s Q and board leadership explanatory 
variables are 0 and 0.9935. So the result rejects order 1 serial correlation, because p=0<0.05. 
The second order and original error are serially uncorrelated because p=0.9935>0.05. AR (1) 
and AR (2) for Tobin’s Q and board evaluation explanatory variables are 0 and 0.6296. So 
the result rejects order 1 serial correlation, because p=0<0.05. The second order and original 
error are serially uncorrelated because p=0.6296>0.05. AR (1) and AR (2) for Tobin’s Q and 
all explanatory variables are 0 and 0.4284. So the result rejects order 1 serial correlation, 
because p=0<0.05. The second order and original error are serially uncorrelated because 
p=0.4284>0.05. Therefore, there are no serial correlations in the original error εit in the 
Tobin’s Q estimations, as desired.  
 
Table 7.12 provides the results for the long-term ROA. AR (1) and AR (2) for ROA and 
board leadership explanatory variables are 0 and 0.6219. So the result rejects order 1 serial 
correlation, because p=0<0.05. The second order and original error are serially uncorrelated 
because p=0.6219>0.05. AR (1) and AR (2) for ROA and board evaluation explanatory 
variables are 0 and 0.6997. So the results do not reject order 1 serial correlation, because 
p=0<0.05. The second order and original error are serially uncorrelated because 
p=0.6997>0.05. AR (1) and AR (2) for ROA and all explanatory variables are 0 and 0.8119. 
So the results do not reject order 1 serial correlation, because p=0<0.05. The second order 
and original error are serially uncorrelated because p=0.8119>0.05. Therefore, there are no 
serial correlations in the original error εit in the ROA estimations, as desired.  
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7.7.2 Over-identification restrictions test 
Second, the study uses J Statistics to test over identification restrictions. Tables 7.10, 7.11, 
and 7.12 present the J statistics for abnormal return, Tobin’s Q and ROA respectively. The 
results indicate that all p-values are not significant at the 5% level, so the instruments are 
valid.  
 
7.7.3 Joint significance test 
The study employs the Wald Test to examine the significance for independent and control 
variables of each GLS and dynamic GMM estimations. Tables 7.10, 7.11, and 7.12 present 
the Wald Test for abnormal return, Tobin’s Q and ROA respectively. The results indicate that 
all p-values are significant at the 1% level, so all independent and control variables can be 
included in those estimations.  
 
7.8 Short-Term Final Estimations 
The results presented in Section 5 indicate that CEO pay, number of supervisors, board 
meetings per year, supervisors meetings per year, insider shareholding, state shareholding, 
largest shareholding, number of committees, and abnormal first day return have significant 
endogeneity problems. Diagnostic testing for endogeneity using the DWH test indicated CEO 
experience, number of directors, supervisors meetings per year, legal person ownership, 
number of committees and Tobin’s Q, and board meetings per year and ROA, all exhibit 
endogeneity.  According to previous studies, a 2SLS model or a Dynamic GMM model are 
used to overcome the endogeneity problem. However, the use of 2SLS and Dynamic GMM 
models is not appropriate as the likely variables that might be suitable instrument variables 
are already included in the analysis, so finding instrument variables other than from this 
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dataset will be hard.  The alternative of deleting the variables and using either an OLS or 
GLS model is considered expedient. 
 
7.8.1 Short-Term Final Estimations for Abnormal First Day Return 
Table 7.13 Cross-Sectional GLS Regression/OLS Regression Results for Dependent Variable Abnormal First Day 
Return 
  Governance Compositions 
 
Size Demographic Leadership Education Evaluation All 
 
GLS OLS GLS OLS GLS GLS 
Independent and Control Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Constant 1.323*** 1.387*** 1.361*** 1.351*** 1.357*** 1.435*** 
MD Age 
 
-0.035 
   
-0.045 
MD Gender 
 
-0.018 
   
-0.012 
MD Qualification 
   
0.004 
 
0.003 
MD Experience 
    
-0.003 -0.003 
CEO Duality 
  
-0.002 
  
-0.004 
Chairman Experience 
    
-0.002 -0.001 
Chairman Qualification 
   
0.001 
 
0.000 
Number of Directors 0.064 
    
0.061 
Independent Director Percentage 0.050 
    
0.045 
Female Director Number 
 
0.004 
   
0.003 
Legal Person Shareholding 
  
-0.027* 
  
-0.028* 
Non-trading Shareholding 
  
0.028 
  
0.023 
Size -0.088*** -0.082*** -0.086*** -0.084*** -0.084*** -0.092*** 
Beta 0.046*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.044*** 
Labour -0.018* -0.019* -0.019* -0.018 -0.018* -0.018 
Percentage change of Trading 
Volume 
0.278*** 0.247*** 0.261*** 0.248*** 0.237*** 0.271*** 
Percentage change of P/E Ratio -0.463*** -0.430*** -0.454*** -0.434*** -0.420*** -0.452*** 
Industry  -0.050* -0.049*  -0.048* -0.052*  -0.050*  -0.051* 
Property  -0.0131 -0.020  -0.0229 -0.022  -0.0190  -0.0215 
Public Service  -0.0447 -0.046*  -0.0484 -0.047*  -0.0460  -0.0486 
Composite -0.024 -0.025 -0.020 -0.025 -0.022 -0.026 
Year 1999  -0.300*** -0.289***  -0.297*** -0.292***  -0.288***  -0.291*** 
Year 2001  -0.081*** -0.085***  -0.088*** -0.085***  -0.083***  -0.077*** 
Year 2003  -0.117*** -0.103***  -0.104*** -0.103***  -0.100***  -0.113*** 
Year 2004  -0.363*** 0.334***  -0.344*** -0.334***  -0.328***  -0.359*** 
R2  0.447 0.445 0.4462 0.443  0.444  0.456 
             
Note: ***, **, and *, indicate that the p-value is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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The results presented in Table 7.13 show the relationship of corporate governance and control 
variables with abnormal first day return. The table includes five governance estimations, viz 
size, demographics, leadership, education, and evaluation. This last estimation shows the 
estimated coefficients when all governance and control variables are included in the 
regression. The presence of heteroskedasticity necessitated the use of GLS estimation for size, 
leadership, evaluation and all variables regressions. Only one governance variable is 
observed as significantly impacting the abnormal first day return. The demographic and 
education regressions Hausman test results are not significant, indicating the study should use 
random effect model. 
 
CEO and the abnormal first day return 
CEO qualification is positively related to the abnormal first day return, while intuitively 
appealing, the correlation is not at a significant level. CEO age, gender, experience and 
duality are negatively related to the abnormal first day return and while intuitively appealing, 
the correlations are not at significant level.  
 
Board and the abnormal yearly return 
Chairman qualification is positively related to the abnormal first day return and while 
intuitively appealing, the correlation is not at significant level. Number of directors, the 
number of female directors, and the proportion of independent directors had been widely used 
in prior studies, but they are not significantly related to the abnormal first day return in this 
case. Chairman experience is not significantly related to abnormal first day return.  
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Ownership and the abnormal yearly return 
The legal person shareholding is negatively related to the Tobin’s Q at the 10% significant 
level. Non-trading ownership is negatively related to the abnormal first day return and while 
intuitively appealing, the correlation is also not at a significant level. 
 
Control variables and the abnormal yearly return 
The control variables in the form of size, change of the P/E ratio, years 1999, 2001, 2003, and 
2004 are negatively related to the abnormal first day return at the 1% significant level. Beta 
and the change of trading volume are positively related to the abnormal first day return at the 
1% significant level. Industry is negatively related to the abnormal first day return at the 10% 
significant level. The results indicate that investors prefer high risk IPOs in the short term.  
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7.8.2 Short-Term Final Estimations for Tobin’s Q 
Table 7.14 Cross-Sectional GLS Regression/OLS Regression Results for Dependent Variable Tobin’s Q 
  Governance Compositions 
 
Size Demographic Leadership Education Evaluation All 
 
GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS 
Independent and Control Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Constant 10.979*** 11.213*** 10.798*** 11.054*** 9.890*** 9.119*** 
MD Age 
 
-0.257 
   
-0.352 
MD Gender 
 
0.194 
   
0.305 
MD Qualification 
   
0.052 
 
0.031 
Top Three Officer Pay 
    
0.429*** 0.353*** 
CEO Duality 
  
-0.304** 
  
-0.264* 
Chairman Experience 
    
-0.049 -0.043 
Chairman Qualification 
   
0.029 
 
0.050 
Independent Director Percentage 0.105 
    
-0.089 
Female Director Number 
 
0.022 
   
0.007 
Number of Supervisors 0.011 
    
0.022 
Board Meeting per Year 
    
-0.532** -0.418* 
Insider Shareholding 
  
0.432** 
  
0.064** 
SOE Shareholding 
  
 
  
-0.234 
Non-trading Shareholding 
  
 
  
2.420*** 
Largest Shareholding 
  
0.525** 
  
0.480* 
Size -0.837*** -0.814*** -0.802*** -0.850*** -0.950*** -1.072*** 
Beta -0.035 -0.034 -0.028 -0.043 -0.001 -0.021 
Labour -0.244** -0.243** -0.277** -0.227** -0.149 -0.122 
Percentage change of Trading 
Volume 
4.179*** 4.067*** 4.018*** 4.112*** 4.296*** 
 Percentage change of P/E Ratio -4.721*** -4.578*** -4.602*** -4.632*** -4.941*** -4.032*** 
Industry  0.3151 0.327  0.3428 0.285  0.3410  0.387* 
Property  -0.1016 -0.131  -0.1251 -0.153  -0.0027  -0.0002 
Public Service  0.2976 0.310  0.366* 0.276  0.3727 0.473** 
Composite 0.499** 0.504** 0.573** 0.461* 0.536** 0.606** 
Year 1999  -2.793*** -2.715***  -2.783*** -2.754***  -2.930***  -0.862*** 
Year 2001  -0.285** -0.268*  -0.318** -0.271*  -0.385***  -0.308*** 
Year 2003  -1.748*** -1.715***  -1.706*** -1.723***  -1.864***  0.0807 
Year 2004  -4.109*** -4.010***  -3.994*** -4.045***  -4.327***  -1.835*** 
R2  0.570 0.57 0.583 0.572  0.588  0.624 
           
 Note: ***, **, and *, indicate that the p-value is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
The results presented in Table 7.14 show the relationship of corporate governance and control 
variables with Tobin’s Q. The table includes five governance estimations, viz size, 
demographics, leadership, education and evaluation. This last estimation shows the estimated 
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coefficients when all governance and control variables are included in the regression. The 
presence of heteroskedasticity necessitated the use of GLS estimation for all possible 
regressions. Six governance variables are observed as significantly impacting Tobin’s Q.  
 
CEO and Tobin’s Q 
Top management salary is positively related to Tobin’s Q at the 1% significant level. This 
finding is consistent with Engel et al. (2002), Lee et al. (2008) and Nikbakht et al. (2007) 
who find that top management salary is positively related to IPO performance. The result is 
also consistent with Kren et al. (1997) and Lippert (1999) who indicate a positive relationship 
between CEO compensation and firm performance. A plausible reason is that most high 
income managers are from larger companies and those companies in China have relatively 
low risk and are more attractive to investors. Investors’ behaviour may impact the share price 
and raise the level of Tobin’s Q. 
 
CEO duality is negatively related to the Tobin’s Q at the 10% significant level. The finding is 
consistent with Balatbat et al. (2004), Chahine et al. (2009), Dempere (2007), Lam et al. 
(2008) and Braun et al. (2007) who indicate that CEO duality is significantly associated with 
IPO performance in Australia, some Arab countries, and US.   
 
CEO gender, age and qualification are negatively related to Tobin’s Q and while intuitively 
appealing, the correlations are not at a significant level.  
 
Board and Tobin’s Q 
Board meetings per year are negatively related to Tobin’s Q at the 10% significant level. The 
high frequency of board meetings may be because board efficiency is low. Chairman 
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qualification, number of female directors and number of supervisors are positively related to 
Tobin’s Q and while intuitively appealing, the correlation is not at a significant level. 
Chairman experience and the proportion of independent directors are negatively related to 
Tobin’s Q but is not at significant level. 
 
Ownership and Tobin’s Q 
Insider ownership is positively related to Tobin’s Q at the 5% significant level. This finding 
is consistent with prior studies. This may be because of the positive relationship between 
management shareholding and firm performance. Non-trading ownership is positively related 
to Tobin’s Q at the 1% significant level. This may be because stable ownership is helpful to 
off-set the insensitive growth of the firms. Largest shareholder ownership is positively related 
to Tobin’s Q at the 10% significant level. State ownership is negatively related to the Tobin’s 
Q and while intuitively appealing, the correlation is not at a significant level. 
 
Control variables and Tobin’s Q 
The control variables in the form of size, change of the P/E ratio, years 1999, 2001, and 2004 
are negatively related to the Tobin’s Q at the 1% significant level. Public service and 
composite are positively related to Tobin’s Q at the 5% significant level. Industry is 
positively related to Tobin’s Q, at the 10% significant level.  
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7.8.3 Short-Term Final Estimations for ROA 
Table 7.15 Cross-Sectional GLS Regression/Dynamic GMM Regression Results for Dependent Variable 
ROA 
  Governance Compositions 
 
Size Demographic Leadership Education Evaluation All 
 
OLS OLS GLS OLS GLS GLS 
Independent and Control Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Constant 0.076** 0.135*** 0.070** 0.087** 0.042 0.061 
MD Age 
 
-0.032 
   
-0.034 
MD Gender 
 
0.002 
   
0.002 
MD Qualification 
   
0.000 
 
-0.001 
MD Experience 
    
-0.001 -0.001 
Top Three Officer Pay 
    
0.014*** 0.014*** 
CEO Duality 
  
-0.007 
  
-0.006 
Chairman Experience 
    
0.000 0.000 
Chairman Qualification 
   
0.001 
 
0.003 
Number of Directors 0.003 
    
0.009 
Independent Director Percentage -0.036** 
    
-0.048*** 
Female Director Number 
 
0.000 
   
-0.001 
Number of Supervisors -0.002** 
    
-0.002** 
Supervisors Meeting per Year 
    
-0.001 0.000 
Insider Shareholding 
  
0.022** 
  
0.014 
SOE Shareholding 
  
 
  
-0.015 
Legal Person Shareholding 
  
 
  
-0.011 
Non-trading Shareholding 
  
0.059*** 
  
0.065*** 
Number of  Committees 0.000 
    
0.001 
Largest Shareholding 
  
0.022*** 
  
0.032*** 
Size -0.001 -0.003 -0.006 -0.003 -0.007* -0.008* 
Beta -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
Labour -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 0.000 0.000 
Percentage change of Trading 
Volume 
 
-0.004 -0.007 -0.001 0.001 
 Percentage change of P/E Ratio 0.041* 0.028 0.026 0.023 0.023 0.048* 
Industry 0.009 0.009*  0.011** 0.010*  0.012**  0.012** 
Property 0.004 0.006  0.0073 0.007  0.0096  0.0057 
Public Service 0.010 0.012*  0.015** 0.012*  0.016**  0.016** 
Composite 0.005 0.004 0.009 0.006 0.007 0.008 
Year 1999 0.019** 0.023**  0.019* 0.020*  0.0204  0.018* 
Year 2001 0.012* 0.012**  0.010** 0.011**  0.012*  0.015* 
Year 2003 
 
-0.001  0.0004 -0.001  -0.0041 
 
Year 2004 0.013 0.006  0.0073 0.004  0.0002  0.0162 
R2 0.095 0.078 0.1336  0.072 0.0979  0.1958  
 
            
Note: ***, **, and *, indicate that the p-value is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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The results presented in Table 7.15 show the relationship of corporate governance and control 
variables with ROA. The table includes five governance estimations, viz size, demographics, 
leadership, education, and evaluation. This last estimation shows the estimated coefficients 
when all governance and control variables are included in the regression. The presence of 
heteroskedasticity necessitates the use of GLS estimation for leadership, evaluation and all 
governance variables regressions. Five governance variables are observed as significantly 
impacting ROA. The size, demographic, and education regressions Hausman test results are 
not significant, indicating the study should use the random effects model. 
 
CEO and ROA 
Top management salary is positively related to the long-term ROA at the 1% significant level. 
This finding is consistent with Engel et al. (2002), Lee et al. (2008) and Nikbakht et al. (2007) 
who find that top management salary is positively related to IPO performance. The result is 
also consistent with Kren et al. (1997) and Lippert (1999), who indicate a positive 
relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance. A plausible reason is that 
most high income managers are from larger companies and those companies in China have 
relatively low risk and offer better ROAs.  
 
CEO gender is positively related to the ROA; while intuitively appealing, the correlation is 
not at a significant level. CEO age, gender, qualification, experience and duality are 
negatively related to the ROA and while intuitively appealing the correlations are not at 
significant levels.  
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Board and ROA 
The proportion of independent directors is negatively related to the short-term ROA at the 1% 
significant level. This finding is opposite to some prior studies. Abdullah (2004), Balatbat et 
al.(2004), Bonn (2004), Bonn et al. (2004), Roosenboom  et al. (2005) and Reddy et al. (2008) 
suggest outside directors are positively related to firm value in Holland, Australia and New 
Zealand, but have no influence in Japan and Malaysia. This may be attributable to investors’ 
behaviour reflecting a concern that the independent directors lack a professional background 
and will not make a consistent contribution to the company. The number of supervisors is 
negatively related to the short-term ROA at the 5% significant level. 
 
Chairman experience, qualification, number of directors, the supervisors meetings per year, 
and the number of committees are positively related to ROA and while intuitively appealing, 
the correlations are not at significant levels. The number of female directors is negatively 
related to ROA and while intuitively appealing the correlation is not at a significant level. 
 
Ownership and ROA 
The non-trading ownership is positively related to Tobin’s Q at the 1% significant level. This 
may be because stable ownership is helpful to off-set the insensitive growth of the firms. 
Insider ownership is positively related to ROA, while intuitively appealing the correlation is 
not at a significant level. The state and legal person ownerships are negatively related to ROA 
and while intuitively appealing the correlations are not at significant levels. The largest 
ownership is positively related to the ROA at the 1% significant level. 
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Control variables and ROA 
Size is negatively related to ROA at the 10% significant level. Beta is negatively related to 
ROA, at the 1% significant level. The change of P/E ratio, year 1999, year 2001 are 
positively related to the ROA at the 10% significant level. Industry and public service are 
positively related to the ROA, at the 5% significant level.  
 
Insignificant independent variables 
There are some very important variables in prior studies but they are not significantly related 
to short-term IPO performance in this SHSE study. CEO gender is one of the important 
variables in prior financial performance studies. Adams et al. (2009) find a positive 
relationship between female CEO and firm performance. But CEO gender is not significantly 
related to the long-term abnormal yearly return in this study. First, this may be attributable to 
investors’ behaviour reflecting that a female CEO is not considered as an important signal. 
Second, according to the data description, only 2% of CEOs are female in the dataset. It is 
very hard to find the relationship between female CEOs and short-term IPO performance 
from such small sample.  
 
Number of directors is another important variable in prior financial performance studies. 
Abdullah (2004), Bonn (2004), Bonn et al. (2004), Daily et al. (2005), Dwivedi et al. (2005), 
Staikouras et al. (2007), and Chang (2009) find that board size is negatively associated with 
firm performance in Japan, Taiwan and Europe, positively associated with firm performance 
in India, and has no influence in Australia, the US and Malaysia. Li and Naughton (2007) 
find that board size is positively associated with under-pricing in the short term in China. 
This study finds it is not significantly related to the short-term IPO performance in the SHSE. 
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Number of female directors is not significantly related to short-term IPO performance in this 
study. Bonn (2004), Bonn et al. (2004), Campbell et al. (2008), and Reddy et al. (2008) find 
that female directors are positively associated with firm performance in Spain, US, New 
Zealand and Australia, but have no influence in Japan. A plausible reason is that there are 
very few female directors in the SHSE, which makes it hard to find the relationship between 
female directors and short-term IPO performance from such a small sample. 
 
Insider ownership is a third important variable in prior IPO and financial performance studies, 
but it is not significantly related to the short-term IPO performance in the SHSE.   Chahine 
(2007) finds that block ownership is negatively associated with firm performance in the 
short-term in France. Reddy et al. (2008) indicate that block ownership has a positive effect 
on firm performance in New Zealand. This may be attributable to investors’ behaviour 
reflecting that they are not concerned about insider ownership. 
 
SOE ownership is a fourth important variable in prior Chinese IPO and financial performance 
studies.  Gu (2003) indicates that state ownership is significantly negatively connected to 
short-term IPO performance in China. Chen (2001) indicates that the size of SOE share 
ownership is negatively associated with corporate performance. This study finds it is not 
significantly related to short-term IPO performance in the SHSE. A plausible reason is that 
most of SHSE listing IPOs are state owned.  
 
 
 
 
196 
 
7.9 Short –Term Specification Tests Results  
Joint significance test 
The study employs the Wald Test to examine the significance for independent and control 
variables of each OLS and GLS estimation. The results indicate that all p-values are 
significant at the 1% level, so all independent and control variables can be included in those 
estimations.  
 
7.10 Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed and explored the results of the corporate governance variables and 
long- and short-term IPO performance relationship in the Shanghai Stock Exchange dataset. 
The distribution of each variable has been checked to ensure it is approximately normal by 
median, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis. The study provides the descriptive 
statistics of variables after fixing missing observations and outliers, and also drops several 
independent variables. Diagnostic testing indicates the presence of heteroskedasticity and 
endogeneity in some of the regressions and a GLS or a dynamic GMM estimation is used. 
 
In the long-term case, this study finds that chairman’s experience is positively related to the 
abnormal yearly return. The proportion of independent directors and the board meetings per 
year are negatively related to the abnormal yearly return. CEO age is positively related to 
Tobin’s Q. The number of directors is negatively related to Tobin’s Q. Board meetings per 
year is negatively related to Tobin’s Q. The proportion of independent directors is negatively 
related to Tobin’s Q. The number of supervisors and the supervisors meetings per year are 
positively related to Tobin’s Q. Top management salary is positively related to ROA. 
Chairman’s qualification and the number of supervisors are positively related to ROA. The 
percentage of largest shareholding ownership is positively related to the abnormal yearly 
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return. This study applies a serial correlation test, over-identification test, and joint 
significance test for all long-term IPO performance regressions and the results show all 
models are statistically robust. According to the above results this study indicates that 
percentage of independent directors, board meetings per year, CEO age, number of directors, 
number of supervisors, supervisors meetings per year, top management salary, chairman’s 
qualification, and percentage of largest shareholding ownership are good corporate 
governance practices for long-term IPO performance in Shanghai Stock Exchange. This 
provides support for not rejecting H1, H4, H6, H9, H11, H19, H22 and H23. 
 
In the short-term case, this study finds that the legal person shareholding is negatively related 
to Tobin’s Q. Top management salary is positively related to short-term Tobin’s Q. CEO 
duality is negatively related to Tobin’s Q. Board meetings per year is negatively related to 
Tobin’s Q. Insider ownership and the non-trading ownership are positively related to Tobin’s 
Q. Top management salary is positively related to long-term ROA. The proportion of 
independent directors is negatively related to the short-term ROA. The number of supervisors 
is negatively related to short-term ROA. The non-trading and the largest ownership are 
positively related to ROA. Overall, the panel data and cross sectional regressions explain the 
long-term and short-term IPO performance well. According to the above results this study 
indicates that legal person shareholding, top management salary, CEO duality, board 
meetings per year, insider ownership, non-trading ownership, percentage of independent 
directors, number of supervisors, and percentage of largest shareholding ownership are good 
corporate governance practices for short-term IPO performance in Shanghai Stock Exchange. 
This leads to not rejecting H9, H15 and H19.   
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CHAPTER 8 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IMPACT ON IPO 
PERFORMANCE: SHENZHEN STOCK EXCHANGE 
 
8.1 Introduction 
Previous chapters offered the empirical results about the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and the short and long term performance of IPOs on Shanghai Stock 
Exchange. This chapter presents the descriptive statistics, econometric tests and the empirical 
results and findings about the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and 
performance of IPOs on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 
 
Section 2 provides a discussion of the descriptive statistics and normality test results of the 
original and transformed variables. Section 3 provides the results of correlation tests. Section 
4 provides the results of heteroskedasticity tests, multicollinearity tests, autocorrelation tests, 
and linearity tests. Section 5 provides the results of endogeneity tests. Section 6 provides the 
results of long-term OLS/GLS/Dynamic GMM tests. Section 7 provides the results of long-
term specification tests. Section 8 provides the results of short-term OLS/GLS tests. Section 9 
provides the results of short-term specification tests. Section 10 provides the conclusion of 
chapter 8. 
 
8.2 Descriptive and Normality Analysis 
The data sample includes 141 IPOs which have been post-listed on the SZSE from 1999 to 
2004. There are 1,139 observations regarding long-term IPO performance and governance 
mechanisms which are compiled as unbalanced panel data. There are 141 observations 
regarding short-term IPO performance and governance mechanisms and these are compiled 
as cross sectional data. Section 2 gives the key descriptive statistics of the original sample, 
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including the number of observations, mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and 
maximum. The section also provides the results of normality tests, which indicate both 
skewness and kurtosis. The sample includes three dependent variables, twenty independent 
variables and twelve control variables. Eight variables are transformed to log values: two 
dependent variables, four independent variables, and two control variables. 
8.2.1 Long-Term Data Descriptive Statistics 
8.2.1.1 Descriptive Statistics of Long-Term Sample 
The distribution of each variable was checked to ensure it was approximately normal by 
median, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis. The risk is those missing values and 
outliers significantly affect the sample data. The study provides the descriptive statistics of 
variables after fixing missing observations and outliers in Table 8.1.  
Table 8.1 Summary of Dependent and Independent Variables Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
Log Yearly Return 1139 0.477 0.473 0.073 0.228 0.693 0.275 5.165 
Tobin's Q 1139 2.110 1.698 1.239 0.613 6.435 1.715 5.784 
ROA 1139 0.032 0.032 0.060 -0.145 0.218 -0.450 5.488 
Log  MD Age 1139 1.657 1.653 0.066 1.415 1.826 0.031 2.848 
MD Gender 1139 0.024 0.000 0.152 0.000 1.000 6.262 40.210 
MD Qualification 1139 1.383 1.000 0.958 0.000 4.000 0.719 3.711 
MD Experience 1139 2.281 2.000 2.163 0.000 11.000 1.142 4.084 
Log  Pay 1139 5.689 5.690 0.403 4.437 7.276 0.018 3.465 
MD Duality 1139 0.834 1.000 0.372 0.000 1.000 -1.796 4.225 
Chairman Experience 1139 3.235 3.000 2.612 0.000 11.000 0.681 2.678 
Chairman Qualification 1139 1.307 1.000 0.968 0.000 4.000 0.773 3.688 
Log Number of Directors 1139 0.969 0.954 0.108 0.301 1.255 -0.499 4.910 
Independent Director Percentage 1139 0.297 0.333 0.124 0.000 0.600 -1.341 4.207 
Female Director Number 1139 0.959 1.000 0.967 0.000 5.000 1.038 3.937 
Number of Supervisors 1139 4.058 3.000 1.272 1.000 7.000 0.658 2.462 
Log Board Meeting per Year 1139 0.889 0.903 0.155 0.301 1.255 -0.148 3.732 
Supervisors Meeting per Year 1139 4.101 4.000 1.642 1.000 13.000 0.661 4.191 
Insider Shareholding 1139 0.033 0.000 0.112 0.000 0.925 4.195 22.639 
SOE Percentage 1139 0.327 0.360 0.270 0.000 0.850 0.017 1.516 
Legal Person Percentage 1139 0.165 0.045 0.216 0.000 0.773 1.199 3.239 
Un-trading Percentage 1139 0.524 0.576 0.196 0.000 0.894 -1.036 3.554 
Number of  Committees 1139 2.357 3.000 1.912 0.000 7.000 -0.247 1.347 
Largest Shareholding 1139 0.417 0.408 0.172 0.081 0.850 0.155 2.128 
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There are key descriptions for all dependent and independent variables as shown in Table 8.1. 
Log abnormal yearly return includes 1139 observations and there is no missing value. The 
mean is 0.4770, which is slightly significantly above 0. This indicates those IPOs’ longer-
term performances are above other IPOs listed before 1999 and after 2004. The median is 
0.4727 and the standard deviation is 0.0734. The abnormal return range is from 0.2278 to 
0.6932. The skewness is 0.2748. It shows the dataset is normally distributed.  The kurtosis is 
5.1651; it also shows the difference between values is not very big. Table 8.1 also presents 
the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, skewness, and kurtosis values 
for the entire long-term dependent and independent variables. 
 
The mean of Tobin’s Q is 2.1100, which is significantly above 1, indicating the market values 
of listed firms are far above current values, and it is more likely their stock prices are 
irrationally high and overvalued.  The mean of ROA is 0.0324, the same as the average ROA 
of the Shanghai Stock Exchange. This value also indicates that most Chinese firms are 
surviving in a less beneficial situation, a result of the recent global economic recession. The 
mean of managing director age is 45.92; the value indicates that Chinese CEOs are relatively 
young compared with top government officials. This is the same as the SHSE case and the 
most likely explanation is that those relatively younger CEOs are from family-owned 
companies and working as CEO under their older generations’ supervision. Supervisors 
meetings per year include 1139 observations. The mean is 4.1010. The value range is from 1 
to 13 with some supervisors meeting just once a year. Compared with the statistics reported 
before data transformation, Tobin’s Q, log of CEO age, CEO gender, CEO qualification, 
CEO experience, log of pay, chairman qualification, percentage of independent directors, 
number of supervisors, log of board meeting per year, supervisors meetings per year, and 
number of committees have been updated by filling the missing values. Abnormal yearly 
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return, log of abnormal yearly return, Tobin’s Q, and ROA, have had outliers removed and 
given replacements. Overall, abnormal yearly return, log of abnormal yearly return, Tobin’s 
Q, ROA, percentage of independent directors, log of board meeting per year, supervisors 
meetings per year, and number of committees provided more normal variants. Others offered 
similar normal variants. Overall, the results indicate that all data are normally distributed 
except CEO gender and insider shareholding. The updated data provides a better and more 
normal distributed dataset than the original sample dataset.  
 
8.2.1.2 Long-Term Control Variables Descriptive Statistics 
Table 8.2 Summary of Control Variables Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
Log Size 1139 9.253 9.178 0.408 8.238 10.809 0.703 3.422 
Beta 1139 1.006 1.035 0.211 0.228 1.681 -0.650 3.624 
Log Labour 1139 3.260 3.249 0.531 0.602 4.816 -0.317 4.370 
Percentage change of Listing 1139 0.063 0.064 0.058 -0.012 0.157 0.154 1.654 
Percentage change of Capitalization 1139 0.433 -0.127 0.907 -0.579 2.221 0.807 2.295 
Percentage change of Trading Volume 1139 0.722 0.024 1.336 -0.471 3.751 1.220 3.429 
Percentage change of Accounts 1139 0.166 0.080 0.239 0.021 0.787 2.052 5.611 
Percentage change of A-Shares 1139 -0.005 -0.006 0.027 -0.035 0.109 3.130 13.992 
Percentage change of P/E Ratio 1139 0.279 -0.071 0.804 -0.760 1.752 0.507 1.886 
Year 1999 1139 0.443 0 0.497 0 1 0.232 1.054 
Year 2000 1139 0.392 0 0.489 0 1 0.441 1.194 
Year 2004 1139 0.165 0 0.371 0 1 1.805 4.256 
 
There are key descriptions for all control variables after fixing those missing values and 
outliers as shown in Table 8.2. The log size includes 1139 observations. The mean is 9.2526, 
the median is 9.1782 and the standard deviation is 0.4075. The value range is from 8.2378 to 
10.8086. The skewness is 0.7032 and the kurtosis is 3.4221. Table 8.2 also presents the mean, 
median, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, skewness, and kurtosis values for the entire 
long-term control variables. The mean of beta is 1.0059; the average beta of sample is very 
close to the market beta. The mean of labour is 3470.076 employees. The value range is from 
four to 65,506 persons!  
202 
 
 
Overall, two control variables have been replaced by logarithm variables. Log of size and log 
of labour offer a more normal distribution than the original sample data outputs. The 
distributions of those variables were approximately normally distributed. The updated data 
provides a similar normal distributed dataset to the original sample dataset.  
 
8.2.2 Short-Term Data Descriptive Statistics 
8.2.2.1 Descriptive Statistics of Short-Term Sample 
Table 8.3 Summary of Dependent and Independent Variables Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
Log First Day Return 142 0.483 0.483 0.114 0.282 0.843 0.603 3.303 
Tobin's Q 142 3.189 2.719 1.762 0.933 10.005 1.646 6.480 
Log ROA 142 0.314 0.313 0.006 0.302 0.341 0.823 5.486 
Log  MD Age 142 1.655 1.644 0.074 1.505 1.813 0.107 2.019 
MD Gender 142 0.028 0.000 0.166 0.000 1.000 5.703 33.529 
MD Experience 142 0.958 1.000 1.003 0.000 4.000 0.847 3.172 
MD Duality 142 0.775 1.000 0.419 0.000 1.000 -1.315 2.728 
Chairman Experience 142 0.958 1.000 0.996 0.000 4.000 0.820 3.154 
Log Number of Directors 142 0.965 0.954 0.109 0.699 1.230 -0.172 3.418 
Independent Director Percentage 142 0.114 0.000 0.165 0.000 0.500 0.842 1.878 
Female Director Number 142 0.887 1.000 0.900 0.000 3.000 0.691 2.561 
Number of Supervisors 142 4.042 3.000 1.320 3.000 9.000 1.073 3.595 
Insider Shareholding 142 0.070 0.000 0.163 0.000 0.886 2.585 9.355 
SOE Percentage 142 0.343 0.393 0.292 0.000 0.850 -0.013 1.371 
Legal Person Percentage 142 0.252 0.145 0.261 0.000 0.750 0.615 1.848 
Un-trading Percentage 142 0.668 0.680 0.110 0.000 0.894 -2.184 13.294 
Number of  Committees 142 0.423 0.000 1.175 0.000 5.000 2.635 8.320 
Largest Shareholding 142 0.464 0.474 0.181 0.093 0.850 -0.052 2.027 
 
There are key descriptive statistics for all dependent and independent variables after fixing 
those missing values and outliers as shown in Table 8.3. Abnormal first day return included 
142 observations and there is no missing value. The mean is 1.1745, which is 117.45% above 
the current day market return on average, indicating that IPOs’ short-term performances are 
irrational in China. The abnormal return range is from -0.0840 to 8.3353, suggesting that 
203 
 
some IPOs had very strong short-term support during the listing date. Log abnormal first day 
return also includes 142 values. The mean is 0.4829, the median is 0.4827, and the standard 
deviation is 0.1142. The log abnormal return range is from 0.2824 to 0.8430. The skewness is 
0.6029 and the kurtosis is 3.3031. Table 8.3 also presents the mean, median, standard 
deviation, minimum, maximum, skewness, and kurtosis values for the entire short-term 
dependent and independent variables. The mean of Tobin’s Q is 3.1889, which is 
significantly above 1, indicating those stock prices are irrational high and overvalued.  The 
median is 2.7189 and the standard deviation is 1.7617.  
 
CEO qualification, top three officers’ pay, chairman qualification, board meetings per year 
and supervisors meeting per year have been dropped as there were too many missing values. 
Tobin’s Q, log of CEO age, CEO gender, CEO experience, percentage of independent 
directors, number of supervisors, and number of committees have been updated by filling the 
missing values. Abnormal first day return, log of abnormal first day return, ROA, and log of 
ROA had outliers removed and given replacements. After this, abnormal first day return, log 
of abnormal first day return, ROA, log of ROA, and number of committees provide more 
normal variants. Others offer similar normal variants. Overall, the results indicate that all data 
are normally distributed except CEO gender, insider shareholding, non-trading shareholding, 
and number of committees. So the updated data provide a better and more normal distributed 
dataset than the original sample dataset.  
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8.2.2.2. Short-Term Control Variables Descriptive Statistics 
Table 8.4 Summary of Control Variables Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
Log Size 142 9.046 8.989 0.344 8.459 10.478 1.139 4.732 
Beta 142 1.051 1.077 0.175 0.428 1.374 -0.779 3.533 
Log Labour 142 3.183 3.204 0.458 1.903 4.816 0.434 3.774 
Percentage change of Listing 142 0.101 0.110 0.025 0.061 0.121 -0.893 1.958 
Percentage change of Capitalization 142 0.369 0.339 0.360 -0.127 0.780 -0.191 1.627 
Percentage change of Trading Volume 142 0.594 0.405 0.347 0.286 1.052 0.531 1.354 
Percentage change of Accounts 142 0.168 0.152 0.105 0.029 0.291 -0.058 1.571 
Percentage change of A-Shares 142 0.081 0.109 0.059 -0.014 0.125 -0.965 1.996 
Percentage change of P/E Ratio 142 0.176 0.187 0.342 -0.319 0.544 -0.392 1.717 
Year 1999 142 0.366 0 0.484 0 1 0.556 1.309 
Year 2000 142 0.359 0 0.482 0 1 0.587 1.345 
Year 2004 142 0.275 0 0.448 0 1 1.010 2.020 
 
 
There are key descriptive statistics for all control variables as shown in Table 8.4. Log size 
includes 142 observations. The mean is 9.0460, the median is 8.9892 and the standard 
deviation is 0.3438. The value range is from 8.4589 to 10.4777. The skewness is 1.1385 and 
the kurtosis is 4.7323. Table 8.4 also presents the mean, median, standard deviation, 
minimum, maximum, skewness, and kurtosis values for the entire set of short-term control 
variables. The mean of beta is 1.0506; the average beta of sample is very close to the market 
beta.   Overall, two control variables have been replaced by logarithm variables. So the 
upgraded data provides a similar normal distributed dataset to the original sample dataset.  
 
8.3 Pair Wise Correlation Test Results 
8.3.1 Pair-Wise Correlation Test Results for Long-Term Sample 
The correlation matrix for long-term variables shown as Table 12.3 in the appendices shows 
all the correlations between dependent and explanatory variables. Most independent and 
control variables are significantly  correlated with the level of Tobin’s Q and ROA; most of 
the control variables and some independent variables are significantly correlated with the 
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level of abnormal yearly return. These results indicate that corporate governance factors have 
less impact on stock performance than financial performance. SOE ownership is highly 
correlated with legal person ownership, a few market value-based control variables are also 
highly correlated with each other. So the study pays attention to those variables by carrying 
out further multicollinearity tests.   
 
8.3.2 Pair-Wise Correlation Test Results for Short-Term Sample 
The correlation matrix for long-term variables shown as Table 12.4 in the appendices shows 
all the correlations between dependent and explanatory variables. Most control variables are 
significantly correlated with the level of abnormal first day return, Tobin’s Q, and ROA and 
some of independent variables are significantly correlated with the level of abnormal first day 
return, Tobin’s Q, and ROA. These results indicate that corporate governance factors have 
relatively less impact on short-term IPO performance than on long-term IPO performance. 
Some of the market value-based control variables are highly correlated with each other. The 
study pays attention to those variables by carrying out further multicollinearity tests.  
 
8.4 Multicollinearity/Heteroskedasticity/Panel and Cross Sectional Data 
OLS Regression Results 
 
8.4.1 Multicollinearity/Heteroskedasticity/Panel Data OLS Regression Results for Long 
Term IPO Performance 
The study tests the relationship between corporate governance and control variables using 
abnormal yearly return by panel data OLS regression. There are five attributions of 
governance estimations, viz size, demographics, leadership, education, and evaluation. This 
last estimation shows the estimated coefficients when all governance and control variables 
are included in the regression. A control variable in the form of a dummy for year 2004 is 
dropped by Stata automatically due to a multicollinearity problem. Each regression provides 
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similar results for independent and control variables, indicating that those results are not 
affected by addition or deletion of the variables that exhibited multicollinearity. The 
abnormal yearly return is significantly positively related to percentage of largest shareholding, 
and is significantly negatively related to top management pay, state share ownership, and 
legal person ownership. However, the results shown for all regressions are problematic as 
diagnostic testing indicates the presence of heteroskedasticity; GLS regressions or Dynamic 
GMM regressions are likely to be more robust. 
 
The study tests the relationship between corporate governance and control variables using 
Tobin’s Q by panel data OLS regression. The estimations include five governance 
estimations similar to the abnormal yearly return analysis. The same multicollinearity issues 
arise as reported for governance above. Tobin’s Q is significantly positively related to top 
three officers’ pay, chairman qualification, and supervisors meetings per year. Tobin’s Q is 
significantly negatively related to the percentage of independent directors and board meeting 
per year. The regressions exhibit heteroskedasticity, so GLS regressions or Dynamic GMM 
regressions are likely to yield superior results in following analysis. 
 
The study tests the relationship between corporate governance and control variables using 
ROA by panel data OLS regression. The same five governance estimations are used. 
Multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity are present. ROA is significantly positively related to 
CEO age, top three officer pay, chairman experience, and number of female directors, 
number of supervisors, percentage of non-trading shareholdings and percentage of largest 
shareholding. ROA is significantly negatively related to state share ownership. GLS 
regressions or Dynamic GMM regressions are investigated in the following analysis. 
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8.4.2 Multicollinearity/Heteroskedasticity/Panel Data OLS Regression Results for 
Short-Term IPO Performance 
The study tested the relationship between corporate governance and control variables using 
abnormal first day return by panel data OLS regression. The estimations include five 
attributes of governance estimations, viz size, demographics, leadership, education, and 
evaluation. This last attribution shows the estimated coefficients when all governance and 
control variables are included in the regression. The control variables in the form of the 
percentage change of listing, percentage change of capitalization, percentage change of 
trading volume, percentage change of accounts, percentage change of A-shares, percentage 
change of P/E ratio, and dummy for year 2004 are dropped by Stata automatically due to a 
multicollinearity problem. Each regression provides similar results for independent and 
control variables, indicating that those results are not affected by addition or deletion of the 
variables which exhibited multicollinearity. The abnormal first day return is significantly 
positively related to number of directors. However, the results show for all regressions there 
is no heteroskedasticity; GLS regressions or 2SLS regressions are likely to be more robust. 
 
The study tests the relationship between corporate governance and control variables using 
Tobin’s Q by panel data OLS regression. The estimations include five governance 
estimations similar to the abnormal first day return analysis. The same multicollinearity 
issues arise as reported for governance above. Tobin’s Q is significantly positively related to 
state share ownership and legal person share ownership. Tobin’s Q is significantly negatively 
related to CEO gender. The regressions exhibit heteroskedasticity, so GLS regressions or 
2SLS regressions are likely to yield superior results in following analysis. 
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The study tests the relationship of corporate governance and control variables with ROA by 
panel data OLS regression. The same five attributes of governance estimations are used. 
Multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity were present so GLS regressions or 2SLS regressions 
are investigated in the following analysis. 
 
8.5 Endogeneity Tests  
8.5.1 Endogeneity Test Results for Abnormal Yearly Return 
Table 8.5 below presents the endogeneity test results between governance variables and 
dependent variable abnormal yearly return. The table includes five attributes of governance 
estimations; size, demographics, leadership, education and evaluation estimations. The last 
column shows the endogeneity test results when all governance and control variables are 
included in the regression.  The presence of heteroskedasticity necessitates the use of GLS 
estimation for the regressions of “size”, “demographics”, “leadership” and “education”. 
Diagnostic testing indicates the presence of heteroskedasticity and endogeneity in the 
“evaluation” and “all estimation” and a dynamic GMM estimation is used. However, the 
study selects almost all possible corporate governance variables, so finding instrument 
variables outside this dataset is difficult, hence the study uses dynamic panel GMM 
estimation.   
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Table 8.5 The DWH Test for Endogeneity of Abnormal Yearly Return 
  Governance Compositions 
 
Size Demographic Leadership Education Evaluation All 
Independent and Control Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
MD Age 
 
0.173 
   
0.294 
MD Qualification 
   
0.425 
 
0.512 
MD Experience 
    
2.637 2.790* 
Top Three Officer Pay 
    
5.961** 5.724** 
Chairman Experience 
    
0.955 0.907 
Chairman Qualification 
   
2.584 
 
3.092* 
Number of Directors 0.452 
    
0.506 
Independent Director Percentage 0.081 
    
0.031 
Female Director Number 
 
0.004 
   
0.004 
Number of Supervisors 0.151 
    
0.230 
Board Meeting per Year 
    
0.361 0.285 
Supervisors Meeting per Year 
    
0.214 0.344 
Insider Shareholding 
  
0.277 
  
0.186 
SOE Shareholding 
  
0.118 
  
0.049 
Legal Person Shareholding 
  
0.950 
  
0.719 
Un-trading Shareholding 
  
0.106 
  
0.111 
Number of  Committees 0.775 
    
1.331 
Largest Shareholding     0.272     0.311 
Note: ***, **, and *, indicate that the p-value is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
8.5.2 Endogeneity Test Results for Tobin’s Q 
Table 8.6 presents the endogeneity test results between governance variables and dependent 
variable Tobin’s Q. The table includes five governance estimations, being size, demographics, 
leadership, education and evaluation estimations. The last column shows the endogeneity test 
results when all governance and control variables are included in the regression. There are no 
endogeneity problems for all board compositions with Tobin’s Q, so the study employs GLS 
estimation for these regressions. The presence of heteroskedasticity necessitates the use of 
GLS estimation for the regressions of “size”, “demographics”, “leadership”, “education’, 
“evaluation” and “all estimation”.   
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Table 8.6 The DWH Test for Endogeneity of Tobin’s Q 
  Governance Compositions 
 
Size Demographic Leadership Education Evaluation All 
Independent and Control Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
MD Age   0.002       0.002 
MD Qualification 
   
0.511 
 
0.500 
MD Experience 
    
0.170 0.049 
Top Three Officer Pay 
    
0.284 0.369 
Chairman Experience 
    
0.019 0.026 
Chairman Qualification 
   
0.254 
 
0.141 
Number of Directors 0.267 
    
0.647 
Independent Director Percentage 0.138 
    
0.637 
Female Director Number 
 
0.227 
   
0.276 
Number of Supervisors 0.001 
    
0.000 
Board Meeting per Year 
    
0.297 0.245 
Supervisors Meeting per Year 
    
0.648 0.938 
Insider Shareholding 
  
1.787 
  
1.462 
SOE Shareholding 
  
0.073 
  
0.073 
Legal Person Shareholding 
  
0.107 
  
0.114 
Un-trading Shareholding 
  
0.350 
  
0.271 
Number of  Committees 0.139 
    
0.029 
Largest Shareholding     0.228     0.441 
Note: ***, **, and *, indicate that the p-value is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
8.5.3 Endogeneity Test Results for ROA 
Table 8.7 presents the endogeneity test results between governance variables and dependent 
variable ROA. The table includes five governance estimations; size, demographics, 
leadership, education and evaluation estimations. The last column shows the endogeneity test 
results when all governance and control variables are included in the regression. The presence 
of heteroskedasticity necessitates the use of GLS estimation for the regressions of “size” and 
“demographics”. Diagnostic testing indicates the presence of heteroskedasticity and 
endogeneity in the “leadership”, “education”, “evaluation” and “all estimation” and a 
dynamic GMM estimation is used. However, the study selects almost all possible corporate 
governance variables, so finding instrument variables outside this dataset is difficult hence 
the study uses dynamic panel GMM estimation.   
211 
 
 
Table 8.7 DWH Test for Endogeneity of ROA 
  Governance Compositions 
 
Size Demographic Leadership Education Evaluation All 
Independent and Control Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
MD Age   0.045       0.420 
MD Qualification 
   
0.281 
 
0.097 
MD Experience 
    
1.151 1.505 
Top Three Officer Pay 
    
6.910*** 3.460* 
Chairman Experience 
    
3.525* 3.427* 
Chairman Qualification 
   
7.856*** 
 
5.847** 
Number of Directors 0.052 
    
0.495 
Independent Director Percentage 0.107 
    
0.022 
Female Director Number 
 
0.068 
   
0.638 
Number of Supervisors 0.710 
    
0.494 
Board Meeting per Year 
    
0.045 0.203 
Supervisors Meeting per Year 
    
0.052 0.029 
Insider Shareholding 
  
0.061 
  
0.230 
SOE Shareholding 
  
0.133 
  
0.383 
Legal Person Shareholding 
  
2.789* 
  
3.693* 
Un-trading Shareholding 
  
4.854** 
  
4.883** 
Number of  Committees 0.031 
    
0.016 
Largest Shareholding     2.123     1.295 
Note: ***, **, and *, indicate that the p-value is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Tables 8.8 and 8.9 present the conclusion of heteroskedasticity tests, endogeneity tests, and 
potential regression estimations of long- and short-term SZSE IPO performance models. 
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Table 8.8 The Heteroskedasticity, Endogeneity Results and Final Estimations of Long-Term Performance 
Abnormal Yearly Return Governance Compositions 
Specification Test Size Demographic Leadership Education Evaluation All 
Heteroskedasticity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Endogeneity No No No No Yes Yes 
Estimation GLS GLS GLS GLS 2SLS Dynamic GMM 
              
Tobin's Q Governance Compositions 
Specification Test Size Demographic Leadership Education Evaluation All 
Heteroskedasticity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Endogeneity No No No No No No 
Estimation GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS 
              
ROA Governance Compositions 
Specification Test Size Demographic Leadership Education Evaluation All 
Heteroskedasticity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Endogeneity No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Estimation GLS GLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS Dynamic GMM 
 
Table 8.9 The Heteroskedasticity, Endogeneity Results and Final Estimations of Short-Term 
Performance 
Abnormal First Day 
Return 
Governance Compositions 
Specification Test Size Demographic Leadership   Evaluation All 
Heteroskedasticity No No No 
 
No No 
Endogeneity No No No 
 
Yes Yes 
Estimation OLS OLS OLS 
 
2SLS GLS 
              
Tobin's Q Governance Compositions 
Specification Test Size Demographic Leadership   Evaluation All 
Heteroskedasticity Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Endogeneity No No No 
 
No No 
Estimation GLS GLS GLS 
 
GLS GLS 
              
ROA Governance Compositions 
Specification Test Size Demographic Leadership   Evaluation All 
Heteroskedasticity No No No 
 
No Yes 
Endogeneity No No Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Estimation OLS OLS 2SLS   2SLS GLS 
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8.6 Long-Term Final Estimations 
8.6.1 Long-Term Final Estimations for Abnormal Yearly Return 
Table 8.10 Panel Data GLS Regression/Dynamic GMM Regression Results for Dependent Variable 
Abnormal Yearly Return 
  Governance Attributions 
 
Size Demographic Leadership Education Evaluation All 
 
GLS GLS GLS GLS GMM GMM 
Independent and Control Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Constant 0.481*** 0.533*** 0.492*** 0.468*** 0.487 0.537 
L1 
    
0.029 0.018 
MD Age 
 
-0.044 
   
-0.119 
MD Gender 
 
0.006 
   
-0.025 
MD Qualification 
   
0.003 
 
0.008 
MD Experience 
    
-0.001 -0.002 
Top Three Officer Pay 
    
0.023 0.046 
CEO Duality 
  
0.000 
  
-0.010 
Chairman Experience 
    
0.001 0.003 
Chairman Qualification 
   
0.000 
 
0.018 
Number of Directors -0.009 
    
0.011 
Independent Director Percentage -0.009 
    
-0.125*** 
Female Director Number 
 
0.001 
   
-0.004 
Number of Supervisors 0.001 
    
-0.004 
Board Meeting per Year 
    
-0.015 -0.004 
Supervisors Meeting per Year 
    
-0.001 0.000 
Insider Shareholding 
  
-0.021 
  
0.033 
SOE Shareholding 
  
-0.062** 
  
-0.110** 
Legal Person Shareholding 
  
-0.065** 
  
-0.078** 
Non-trading Shareholding 
  
0.044 
  
-0.118 
Number of  Committees 0.000 
    
0.000 
Largest Shareholding 
  
0.037*** 
  
0.091* 
Size 0.007 0.008 0.005 0.008 -0.010 -0.011 
Beta -0.064*** -0.065*** -0.065*** -0.064*** -0.055*** -0.057*** 
Labour -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 0.001 0.005 
Percentage change of Listing 0.202*** 0.188*** 0.181*** 0.178*** 0.139 0.136 
Percentage change of Capitalization 0.163*** 0.157*** 0.162*** 0.155*** 0.042 0.048 
Percentage change of Trading 
Volume 
-0.064*** -0.064*** -0.062*** -0.063*** -0.017 0.005 
Percentage change of Accounts -0.048* -0.037* -0.050** -0.036 0.017 -0.071 
Percentage change of A-Shares -0.152* -0.130* -0.148* -0.123* 0.924** 1.343*** 
Percentage change of P/E Ratio -0.086*** -0.082*** -0.088*** -0.081*** -0.022 -0.039 
Year 1999 0.000 0.001 0.004 -0.001 
  
Year 2000 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.002 
  
R2 0.097 0.098 0.103 0.098 
  
AR(1) 
    
-8.667*** -8.549*** 
AR(2) 
    
-1.112 -0.810 
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J-statistics 
    
76.068 112.900 
Chi2  102.630***  99.080***  120.560***  97.170*** 67.660*** 81.000*** 
Note: ***, **, and *, indicate that the p-value is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
The results presented in Table 8.10 show the relationship of corporate governance and control 
variables with abnormal yearly return. The table includes five governance estimations, which 
are size, demographics, leadership, education, and evaluation estimations. The last column 
shows the estimation coefficients when all governance and control variables are included in 
the regression. The presence of heteroskedasticity necessitates the use of GLS estimation for 
the regressions of “size”, “demographics”, “leadership”, and “education”. Diagnostic testing 
indicates the presence of heteroskedasticity and endogeneity in “evaluation” and “all 
estimation” and a dynamic GMM estimation is used. Four governance variables and three 
control variables are observed as significantly impacting the abnormal yearly return.  
 
CEO and the abnormal yearly return 
CEO qualification and top management salary are positively related to the long-term 
abnormal yearly return. While intuitively appealing, the correlation is not at a significant 
level. CEO age, CEO gender, CEO experience, and CEO duality are negatively related to the 
abnormal yearly return, and again are not statistically significant.  
 
Board and the abnormal yearly return 
The percentage of independent directors is negatively related to the abnormal yearly return, 
and is significant at the 1% level. This finding runs contrary to some prior studies. Abdullah 
(2004), Balatbat et al. (2004), Bonn (2004), Bonn et al. (2004), Roosenboom  et al. (2005) 
and Reddy et al. (2008) suggest outside directors are positively related to firm value in 
Holland, Australia and New Zealand, but have no influence in Japan and Malaysia. This may 
be attributable to investors’ behaviour reflecting a concern that the independent directors lack 
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a professional background and will not make a consistent contribution to the company. 
Chairman’s qualification, chairman’s experience, number of directors, supervisors meetings 
per year, and number of committees reflect a coefficient positively related with the abnormal 
yearly return though not at a significant level. The number of female directors, number of 
supervisors, and board meetings per year are negatively related with the abnormal yearly 
return and are not statistically significant.  
 
Ownership and the abnormal yearly return 
State ownership and legal person ownership are negatively related to the abnormal yearly 
return at the 5% significant level. These findings are consistent with previous studies by Chen 
(2001) and Gu (2003). They find that SOE ownership is significantly negatively connected to 
the IPO performance and corporate performance in China. Wang (2005) also indicates that a 
curvilinear relationship exists between legal person shareholding and operating performance. 
The percentage of largest shareholding ownership is positively related to the abnormal yearly 
return, at the 10% significant level. The likely explanation for this weakly significant finding 
relates to prior research. First, investors may believe that the large amount of the share 
ownership is an important signal that shows a large block holder has high expectations for the 
company, encouraging others to acquire shares. Second, a large amount of founder ownership 
indicates that the company has the potential to raise capital from the debt market as well as 
the stock market. Third, a rise in stock price may be the result of demand and purchase 
factions of large shareholders. Insider ownership is positively related to the abnormal yearly 
return, but not at a significant level. The non-trading ownership is negatively related to the 
abnormal yearly return, and is not significant. Insider ownership is an important variable in 
prior IPO and financial performance studies, but it is not significantly related to the long-term 
abnormal yearly return in this study.   
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Control variables and the abnormal yearly return 
Beta is negatively related to the abnormal yearly return at the 1% significant level. And the 
change of listing A-shares is positively related to the abnormal yearly return at the 1% 
significant level. These are consistent with investors being pleased with the small, low risk 
industry IPOs on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.  
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8.6.2 Long-Term Final Estimations for Tobin’s Q 
Table 8.11 Panel Data GLS Regression Results for Dependent Variable Tobin’s Q 
  Governance Compositions 
 
Size Demographic Leadership Education Evaluation All 
 
GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS 
Independent and Control Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Constant 12.280*** 11.619*** 12.476*** 12.422*** 11.982*** 10.618*** 
MD Age 
 
0.461 
   
0.362 
MD Gender 
 
-0.210 
   
-0.095 
MD Qualification 
   
0.044 
 
0.069 
MD Experience 
    
0.003 -0.005 
Top Three Officer Pay 
    
0.376** 0.389** 
CEO Duality 
  
-0.072 
  
-0.074 
Chairman Experience 
    
-0.008 -0.001 
Chairman Qualification 
   
0.124** 
 
0.100* 
Number of Directors 0.552 
    
0.422 
Independent Director Percentage -1.110*** 
    
-1.284*** 
Female Director Number 
 
0.064* 
   
0.043 
Number of Supervisors 0.019 
    
0.017 
Board Meeting per Year 
    
-0.479** -0.359* 
Supervisors Meeting per Year 
    
0.027 0.038* 
Insider Shareholding 
  
-0.184 
  
-0.216 
SOE Shareholding 
  
0.085 
  
-0.014 
Legal Person Shareholding 
  
0.060 
  
-0.049 
Non-trading Shareholding 
  
0.312 
  
0.235 
Number of  Committees -0.024 
    
-0.020 
Largest Shareholding 
  
-0.241 
  
-0.030 
Size -1.018*** -1.009*** -1.032*** -1.035*** -1.172*** -1.139*** 
Beta -1.055*** -1.036*** -1.037*** -1.049*** -1.025*** -1.030*** 
Labour -0.045 -0.040 -0.007 -0.022 -0.017 -0.035 
Percentage change of Listing 0.411 -2.093*** -1.093 -2.252*** -2.677*** -0.503 
Percentage change of Capitalization -1.615*** -2.363*** -2.310*** -2.399*** -2.410*** -1.661*** 
Percentage change of Trading 
Volume 
-0.239*** -0.119 -0.186* -0.111 -0.077 -0.192* 
Percentage change of Accounts 5.138*** 6.327*** 6.339*** 6.364*** 6.366*** 5.169*** 
Percentage change of A-Shares 5.453*** 8.697*** 7.886*** 8.774*** 9.191*** 6.149*** 
Percentage change of P/E Ratio 1.787*** 2.293*** 2.310*** 2.317*** 2.294*** 1.794*** 
Year 1999 -0.327 -0.288 -0.314 -0.299* -0.145 -0.290 
Year 2000 -0.261 -0.235 -0.260 -0.235 -0.148 -0.248 
Chi2 751.260*** 685.470*** 762.490*** 703.130*** 743.720*** 910.100*** 
R2 0.473 0.475 0.472 0.485 0.479 0.499 
Note: ***, **, and *, indicate that the p-value is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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The results presented in Table 8.11 show the relationship of corporate governance and control 
variables with the long-term Tobin’s Q. The table includes five governance estimations, 
which are size, demographics, leadership, education, and evaluation estimations. The last 
column shows the estimation coefficients when all governance and control variables are 
included in the regression. The presence of heteroskedasticity necessitates the use of GLS 
estimation for all regressions. Five governance variables and seven control variables are 
observed as significantly impacting the long-term Tobin’s Q.  
 
CEO and the long-term Tobin’s Q 
Top management salary is positively related to the long-term Tobin’s Q at the 5% significant 
level. This finding is consistent with Engel et al. (2002), Lee et al. (2008) and Nikbakht et al. 
(2007) who find that top management salary is positively related to IPO performance. The 
result is also consistent with Kren et al. (1997) and Lippert (1999) who indicate a positive 
relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance. The current study finding 
goes further, noting that top management salary is also positively related with long-term 
Tobin’s Q in China. A plausible reason is that most high income managers are from larger 
companies and those companies in China have relatively low risk and are more attractive to 
investors. The investors’ behaviour may impact the share price and raise the level of Tobin’s 
Q. CEO age and qualification are positively related to the long-term Tobin’s Q, but while 
intuitively appealing, the correlation is not at a significant level. CEO gender, CEO 
experience, and CEO duality are negatively related to the long-term Tobin’s Q, and again not 
at a statistically significant level. CEO gender and CEO duality are important variables in 
prior studies but they are not significantly related to the long-term Tobin’s Q in this study.  
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Board and the long-term Tobin’s Q 
Chairman’s qualification is positively related to the long-term Tobin’s Q at the 10% 
significant level. The chairman’s qualification is an important signal for Chinese investors 
who traditionally have general reverence for higher educated people and view them as having 
acquired more wisdom.  The proportion of independent directors is negatively related to the 
long-term Tobin’s Q, at the 1% significant level. This finding is opposite to some prior 
studies. Abdullah (2004), Balatbat et al.(2004), Bonn (2004), Bonn et al. (2004), 
Roosenboom  et al. (2005) and Reddy et al. (2008) suggest outside directors are positively 
related to firm value in Holland, Australia and New Zealand, but have no influence in Japan 
and Malaysia. This may be attributable to investors’ behaviour reflecting a concern that 
independent directors lack a professional background and will not make a consistent 
contribution to the company. Actually, many Chinese independent directors are government 
officials, academics, and also foreigners and perhaps they may not have a reasonable 
understanding of a company’s current situation. Before 2002, a listed company only needed 
to include two independent directors on their board. The small number of independent 
directors means they are marginalized and find it hard to influence board decision-making.  
 
The number of board meetings per year is negatively related to the long-term Tobin’s Q at the 
10% significant level. The high frequency of board meetings may indicate the board is 
inefficient or the company has a lot of issues. Supervisor meetings per year are positively 
related to the long-term Tobin’s Q at the 10% significant level. As mentioned in section 5.5.2, 
supervisors play a key role. A more active supervisory group will help the company to 
achieve a better performance, protect shareholders’ benefit, and reduce agency cost. The 
number of directors, number of supervisors and number of female directors are positively 
related to the long-term Tobin’s Q, but not at a significant level. Chairman experience and 
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number of committees are negatively related to the long-term Tobin’s Q, but not at 
statistically significant levels. The number of directors and the number of female directors are 
not significantly related to the long-term Tobin’s Q in this study.  
 
Ownership and long-term Tobin’s Q 
Inside ownership, SOE ownership, legal person ownership, and the largest shareholding are 
negatively related to the long-term Tobin’s Q, but not at a significant level. Non-trading 
ownership is positively related to the long-term Tobin’s Q but is not significant. 
 
Control variables and long-term Tobin’s Q 
Size, beta, and change of capitalization are negatively related to the long-term Tobin’s Q at 
the 1% significant level and the change of trading volume is negatively related to the long-
term Tobin’s Q at the 10% significant level. These results indicate that Chinese investors are 
likely to invest in small and low-risk industry IPOs. The change of investor accounts, the 
change of A-shares listing, and the change of P/E ratio are positively related to the long-term 
Tobin’s Q at the 1% significant level. The results also indicate that one trading strategy used 
by investors is to hold the stocks and enjoy the capital gain when stock prices are rising. 
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8.6.3 Long-Term Final Estimations for ROA 
Table 8.12 Panel Data GLS Regression/Dynamic GMM Regression Results for Dependent Variable ROA 
  Governance Compositions 
 
Size Demographic Leadership Education Evaluation All 
 
GLS GLS GMM GMM GMM GMM 
Independent and Control Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Constant -0.170 -0.304** -0.193 -0.144 -0.221 -0.456** 
L1 
  
0.325*** 0.326*** 0.324*** 0.238*** 
MD Age 
 
0.084** 
   
0.109 
MD Gender 
 
-0.002 
   
-0.005 
MD Qualification 
   
-0.009 
 
-0.003 
MD Experience 
    
-0.001 -0.002 
Top Three Officer Pay 
    
0.000 0.014 
CEO Duality 
  
-0.003 
  
0.001 
Chairman Experience 
    
-0.002 -0.001 
Chairman Qualification 
   
-0.003 
 
-0.017 
Number of Directors 0.026 
    
-0.011 
Independent Director Percentage -0.029 
    
0.019 
Female Director Number 
 
0.007*** 
   
0.009** 
Number of Supervisors 0.003 
    
0.011** 
Board Meeting per Year 
    
0.005 0.006 
Supervisors Meeting per Year 
    
0.000 0.000 
Insider Shareholding 
  
0.034 
  
0.000 
SOE Shareholding 
  
-0.042 
  
-0.069 
Legal Person Shareholding 
  
-0.045 
  
-0.066 
Non-trading Shareholding 
  
0.037 
  
0.061 
Number of  Committees -0.001 
    
-0.001 
Largest Shareholding 
  
0.076* 
  
0.090** 
Size 0.031** 0.033** 0.033 0.033 0.039 0.029 
Beta -0.052*** -0.050*** -0.065*** -0.062*** -0.068*** -0.064*** 
Labour -0.007 -0.007 -0.019 -0.026* -0.017 -0.016 
Percentage change of Listing -0.046 -0.153** -0.016 -0.061 -0.036 0.008 
Percentage change of Capitalization -0.048** -0.072*** -0.048* -0.054** -0.047* -0.051** 
Percentage change of Trading 
Volume 
0.006 0.011** 0.009 0.011 0.008 0.002 
Percentage change of Accounts 0.088*** 0.125*** 0.072** 0.082** 0.074** 0.101** 
Percentage change of A-Shares 0.163** 0.280*** -0.074 0.032 -0.060 -0.276 
Percentage change of P/E Ratio 0.038** 0.053*** 0.037** 0.040** 0.037** 0.043*** 
Year 1999 -0.056*** -0.056*** 
    
Year 2000 -0.048*** -0.047*** 
    
R2 0.167 0.173 
    
AR(1) 
  
-6.136*** -5.935*** -5.728*** -6.401*** 
AR(2) 
  
-1.867* -1.896* -1.874* -1.947* 
J-statistics 
  
127.646 120.214 126.519 187.095 
Chi2(Wald Test)  126.480***  125.500*** 98.500*** 91.550*** 91.190*** 137.360*** 
Note: ***, **, and *, indicate that the p-value is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8.12 presents the relationship of corporate governance and control variables with the 
long-term ROA. The table includes five governance estimations, which are size, 
demographics, leadership, education, and evaluation estimations. The last column shows the 
estimation coefficients when all governance and control variables are included in the 
regression. The presence of heteroskedasticity necessitates the use of GLS estimation for the 
regressions of “size” and “demographics”. Diagnostic testing indicates the presence of 
heteroskedasticity and endogeneity in “leadership”, “education”, “evaluation” and “all 
estimation” and a dynamic GMM estimation is used. Three governance variables and four 
control variables are observed as significantly impacting the abnormal yearly return.  
 
CEO and the long-term ROA 
CEO age, CEO duality, and top management salary are positively related with the long-term 
ROA, but not at a significant level. CEO gender, CEO experience, and CEO qualification are 
negatively related with long-term ROA, and also not at significant levels.  
 
Board and the long-term ROA 
The number of female directors is positively related to long-term ROA at the 5% significant 
level. The finding is in line with Bonn (2004), Bonn et al. (2004), Campbell et al. (2008), and 
Reddy et al. (2008) who find that female directors are positively associated with firm 
performance in Spain, US, New Zealand and Australia. The prior studies suggest the 
existence of female directors will bring different ideas to the board, contributing to 
performance.  
 
The number of supervisors is positively related to long-term ROA at the 5% significant level. 
More supervisors are likely to help the company to achieve a better performance reduce the 
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agency cost. The percentage of independent directors, the number of directors, and the 
number of supervisors are positively related with the long-term ROA, but not at a significant 
level. Chairman’s experience, chairman qualification, number of supervisors and number of 
committees are negatively related with long-term ROA, but not at a significant level. 
 
The number of directors and proportion of independent directors are not significantly related 
to the long-term ROA in this study.  
 
Ownership and long-term ROA 
The percentage of largest shareholding ownership is positively related to ROA at the 5% 
significant level. This may be because a state shareholder or a founder is likely to enhance 
monitoring of management and improve company performance. Inside ownership and the 
non-trading ownership are positively related with long-term ROA, but not at a significant 
level. SOE ownership and legal person ownership are positively related with long-term ROA 
but not at a significant level. Insider ownership and SOE ownership are not significantly 
related to the long-term ROA in this study.  
 
Control variables and long-term ROA 
Beta is negatively related to the long-term ROA at the 1% significant level. The change of 
capitalization is negatively related to long-term ROA at the 5% significant level. The change 
of A-shares listing is positively related to the long-term ROA at the 5% significant level. The 
change of P/E ratio is positively related to the long-term ROA at the 1% significant level.  
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Insignificant independent variables 
There are some very important variables in the prior studies but they are not significantly 
related to the long-term IPO performance in this SZSE study. Adams et al. (2009) find a 
positive relationship between female CEO and firm performance. But CEO gender is not 
significantly related to the long-term IPO performance in this study. First, this may be 
attributable to investors’ behaviour reflecting that female CEOs are not considered an 
important signal. Second, according to the descriptive data, only 2% CEOs are female in the 
dataset. It is very hard to find the relationship between female CEOs and long-term IPO 
performance from such a small sample. 
 
Balatbat et al. (2004), Chahine et al. (2009), Dempere (2007), Lam et al. (2008) and Braun et 
al. (2007)  indicate that CEO duality is significantly associated with IPO performance in 
Australia, Arab countries, and US.  Lam et al. (2008) and Abdullah (2004) indicate that CEO 
duality has no significant effect on firm performance in Hong Kong and Malaysia. This study 
finds it is not significantly related to the long-term IPO performance in the SZSE. This may 
be because of the specific role of Chinese chairmen. In western developed listing firms, most 
chairmen are independent directors, but in many Chinese firms chairmen are also the legal 
persons or the largest shareholders of the company; their roles are not only monitoring the 
firm, they also act as manager in the company. Therefore, CEO duality is not deemed 
important.  
 
The number of directors had been widely used in prior studies, but it is not significantly 
related to long-term IPO performance in this study  Abdullah (2004); Bonn (2004); Bonn et 
al. (2004); Daily et al. (2005), Dwivedi et al. (2005); Staikouras et al. (2007), and Chang 
(2009) find that board size is negatively associated with firm performance in Japan, Taiwan 
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and Europe, but positively associated with firm performance in India, and has no influence in 
Australia, the US and Malaysia. Li and Naughton (2007) find that board size is positively 
associated with under-pricing in the short term in China. This may be attributable to the large 
board reflecting an ineffective leadership, and the small board reflecting a shortage of 
professional background. 
 
Insider ownership is an important variable in prior IPO and financial performance studies, but 
it is not significantly related to the long-term IPO performance in this study.  For developed 
market studies, Kroll et al. (2007), Nikbakht et al.(2007), Balatbat et al. (2004), and  
Roosenboom et al. (2005) suggest that managerial ownership is positively associated with 
IPO performance in the US, Australia and Holland. Dempere (2007), Firth (1997) and Reddy 
et al. (2008) indicate that insider ownership has a negative effect on firms’ performance in 
New Zealand. For developing market studies, Chen et al. (2005) indicate the increase of 
managerial ownership decreases the stock performance in Taiwan. Chou et al. (2007) and Hu 
et al. (2008) indicate that the link between firm performance and managerial ownership is 
non-linear in China and Taiwan. This may be attributable to investors’ behaviour reflecting 
that they are not concerned about insider ownership, or it may be because private companies 
have a higher level of insider ownership but also a lower level of ROA. 
 
8.7 Long-Term Specification Tests Results 
8.7.1 Serial correlation test 
First, the study examines autoregressive level 1 and autoregressive level 2 statistics to test the 
first and the second order correlation. If ε it is serially uncorrelated, we expect to reject at the 
first order but not at the second order.  Table 8.10 provided the results for the long-term 
abnormal return. AR (1) and AR (2) for abnormal yearly return and board evaluation 
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explanatory variables are 0 and 0.2663. So the result rejects order 1 serial correlation, 
because p=0<0.05. The second order and original error are serially uncorrelated because 
p=0.2663>0.05. AR (1) and AR (2) for abnormal yearly return and all explanatory variables 
are 0 and 0.4179. So the result rejects order 1 serial correlation, because p=0<0.05. The 
second order and original error are serially uncorrelated because p=0.4179>0.05. Therefore, 
there are no serial correlations in the original error εit in the abnormal yearly return 
estimations, as desired.  
 
Table 8.11 provides the results for long-term Tobin’s Q. As all estimations are GLS models, 
the study does not need to provide the serial correlation tests.  
 
Table 8.12 provides the results for the long-term ROA. AR (1) and AR (2) for ROA and 
board leadership explanatory variables are 0 and 0.0619. So the result rejects order 1 serial 
correlation, because p=0<0.05. The second order and original error are serially uncorrelated 
because p=0.0619>0.05. AR (1) and AR (2) for ROA and board education explanatory 
variables are 0 and 0.0659. So the result does not reject order 1 serial correlation, because 
p=0<0.05. The second order and original error are serially uncorrelated because 
p=0.0659>0.05. AR (1) and AR (2) for ROA and board evaluation explanatory variables are 
0 and 0.0610. So the result does not reject order 1 serial correlation, because p=0<0.05. The 
second order and original error are serially uncorrelated because p=0.0610>0.05. AR (1) and 
AR (2) for ROA and all explanatory variables are 0 and 0.0618. So the result does not reject 
order 1 serial correlation, because p=0<0.05. The second order and original error are serially 
uncorrelated because p=0.0618>0.05. Therefore, there are no serial correlations in the 
original error εit in the ROA estimations, as desired.  
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8.7.2 Over-identification restrictions test 
Second, the study uses J Statistics to test over identification restrictions. Tables 8.10, 8.11, 
and 8.12 present the J statistics for abnormal return, Tobin’s Q and ROA respectively. The 
results indicate that all p-values are not significant at the 5% level, so the instruments are 
valid.  
 
8.7.3 Joint significance test 
The study employs the Wald Test to examine the significance for independent and control 
variables of each GLS and dynamic GMM estimations. Tables 8.10, 8.11, and 8.12 present 
the Wald Test for abnormal return, Tobin’s Q and ROA respectively. The results indicate that 
all p-values are significant at the 1% level, so all independent and control variables can be 
included in those estimations.  
 
8.8 Short-Term Final Estimations 
The results presented in Section 5 indicate that CEO experience and abnormal first day return 
have significant endogeneity problems. Diagnostic testing for endogeneity, using the DWH 
test, indicates CEO experience and abnormal first day return, and chairman experience and 
ROA all exhibit endogeneity.  According to previous studies, a 2SLS model or a Dynamic 
GMM model are used to overcome endogeneity problems. However, the use of 2SLS and 
Dynamic GMM models are not appropriate in this study as the likely variables that might be 
suitable instrument variables are already included in the analysis, so finding instrument 
variables other than from this dataset will be hard.  The alternative of deleting the variables 
and using either OLS or GLS models is considered expedient. 
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8.8.1 Short-Term Final Estimations for Abnormal First Day Return 
Table 8.13 Cross-Sectional GLS Regression/OLS Regression Results for Dependent Variable Abnormal First Day 
Return 
  Governance Compositions 
 
Size Demographic Leadership Evaluation All 
 
OLS OLS OLS GLS GLS 
Independent and Control Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Constant 1.083*** 0.980** 1.041*** 1.133*** 0.941** 
MD Age 
 
0.027 
  
0.016 
MD Gender 
 
-0.073 
  
-0.074 
MD Experience 
   
0.001 
 CEO Duality 
  
-0.007 
 
0.002 
Chairman Experience 
   
-0.006 0.000 
Number of Directors 0.188** 
   
0.177** 
Independent Director Percentage -0.068 
   
-0.036 
Female Director Number 
 
0.015 
  
0.011 
Number of Supervisors  0.0055 
 
 
 
0.005 
Insider Shareholding 
  
-0.077 
 
-0.085 
SOE Shareholding 
  
-0.003 
 
0.046 
Legal Person Shareholding 
  
0.012 
 
0.058 
Non-trading Shareholding 
  
0.065 
 
-0.007 
Number of Committees -0.009 
   
-0.010 
Largest Shareholding 
  
-0.061 
 
-0.058 
Size -0.079** -0.053 -0.056 -0.065 -0.063** 
Beta 0.014 0.017 0.015 0.016 0.014 
Labour -0.047** -0.055** -0.049** -0.050** -0.050** 
Year 1999 0.064 0.098*** 0.091***  0.095*** 0.054 
Year 2000 0.093** 0.130*** 0.121*** 0.131***  0.085** 
R2 0.297 0.274 0.264 0.253 0.327 
 
          
Note: ***, **, and *, indicate that the p-value is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
The results presented in Table 8.13 show the relationship of corporate governance and control 
variables with abnormal first day return. The table includes four governance estimations, viz 
size, demographics, leadership, and evaluation. This last estimation shows the estimated 
coefficients when all governance and control variables are included in the regression. The 
presence of heteroskedasticity necessitates the use of GLS estimation for evaluation and all 
variables’ regressions. Only one governance variable is observed as significantly impacting 
the abnormal first day return, which is number of directors. The size, demographic, and 
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leadership regressions Hausman test results are not significant, indicating the study should 
use the random effects model. 
 
CEO and the abnormal first day return 
CEO age is positively related to the abnormal first day return, and while intuitively appealing 
the correlation is not significant. CEO gender is negatively related to the abnormal first day 
return; while intuitively appealing, the correlation is not at a significant level. CEO duality is 
positively related to the abnormal first day return. Again, while intuitively appealing, the 
correlation is not at a significant level.  
 
Board and the abnormal yearly return 
The number of directors is positively related to the abnormal first day return at the 5% 
significant level. This finding is consistent with Li et al. (2007). Li and Naughton (2007) find 
that board size is positively associated with under-pricing in the short term in China. 
Abdullah (2004); Bonn (2004); Bonn et al. (2004); Daily et al. (2005), Dwivedi et al. (2005); 
Staikouras et al. (2007), and Chang (2009) find that board size is negatively associated with 
firm performance in Japan, Taiwan and Europe, but positively associated with firm 
performance in India, and has no influence in Australia, the US and Malaysia.  
 
Chairman experience is positively related to the abnormal first day return; while intuitively 
appealing, the correlation is not at significant level. The number of female directors and 
proportion of independent directors has been widely used in prior studies but are not 
significant related to the abnormal first day return in this case. Number of supervisors and 
number of committees are not significantly related to the abnormal first day return in this 
case.  
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Ownership and the abnormal yearly return 
State ownership and legal person ownership are positively related to the abnormal first day 
return, though intuitively appealing the correlations are not at significant levels. Insider 
ownership, non-trading ownership and largest ownership are negatively related to the 
abnormal first day return, and while intuitively appealing, the correlations are not significant. 
 
Control variables and the abnormal yearly return 
The control variables size and labour are negatively related to the abnormal first day return at 
the 5% significant level. Year 2000 is positively related to the abnormal first day return at the 
5% significant level. These are consistent with investors being pleased with the small, low-
risk industry IPOs on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.  
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8.8.2 Short-Term Final Estimations for Tobin’s Q 
Table 8.14 Cross-Sectional GLS Regression/OLS Regression Results for Dependent Variable Tobin’s Q 
  Governance Compositions 
 
Size Demographic Leadership Evaluation All 
 
OLS OLS OLS GLS GLS 
Independent and Control Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Constant 19.385*** 19.932*** 17.432*** 18.975*** 18.163*** 
MD Age 
 
-0.991 
  
-0.882 
MD Gender 
 
-1.763*** 
  
-1.752*** 
MD Experience 
   
-0.005 -0.022 
CEO Duality 
  
0.062 
 
0.082 
Chairman Experience 
   
0.076 0.079 
Number of Directors 1.389 
   
1.523** 
Independent Director Percentage -2.639* 
   
-0.970 
Female Director Number 
 
0.101 
  
0.040 
Number of Supervisors  0.0308 
 
 
 
0.010 
Insider Shareholding 
  
0.248 
 
0.050 
SOE Shareholding 
  
1.170* 
 
1.636* 
Legal Person Shareholding 
  
1.091* 
 
1.505* 
Non-trading Shareholding 
  
1.703 
 
1.046 
Number of Committees -0.096 
   
-0.091 
Largest Shareholding 
  
-0.623 
 
-0.908 
Size -1.668*** -1.466*** -1.591*** -1.572*** -1.571*** 
Beta -1.193 -1.198 -1.189 -1.186 -1.258 
Labour -0.544* -0.672** -0.526* -0.593** -0.561* 
Year 1999 0.819 1.897*** 1.847***  1.884*** 1.394* 
Year 2000 1.254** 2.285*** 2.246*** 2.246***  1.698** 
R2 0.359 0.365 0.364 0.338 0.406 
 
          
Note: ***, **, and *, indicate that the p-value is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
The results presented in Table 8.14 show the relationship of corporate governance and control 
variables with Tobin’s Q. The table includes four governance estimations, viz size, 
demographics, leadership, and evaluation. This last estimation shows the estimated 
coefficients when all governance and control variables are included in the regression. The 
presence of heteroskedasticity necessitates the use of GLS estimation for all variables 
regression. Four governance variables are observed as significantly impacting Tobin’s Q. The 
size, demographic, and leadership regressions Hausman test results are not significant, 
indicating the study should use the random effects model. 
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CEO and Tobin’s Q 
CEO gender is negatively related to the Tobin’s Q at the 1% significant level. CEO gender is 
an important variable in prior financial performance studies. Adams et al. (2009) find a 
positive relationship between female CEO and firm performance. But CEO gender is 
negatively related to the short-term Tobin’s Q in the current study. This may be due to the 
dataset. According to the descriptive data, only 2% of CEOs are female, so it is very hard to 
decide the relationship between female CEOs and short-term Tobin’s Q from such small 
sample. 
 
CEO age and CEO experience are negatively related to Tobin’s Q, but the correlation is not 
at a significant level. CEO duality has also been widely used in prior studies, but it is not 
significantly related to Tobin’s Q in this case.  
 
Board and Tobin’s Q 
Number of directors is positively related to Tobin’s Q at the 5% significant level. This 
finding is consistent with Li et al. (2007). Li and Naughton (2007) find that board size is 
positively associated with under-pricing in the short term in China. Abdullah (2004); Bonn 
(2004); Bonn et al. (2004); Daily et al. (2005), Dwivedi et al. (2005); Staikouras et al. (2007), 
and Chang (2009) find that board size is negatively associated with firm performance in 
Japan, Taiwan and Europe, but positively associated with firm performance in India, and has 
no influence in Australia, the US and Malaysia.  
 
Chairman experience is positively related to Tobin’s Q and while intuitively appealing, the 
correlation is not at significant level. The number of female directors, and the proportion of 
independent directors have been widely used in prior studies, but they are not significantly 
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related to Tobin’s Q in this case. The number of supervisors and number of committees are 
not significantly related to the Tobin’s Q in this case.  
 
Ownership and Tobin’s Q 
State ownership and legal person ownership are positively related to Tobin’s Q at the 1% 
significant level. This finding is different from several prior studies. Gu (2003) indicates that 
state ownership is significantly negatively connected to short-term IPO performance in China. 
Chen (2001) indicates that the size of SOE share ownership is negatively associated with 
corporate performance. A plausible reason is that most of SZSE listing IPOs are private 
rather than state owned. 
 
Insider ownership and non-trading ownership are positively related to Tobin’s Q and while 
intuitively appealing the correlation is not at a significant level. Largest shareholder 
ownership is negatively related to Tobin’s Q, but not at a significant level. 
 
Control variables and Tobin’s Q 
The control variables size and labour are negatively related to Tobin’s Q at 1% and 10% 
significant levels respectively. Year 1999 is positively related to Tobin’s Q at the 10% 
significant level. Year 2000 is positively related to the Tobin’s Q at the 5% significant level. 
These are consistent with investors being pleased with the small, low- risk industry IPOs on 
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.  
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8.8.3 Short-Term Final Estimations for ROA 
Table 8.15 Cross-Sectional GLS Regression/Dynamic GMM Regression Results for Dependent Variable 
ROA 
  Governance Compositions 
 
Size Demographic Leadership Evaluation All 
 
OLS OLS OLS GLS GLS 
Independent and Control Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Constant 0.340*** 0.348*** 0.340*** 0.339*** 0.346*** 
MD Age 
 
-0.005 
  
-0.003 
MD Gender 
 
-0.002 
  
-0.002 
MD Experience 
   
0.001 0.001 
CEO Duality 
  
0.001 
 
0.001 
Chairman Experience 
   
  Number of Directors -0.002 
   
-0.001 
Independent Director Percentage -0.005 
   
-0.004 
Female Director Number 
 
0.000 
  
0.000 
Number of Supervisors  0.0004 
 
 
 
0.000 
Insider Shareholding 
  
0.003 
 
0.004 
SOE Shareholding 
  
0.002 
 
0.003 
Legal Person Shareholding 
  
0.000 
 
0.002 
Non-trading Shareholding 
  
0.002 
 
0.000 
Number of Committees 0.000 
   
0.000 
Largest Shareholding 
  
0.000 
 
-0.001 
Size -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
Beta -0.006** -0.006** -0.007** -0.006** -0.006** 
Labour 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Year 1999 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001  -0.0007 -0.002 
Year 2000 -0.006* -0.003*** -0.003** -0.004***  -0.005** 
R2 0.149 0.143 0.160 0.140 0.178 
 
          
Note: ***, **, and *, indicate that the p-value is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
The results presented in Table 8.15 show the relationship of corporate governance and control 
variables with ROA. The table includes four governance estimations, viz size, demographics, 
leadership, and evaluation. This last estimation shows the estimated coefficients when all 
governance and control variables are included in the regression. The presence of 
heteroskedasticity necessitates the use of GLS estimation for evaluation and all governance 
variables regressions. No governance variables are observed as significantly impacting ROA. 
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The size, demographic, and leadership regressions Hausman test results are not significant, 
indicating the study should use the random effects model. 
 
CEO and ROA 
CEO age and gender are negatively related to the ROA; while intuitively appealing, the 
correlation is not at a significant level. CEO experience and duality are positively related to 
ROA, though the correlation is not at a significant level.  
 
Board and ROA 
Number of directors, number of female directors, the proportion of independent directors, and 
the number of supervisors are negatively related to the ROA and while intuitively appealing 
the correlations are not at significant levels. 
 
Ownership and ROA 
Insider, state and legal person ownerships are positively related to ROA, but the correlations 
are not at significant levels. Non-trading and largest ownerships are negatively related to 
ROA, and also not at significant levels. 
 
Control variables and ROA 
The control variable in the form of the dummy year 2000 is negatively related to the ROA at 
the 5% significant level. Beta is negatively related to ROA at the 5% significant level.  
 
Insignificant independent variables 
There are some very important variables in prior studies but they are not significantly related 
to the short-term IPO performance in this SZSE study. Balatbat et al. (2004), Chahine et al. 
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(2009), Dempere (2007), Lam et al. (2008) and Braun et al. (2007) indicate that CEO duality 
is significantly associated with IPO performance in Australia, Arab countries, and the US.  
Lam et al. (2008) and Abdullah (2004) indicate that CEO duality has no significant effect on 
firm performance in Hong Kong and Malaysia. This study finds it is not significantly related 
to the short-term IPO performance in the SZSE.  
 
The proportion of independent directors is also not significantly related to the short-term IPO 
performance in SZSE. However, the proportion of independent directors is an important 
variable in prior financial performance studies. Abdullah (2004), Balatbat et al. (2004), Bonn 
(2004), Bonn et al. (2004), Roosenboom  et al. (2005) and Reddy et al. (2008) suggest 
outside directors are positively related to firm value in Holland, Australia and New Zealand, 
but have no influence in Japan and Malaysia. A plausible reason is that many Chinese 
independent directors are government officials, academics, and also foreigners and perhaps 
they do not have a reasonable understanding of a company’s current situation.  This may be 
because these independent directors lack a professional background and are not seen as 
making a consistent contribution to the company. 
 
The number of female directors is not significantly related to the short-term IPO performance 
in this study. Bonn (2004), Bonn et al. (2004), Campbell et al. (2008), and Reddy et al. (2008) 
find that female directors are positively associated with firm performance in Spain, US, New 
Zealand and Australia, but have no influence in Japan. A plausible reason is that there are 
very few female directors in the SZSE, which makes it hard to find any relationship between 
female directors and the short-term IPO performance from such a small sample. 
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Insider ownership is an important variable in prior IPO and financial performance studies, but 
it is not significantly related to short-term IPO performance in the SZSE.   Chahine (2007) 
finds that block ownership is negatively associated with firm performance in the short-term in 
France. Reddy et al. (2008) indicate that block ownership has a positive effect on firm 
performance in New Zealand. This may be attributable to investors’ behaviour reflecting that 
they are not concerned about insider ownership.  
 
8.9 Short –Term Specification Tests Results  
Joint significance test 
The study employs the Wald Test to examine the significance for independent and control 
variables of each OLS and GLS estimation. The results indicate that all p-values are 
significant at the 1% level, so all independent and control variables can be included in those 
estimations.  
 
8.10 Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed and explored the results of the relationship between corporate 
governance variables and long- and short-term IPO performance on the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange. The distribution of each variable has been checked to ensure if it is approximately 
normal by median, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis. The study provides the 
descriptive statistics of variables after fixing missing values and outliers, and also dropping 
several independent variables. Diagnostic testing indicates the presence of heteroskedasticity 
and endogeneity in some of the regressions and a GLS or a dynamic GMM estimation is used. 
 
In the long-term case, this study finds that the percentage of independent directors, state 
ownership and legal person ownership are negatively related to the abnormal yearly return. 
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The percentage of largest shareholding ownership is positively related to the abnormal yearly 
return. Top management salary and chairman’s qualification are positively related to long-
term Tobin’s Q. The proportion of independent directors is negatively related to long-term 
Tobin’s Q. The number of board meetings per year is negatively related to long-term Tobin’s 
Q while supervisor meetings per year is positively related to long-term Tobin’s Q. The 
number of female directors, number of supervisors and percentage of largest shareholding are 
positively related to ROA. This study applies a serial correlation test, over-identification test, 
and joint significance test for all long-term IPO performance regressions and the results show 
all models are statistically robust. According to the above results the percentage of 
independent directors, SOE ownership, legal person ownership, top management salary, 
number of board meetings, number of female directors, number of supervisors, and 
percentage of largest shareholdings are good corporate governance practices for long-term 
IPO performance in Shenzhen Stock Exchange. This leads to non-rejection of H4, H9, H13, 
H19, H22 and H23. 
 
In the short-term case, this study finds the number of directors is positively related to the 
abnormal first day return. CEO gender is negatively related to Tobin’s Q. Number of 
directors is positively related to Tobin’s Q. State ownership and legal person ownership are 
positively related to the Tobin’s Q. This study applied the joint significance test for all short-
term IPO performance regressions and the results show the significance of corporate 
governance variables in all models. According to the above results this study indicates that 
CEO gender, SOE ownership, legal person ownership, and number of directors are good 
corporate governance practices for short-term IPO performance in Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 
This leads to non-rejection of H7 and H21. 
 
239 
 
Overall, the panel data regressions explain the long-term IPO performance well, but the cross 
sectional regressions do not have reasonable explanation on the short-term IPO performance. 
In the short-term case, first day return, Tobin’s Q and ROA have been investigated by the 
models, but just one independent variable is significantly related to abnormal first day return, 
and four variables are significantly related to Tobin’s Q. This may be due to the lack of 
available information. In other words, the investors may not have had any opportunity to 
learn about specific corporate governance mechanisms before the IPO listing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
240 
 
CHAPTER 9 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IMPACT ON IPO 
PERFORMANCE: NEW ZEALAND STOCK EXCHANGE 
9.1 Introduction 
Previous chapters offer the empirical results for the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and the short- and long-term performance of IPOs on the Shanghai 
and Shenzhen stock exchanges. This chapter presents the descriptive statistics, econometric 
tests and the empirical results and findings about the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and performance of IPOs on the New Zealand Stock Exchange. 
 
Section 2 provides a discussion of the descriptive statistics and normality test results of the 
original and transformed variables. Section 3 provides the results of correlation tests. Section 
4 has the results of heteroskedasticity tests, multicollinearity tests, autocorrelation tests, and 
linearity tests. Section 5 provides the results of endogeneity tests. Section 6 has the results of 
long-term OLS/GLS/Dynamic GMM tests. Section 7 provides the results of long-term 
specification tests. Section 8 gives the results of short-term OLS/GLS tests. Section 9 
provides the results of short-term specification tests. Section 10 provides the conclusion of 
chapter 9. 
 
9.2 Descriptive and Normality Analysis 
The data sample includes 82 IPOs post-listed on the NZSE from 1999 to 2004. There are 494 
observations regarding long-term IPO performance and governance mechanisms which are 
compiled as unbalanced panel data. There are 82 observations regarding short-term IPO 
performance and governance mechanisms and these are compiled as cross sectional data. 
This section gives the key descriptive statistics of the original sample, including the number 
of observations, mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum. The section also 
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provides the results of normality tests, which indicate skewness and kurtosis. The sample 
includes three dependent variables, eighteen independent variables and fifteen control 
variables.  
 
9.2.1 Long-Term Data Descriptive Statistics 
9.2.1.1. Descriptive Statistics of Long-Term Sample 
The distribution of each variable has been checked to ensure it is approximately normal by 
median, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis. The risk is those missing values and 
outliers significantly affect the sample data. The study provides the descriptive statistics of 
variables after fixing missing values and outliers in the next tables. The study drops several 
independent variables, including CEO qualification (233 out of 494 are missing), chairman 
qualification (192 of 494 are missing), and board meeting per year (234 out of 494 are 
missing), as more than 30% of values are missing. The statistics suggest that abnormal first 
day return, Tobin’s Q, ROA, and CEO salary offer are not normally distributed, exhibit  
skewness and a large kurtosis. The descriptive statistics indicate that a potential outlier 
problem may exist and a series of log transformations are appropriate. 
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Table 9.1 Summary of Dependent and Independent Variables Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
Yearly Return 494 -0.058 -0.071 0.369 -1.039 1.229 0.481 3.933 
Tobin's Q 494 1.627 1.214 0.966 0.169 5.355 1.502 4.979 
ROA 494 -0.009 0.027 0.154 -0.502 0.480 -0.948 4.721 
MD Gender 494 0.026 0.000 0.160 0.000 1.000 5.918 36.027 
MD Experience 494 2.016 2.000 1.729 0.000 8.000 0.854 3.187 
MD Salary 494 407271 299500 447625 2000 3981543 4.181 25.620 
Log  of MD Salary 494 5.450 5.476 0.402 3.301 6.600 -1.214 8.508 
MD Duality 494 0.951 1.000 0.215 0.000 1.000 -4.199 18.634 
Chairman Experience 494 2.146 2.000 1.779 0.000 9.000 0.786 3.236 
Number of Directors 494 5.447 5.000 1.782 1.000 12.000 0.846 4.270 
Independent Director Percentage 494 0.561 0.556 0.250 0.000 1.000 -0.252 2.870 
Female Director Number 494 0.397 0.000 0.701 0.000 6.000 2.351 12.208 
Block Ownership 494 0.953 1.000 0.211 0.000 1.000 -4.304 19.527 
Insider Shareholding 494 0.440 0.443 0.250 0.000 0.952 0.019 1.948 
Management Shareholding 494 0.249 0.159 0.249 0.000 0.880 0.774 2.297 
Board Committee 494 0.743 1.000 0.438 0.000 1.000 -1.112 2.236 
Remuneration Committee 494 0.609 1.000 0.488 0.000 1.000 0.239 -0.448 
Independent Audit 494 0.988 1.000 0.110 0.000 1.000 -8.908 80.346 
Largest Shareholding 494 0.262 0.199 0.187 0.001 0.836 0.980 3.089 
 
 
There are key descriptions for all dependent and independent variables as shown in Table 9.1. 
Abnormal yearly return includes 494 observations and there are no missing values. The mean 
is -0.0582, which is slightly significantly below 0. This indicates those IPOs’ longer-term 
performances are below other IPOs listed before 1999 and after 2004. The median is -0.0707 
and the standard deviation is 0.9664. The abnormal return range is from -1.0386 to 1.2285. 
The skewness is 0.4805. It shows the dataset is normally distributed.  The kurtosis is 3.9325, 
showing the differences between values are not huge. Table 9.1 also presents the mean, 
median, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, skewness and kurtosis values for all long-
term dependent and independent variables.  
 
The mean of Tobin’s Q is 1.6267, which is slightly above 1, indicating the market values of 
listed firms are somehow above current values, and it is more likely their stock prices are 
overvalued.  The CEO salary includes 494 observations. The mean is $330698.6 per year. 
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The median is $407270.7 per year. The standard deviation is 475295.6, which is extremely 
high. The value range is from 2000 dollars to 3.98 million dollars.  The percentage of 
independent directors includes 494 observations. The mean is 0.5612, the median is 0.5556 
and the standard deviation is 0.2504. It indicates more than half of directors are independent 
on New Zealand boards, which is much higher than Chinese exchanges.  
 
Compared with the statistics reported before data transformation, ROA, CEO experience, 
CEO duality, CEO salary, chairman’s experience, number of directors, percentage of 
independent directors, number of female directors, block ownership, insider ownership, 
management ownership, board committee, remuneration committee, and independent audit 
have been updated by filling the missing values. Most variables have had outliers removed 
and given replacements. This done, the descriptive statistics provide more normal variants. 
Overall, the results indicate that all data are normally distributed except dummy variables. 
The updated data provides a better and more normal distributed dataset than the original 
sample dataset. As the logarithm CEO salary result is more normally distributed than original 
CEO salary, the study still employs logarithm CEO salary as the dependent variable to test 
the longer-term IPO performance. 
 
9.2.1.2. Long-Term Control Variables Descriptive Statistics 
The distribution of each variable had been checked to ensure it is approximately normal by 
median, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis. The risk is those missing values and 
outliers significantly affect the sample data. The descriptive statistics of variables, after 
missing values and outliers are adjusted, are reported in the following tables. The debt to 
equity ratio and size continue as non-normal variates exhibiting large skewness and kurtosis 
statistics. 
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Table 9.2 Summary of Control Variables Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
D/E ratio 494 0.990 0.579 1.093 0.003 5.313 1.972 6.923 
Size 494 54300000 19850000 84700000 0 413000000 2.226 7.265 
Primary 494 0.081 0 0.273 0 1 3.072 10.438 
Energy 494 0.020 0 0.141 0 1 6.813 47.421 
Goods 494 0.168 0 0.374 0 1 1.776 4.154 
Property 494 0.067 0 0.250 0 1 3.470 13.041 
Service 494 0.429 0 0.496 0 1 0.286 1.082 
Investment 494 0.235 0 0.424 0 1 1.251 2.566 
Year 1999 494 0.101 0 0.302 0 1 2.644 7.993 
Year 2000 494 0.298 0 0.458 0 1 0.886 1.784 
Year2001 494 0.122 0 0.327 0 1 2.318 6.372 
Year2002 494 0.087 0 0.282 0 1 2.930 9.584 
Year 2003 494 0.170 0 0.376 0 1 1.757 4.086 
Year 2004 494 0.223 0 0.417 0 1 1.333 2.774 
 
There are key descriptions for all control variables as shown in Table 9.2. Compared with the 
statistics reported before data transformation, only the D/E ratio has been updated by 
removing outliers and giving replacements and then offering a normal distribution. The D/E 
ratio includes 494 observations. The mean is 0.9901. The median is 0.5788. The standard 
deviation is 1.0925. The value range is from 0.003 to 5.3133. The skewness is 1.9720 and the 
kurtosis is 6.9232, which are acceptable levels. 
 
Size includes 494 observations. The mean is 54300000, the median is 19850000 and the 
standard deviation is 84700000. The value range is from 0 to 413000000. The skewness is 
2.2255 and the kurtosis is 7.2651, which are acceptable levels. 
 
The remaining control variables are all dummy variables. The distribution of each variable 
has been checked to ensure it is approximately normal by median, standard deviation, 
skewness, and kurtosis. Overall, no control variables have been replaced by logarithm 
variables. The distributions of those variables are approximately normally distributed.  
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9.2.2 Short-Term Data Descriptive Statistics 
9.2.2.1 Descriptive Statistics of Short-Term Sample 
The distribution of each variable has been checked to ensure it is approximately normal by 
median, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis. The risk is those missing values and 
outliers significantly affect the sample data. The study provides the descriptive statistics of 
variables after fixing missing values and outliers in the late tables. The study drops several 
independent variables, including CEO qualification (37 out of 82 are missing), chairman 
qualification (32 of 82 are missing), and board meeting per year (50 out of 82 are missing), as 
more than 30% of values are missing. From the results, Tobin’s Q, ROA, the CEO salary, 
D/E ratio, and size offer abnormal distributed skewness and large kurtosis, so the descriptive 
statistics indicate that potential outlier problems may exist and a series of logarithm values’ 
replacement may be necessary. 
Table 9.3 Summary of Dependent and Independent Variables Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
First Day  Return 82 -0.022 -0.003 0.063 -0.254 0.089 -1.811 6.760 
Tobin's Q 82 1.873 1.341 1.435 0.169 6.928 1.861 6.053 
ROA 82 0.014 0.027 0.131 -0.402 0.386 -0.759 5.377 
MD Gender 82 0.012 0.000 0.110 0.000 1.000 8.889 80.012 
MD Experience 82 0.085 0.000 0.110 0.000 2.000 4.395 21.961 
MD Salary 82 351635.6 235000 515549.9 6000 3662491 4.4583 25.6238 
Log  of MD Salary 82 5.333 5.371 0.425 3.778 6.564 -0.301 5.215 
MD Duality 82 0.939 1.000 0.241 0.000 1.000 -3.670 14.465 
Chairman Experience 82 0.037 0.000 0.189 0.000 1.000 4.937 25.371 
Number of Directors 82 5.695 5.000 1.973 3.000 13.000 1.128 4.700 
Independent Director Percentage 82 0.527 0.556 0.281 0.000 1.000 -0.232 2.310 
Female Director Number 82 0.342 0.000 0.652 0.000 3.000 1.947 6.322 
Block Ownership 82 0.927 1.000 0.262 0.000 1.000 -3.278 11.746 
Insider Shareholding 82 0.406 0.404 0.269 0.000 0.911 0.019 1.716 
Management Shareholding 82 0.252 0.169 0.248 0.000 0.973 0.815 2.351 
Board Committee 82 0.683 1.000 0.468 0.000 1.000 -0.786 1.618 
Remuneration Committee 82 0.537 1.000 0.502 0.000 1.000 -0.147 1.022 
Independent Audit 82 0.988 1.000 0.110 0.000 1.000 -8.889 80.012 
Largest Shareholding 82 0.279 0.199 0.204 0.001 0.785 0.781 2.549 
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There are key descriptions for all dependent and independent variables are shown in Table 
9.3. Abnormal first day return includes 82 observations and there are no missing values. The 
mean is -0.0223, which is slightly significantly below 0. This indicates those IPOs’ shorter-
term performances are below other stocks in the market and a possible reason is that New 
Zealand investors are rational and the IPOs’ prices are stable. The median is -0.0033 and the 
standard deviation is 0.0633. The abnormal return range is from 0.254 to 0.0886. The 
skewness is -1.8105. It shows the dataset is normally distributed.  The kurtosis is 6.7598, 
showing the differences between values are not huge. Table 9.3 also presents the mean, 
median, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, skewness, and kurtosis values for the entire 
short-term dependent and independent variables. The mean of Tobin’s Q is 1.8728, which is 
above 1, indicating the market values of listed firms are somehow above current values, and 
it is more likely their stock prices are overvalued.   
 
Compared with the statistics reported before data transformation, CEO gender, CEO 
experience, CEO duality, CEO salary, chairman’s experience, number of directors, 
percentage of independent directors, number of female directors, block ownership, insider 
ownership, management ownership, board committee, remuneration committee, independent 
audit, and the largest shareholding have been updated by filling the missing values. Most 
variables have had outliers removed and given replacements. This done, the descriptive 
statistics provide more normal variants. Overall, the results indicate that all data are normally 
distributed except dummy variables. The updated data provides a better and more normal 
distributed dataset than the original sample dataset. As the logarithm CEO salary result is 
more normally distributed than original CEO salary, the study still employs logarithm CEO 
salary as the dependent variable to test the longer-term IPO performance. 
 
247 
 
9.2.2.2. Short-Term Control Variables Descriptive Statistics 
The distribution of each variable has been checked to ensure it is approximately normal by 
median, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis. The risk is those missing values and 
outliers significantly affect the sample data. The study provides the descriptive statistics of 
variables after fixing missing values and outliers in the following tables. From the results, the 
debt to equity ratio and size offer not very normally distributed skewness and also very huge 
kurtosis, so the descriptive indicates that the potential outlier problems may exist and a series 
of logarithm values’ replacement is necessary. 
Table 9.4 Summary of Control Variables Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
D/E ratio 82 0.634 0.529 0.727 0.003 4.237 2.558 11.388 
Size 82 20300000 14318250 27300000 5098 135000000 2.179 7.816 
Primary 82 0.085 0 0.281 0 1 2.968 9.808 
Energy 82 0.012 0 0.110 0 1 8.889 80.012 
Goods 82 0.195 0 0.399 0 1 1.539 3.367 
Property 82 0.061 0 0.241 0 1 3.670 14.465 
Service 82 0.439 0 0.499 0 1 1.444 1.060 
Investment 82 0.207 0 0.408 0 1 1.444 3.085 
Year 1999 82 0.061 0 0.241 0 1 3.670 14.465 
Year 2000 82 0.207 0 0.408 0 1 1.444 3.085 
Year2001 82 0.098 0 0.299 0 1 2.713 8.358 
Year2002 82 0.098 0 0.299 0 1 2.713 8.358 
Year 2003 82 0.207 0 0.408 0 1 1.444 3.085 
Year 2004 82 0.329 0 0.473 0 1 0.727 1.528 
 
There are key descriptions for all control variables as shown in Table 9.4. Compared with the 
statistics reported before data transformation, only D/E ratio has been updated by removing 
outliers and giving replacements and then offering a normal distribution. The D/E ratio 
includes 82 observations. The mean is 0.6343. The median is 0.5285. The standard deviation 
is 0.7267. The value range is from 0.0031 to 4.2366. The skewness is 2.5575 and the kurtosis 
is 11.3880, which are acceptable levels. 
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Size includes 82 observations. The mean is 20300000, the median is 14318250 and the 
standard deviation is 27300000. The value range is from 5098 to 135000000. The skewness is 
2.1786 and the kurtosis is 7.8162 which are both acceptable levels. 
 
The rest of the control variables are all dummy variables. The distribution of each variable 
has been checked to ensure it is approximately normal by median, standard deviation, 
skewness, and kurtosis. Overall, no control variables have been replaced by logarithm 
variables. The distributions of those variables are approximately normally distributed.  
 
9.3 Pair Wise Correlation Test Results 
9.3.1 Pair-Wise Correlation Test Results for Long-Term Sample 
The correlation matrix for long-term variables, shown as Table 12.5 in the appendices, gives 
all the correlations between dependent and explanatory variables. Most of independent and 
control variables are significantly  correlated with the level of Tobin’s Q and ROA, and most 
control variables and some independent variables are significantly correlated with the level of 
abnormal yearly return. These results indicate that corporate governance factors have less 
impact on stock performance than financial performance. SOE ownership is highly correlated 
with legal person ownership. Some of the market value based control variables are also 
highly correlated with each other, so the study pays attention to those variables making 
further multicollinearity tests necessary.  
 
9.3.2 Pair-Wise Correlation Test Results for Long-Term Sample 
The correlation matrix for short-term variables, shown as Table 12.6 in the appendices, shows 
all the correlations between dependent and explanatory variables. Most of the control 
variables are significantly correlated with the level of abnormal first day return, Tobin’s Q, 
249 
 
and ROA, and some independent variables are significantly correlated with the level of 
abnormal first day return, Tobin’s Q and ROA. These results indicate that corporate 
governance factors have relatively less impact on short-term IPO performance than on long-
term IPO performance. A few market value based control variables are highly correlated with 
each other. The study pays attention to those variables making further multicollinearity tests 
necessary.  
 
9.4 Multicollinearity/Heteroskedasticity/Panel and Cross Sectional Data 
OLS Regression Results 
 
9.4.1 Multicollinearity/Heteroskedasticity/Panel Data OLS Regression Results for Long 
Term IPO Performance 
The study tests the relationship between corporate governance and control variables using 
abnormal yearly return by panel data OLS regression. The estimations include four 
governance estimations, viz size, demographics, leadership, and evaluation. This last 
estimation shows the estimated coefficients when all governance and control variables are 
included in the regression. The control variables in the form of the dummy for investment and 
year 2004 are dropped by Stata automatically due to a multicollinearity problem. Each 
regression provides similar results for independent and control variables, indicating that those 
results are not affected by addition or deletion of the variables that exhibit multicollinearity. 
OLS results indicate that most of the governance variables have a positive relationship with 
the abnormal yearly return. The abnormal yearly return is significantly positively related to 
CEO experience, board committee, remuneration committee, and independent audit. It is 
significantly negatively related to CEO gender. However, the results shown for all 
regressions are problematic as diagnostic testing indicates the presence of heteroskedasticity; 
GLS regressions or Dynamic GMM regressions are likely to be more robust. 
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The study tests the relationship between corporate governance and control variables using 
Tobin’s Q by panel data OLS regression. The estimations include five governance 
estimations similar to the abnormal yearly return analysis. The same multicollinearity issues 
arise as reported for governance above. OLS results indicate that most of the governance 
variables have a negative relationship to Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q is significantly positively 
related to insider shareholding and remuneration committee. It is significantly negatively 
related to the number of directors and the largest shareholding. The regressions exhibit 
heteroskedasticity, so GLS regressions or Dynamic GMM regressions are likely to yield 
superior results in subsequent analysis. 
 
The study tests the relationship between corporate governance and control variables using 
ROA by panel data OLS regression. The same five governance estimations are used. 
Multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity are present. ROA is significantly positively related to 
the percentage of independent directors, remuneration committee, and independent audit. 
GLS regressions or Dynamic GMM regressions are investigated in the following analysis. 
 
9.4.2 Multicollinearity/Heteroskedasticity/OLS Regression Results for Short-Term IPO 
Performance 
The study tests the relationship between corporate governance and control variables using 
abnormal first day return by panel data OLS regression. The estimations include four 
governance estimations, viz size, demographics, leadership, and evaluation. This last 
attribution shows the estimated coefficients when all governance and control variables are 
included in the regression. The control variables in the form of the dummy for energy and 
year 1999 are dropped by Stata automatically due to a multicollinearity problem. Each 
regression provides similar results for independent and control variables, indicating that those 
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results are not affected by addition or deletion of the variables exhibiting multicollinearity. 
The abnormal first day return is significantly positively related to CEO salary and is 
significantly negatively related to CEO gender. However, the results show that all regressions 
are problematic as diagnostic testing indicates the presence of heteroskedasticity; GLS 
regressions or 2SLS regressions are likely to be more robust. 
 
The study tests the relationship between corporate governance and control variables using 
Tobin’s Q by panel data OLS regression. Five governance estimations similar to the 
abnormal first day return analysis are undertaken. The same multicollinearity issues arise as 
reported for governance above. Tobin’s Q is significantly positively related with the 
management shareholding and the independent audit. It is significantly negatively related to 
the number of directors. The regressions exhibit heteroskedasticity, so GLS regressions or 
2SLS regressions are likely to yield superior results in subsequent analysis. 
 
The study tests the relationship of corporate governance and control variables with ROA by 
panel data OLS regression. The same five governance estimations are used. Multicollinearity 
and heteroskedasticity are present. ROA is significantly positively related to CEO gender, 
CEO salary, management ownership, and board committees. GLS regressions or 2SLS 
regressions are investigated in the following analysis. 
 
9.5 Endogeneity Tests 
9.5.1 Endogeneity Test Results for Abnormal Yearly Return 
Table 9.5 below presents the endogeneity test results between governance variables and 
dependent variable abnormal yearly return. The table includes four governance estimations, 
which are size, demographics, leadership, and evaluation estimations. The last column shows 
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the endogeneity test results when all governance and control variables are included in the 
regression. The presence of heteroskedasticity necessitates the use of GLS estimation for the 
regressions of “size”, “demographics” and “leadership”. Diagnostic testing indicates the 
presence of heteroskedasticity and endogeneity in the “evaluation” and “all estimation” and a 
dynamic GMM estimation is used. However, the study selects almost all possible corporate 
governance variables, so finding instrument variables from outside this dataset will be hard.  
So the study uses dynamic panel GMM estimation.  In the short term case, the 2SLS 
estimation is necessary. 
Table 9.5 The DWH Test for Endogeneity of Abnormal Yearly Return 
  Governance Compositions 
 
Size Demographic Leadership Evaluation All 
Independent and Control Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
MD Experience 
   
3.870** 4.360** 
MD Salary 
   
0.021 0.012 
Chairman Experience 
   
0.446 0.664 
Number of Directors 0.751 
   
0.569 
Independent Director Percentage 0.037 
   
0.088 
Female Director Number 
 
0.083 
  
0.202 
Insider Shareholding 
  
1.217 
 
0.553 
Management Shareholding 
  
0.491 
 
0.010 
Largest Shareholding     0.245   0.014 
Note: ***, **, and *, indicate that the p-value is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
9.5.2 Endogeneity Test Results for Tobin’s Q 
Table 9.6 presents the endogeneity test results between governance variables and dependent 
variable Tobin’s Q. The table includes four governance estimations, which are size, 
demographics, leadership, and evaluation estimations. The last column shows the 
endogeneity test results when all governance and control variables are included in the 
regression. The presence of heteroskedasticity necessitates the use of GLS estimation for the 
regressions of “size”, “demographics”, “evaluation” and “all estimation”. Diagnostic testing 
indicates the presence of heteroskedasticity and endogeneity in the “leadership” and a 
dynamic GMM estimation is used. However, the study has selected almost all possible 
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corporate governance variables, so finding instrument variables other than from this dataset 
will be hard.  So the study will use dynamic panel GMM estimation.  In the short-term case, 
the 2SLS estimation is necessary. 
 
Table 9.6 The DWH Test for Endogeneity of Tobin’s Q 
  Governance Compositions 
 
Size Demographic Leadership Evaluation All 
Independent and Control Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
MD Experience       0.406 0.558 
MD Salary 
   
1.398 0.470 
Chairman Experience 
   
0.035 0.119 
Number of Directors 2.646 
   
2.514 
Independent Director Percentage 2.434 
   
1.004 
Female Director Number 
 
1.664 
  
1.277 
Insider Shareholding 
  
2.063 
 
0.864 
Management Shareholding 
  
4.997** 
 
1.505 
Largest Shareholding     5.015**   2.288 
Note: ***, **, and *, indicate that the p-value is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
9.5.3 Endogeneity Test Results for ROA 
Table 9.7 below presents the endogeneity test results between governance variables and 
dependent variable abnormal yearly return. The table includes four governance estimations, 
which are size, demographics, leadership, and evaluation estimations. The last column shows 
the endogeneity test results when all governance and control variables are included in the 
regression. The presence of heteroskedasticity necessitates the use of GLS estimation for the 
regressions of “size”, “demographics”, “leadership”, and “evaluation”. Diagnostic testing 
indicates the presence of heteroskedasticity and endogeneity in “all estimation” and a 
dynamic GMM estimation is used. However, the study has selected almost all possible 
corporate governance variables, so finding instrument variables other than from this dataset 
will be hard.  So the study uses dynamic panel GMM estimation.  In the short-term case, the 
2SLS estimation is necessary. 
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Table 9.7 The DWH Test for Endogeneity of ROA 
  Governance Compositions 
 
Size Demographic Leadership Evaluation All 
Independent and Control Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
MD Experience       2.091 3.100** 
MD Salary 
   
0.859 0.970 
Chairman Experience 
   
2.240 3.125** 
Number of Directors 0.201 
   
0.221 
Independent Director Percentage 1.101 
   
1.433 
Female Director Number 
 
0.561 
  
0.550 
Insider Shareholding 
  
0.569 
 
0.359 
Management Shareholding 
  
2.571 
 
0.250 
Largest Shareholding     1.031   0.020 
Note: ***, **, and *, indicate that the p-value is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Tables 9.8 and 9.9 present the conclusion of heteroskedasticity tests, endogeneity tests, and 
potential regression estimations of long- and short-term NZSE IPO performance models. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
255 
 
Table 9.8 The Heteroskedasticity, Endogeneity Results and Final Estimations of Long-Term Performance 
Abnormal Yearly Return Governance Compositions 
Specification Test Size Demographic Leadership Evaluation All 
Heteroskedasticity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Endogeneity No No No Yes Yes 
Estimation GLS GLS GLS 
Dynamic 
GMM 
Dynamic 
GMM 
            
Tobin's Q Governance Compositions 
Specification Test Size Demographic Leadership Evaluation All 
Heteroskedasticity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Endogeneity No No No No No 
Estimation GLS GLS 
Dynamic 
GMM 
GLS GLS 
            
ROA Governance Compositions 
Specification Test Size Demographic Leadership Evaluation All 
Heteroskedasticity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Endogeneity No No Yes Yes Yes 
Estimation GLS GLS GLS GLS 
Dynamic 
GMM 
 
Table 9.9 The Heteroskedasticity, Endogeneity Results and Final Estimations of Short-Term 
Performance 
Abnormal First Day 
Return 
Governance Compositions 
Specification Test Size Demographic Leadership Evaluation All 
Heteroskedasticity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Endogeneity No No No Yes Yes 
Estimation GLS GLS GLS 2SLS GLS 
            
Tobin's Q Governance Compositions 
Specification Test Size Demographic Leadership Evaluation All 
Heteroskedasticity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Endogeneity No No No No No 
Estimation GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS 
            
ROA Governance Compositions 
Specification Test Size Demographic Leadership Evaluation All 
Heteroskedasticity Yes No No No Yes 
Endogeneity No No Yes Yes Yes 
Estimation GLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS GLS 
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9.6 Long-Term Final Estimations 
9.6.1 Long-Term Final Estimations for Abnormal Yearly Return 
Table 9.10 Panel Data GLS Regression/Dynamic GMM Regression Results for Dependent Variable 
Abnormal Yearly Return 
  Governance Compositions 
 
Size Demographic Leadership Evaluation All 
 
GLS GLS GLS GMM GMM 
Independent and Control Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Constant -0.509*** 0.000 -0.045 0.124 0.052 
L1 
   
-0.028 -0.020 
MD Gender 
 
-0.219** 
  
-0.099* 
MD Experience 
   
0.063 0.068 
MD Salary 
   
-0.061 -0.094 
CEO Duality 
  
0.022 
 
0.093 
Chairman Experience 
   
-0.006 -0.013 
Number of Directors 0.016 
   
0.035 
Independent Director Percentage -0.010 
   
0.205 
Female Director Number 
 
-0.020 
  
-0.094* 
Block Shareholding 
  
-0.061 
 
-0.080 
Insider Shareholding 
  
0.047 
 
-0.426 
Management Shareholding 
  
-0.052 
 
-0.239 
Board Committee 0.158*** 
   
0.125** 
Remuneration Committee -0.087* 
   
-0.127 
Independent Audit 0.310*** 
   
0.127*** 
Largest Shareholding 
  
0.111 
 
0.312 
D/E Ratio -0.007 -0.006 0.001 0.046 0.041 
Size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Primary -0.056 -0.082 -0.049 
  
Energy 0.038 0.026 0.018 
  
Goods 0.015 -0.005 0.036 
  
Property -0.010 -0.014 0.011 
  
Service 0.007 -0.037 0.010 
  
Year 1999 0.071 0.039 0.055 
  
Year 2000 -0.027 -0.113** -0.088* 
  
Year 2001 -0.025 -0.050 -0.040 
  
Year 2002 0.029 -0.029 -0.017 
  
Year 2003 0.030 0.022 0.039 
  
R2 0.060 0.034 0.030 
  
AR(1) 
   
-4.778*** -4.784*** 
AR(2) 
   
-0.506 0.072 
J-statistics 
   
44.418** 45.564** 
Chi2       4.920*** 22.480*** 
Note: ***, **, and *, indicate that the p-value is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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The results presented in Table 9.10 show the relationship of corporate governance and control 
variables with abnormal yearly return. The table includes four governance estimations, which 
are size, demographics, leadership, and evaluation estimations. The last column shows the 
estimation coefficients when all governance and control variables are included in the 
regression. The presence of heteroskedasticity necessitates the use of GLS estimation for the 
regressions of “size”, “demographics”, and “leadership”. Diagnostic testing indicates the 
presence of heteroskedasticity and endogeneity in “evaluation” and “all estimation” and a 
dynamic GMM estimation is used. Four governance variables are observed as significantly 
impacting the abnormal yearly return.  
 
CEO and the abnormal yearly return 
CEO gender is negatively related to the abnormal yearly return, at the 5% significant level. 
This finding is offset by previous studies by Adams et al. (2009), who indicate a positive 
relationship between female CEO and firm performance. The possible solution is the lack of 
female CEOs in New Zealand. According to the data descriptive statistics, only 2.63% CEOs 
are female in the dataset. A small sample may not provide enough female CEO success 
stories to the public, and this may be attributable to investors’ behaviour reflecting that a 
female CEO is not considered an important signal for positive firm performance. 
 
CEO experience and duality are positively related to the long-term abnormal yearly return 
and while intuitively appealing the correlation is not at significant level. CEO salary is 
negatively related to the abnormal yearly return, and again is not at a statistically significant 
level.  
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Board and the abnormal yearly return 
The number of female directors is positively related to the abnormal yearly return and is 
significant at the 10% level. This finding is consistent with previous studies by Bonn (2004), 
Bonn et al. (2004), Campbell et al. (2008), and Reddy et al. (2008), who find female directors 
are positively associated with firm performance in Spain, US, New Zealand and Australia, 
but has no influence in Japan. The prior studies suggest female directors will bring different 
ideas to the board contributing to firm performance.  
 
Board committee is positively related to the abnormal yearly return and is significant at the 5% 
level. The independent audit is positively related to the abnormal yearly return and is 
significant at the 1% level. These findings are consistent with the previous studies by Jain et 
al. (2005) and Reddy et al. (2008). According to Jain et al. (2005), investment in a high 
quality audit leads to a significantly lower post-IPO failure rate in the US. Reddy et al. (2008) 
indicate that an audit committee has a positive effect on firm performance in New Zealand. 
 
The number of directors has been widely used in prior studies, but it is not significantly 
related to the long-term abnormal yearly return in this study. The proportion of independent 
directors is also not significantly related to the long-term abnormal yearly return in this study. 
Chairman’s experience reflects a coefficient positively related with the abnormal yearly 
return but not at a significant level.  
 
Ownership and the abnormal yearly return 
Management ownership and insider ownership are important variables in prior IPO and 
financial performance studies, but they are not significantly related to the long-term abnormal 
yearly return in the NZSE.  Block ownership is an important variable in prior IPO and 
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financial performance studies, but it is not significantly related to the long-term abnormal 
yearly return in the NZSE.    
 
9.6.2 Long-Term Final Estimations for Tobin’s Q 
Table 9.11 Panel Data GLS Regression/Dynamic GMM Regression Results for Dependent Variable 
Tobin’s Q 
  Governance Compositions 
 
Size Demographic Leadership Evaluation All 
 
GLS GLS GMM GLS GLS 
Independent and Control Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Constant 2.129*** 1.467*** 1.278** 0.803 1.740 
L1 
  
0.533*** 
  
MD Gender 
 
0.486 
  
0.335 
MD Experience 
   
-0.025 -0.041 
MD Salary 
   
0.147 0.105 
CEO Duality 
  
0.214 
 
-0.218 
Chairman Experience 
   
-0.018 -0.017 
Number of Directors -0.064** 
   
-0.098*** 
Independent Director Percentage 0.029 
   
-0.142 
Female Director Number 
 
-0.035 
  
-0.008 
Block Shareholding 
  
-0.245 
 
-0.169 
Insider Shareholding 
  
0.212 
 
0.959*** 
Management Shareholding 
  
-0.794 
 
0.349 
Board Committee -0.061 
   
-0.059 
Remuneration Committee 0.2676* 
   
0.268* 
Independent Audit -0.344 
   
-0.175 
Largest Shareholding 
  
-0.876* 
 
-0.765* 
D/E Ratio -0.023 -0.008 -0.024 -0.003 -0.027 
Size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Primary -0.555* -0.516* 
 
-0.630** -0.433* 
Energy -0.578* -0.388 
 
-0.537 -0.459 
Goods 0.190 0.271 
 
0.199 0.274 
Property -0.779*** -0.756*** 
 
-0.857*** -0.675** 
Service -0.063 0.017 
 
-0.083 -0.009 
Year 1999 0.192 0.140 
 
0.121 0.186 
Year 2000 0.290 0.360* 
 
0.387* 0.371* 
Year 2001 0.521 0.476 
 
0.472 0.513 
Year 2002 0.340 0.419 
 
0.363 0.295 
Year 2003 0.349 0.352 
 
0.365 0.459* 
R2 0.117 0.107 
 
0.099 0.180 
AR(1) 
  
-3.154*** 
  
AR(2) 
  
-0.675 
  
J-statistics 
  
80.459** 
  
Chi2 64.150*** 66.130*** 52.280*** 60.440*** 102.380*** 
Note: ***, **, and *, indicate that the p-value is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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The results presented in Table 9.11 show the relationship of corporate governance and control 
variables with the long-term Tobin’s Q. The table includes four governance estimations, 
which are size, demographics, leadership, and evaluation estimations. The last column shows 
the estimation coefficients when all governance and control variables are included in the 
regression. The presence of heteroskedasticity necessitates the use of GLS estimation for the 
regressions of “size”, “demographics”, and “evaluation”, and “all estimation”. Diagnostic 
testing indicates the presence of heteroskedasticity and endogeneity in “leadership” and a 
dynamic GMM estimation is used. Four governance variables and four control variables are 
observed as significantly impacting the long-term Tobin’s Q.  
 
CEO and the long-term Tobin’s Q 
CEO gender and CEO salary are positively related with long-term Tobin’s Q, but not at a 
significant level. CEO experience and CEO duality are negatively related with the long-term 
Tobin’s Q and not at a significant level.  
 
Board and the long-term Tobin’s Q 
The number of directors is negatively related to the Tobin’s Q and is significant at the 1% 
level. Abdullah (2004), Bonn (2004), Bonn et al. (2004), Daily et al. (2005), Dwivedi et al. 
(2005), Staikouras et al. (2007), and Chang (2009) find that board size is negatively 
associated with firm performance in Japan, Taiwan and Europe, but positively associated 
with firm performance in India, and has no influence in Australia, the US and Malaysia. This 
study finds it is negatively significantly related to the long-term Tobin’s Q on the NZSE. This 
may be because a large board reflects ineffective leadership. 
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The remuneration committee is positively related to Tobin’s Q and is significant at the 10% 
level. The number of female directors is negatively related to the Tobin’s Q, but not at a 
significant level. The proportion of independent directors is also not significantly related to 
the long-term abnormal yearly return in this study. Chairman’s experience reflects a 
coefficient negatively related with the abnormal yearly return but not at a significant level.  
 
Ownership and long-term Tobin’s Q 
Insider ownership is positively related to long-term Tobin’s Q, significant at the 1% level. 
This may be because investors’ behaviour reflects that insider shareholding is considered an 
important signal for any potential share price rise. For developed market studies, Kroll et al. 
(2007), Nikbakht et al.(2007), Balatbat et al. (2004), and Roosenboom et al. (2005) suggest 
that managerial ownership is positively associated with IPO performance in the US, Australia 
and Holland. Dempere (2007), Firth (1997) and Reddy et al. (2008) indicate that insider 
ownership has a negative effect on firms’ performance in New Zealand.  
Largest shareholding is negatively related to the long-term Tobin’s Q and is significant at the 
10% level. This finding is consistent with a previous study by Chahine (2007). He finds that 
block ownership is negatively associated with firm performance in the long-term in France. A 
plausible reason is that large share ownership is seen as a potential risk for agency problems. 
Block ownership is negatively related to the long-term Tobin’s Q, but not at a significant 
level.  
 
Control variables and long-term Tobin’s Q 
Primary industry is negatively related to the long-term Tobin’s Q at the 10% significant level 
and the property industry is negatively related to the long-term Tobin’s Q at the 5% 
significant level. These results indicate that New Zealand investors are likely to invest in 
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other industries’ IPOs. The year 2000 and year 2003 are positively related to the long-term 
Tobin’s Q, at the 10% significant level.  
 
9.6.3 Long-Term Final Estimations for ROA 
Table 9.12 Panel Data GLS Regression/Dynamic GMM Regression Results for Dependent Variable ROA 
  Governance Compositions 
 
Size Demographic Leadership Evaluation All 
 
GLS GLS GLS GLS GMM 
Independent and Control Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Constant -0.171*** -0.002 0.038 -0.139 -0.114 
L1 
    
0.323*** 
MD Gender 
 
-0.029* 
  
-0.132** 
MD Experience 
   
0.002** 0.015** 
MD Salary 
   
0.027 0.003 
CEO Duality 
  
-0.023 
 
0.024 
Chairman Experience 
   
-0.004 0.007 
Number of Directors -0.002 
   
0.004 
Independent Director Percentage 0.060 
   
0.071 
Female Director Number 
 
0.012 
  
-0.017 
Block Shareholding 
  
-0.024 
 
-0.003 
Insider Shareholding 
  
0.004 
 
0.036 
Management Shareholding 
  
0.035 
 
-0.020 
Board Committee 0.004 
   
-0.003 
Remuneration Committee 0.037** 
   
0.030** 
Independent Audit 0.123** 
   
0.058** 
Largest Shareholding 
  
-0.033 
 
-0.132 
D/E Ratio -0.028*** -0.021** -0.022** -0.020** -0.018* 
Size 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 
Primary 0.002 -0.017 -0.002 -0.013 
 
Energy 0.017 0.022 0.047 0.016 
 
Goods -0.042 -0.045 -0.040 -0.042 
 
Property 0.053* 0.036 0.048 0.033 
 
Service 0.045 0.028 0.035 0.031 
 
Year 1999 0.013 0.014 0.017 0.016 
 
Year 2000 -0.031 -0.049 -0.048 -0.039 
 
Year 2001 -0.010 -0.016 -0.019 -0.015 
 
Year 2002 -0.008 -0.010 -0.001 -0.013 
 
Year 2003 -0.012 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 
 
R2 0.180 0.144 0.139 0.153 
 
AR(1) 
    
-2.690 
AR(2) 
    
2.023 
J-statistics 
    
88.001** 
Chi2         64.470*** 
Note: ***, **, and *, indicate that the p-value is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 9.12 presents the relationship of corporate governance and control variables with the 
long-term ROA. The table includes four governance estimations, which are size, 
demographics, leadership, and evaluation estimations. The last column shows the estimation 
coefficients when all governance and control variables are included in the regression. The 
presence of heteroskedasticity necessitates the use of GLS estimation for the regressions of 
“size”, “demographics”, “leadership”, and “evaluation”. Diagnostic testing indicates the 
presence of heteroskedasticity and endogeneity in “all estimation” and a dynamic GMM 
estimation is used. Four governance variables and one control variable are observed as 
significantly impacting the abnormal yearly return.  
 
CEO and the long-term ROA 
CEO gender is negatively related with the long-term ROA at the 5% significant level. Adams 
et al. (2009) find a positive relationship between female CEO and firm performance. 
According to the data’s descriptive statistics, only 2.63% CEOs are female in the dataset. It is 
very hard to find the relationship between female CEOs and ROA from such a small sample.  
CEO experience is positively related with long-term ROA at the 5% significant level. This 
may be because experienced CEOs have more knowledge of firms than those less 
experienced CEOs.  
 
CEO salary is positively related with the long-term ROA, but not at a significant level. CEO 
duality is negatively related with long-term Tobin’s Q, and not at a significant level.  
 
Board and the long-term ROA 
The remuneration committee is positively related to the ROA and is significant at the 5% 
level. The independent audit is positively related to ROA and is significant at the 5% level. 
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These findings are consistent with the previous studies by Jain et al. (2005) and Reddy et al. 
(2008). According to Jain et al. (2005), investment in a high quality audit leads to a 
significantly lower post-IPO failure rate in the US. Reddy et al. (2008) indicate that an audit 
committee has a positive effect on firm performance in New Zealand. 
 
The number of directors has been widely used in prior studies, but it is not significantly 
related to the long-term ROA in this study. The number of female directors is negatively 
related to the ROA, but not at the significant level. The proportion of independent directors is 
also not significantly related to the long-term ROA in this study.  
 
Ownership and long-term ROA 
Insider ownership is positively related to the long-term ROA, but not at the significant level. 
The largest shareholding is negatively related to the long-term ROA, but not at the significant 
level. Block ownership is negatively related to the long-term ROA, but not at a significant 
level.  
 
Control variables and long-term ROA 
D/E ratio is negatively related to the long-term ROA at the 10% significant level. These results 
indicate that high debt companies are likely to face a higher failure risk.  
 
Insignificant independent variables 
There are some very important variables in prior studies but they are not significantly related 
to the long-term IPO performance in this NZSE study. CEO duality is not significantly 
related to the long-term IPO performance in the New Zealand market. This may be because in 
the sample dataset only 6.1% companies have CEO duality on the NZSE.  So it is very hard 
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to discover the impact of CEO duality on the abnormal yearly return. Balatbat et al. (2004), 
Chahine et al. (2009), Dempere (2007), Lam et al. (2008) and Braun et al. (2007) indicate 
that CEO duality is significantly associated with IPO performance in Australia, Arab 
countries and the US.  Lam et al. (2008) and Abdullah (2004) indicate that CEO duality has 
no significant effect on firm performance in Hong Kong and Malaysia.  
 
CEO salary had been widely used in prior studies, but it is not significantly related to the 
long-term IPO performance in this study. Engel et al. (2002), Lee et al. (2008) and Nikbakht 
et al. (2007) find that top management salary is positively related to IPO performance in the 
US. Kren & Kerr (1997) and Lippert (1999) indicate a positive relationship between CEO 
compensation and firm performance. Compared with Chinese listed companies the top 
managers of larger companies in New Zealand are more likely to have higher salary, but 
those companies may not be attractive to investors, as they have relatively low risk and stock 
prices are more stable, but may not be outperforming others in ROA.  
 
Number of directors has been widely used in prior studies, but it is not significantly related to 
the long-term IPO performance in this study. Abdullah (2004), Bonn (2004), Bonn et al. 
(2004), Daily et al. (2005), Dwivedi et al. (2005), Staikouras et al. (2007), and Chang (2009) 
find that board size is negatively associated with firm performance in Japan, Taiwan and 
Europe, positively associated with firm performance in India and has no influence in 
Australia, the US and Malaysia. This study finds it is not significantly related to the long-
term abnormal yearly return in the NZSE. This may be because a large board reflects 
ineffective leadership, and a small board reflects a shortage of directors with professional 
backgrounds.  
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The proportion of independent directors is also not significantly related to the long-term IPO 
performance in this study. The proportion of independent directors is an important variable in 
prior financial performance studies. Abdullah (2004), Balatbat et al. (2004), Bonn (2004), 
Bonn et al. (2004), Roosenboom  et al. (2005) and Reddy et al. (2008) suggest outside 
directors are positively related to firm value in Holland, Australia and New Zealand, but have 
no influence in Japan and Malaysia. This study finds it is not significantly related to the long-
term abnormal yearly return in the NZSE.  
 
Management ownership is also not significantly related to long-term IPO performance in the 
New Zealand market. For the developed market studies, Kroll et al. (2007), Nikbakht et 
al.(2007), Balatbat et al. (2004), and  Roosenboom et al. (2005) suggest that managerial 
ownership is positively associated with IPO performance in the US, Australia and Holland. 
This study finds that management ownership is not significantly related to the long-term 
abnormal yearly return in the NZSE. This may be attributed to investors’ behaviour reflecting 
they are not concerned about insider ownership. 
 
9.7 Long-Term Specification Tests Results 
9.7.1 Serial correlation test 
First, the study examines autoregressive level 1 and autoregressive level 2 statistics to test the 
first and the second order correlation. If ε it is serially uncorrelated, we expect to reject at the 
first order but not at the second order.  Table 9.10 provides the results for the long-term 
abnormal return. AR (1) and AR (2) for abnormal yearly return and board evaluation 
explanatory variables are 0 and 0.6129. So the result rejects order 1 serial correlation, 
because p=0<0.05. The second order and original error are serially uncorrelated because 
p=0.6129>0.05. AR (1) and AR (2) for abnormal yearly return and all explanatory variables 
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are 0 and 0.9424. So the result rejects order 1 serial correlation, because p=0<0.05. The 
second order and original error are serially uncorrelated because p=0.9424>0.05. Therefore, 
there are no serial correlations in the original error εit in the abnormal yearly return 
estimations, as desired.  
 
Table 9.11 provides the results for the long-term Tobin’s Q. AR (1) and AR (2) for Tobin’s Q 
and board leadership explanatory variables are 0.0016 and 0.4998. So the result rejects order 
1 serial correlation, because p=0.0016<0.05. The second order and original error are serially 
uncorrelated because p=0.4998>0.05. Therefore, there are no serial correlations in the 
original error εit in the Tobin’s Q estimations, as desired.  
 
Table 9.12 provides the results for the long-term ROA. AR (1) and AR (2) for ROA and all 
explanatory variables are 0.0071 and 0.1431. So the result rejects order 1 serial correlation, 
because p=0<0.05. The second order and original error are serially uncorrelated because 
p=0.1431>0.05. Therefore, there are no serial correlations in the original error εit in the ROA 
estimations, as desired.  
 
9.7.2 Over-identification restrictions test 
Second, the study examines J Statistics to test over identification restrictions. Tables 9.10, 
9.11 and 9.12 present the J statistics for abnormal return, Tobin’s Q and ROA respectively. 
The results indicate that all p-values are not significant at the 5% level, so the instruments are 
valid.  
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9.7.3 Joint significance test 
The study employs the Wald Test to examine the significance for independent and control 
variables of each GLS and dynamic GMM estimations. Tables 9.10, 9.11 and 9.12 present the 
Wald Test for abnormal return, Tobin’s Q and ROA respectively. The results indicate that all 
p-values are significant at the 1% level, so all independent and control variables can be 
included in those estimations.  
 
9.8 Short-Term Final Estimations 
The results presented in Section 5 indicate that CEO experience and abnormal first day return 
have significant endogeneity problems. Diagnostic testing for endogeneity, using the DWH 
test, indicate management shareholding and Tobin’s Q, largest shareholding and Tobin’s Q, 
CEO experience and ROA, chairman experience and ROA, all exhibit endogeneity.  
According to previous studies, a 2SLS model or a Dynamic GMM model are used to 
overcome endogeneity problems. However, the use of 2SLS and Dynamic GMM models are 
not appropriate as the likely variables that might be suitable instrument variables are already 
included in the analysis, so finding instrument variables other than from this dataset will be 
hard.  The alternative of deleting the variables and using either OLS or GLS model is 
considered expedient. 
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9.8.1 Short-Term Final Estimations for Abnormal First Day Return 
Table 9.13 Cross-Sectional GLS Regression/OLS Regression Results for Dependent Variable Abnormal First Day 
Return 
  Governance Compositions 
 
Size Demographic Leadership Evaluation All 
 
GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS 
Independent and Control Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Constant -0.104* -0.092*** -0.058 -0.374*** -0.389** 
MD Gender 
 
-0.058* 
  
-0.077* 
MD Salary 
   
0.343** 0.061*** 
CEO Duality 
  
-0.021 
 
-0.010 
Chairman Experience 
   
-0.039 -0.024 
Number of Directors -0.002 
   
-0.006 
Independent Director Percentage 0.017 
   
-0.006 
Female Director Number 
 
0.003 
  
-0.001 
Block Shareholding 
  
0.003 
 
-0.027 
Insider Shareholding 
  
-0.033 
 
-0.031 
Management Shareholding 
  
-0.017 
 
-0.003 
Board Committee -0.009 
   
-0.026 
Remuneration Committee -0.001 
   
0.017 
Independent Audit 0.025 
   
0.007 
Largest Shareholding 
  
0.020 
 
0.029 
D/E Ratio -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.004 -0.002 
Size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000* 
Primary 0.084*** 0.083*** 0.088***  0.138***  0.136*** 
Goods 0.063** 0.064*** 0.070**  0.119***  0.118*** 
Property 0.069** 0.078*** 0.075***  0.139***  0.128** 
Service 0.077*** 0.077*** 0.082***  0.130***  0.122*** 
Investment 0.076** 0.086*** 0.084*** 0.138*** 0.132** 
Year 2000 -0.051 -0.053 -0.062*  -0.0354  -0.0449 
Year 2001 0.009 0.006 0.005  0.0079  0.0264 
Year 2002 0.020 0.021 0.022  0.0162  0.0252 
Year 2003 0.000 0.003 -0.005 0.0023   0.0130 
Year 2004 0.022 0.021 0.015 0.019 0.029 
R2 0.194 0.193 0.205  0.265  0.322 
 
          
Note: ***, **, and *, indicate that the p-value is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
The results presented in Table 9.13 show the relationship of corporate governance and control 
variables with abnormal first day return. The table includes four governance estimations, viz 
size, demographics, leadership, and evaluation. This last estimation shows the estimated 
coefficients when all governance and control variables are included in the regression. The 
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presence of heteroskedasticity necessitates the use of GLS estimation for all regressions. 
Only two governance variables are observed as significantly impacting the abnormal first day 
return.  
 
CEO and the abnormal first day return 
CEO gender is negatively related to the abnormal first day return at the 10% significant level. 
This finding is offset by the previous study by Adams et al. (2009) who indicate a positive 
relationship between female CEO and firm performance. The possible solution is the lack of 
female CEOs in New Zealand. According to the data’s descriptive statistics, only 1.22% 
CEOs are female in the dataset. A small sample may not provide enough female CEO success 
stories to the public, and this may be attributed to investors’ behaviour reflecting that female 
CEOs are not considered an important signal for positive firm performance. 
 
CEO salary is positively related to abnormal first day return at the 1% significant level. This 
finding is consistent with Engel et al. (2002), Lee et al. (2008) and Nikbakht et al. (2007) 
who find that top management salary is positively related to IPO performance in the US. 
Kren & Kerr (1997) and Lippert (1999) indicate a positive relationship between CEO 
compensation and firm performance. A plausible reason is that most high income managers 
are from larger companies, those companies have relatively low risk and they are more 
attractive to investors as a short-term investment prospective. 
 
CEO duality is positively related to the abnormal first day return and while intuitively 
appealing, the correlation is not at a significant level.  
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Board and the abnormal yearly return 
Chairman experience is negatively related to the abnormal first day return, and again, while 
intuitively appealing, the correlation is not at a significant level. Number of directors, number 
of female directors, and the proportion of independent directors has been widely used in prior 
studies, but they are not significantly related to the abnormal first day return in this case. 
Board committee, remuneration committee and independent audit are also not significantly 
related to the abnormal first day return in this case.  
 
Ownership and the abnormal yearly return 
Block ownership, management ownership and insider ownership are negatively related to the 
abnormal first day return, and while intuitively appealing, the correlations are not at 
significant levels. Largest ownership is positively related to the abnormal first day return, 
which is intuitively appealing but the correlation is not at a significant level. 
 
Control variables and the abnormal yearly return 
The control variables in the form of the dummy for primary, goods, and service are positively 
related to the abnormal first day return at the 1% significant level. Property and investment 
are positively related to the abnormal first day return at the 5% significant level. Size is 
positively related to the abnormal first day return at the 10% significant level.  
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9.8.2 Short-Term Final Estimations for Tobin’s Q 
Table 9.14 Cross-Sectional GLS Regression/OLS Regression Results for Dependent Variable Tobin’s Q 
  Governance Compositions 
 
Size Demographic Leadership Evaluation All 
 
GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS 
Independent and Control Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Constant 0.755 1.358*** 0.617 -0.387 -5.432 
MD Gender 
 
-0.309 
  
-0.685 
MD Experience 
   
-0.525 -0.077 
MD Salary 
   
0.272 0.689 
CEO Duality 
  
-0.393 
 
0.291 
Chairman Experience 
   
0.419 0.028 
Number of Directors -0.129* 
   
-0.136* 
Independent Director Percentage 0.169 
   
0.730 
Female Director Number 
 
-0.054 
  
0.241 
Block Shareholding 
  
0.492 
 
0.160 
Insider Shareholding 
  
0.981 
 
1.417 
Management Shareholding 
  
 
 
2.726*** 
Board Committee -0.612 
   
-0.752 
Remuneration Committee -0.154 
   
-0.201 
Independent Audit 2.207*** 
   
2.721*** 
Largest Shareholding 
  
  
-1.254 
D/E Ratio -0.323** -0.336** -0.432*** -0.374** -0.463*** 
Size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Primary -0.228 0.217 0.307  0.5040 -0.290 
Goods 0.208 0.681 0.701  0.9292  0.2007 
Property -1.511** -0.559 -0.311  -0.3104 -1.117 
Service 0.230 0.782 0.960** 1.081* -0.038 
Investment -0.815 -0.066 0.063 0.273 -0.802 
Year 2000 0.402 0.621 0.829  0.7073  1.1219 
Year 2001 0.772 0.560 0.510  0.5941  1.3322 
Year 2002 1.178 1.168* 1.205*  1.477*  1.624* 
Year 2003 0.487 0.402 0.548 0.457  1.1794 
Year 2004 0.292 0.062 0.188 0.067 0.997 
R2 0.224 0.142 0.187  0.156  0.421 
 
          
Note: ***, **, and *, indicate that the p-value is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
The results presented in Table 9.14 show the relationship of corporate governance and control 
variables with Tobin’s Q. The table includes four governance estimations, viz size, 
demographics, leadership, and evaluation. This last estimation shows the estimated 
coefficients when all governance and control variables are included in the regression. The 
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presence of heteroskedasticity necessitates the use of GLS estimation for all regressions. 
Three governance variables are observed as significantly impacting Tobin’s Q.  
 
CEO and Tobin’s Q 
CEO gender and CEO experience are negatively related to Tobin’s Q, and while intuitively 
appealing, the correlations are not at significant levels. CEO salary and CEO duality have 
been widely used in prior studies, but they are not significantly related to the abnormal first 
day return in this case.  
 
Board and Tobin’s Q 
The number of directors is negatively related to Tobin’s Q and is significant at the 10% level. 
Abdullah (2004), Bonn (2004), Bonn et al. (2004), Daily et al. (2005), Dwivedi et al. (2005), 
Staikouras et al. (2007), and Chang (2009) find that board size is negatively associated with 
firm performance in Japan, Taiwan and Europe, but positively associated with firm 
performance in India, and has no influence in Australia, the US and Malaysia. This study 
finds board size is negatively significantly related to the short-term Tobin’s Q in the NZSE. 
This may be because a large board reflects ineffective leadership. 
 
The independent audit is positively related to Tobin’s Q and is significant at the 1% level. 
These findings are consistent with previous studies by Jain et al. (2005) and Reddy et al. 
(2008). According to Jain et al. (2005), investment in a high quality audit leads to a 
significantly lower post-IPO failure rate in the US. Reddy et al. (2008) indicate that an audit 
committee has a positive effect on firm performance in New Zealand. 
 
274 
 
Chairman’s experience reflects a coefficient positively related with the Tobin’s Q but not at a 
significant level. The number of female directors and the proportion of independent directors 
have been widely used in prior studies, but they are not significantly related to the Tobin’s Q 
in this case. Board committee and remuneration committee are also not significantly related 
to the Tobin’s Q in this case.  
 
Ownership and Tobin’s Q 
Management ownership is positively related to Tobin’s Q and is significant at the 1% level. 
This may be attributed to investors’ behaviour reflecting that management shareholding is 
considered an important signal for a potential share price rise. This finding is consistent with 
several previous studies. Kroll et al. (2007), Nikbakht et al.(2007), Balatbat et al. (2004), and  
Roosenboom et al. (2005) suggest that managerial ownership is positively associated with 
IPO performance in the US, Australia and Holland. This finding is contrary to several 
previous studies, where Dempere (2007), Firth (1997) and Reddy et al. (2008) indicate that 
insider ownership has a negative effect on firms’ performance in New Zealand.  
 
Block ownership and insider ownership are positively related to Tobin’s Q and while 
intuitively appealing, the correlation is not at a significant level. Largest ownership is 
negatively related to the abnormal first day return and though it is intuitively appealing, the 
correlation is not at significant level. 
 
Control variables and Tobin’s Q 
The control variables’ D/E ratio is negatively related to Tobin’s Q, at the 1% significant level. 
Year 2002 is positively related to the Tobin’s Q at the 10% significant level.  
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9.8.3 Short-Term Final Estimations for ROA 
Table 9.15 Cross-Sectional GLS Regression/Dynamic GMM Regression Results for Dependent Variable 
ROA 
  Governance Compositions 
 
Size Demographic Leadership Evaluation All 
 
GLS OLS OLS OLS GLS 
Independent and Control Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Constant -0.048 0.022 0.006 -0.520** -0.649** 
MD Gender 
 
0.211*** 
  
0.253*** 
MD Experience 
   
0.028 
 
MD Salary 
   
0.083** 0.093** 
CEO Duality 
  
-0.012 
 
-0.018 
Chairman Experience 
   
0.070 
 Number of Directors -0.015** 
   
-0.012 
Independent Director Percentage -0.039 
   
-0.019 
Female Director Number 
 
-0.012 
  
-0.022 
Block Shareholding 
  
-0.037 
 
-0.016 
Insider Shareholding 
  
0.062 
 
0.024 
Management Shareholding 
  
0.060 
 
0.104 
Board Committee 0.170*** 
   
0.134** 
Remuneration Committee 0.015 
   
0.046 
Independent Audit 0.042 
   
-0.013 
Largest Shareholding 
  
0.056 
 
0.084 
D/E Ratio 0.014 0.033 0.027 0.026 0.007 
Size 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 
Primary -0.045 -0.113* -0.129** -0.057 0.033 
Goods -0.013 -0.076 -0.095* -0.020  0.0657 
Property 0.108* 0.000 0.012 0.052 0.229*** 
Service 0.071 -0.009 -0.022 0.041 0.157* 
Investment 0.060 -0.030 -0.030 0.021 0.134 
Year 2000 -0.036 -0.039 -0.032  0.0276 0.019 
Year 2001 -0.091 -0.024 -0.024  0.0280  -0.0530 
Year 2002 -0.155** -0.048 -0.036 -0.025 -0.108 
Year 2003 -0.095 -0.032 -0.011 0.016 -0.045 
Year 2004 -0.113* -0.004 0.012 0.040 -0.077 
R2 0.420 0.269 0.287  0.297  0.530 
 
          
Note: ***, **, and *, indicate that the p-value is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
The results presented in Table 9.15 show the relationship of corporate governance and control 
variables with ROA. The table include four governance estimations, viz size, demographics, 
leadership, and evaluation. This last estimation shows the estimated coefficients when all 
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governance and control variables are included in the regression. The presence of 
heteroskedasticity necessitates the use of GLS estimation for size and all governance 
regression. Three governance variables are observed as significantly impacting ROA. The 
demographic, leadership and education regressions Hausman test results are not significant 
and suggesting the random effects model is appropriate. 
 
CEO and ROA 
CEO gender is positively related to ROA at the 10% significant level. This finding is 
consistent with previous studies by Adams et al. (2009) who indicate a positive relationship 
between female CEO and firm performance.  
 
CEO salary is positively related to ROA at the 5% significant level. This finding is consistent 
with Engel et al. (2002), Lee et al. (2008) and Nikbakht et al. (2007) who find that top 
management salary is positively related to IPO performance in the US. Kren & Kerr (1997) 
and Lippert (1999) indicate a positive relationship between CEO compensation and firm 
performance. A plausible reason is that most high income managers are from larger 
companies. Those companies have relatively low risk and offer better ROAs. 
 
CEO duality is negatively related to the ROA and while intuitively appealing the correlation 
is not at a significant level.  
 
Board and ROA 
The board committee is positively related to ROA and is significant at the 5% level. These 
findings are consistent with the previous studies by Jain et al. (2005) and Reddy et al. (2008). 
Number of directors, number of female directors, and the proportion of independent directors 
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has been widely used in prior studies, but they are not significantly related to the ROA in this 
case. The remuneration committee reflects a coefficient positively related with ROA but not 
at a significant level. The independent audit reflects a coefficient negatively related with the 
ROA but not at a significant level.  
 
Ownership and ROA 
Block ownership is negatively related to ROA and while intuitively appealing the correlation 
is not at a significant level. Management ownership, insider ownership and largest ownership 
are positively related to the abnormal first day return and while intuitively appealing, the 
correlations are not at significant levels. 
 
Control variables and ROA 
The control variables size and property are positively related to ROA at the 1% significant 
level. Service is positively related to the abnormal first day return at the 10% significant level.  
 
Insignificant independent variables 
There are some very important variables in prior studies but they are not significantly related 
to the short-term IPO performance in this NZSE study. Balatbat et al. (2004), Chahine et al. 
(2009), Dempere (2007), Lam et al. (2008) and Braun et al. (2007) indicate that CEO duality 
is significantly associated with IPO performance in Australia, Arab countries, and the US.  
Lam et al. (2008) and Abdullah (2004) indicate that CEO duality has no significant effect on 
firm performance in Hong Kong and Malaysia. This study finds it is not significantly related 
to the short-term IPO performance in the NZSE. This may be because in the sample dataset 
only 6.1% companies have CEO duality in the NZSE.  So it is very hard to determine the 
impact of CEO duality on the short-term IPO performance.  
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The proportion of independent directors is also not significantly related to the short-term IPO 
performance in the New Zealand market. The proportion of independent directors is an 
important variable in prior financial performance studies. Abdullah (2004), Balatbat et 
al.(2004), Bonn (2004), Bonn et al. (2004), Roosenboom  et al. (2005) and Reddy et al. (2008) 
suggest outside directors are positively related to firm value in Holland, Australia and New 
Zealand, but have no influence in Japan and Malaysia. A plausible reason is that most 
directors are independent directors, and it is hard to compare the performance of independent 
and executive directors. 
 
The number of female directors is not significantly related to the short-term IPO performance 
in this study. Bonn (2004), Bonn et al. (2004), Campbell et al. (2008), and Reddy et al. (2008) 
find that female directors are positively associated with firm performance in Spain, US, New 
Zealand and Australia, but have no influence in Japan. A plausible reason is that there are 
very few female directors in the NZSE (0.3415 in average), which makes it hard to find the 
relationship between female directors and the short-term IPO performance from such small 
sample. 
 
Insider ownership and block ownership are important variables in prior IPO and financial 
performance studies, but they are not significantly related to the short-term IPO performance 
in the NZSE.   Chahine (2007) finds that block ownership is negatively associated with firm 
performance in the short-term in France. Reddy et al. (2008) indicate that block ownership 
has a positive effect on firm performance in New Zealand. This may be attributable to 
investors’ behaviour reflecting they are not concerned about insider and block ownership. 
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9.9 Short –Term Specification Tests Results  
Joint significance test 
The study employs the Wald Test to examine the significance for independent and control 
variables of each OLS and GLS estimation. The results indicate that all p-values are 
significant at the 1% level, so all independent and control variables can be included in those 
estimations.  
 
9.10 Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed and explored the results of the corporate governance variables and 
the long- and short-term IPO performance relationships in the New Zealand Stock Exchange 
dataset. The distribution of each variable has been checked to ensure it is approximately 
normal by median, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis. The study provides the 
descriptive statistics of variables after fixing missing values and outliers, and dropping 
several independent variables. Diagnostic testing indicates the presence of heteroskedasticity 
and endogeneity in some of the regressions and a GLS or a dynamic GMM estimation is used. 
 
In the long-term case, this study finds CEO gender is negatively related to the abnormal 
yearly return and ROA. The number of female directors is positively related to the abnormal 
yearly return. The number of directors is negatively related to Tobin’s Q. The board 
committee is positively related to the abnormal yearly return. The remuneration committee is 
positively related to the Tobin’s Q and ROA. The independent audit is positively related to 
the ROA. Insider ownership is positively related to the long-term Tobin’s Q. The largest 
shareholding is negatively related to the long-term Tobin’s Q. This study applies a serial 
correlation test, over-identification test, and joint significance test for all long-term IPO 
performance regressions and the results show all models are statistically robust. According to 
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the above results this study indicates that CEO gender, number of female directors, 
committees, insider ownership, and largest shareholdings are corporate governance practices 
linked to long-term IPO performance in New Zealand. This leads to non-rejection of H7, H11, 
H13, H15, H19, H24, H25 and H26. 
 
In the short-term case, this study finds CEO gender is negatively related to the abnormal first 
day return but positively related to ROA. CEO salary is positively related to the abnormal 
first day return and ROA. The number of directors is negatively related to the Tobin’s Q. The 
board committee is positively related to ROA. The independent audit is positively related to 
Tobin’s Q. Management ownership is positively related to Tobin’s Q. This study applies the 
joint significance test for all short-term IPO performance regressions and the results show the 
significance of corporate governance variables in all models. According to the above results 
this study indicates that CEO gender, CEO salary, committees, insider ownership, and 
number of directors are good corporate governance practices for short-term IPO performance 
in New Zealand. This leads to non-rejection of H7, H8, H11, H15, H24 and H26. 
 
Overall, the panel data regressions explain the long-term IPO performance well, but the cross 
sectional regressions do not have reasonable explanation on the short-term IPO performance. 
In the short-term case, first day return, Tobin’s Q and ROA have been investigated by the 
models, but just two independent variables are significantly related to abnormal first day 
return, and three variables are significantly related to Tobin’s Q and ROA. This may be due 
to a lack of available information. In other words, investors may not have many or any 
opportunities to learn about corporate governance mechanisms before an IPO listing. 
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CHAPTER 10 COMPARISON OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IMPACTS ON IPO PERFORMANCE IN 
CHINESE AND NEW ZEALAND STOCK EXCHANGES 
 
10.1 Introduction 
Previous chapters described statistical tests and the results describing the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms and performance of IPOs on the SHSE, SZSE 
and NZSE. This chapter presents a comparison of the three individual analyses of corporate 
governance and short- and long-term IPO performance. Section 2 provides a discussion of the 
corporate governance on long-term IPO performance through the three stock exchanges. 
Section 3 provides a discussion of the corporate governance on short-term IPO performance 
through the three stock exchanges. Section 4 concludes the chapter. 
 
10.2 Comparison of SHSE, SZSE, and NZSE’s corporate governance on 
long-term IPO performance 
 
Table 10.1 produces the relationship between corporate governance and long-term IPO 
performance (abnormal yearly return, Tobin’s Q and ROA) across the SHSE, SZSE, and 
NZSE. 
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Table 10.1 Comparison of SHSE, SZSE, and NZSE’s Long-Term Regression Results Summary 
Variable Abnormal Yearly Return Tobin's Q ROA 
  SHSE SZSE NZSE SHSE SZSE NZSE SHSE SZSE NZSE 
MD Age 
   
+ 
     MD Gender 
  
- 
     
- 
MD Qualification 
         MD Experience 
        
+ 
Top Three Officer Pay/MD 
Salary 
    
+ 
 
+ 
  CEO Duality 
         Chairman Experience + 
        Chairman Qualification 
    
+ 
 
+ 
  Number of Directors 
   
- 
 
- 
   Independent Director Percentage - - 
 
- - 
    Female Director Number 
  
- 
    
+ 
 Number of Supervisors 
   
+ 
  
+ + 
 Board Meeting per Year - 
  
- - 
    Supervisors Meeting per Year 
   
+ + 
    Block Shareholding 
         Insider Shareholding 
     
+ 
   Management Shareholding 
         SOE Shareholding 
 
- 
       Legal Person Shareholding 
 
- 
       Non-trading Shareholding 
         Board Committees 
  
+ 
      Remuneration Committees 
     
+ 
  
+ 
Independent Audit 
  
+ 
     
+ 
Number of  Committees 
         Largest Shareholding   +       - + +   
Note: + and -, indicate that a positive or negative significant relationship respectively. 
 
CEO factors and long-term IPO performance 
Results indicate CEO age has no impact on the long-term IPO performance in SZSE, but has 
a positive impact on the Tobin’s Q in SHSE. CEO age is important for China given a 
continuing general reverence given to older people who are viewed as having acquired more 
wisdom. The older CEOs are likely to have more experience in the industry.  However, most 
SZSE listed firms are relatively small and high risk, high technology firms and CEO age may 
not be considered an important factor by investors. CEO age is not available for NZSE data. 
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CEO gender has a negative impact for the long-term Tobin’s Q and ROA on the NZSE, but 
has no impact on the SHSE and SZSE. There are two reasons. First, this may be attributable 
to investors’ behaviour reflecting that female CEOs are not considered an important signal 
for the positive performance. Second, according to the descriptive statistics, only 2% of 
CEOs are female in the dataset for New Zealand and China. It is very hard to detect the 
relationship between female CEOs and long-term IPO performance from such a small sample. 
 
Results indicate CEO qualification has no impact on the long-term IPO performance in SHSE, 
SZSE, and NZSE. This may be because of the missing data. Only 2234 out of 2966 original 
observations are available on the SHSE, 862 out of 1139 are available on the SZSE, and 233 
out of 494 are available on the NZSE. 
 
CEO experience has no impact on the long-term IPO performance on the SHSE and SZSE, 
but has a positive impact on the long-term ROA on the NZSE. In the Chinese samples, many 
of the listed firms are SOEs, where the tenure of the CEO is often less than five years before 
they move on to another company. It is hard to find the relationship between CEO experience 
and IPO performance. This may be because experienced CEOs have more knowledge of 
firms than those less experienced CEOs in the NZSE.  
 
Top management salary has positive impacts on the ROA on the SHSE, and on the long-term 
Tobin’s Q of the SZSE. This may be a reflection of Chinese government policy. Most high 
income managers are from larger companies and those companies in the SZSE have 
relatively low risk and are more attractive to investors. Investor behaviour may impact the 
share price and raise the level of Tobin’s Q. SHSE, when compared to SZSE, has large 
amounts of state owned enterprises listing IPOs and unlike private companies, the top 
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managers of larger SOE companies do not necessarily have high salaries. The larger 
companies also have relatively low risk and are more attractive to the investors and the firm 
performance is affected by the influence of high income CEOs.  
 
Results indicate CEO duality has no impact on the long-term IPO performance on all three 
exchanges. For SHSE and SZSE this may be attributable to the specific role of Chinese 
chairmen. Many Chinese chairmen come from a legal person background or they are the 
largest shareholders of the companies; their roles are not only monitoring the firm, they also 
act as managers in the company. Therefore, CEO duality becomes unimportant. However, the 
result might also be because of the sample dataset; less than 6% companies have CEO duality 
in those markets.  So it is very hard to ascertain the impact of CEO duality on long-term IPO 
performance. 
 
Board factors and long-term IPO performance 
Results indicate that chairman experience has a positive impact on the long-term abnormal 
yearly return on the SHSE, but no impact on the others. This may be attributable to investors’ 
behaviour reflecting an understanding that more experienced chairmen have more knowledge 
in the current industry and will make a consistent contribution to the company on the SHSE. 
But as with CEO experience, the tenure of the chairman is a limitation of the study. It is hard 
to find the relationship between chairman experience and IPO performance on the SZSE and 
NZSE. 
 
Chairman qualification has a positive impact on ROA on the SHSE, and a positive impact on 
the long-term Tobin’s Q of the SZSE. The chairman’s qualification is an important signal for 
Chinese investors who have a continuing general reverence for higher educated people who 
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are viewed as having acquired more wisdom.  These higher educated chairmen are seen as 
more likely to help the company achieve better long-term firm performance. The factor is 
deleted in the New Zealand study as there are too many missing values.  
 
Number of directors has no impact on the SZSE, but has negative impacts on the Tobin’s Q 
of the SHSE and NZSE. A large board decreases effective communication and co-ordination 
between shareholders. Another possible reason is that investors may be concerned that the 
directors lack a professional background. Actually, many Chinese independent directors of 
state owned firms are government officials, academics, and some are foreigners so perhaps 
they do not have a reasonable understanding of a company’s current situation.  
 
The proportion of independent directors has a negative impact on the long-term abnormal 
yearly return and Tobin’s Q on the Chinese exchanges. This may be attributable to investors’ 
behaviour reflecting a concern that independent directors lack a professional background and 
will not make a consistent contribution to the company. Actually, as already mentioned, 
many Chinese independent directors are government officials, academics, and foreigners who 
may not have a reasonable understanding of the company’s current situation. Each listed 
company only needs to include two independent directors on their board before year 2002. 
The small number of independent directors means they can be marginalized and find it hard 
to influence board decision-making.  
 
The number of female directors has a negative impact for the abnormal yearly return on the 
NZSE, and a positive impact for ROA on the SZSE. Prior studies suggest that the existence 
of female directors will bring different ideas to the board and therefore contribute to 
performance. Similarly, with the CEO gender issue, there are very few female directors in the 
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SHSE, making it hard to find the relationship between female directors and long-term IPO 
performance from such a small sample. Also different countries have different board 
selection criteria, law and institutional structures. These factors may impact on contradictory 
results. 
 
Board meeting per year has a negative impact for the long-term Tobin’s Q on the SHSE and 
SZSE, and has a negative impact for the long-term abnormal yearly return on the SHSE. The 
high frequency of board meetings may be because board efficiency is low. It may also 
indicate that company has a lot of issues. The factor is unavailable for the NZSE study.  
 
Results indicate number of supervisors and supervisor meetings per year have positive 
impacts for long-term performance on the SHSE and SZSE. Supervisors are responsible for 
overseeing the financial condition of the company, monitoring the implementation of 
decisions made by top management and board of directors, and implementing other 
supervisory duties prescribed by the company constitution. More supervisors are likely to 
help the company to achieve a better performance and reduce agency cost. Investors may 
believe that more supervisors and a more active supervisory group will help the company to 
achieve a better performance, protect shareholders’ benefits, and reduce agency costs. 
 
Board committees and independent audit have positive impacts for the long-term IPO 
performance on the NZSE. Those factors are unavailable for the Chinese exchanges. Number 
of committees has no impact on the SHSE and SZSE.  
 
 
 
287 
 
Ownership factors and long-term IPO performance 
Block ownership has no impact on the long-term IPO performance on the NZSE. This may be 
because of the sample dataset where only 4.66% companies have no block shareholders on 
the NZSE.  So it is very hard to ascertain the impact of block ownership on the long-term 
performance. This factor is unavailable for the Chinese cases, as block ownership exists in 
every Chinese listed firm. 
 
Insider shareholding has positive impacts on Tobin’s Q on the NZSE, but no impact on the 
Chinese exchanges. This may be attributable to investors’ behaviour reflecting that insider 
shareholding is considered an important signal for potential share price rise in New Zealand. 
But the inside trading advantage is a common issue in China, so the Chinese investors may 
not consider it an important signal. 
 
The SOE and legal person ownership have negative impacts on the abnormal yearly return on 
the SZSE, and no impact on the SHSE. Most SHSE listing IPOs are SOEs. The largest 
ownership has a positive impact on the abnormal yearly return and ROA on the SZSE, and a 
positive impact on ROA on the SHSE. First, investors may believe that the large amount of 
the share ownership is an important signal which shows that s large block holder has high 
expectations for the company, encouraging others to acquire shares. Second, a large amount 
of founder ownership indicates that the company has the potential to raise capital from the 
debt market as well as from the stock market. Third, a rise in stock price may be the results of 
demand and purchase factions of large shareholders. Largest ownership has a negative impact 
on Tobin’s Q on the NZSE. A possible reason is that large share ownership is seen as a 
potential cause for agency problems. 
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Overall, corporate governance factors play a significant role on the SHSE, SZSE, and 
NZSE’s IPO performance.  
 
10.3 Comparison of SHSE, SZSE, and NZSE’s corporate governance on 
short-term IPO performance 
 
Table 10.2 shows the relationship between corporate governance and short-term IPO 
performance (abnormal first day return, Tobin’s Q and ROA) across the SHSE, SZSE, and 
NZSE. 
Table 10.2 Comparison of SHSE, SZSE, and NZSE’s Short-Term Regression Results Summary 
Variable First Day Return Tobin's Q ROA 
  SHSE SZSE NZSE SHSE SZSE NZSE SHSE SZSE NZSE 
MD Age 
         MD Gender 
  
- 
 
- 
   
+ 
MD Qualification 
         MD Experience 
         Top Three Officer Pay/MD 
Salary 
  
+ + 
  
+ 
 
+ 
CEO Duality 
   
- 
     Chairman Experience 
         Chairman Qualification 
         Number of Directors 
 
+ 
  
+ - 
   Independent Director Percentage 
      
- 
  Female Director Number 
         Number of Supervisors 
      
- 
  Board Meeting per Year 
   
- 
     Supervisors Meeting per Year 
         Block Shareholding 
         Insider Shareholding 
   
+ 
 
+ 
   Management Shareholding 
         SOE Shareholding 
    
+ 
    Legal Person Shareholding - 
   
+ 
    Non-trading Shareholding 
   
+ 
  
+ 
  Board Committees 
        
+ 
Remuneration Committees 
         Independent Audit 
     
+ 
   Number of  Committees 
         Largest Shareholding       +     +     
Note: + and -, indicate that a positive or negative significant relationship respectively. 
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CEO factors and long-term IPO performance 
Results indicate CEO age has no impacts on the short-term IPO performance in the SHSE 
and SZSE. The reason is that the short-term performance of the Chinese IPOs is extremely 
active
15
, so CEO age is no longer considered as an indicator of wisdom. The CEO age factor 
is not available for NZSE data. 
 
CEO gender has negative impact on the short-term Tobin’s Q on the SZSE, a negative impact 
for the short-term first day return on the NZSE, but has a positive impact for the short-term 
ROA on the NZSE. There are two reasons. First, this may be attributable to investors’ 
behaviour reflecting that female CEOs are not considered as an important signal for positive 
performance. Second, according to the data descriptive statistics, only 2% CEOs are female 
in the dataset. It is very hard to find the relationship between female CEOs and long-term 
IPO performance from such a small sample. 
 
Results indicate CEO qualification and experience have no impacts on the short-term IPO 
performance in SHSE, SZSE and NZSE. First, this may be because of the missing data. For 
the qualification factor, only 291 out of 409 original observations are available on the SHSE, 
85 out of 142 are available on the SZSE. Second, in the Chinese samples, many of the listed 
firms are state owned and the terms of office are normally less than five years, after which 
CEOs may move to other companies. It is hard to find the relationship between CEO 
experience and IPO performance. CEO qualification and experience are deleted from the 
NZSE dataset because of too many missing values.  
 
                                                 
15
 On average, the abnormal first day return is 100.09% for SHSE, and 103.86% for SZSE. 
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Top management salary has a positive impact on the short-term ROA on the SHSE and 
NZSE, a positive impact on the first day return on the NZSE, and a positive impact on the 
short-term Tobin’s Q on the SHSE. This may be reflecting Chinese government policy. Most 
high income managers are from larger companies and those companies on the SZSE have 
relatively low risk and are more attractive to investors. Investor behaviour may impact the 
share price and raise the level of Tobin’s Q. SHSE, when compared to SZSE, has large 
amounts of SOE listing IPOs and unlike private companies, the top managers of larger SOE 
companies do not necessarily have high salaries. The larger companies have relatively low 
risk and are more attractive to the investors. But the firm performance is affected by the 
influence of high-income CEOs.  
 
Results indicate CEO duality has a negative impact on the short-term Tobin’s Q on the SHSE. 
This may be because of the specific role of Chinese chairmen. Many Chinese chairmen come 
from a legal background or they are the company’s largest; their role is not just to monitor the 
firm, they often manage the company too.  
 
Board factors and long-term IPO performance 
Results indicate chairman experience and qualification have no impact on the short-term IPO 
performance in all three markets. It is the same with CEO experience and qualification 
factors, with missing data the potential reason for insignificance. The term of office is a 
limitation of this study. It is hard to find the relationship between chairman experience and 
IPO performance in all three markets. 
 
Chairman qualification has positive impact on ROA on the SHSE, and has a positive impact 
on the long-term Tobin’s Q on the SZSE. The chairman’s qualification is an important signal 
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for Chinese investors who have a continuing general reverence for higher educated people 
who are viewed as having acquired more wisdom.  And these higher educated chairmen are 
more likely to help the company achieve a better long-term performance. The factor is 
deleted from the NZSE study as many miss values.  
 
Number of directors has no impact on the SHSE, but has a positive impact on the first day 
return and Tobin’s Q of the SZSE. It has a negative impact on the Tobin’s Q of the NZSE. 
This finding is offset with the long-term case. A possible reason is that investors may believe 
the large board is effective in the very first stage, but after years they may find that a large 
board decreases effective communication and co-ordination between shareholders. Another 
possible reason is that investors may be concerned that the directors lack a professional 
background.  
 
The proportion of independent directors has a negative impact for the short-term ROA on the 
SHSE. Actually, most listed IPOs are state-owned in the SHSE, and many independent 
directors are government officials, so perhaps they do not have a reasonable understanding of 
the company’s current situation and cannot bring the professional knowledge to help the firm 
grow. Also each listed company only needs to include two independent directors on their 
board before year 2002. The small number of independent directors means they can become 
marginalized and find it hard to influence board decision-making.  
 
The number of female directors has no impact on all markets. Similarly with CEO gender. 
There are very few female directors in all markets, making it hard to find the relationship 
between female directors and long-term IPO performance from such a small sample. 
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Board meeting per year has a negative impact for the short-term Tobin’s Q on the SHSE. The 
high frequency of board meetings may be because of board efficiency is low. It may be also 
indicate that company has a lot of issues. The factor is unavailable for NZSE study.  
 
Results indicate number of supervisors has a negative impact for the short-term ROA on the 
SHSE. Supervisors’ meeting per year has no impact on the SHSE. The investors may believe that 
more supervisors and a more active supervisory group will help the company to achieve a 
better performance, protect shareholders’ benefits and reduce agency costs. But the 
supervisor team is not helpful for short-term firm performance. 
 
Board committees and independent audit have positive impacts for the long-term IPO 
performance on the NZSE. Those factors are unavailable for the Chinese exchange studies. 
Number of committees has no impact on the SHSE and SZSE.  
 
Ownership factors and long-term IPO performance 
Block ownership has no impact on the long-term IPO performance on the NZSE. This may be 
because of the sample dataset where only 4.66% companies have no block shareholders in the 
NZSE.  So it is very hard to ascertain the impact of block ownership on long-term 
performance. This factor is unavailable for the Chinese cases, as block ownership exists in 
every Chinese listed firm.  
 
Insider shareholding has a positive impact on Tobin’s Q on the SHSE and NZSE. In New 
Zealand, this may be attributable to investors’ behaviour reflecting that insider shareholding 
is considered an important signal for a potential share price rise.  
 
293 
 
SOE and legal person ownership have positive impacts on Tobin’s Q on the SZSE. Legal 
person ownership has a negative impact on the first day return on the SHSE. Most SHSE 
listing of IPOs are state owned enterprises, but the SZSE has relatively fewer SOE IPOs. 
SOE ownership may be considered as a signal of information from government officials and 
also contribute to the attractiveness for investors. 
 
Largest ownership has a positive impact on Tobin’s Q and ROA on the SHSE. On the SHSE, 
the state is usually the largest shareholder, so investors may believe that the large amount of 
the share ownership is an important signal that shows that large block holder has a high 
expectation for the company, which encourages others to acquire shares. The largest 
ownership has no impact on the SZSE and NZSE. A plausible reason is that large share 
ownership is deemed a potential risk for agency problems. 
 
Overall, corporate governance factors play a significant role on the SHSE, SZSE and NZSE’s 
short-term Tobin’s Q and ROA, but corporate governance has almost no effect on the 
abnormal first day return in all markets.  
 
10.4 Conclusion 
This chapter explores the results of the corporate governance variables and the long- and 
short-term IPO performance relationships in all three exchanges, and compares the three 
exchanges. This chapter shows how governance factors play a significant role on the long-
term IPO performance in all three exchanges, even when the different variables have different 
impacts across the different markets. The study finds that board and ownership variables are 
more significant and important than the CEO variables on the long-term IPO performance in 
all markets. 
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Second, this chapter also reports the governance factors play a significant role on the short-
term Tobin’s Q and ROA in all three different markets, but have no effect on the abnormal 
first day return in all cases. This may be because of disclosing. For most of investors it is 
extremely hard to receive the governance information on the first day of trade, unless they are 
inside traders. Specifically, the study finds that board and ownership variables are more 
significant and important than the CEO variables on the short-term IPO performance in all 
markets. 
 
The last chapter provides the summary and conclusion of the thesis and includes the 
contribution and limitations of the study.  
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CHAPTER 11 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
11.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a summary of the process followed in this study and the findings. The 
significant contribution of this work is discussed and limitations of the work are noted. The 
remainder of the chapter is divided into the following sections. Section 11.2 provides a 
review of the study process. Section 11.3 notes the key findings. Section 11.4 presents the 
contribution of the study to the literature.  Section 11.5 considers the implications of the 
study. Section 11.6 notes the limitation of the study. Section 11.7 comments on potential 
future research.  Section 11.8 presents the conclusion of the chapter.  
11.2 Summary of the Study Progress 
Corporate governance mechanisms and IPO performance have been widely studied by 
researchers. The previous literature suggests that corporate governance mechanisms have an 
impact on IPO performance in developed and developing countries at different levels. 
However, most studies have focused on large and developed economies. China is continually 
evolving and the rapid pace of development may give rise to new attributes or features of IPO 
leading to success. In New Zealand there had been little attention given to these studies and 
little change to board characteristics. 
 
China is now the second largest economy in the world. Researchers have investigated many 
issues relating to the Chinese stock exchange, but the material relating to corporate 
governance and IPOs is relatively small. The New Zealand economy is increasingly 
becoming more integrated with Asian economies, but culture, lifestyle, politics and legal 
systems are very different in East and North Asian countries. The tests of how corporate 
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governance impacts on IPOs’ returns in culturally different countries will enable a valuable 
comparison.  
 
New Zealand and China are very different countries, reflected in their size, population, legal, 
and political systems, but there are still some interesting similarities for their stock markets. 
The modern stock trading actions were started in 1860s for both countries and were subject to 
European influences. The developments of their stock markets were interrupted by the 
Second World War. The New Zealand exchanges finally emerged as one national exchange 
in 1989. The new Chinese stock exchanges were established in 1990, almost at the same time. 
Neither the New Zealand nor Chinese stock markets have proved attractive to foreign IPOs.  
 
This research examined the impact of corporate governance practices in China and New 
Zealand on the short- and longer-term sustainable returns of IPOs. The focus of the 
investigation was not on premium paid on listing, but rather the sustained returns post-listing.   
 
The study used data from Shanghai, Shenzhen and New Zealand stock exchanges, covering 
the IPOs listed from 1999 to 2004. The data is secondary data collected from the websites of 
the three stock exchanges, NZX Deep Archive, CSMAR database and individual companies’ 
annual reports. However, from the New Zealand case, 23 companies did not provide most of 
the corporate governance data. There were 82 remaining IPOs in New Zealand, 409 IPOs in 
SHSE, and 142 IPOs in SZSE. In Shanghai, 409 IPOs have been post-listed from 1999 to 
2004. There are 2966 observations regarding long-term IPO performance, and 409 
observations regarding short-term IPO performance in the SHSE. There are 1139 
observations to test the long-term IPO performance, and 142 observations to test the short-
297 
 
term IPO performance in the SZSE. There are 494 observations to test long-term IPO 
performance, and 82 observations to test short-term IPO performance in the NZSE. 
 
The study included an extensive range of governance variables, including board size (number 
of directors, percentage of independent directors, number of supervisors and committees), 
board demographics (CEO age, CEO gender and number of female directors), board 
leadership (CEO duality and ownerships), board education (CEO and chairman qualification), 
and board evaluation variables (CEO and chairman experience, top manager salary, board 
meetings per year and supervisors meetings per year). There are three long-term sustainable 
dependent variables, viz yearly abnormal return, long-term Tobin’s Q, and long-term ROA. 
There are also three short-term dependent variables, viz first day abnormal return, short-term 
Tobin’s Q and short term ROA. There are a group of control variables between independent 
and dependent variables, viz size, beta, labour, market factors, industries, and years of listings. 
 
The study describes the research methods, which include the initial research questions, 
hypotheses, models, potential independent and control variables, statistical tests, and suitable 
regressions formulation. The study also presents the descriptive statistics, econometric tests 
and the empirical results and findings about the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and the short- and long-term performance of IPOs on the SHSE, SZSE and 
NZSE. Several diagnostic tests including serial correlation test, over-identification test, and 
joint significance test are also used to check the validity of the regressions. 
11.3 Summary of the Study Findings 
There are many significant independent variables in the SHSE study. In the long-term case, 
this study finds that the chairman’s experience is positively related to the abnormal yearly 
return. The proportion of independent directors and the number of board meetings per year 
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are negatively related to the abnormal yearly return. The CEO age is positively related to the 
Tobin’s Q. The number of directors, the number of board meetings and the proportion of 
independent directors are negatively related to the Tobin’s Q. The number of supervisors and 
the supervisors meeting per year are positively related to the Tobin’s Q. The top management 
salary, the chairman’s qualification and the number of supervisors are positively related to the 
ROA. The percentage of largest shareholding ownership is positively related to the abnormal 
yearly return. In the short-term case, this study finds that the legal person shareholding is 
negatively related to the Tobin’s Q. Top management salary is positively related to the short-
term Tobin’s Q. CEO duality and the number of board meetings a year are negatively related 
to Tobin’s Q. Insider ownership and the non-trading ownership are positively related to the 
Tobin’s Q. The top management salary is positively related to the long-term ROA. The 
proportion of independent directors and number of supervisors are negatively related to the 
short-term ROA. The non-trading and the largest ownership are positively related to ROA. 
Overall, the panel data and cross sectional regressions explain the long and short-term IPO 
performance well.  
 
There are also many significant independent variables in the SZSE study. In the long-term 
case, this study finds that the percentage of independent directors, state ownership and legal 
person ownership are negatively related to the abnormal yearly return. The percentage of 
largest shareholding ownership is positively related to the abnormal yearly return. The top 
management salary is positively related to the long-term Tobin’s Q and the chairman’s 
qualification is positively related to the long-term Tobin’s Q. The proportion of independent 
directors and the number of board meetings per year are negatively related to the long-term 
Tobin’s Q. Supervisors meetings per year is positively related to the long-term Tobin’s Q. 
The number of female directors and the number of supervisors are positively related to the 
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long-term ROA. . The percentage of largest shareholding ownership is positively related to 
the ROA. In the short-term case, this study finds that the number of directors is positively 
related to the abnormal first day return. CEO gender is negatively related to the Tobin’s Q 
while the number of directors is positively related to the Tobin’s Q. State ownership and legal 
person ownership are positively related to the Tobin’s Q. Overall, the panel data regressions 
explain the long-term IPO performance well, but the cross sectional regressions do not have 
reasonable explanation for the short-term IPO performance. 
 
There are some significant independent variables in the NZSE study. In the long-term case, 
this study finds CEO gender is negatively related to the abnormal yearly return and ROA. 
The number of female directors is positively related to the abnormal yearly return. The 
number of directors is negatively related to the Tobin’s Q. Board committee is positively 
related to the abnormal yearly return. The remuneration committee is positively related to the 
Tobin’s Q and ROA. The independent audit is positively related to the ROA. Insider 
ownership is positively related to the long-term Tobin’s Q. The largest shareholding is 
negatively related to the long-term Tobin’s Q. In the short-term case, this study finds CEO 
gender is negatively related to the abnormal first day return but positively related to the ROA. 
CEO salary is positively related to the abnormal first day return and ROA. The number of 
directors is negatively related to the Tobin’s Q. The board committee is positively related to 
the ROA. The independent audit is positively related to the Tobin’s Q. Management 
ownership is positively related to the Tobin’s Q. Overall, the panel data regressions explain 
the long-term IPO performance well, but the cross sectional regressions do not have 
reasonable explanation for the short-term IPO performance. 
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11.4 Contribution of the Study to the Literature 
This research examined the impact of corporate governance practices in China and New 
Zealand on the short- and longer-term sustainable returns of IPOs. This thesis makes several 
a ranges of contributions to knowledge about the IPO performance and corporate governance. 
Through the use of a wide range of governance variables, the analysis is broader than prior 
work and provides greater confidence in the findings. As the first study looking at both short-
term and long-term IPO performance associated with corporate governance structures the 
thesis highlights the intertemporal change in emphasis. 
 
Prior studies predominantly test either short-term or long-term IPO performance over a 
specific period.  This study extends an understanding of the sustainable relationship between 
the IPO performance and corporate governance. The current study tests the yearly sustainable 
long-term IPO performance for periods of up to 11 years. In the short-term corporate 
governance relating to high salary management teams, a large percentage of ownership for 
insiders, SOEs, legal person(s), and non-trading ownership are important but this is not seen 
to be so in the longer-term for Chinese IPOs. Similarly in the long-term corporate governance 
emphasises CEO age, chairperson experience and qualification, supervisory board activity, 
and more female directors which do not appear to be associated with short-term performance 
in China. In the short-term corporate governance relating to high salary CEO and large 
percentage of management ownership are important but not seen to be so in the longer-term 
in New Zealand. Similarly, in the long-term corporate governance emphasises insider 
ownership which does not appear to be associated with short-term performance in New 
Zealand. 
16
 
 
                                                 
16
 Findings refers to section 7.6, 7.8, 8.6, 8.8, 9.6, and 9.8. 
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Most previous studies have focused on large and developed economies, such as the United 
States, United Kingdom, other European nations, Australia and Japan. This study provides 
evidence from China, which is the world’s fastest growing economy and which has 
developing stock markets. The study also introduces many specific independent variables, viz 
supervisor-related variables, which do not appear in the US or UK, but are important in the 
Chinese cases. The study also introduces the Chinese Company Act, and discovers the factors 
important for the development of firm management. The study also included New Zealand, 
which is a small developed economy.  
 
Most of the empirical literature relating to IPOs tests the impact of corporate governance on 
IPO and firm performance in one market, but this study offers a comparison between two 
Chinese stock markets, and a comparison between two countries. The study introduces many 
specific control variables. 
 
The merits of the Chinese supervisory board system are reflected in differing views in prior 
studies. This thesis concludes that supervisory boards are significant positively related to the 
long-term IPO performance in SHSE and SZSE.   
 
Finally, this study uses a more robust empirical analysis, extending the commonly used OLS 
approach, with careful diagnostic testing and then applying a more appropriate model as 
appropriate. Some previous studies use the 2SLS technique, and not many studies use 
diagnostic tests. The study introduces GLS and GMM dynamic panel and GLS cross 
sectional technique with various diagnostic tests. Overall, the study makes many 
contributions to the literature. 
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11.5 Implications of the Study  
The findings of the study point to several practical implications. A summary is presented in 
Table 11.1 showing the major implications and evidence across the countries and exchanges. 
These are expanded in the following discussion.  
Table 11.1 Implications Summary 
Issue/Area Implication Evidence 
Exchanges in China 
Shenzhen specialises in small and 
medium, Shanghai covers full 
range of companies 
Exchanges need to be aware of 
attributes associated with short- 
and long-term success to advise 
potential IPOs of most likely 
successful governance structure.  
Refers to section 7.6 and section 
7.8. 
Refers to section 8.6 and section 
8.8. 
Companies in China The companies need to be aware of 
the most appropriate governance 
structure. IPO should select the 
exchange that will most likely to 
lead to successful listing.  
Refers to section 7.6 and section 
7.8. 
Refers to section 8.6 and section 
8.8. 
Investors in China Investors need to check the 
governance attributes of IPO and 
consider consequences for short- 
and long-term returns. 
Refers to section 7.6 and section 
7.8. 
Refers to section 8.6 and section 
8.8. 
Policies in China Enhancement of supervisory board 
role. Encouragement of more 
female directors. 
Refers to section 7.6 and 8.6. 
Exchange in New Zealand Exchanges need to be aware of 
attributes associated with short- 
and long-term success to advise 
potential IPOs of most likely 
successful governance structure. 
Promotion to offshore investors 
information about the best practice 
governance in NZ. 
Refers to section 9.6 and 9.8. 
Companies in New Zealand Companies need to be aware of the 
most appropriate governance 
structure.  
Refers to section 9.6 and 9.8. 
Investors in New Zealand Investors need to check the 
governance attributes of IPO and 
consider consequences for short-
and long-term returns. 
Refers to section 9.6 and 9.8. 
Policies in New Zealand Increase the number of female 
directors. 
Refers to section 9.6 and 9.8. 
Trade between two countries China is New Zealand’s second 
largest trading partner. More joint 
venture firms can be encouraged. 
Build awareness of respective 
governance mechanisms that work 
best. 
Refers to section 1 and 11. 
Immigration from China  Encourage high net worth 
immigrants to invest beyond 
property sector, participating in 
equity markets. Knowledge of 
corporate governance may promote 
wise IPO investment. 
Refers to section 1 and 11. 
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There are two stock exchanges in China, namely the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange. Compared with the New Zealand Stock Exchange, generally Chinese stock 
exchanges offer relatively higher levels of short-term IPO return and more unpredictable 
long-term returns. Chinese IPOs have greater risk in respect of long-term outcomes. Chinese 
exchanges need to be aware of attributes associated with short- and long-term success to 
advise potential IPOs of the most likely successful governance structure. More practically, 
the study finds that firms with an experienced chairperson, fewer independent directors, and 
dominant shareholders perform well on the SHSE from a long-term stock perspective. Firms 
with fewer independent directors, less SOE and legal person ownership, and dominant 
shareholders are more likely to be successful on the SZSE from a long-term stock perspective. 
From a short-term stock return perspective, firms with more directors are more likely to 
perform well on the SZSE.  
 
Many Chinese listed companies are SOE companies, but family and privately based 
companies are also present on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Compared with NZSE listed 
companies, the Chinese listed companies have relatively more staff, and all the listed 
companies are domestic Chinese companies. When planning on listing, companies should 
select the exchange that will most likely lead to a successful listing. Grooming the 
governance structures to fit with those that have previously succeeded makes sense. 
According to findings, the companies with a senior CEO, a well-qualified and experienced 
chairperson, large and active supervisory board, and dominant shareholders, are likely to be 
successful in terms of long-term performance on the SHSE. Companies with high salary 
management teams, a large percentage of insider and non-trading ownership, and dominant 
shareholders, are likely to be successful in terms of short-term stock and firm performance on 
the SHSE. For the SZSE it appears that companies with high salary management teams, a 
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well-qualified chairperson, large and active supervisory board, more female directors, and 
dominant shareholders, are likely to be more successful in longer-term stock and firm 
performance. The companies with a large board, and a large percentage of SOE and legal 
person ownership are likely to achieve higher stock and firm performance in the short-term 
on the SZSE.  
 
Chinese investors prefer to invest in well-known companies and low risk industries. Investors 
need to check the governance attributes of the IPO, and also consider consequences for short- 
and long-term returns. This study finds that firms with an experienced chairperson, fewer 
independent directors, and dominant shareholders offer higher stock returns in the long-term 
on the SHSE.  Firms with fewer independent directors, less SOE and legal person ownership, 
and dominant shareholders offered higher stock returns in the long-term stock perspective on 
the SZSE. Firms with more directors offer better stock returns in the short-term case on the 
SZSE.  
 
In China, the two exchanges are under the regulation of CSRC. Government policies affect 
the stock markets directly. However, the study shows some corporate governance 
mechanisms have a significant impact on the stock returns and firm performance. Therefore, 
the Government could offer the advances to the exchanges, companies, and also investors. 
The efficiency of Chinese supervisory boards was debated in prior studies. This study 
indicates a more active supervisory board is very important for IPO performance on both the 
SHSE and SZSE.  Enhancement of supervisory board role will be necessary. This study also 
finds that only 2% of CEOs are female and, on average, there is less than one female director 
on the board. But the study finds female directors play an important role in the long-term case 
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for the SZSE. There are many well qualified, knowledgeable, and hardworking women 
available in the industries.  Encouragement of more female directors is also recommended. 
 
There is one national exchange in New Zealand, namely the New Zealand Stock Exchange. 
Compared with the Chinese stock exchanges, the NZSE offer relatively lower levels of short-
term IPO return and more predictable long-term returns. New Zealand IPOs have lower risk 
in respect of long-term outcomes. The NZSE needs to be aware of attributes associated with 
short- and long-term success to advise potential IPOs of the most likely successful 
governance structure. This study finds that firms with a male CEO, more female directors, 
and committees perform well on the NZSE from a long-term stock perspective. In the short-
term stock return perspective, firms with a male and high salary CEO are more likely to 
perform well on the NZSE. The exchange also needs to provide information about best 
practice governance to offshore investors. The Chinese exchanges offer the highest short-
term IPO returns in the world, but the long-term performance is unpredictable. The NZSE 
offers a more predictable long-term return. The study suggests that the NZSE is a well- 
diversified option for Chinese investors to hedge their risk, and the Chinese stock exchanges 
are more active options to New Zealand investors. 
 
The majority of New Zealand listed companies are private companies. Compared with 
Chinese listed companies, the New Zealand listed companies have relatively fewer staff, and 
very few overseas listings. This study finds that firms with a male CEO, more female 
directors, small board, committees, and a large percentage of insider ownership are likely to 
be successful in terms of long-term performance on the NZSE. From the short-term stock 
return perspective, firms with a male and high salary CEO, small board, committees, and 
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large percentage of management ownership, are likely to be successful in the terms of short-
term stock and firm performance on the NZSE.  
 
New Zealand investors prefer to invest in long-term stable return companies that offer high 
dividends. Investors need to check the governance attributes of the IPO, and also consider 
consequences for short- and long-term returns. This study finds that firms with a male CEO, 
more female directors, and committees offer higher stock returns in the long-term in the 
NZSE. Firms with male and high salary CEOs offer higher stock returns in the short-term on 
the NZSE. Investors need to check and select the stocks with the governance attributes that 
lead to the short- and long-term IPO higher returns. Further, the study indicates the 
complementary relationship between New Zealand and Chinese stock exchanges. If the 
investor is looking for long-term growth, the NZSE is a better option than the two Chinese 
stock markets. If the investor is looking for a short-term gain, Chinese stock markets are 
more suitable than NZSE. 
 
The study shows some corporate governance mechanisms have a significant impact on stock 
returns and firm performance. Therefore, Government by being cognisant of the relationships 
can formulate policy frameworks which will stimulate investment and growth. Rather than 
establishing a company law like China, a kind of recommendation may need to be made by a 
softer, persuasive approach to influencing matters such as increase the number of female 
directors may be appropriate. This study finds that fewer than 3% of CEOs are female and 
there is less than one female director in the board on average. But the study finds female 
directors play an important role in the long-term case for the NZSE.  
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A Free Trading Agreement between New Zealand and China was established on 1
st
 October, 
2008 and since then China has become New Zealand’s second largest trading partner. Trade 
between the two countries has risen quickly in recent years. In the first three quarters of 2011, 
two-way merchandise trade amounted to $12.7 billion.
17
 Recently, many Chinese companies 
have invested in New Zealand, especially in the agriculture and property industries. And 
many New Zealand companies have built their businesses in China; the majority trading in 
dairy and wine products. However, a far more closely capitalised partnership between the two 
countries is expected in the near future. Therefore, joint venture firms will be encouraged and 
those companies may need to be listed on New Zealand or Chinese stock exchanges. This 
study shows some governance mechanisms have impacts on those markets, and the joint 
venture firms need to be aware of those mechanisms. If venture capital or New Zealand-
based firms would like to list on Chinese exchanges, a well-known experienced chairman, a 
hardworking supervisory team, and a stable dominated shareholder will be advantage.   For 
venture capital or Chinese-based firms listing on the NZSE, committees are compulsory. 
 
From the late 1990s, China became one of the major source countries for immigrants to New 
Zealand. A total 14,745 Chinese gained permanent residence in New Zealand in 2002. 
According to the 2006 census, 78,117 migrants were born in China; the number is only less 
than migrants from England.
18
 Most of those Chinese migrants are skilled migrants, but still a 
huge number of them are investment-based migrants. According to New Zealand 
Immigration Office policy, a person who invests at least $1.5 million in New Zealand is able 
to apply in the Investor Category. There are some options for those investment based 
migrants, but most Chinese migrants like to invest in the property market. Compared with 
                                                 
17
 Refers to New Zealand Economic and Financial Overview 2012 External Sector, Principal Trading Partners. 
18
 Refers to New Zealand Migrants, ENZ. 
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property, deposits, bonds and stocks offer relatively low returns which are unattractive to 
Chinese investors. 
 
Such actions have raised a few issues. First, the irrational growth of property prices may 
cause problems for younger generations who may not be able to afford to buy property. The 
average trading price for a home is more than $650,000 in Auckland in 2012, which is 
extremely high for young people. Second, large amounts of property investment may lead to 
a high level of inflation. Third, property investment is not helpful to active the long-term 
economic growth. 
 
Therefore, this study confirms that the government should discourage on property trading and 
encourage high net worth investment immigrants to invest beyond the property sector. Those 
investments are very important for the financing of New Zealand’s domestic firms. This 
study suggests some options. First, immigration agents need to understand the investment 
environment in New Zealand, and be able to provide information on exchange, agriculture, 
and other opportunities available to migrants. Second, harsh punishment of unprofessional 
behaviour by agents is necessary. Many agents recommend properties to their clients because 
they can profit from the transaction. They can receive commissions from property agents or 
companies, Such actions are not fulfilling the interests of clients. Third, migrants may not 
understand how New Zealand companies are structured and organised; the lack of knowledge 
may stop them investing in local companies. Knowledge of corporate governance may 
promote wise IPO investments. A series of lectures, organised by the government or 
universities, could alleviate such problems. People with professional backgrounds are able to 
help migrants. Fourth, enforcement and follow up policies may necessary by the New 
Zealand government. The government may set a high tax payment on a property trading, or 
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enforce migrants to invest at least a percentage of their money on the stock exchange or on 
reconstruction of earthquake-hit Christchurch.  
11.6 Limitation of the Study  
The study has two major limitations. First, missing data raises a number of issues. Many 
governance variables are collected from annual reports and in some instances the required 
information is missing. Outliers and missing data are a problem in the New Zealand case. 
Consequently, many potentially important governance variables are omitted from the datasets 
because of significant missing data.  Second, only three exchanges are included in the study.  
11.7 Future Research  
A number of issues have arisen through this current study which may be considered for future 
research. This thesis examines the impact of corporate governance practices on the short and 
longer-term sustainable returns of IPOs in New Zealand and Chinese A-shares only. Further 
research could expand the dataset including B class shares to investigate their relationship 
between IPOs and corporate governance mechanisms. Some firms list IPOs with both A and 
B shares. If there are differences then this opens a range of issues concerning the focus of 
international and national investors and regulatory arrangements impacting any nexus 
between A and B share returns. 
 
In 2004 there was a restructure of the SZSE establishing a SME Board. The dataset of SME 
IPOs provides an opportunity to undertake a study similar to the current thesis but focused on 
smaller companies. Obviously a comparison of such results will be interesting to see whether 
smaller companies have higher risks at IPO and whether governance structures contribute to 
minimising this. 
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This thesis provides a comparison between two countries, one from which I came and one 
where I now live. Future research could expand the number of countries to make comparisons 
between more Asia-Pacific exchanges, viz Japan, Hong Kong, South Korean, Taiwan, 
Singapore, and also Australia. Will a Euronext like multinational exchange efficient in Asia-
Pacific area? Such future studies will find the answer. The political, social, economic, ethnic, 
and religious diversity across nations are likely to impact on the connection between 
corporate governance and IPO performance. The specific attributes of corporate governance 
are likely to have different weighting and the diversity variables may be integrated into the 
analysis using dummy variables. 
 
Finally, it is reasonable to expect that overtime the nature of the relationships discerned in 
this thesis may change. Follow up estimations as the Chinese economy matures will be of 
interest. 
11.8 Conclusion of the Study  
This chapter has summarized the study method, findings, contributions, implications, 
limitations, and potential for future research. This study examines the impact of corporate 
governance practices on the short- and longer-term sustainable returns of IPOs in China and 
New Zealand. Overall, the corporate governance factors play a significant role on the SHSE, 
SZSE, and NZSE’s long-term IPO performance. And the corporate governance factors play a 
significant role on the SHSE, SZSE, and NZSE’s short-term Tobin’s Q and ROA, but have 
almost no effect on the abnormal first day return in all markets.  
 
This study contributes to current literature in several ways. This study adds to the 
understanding of how different forms of governance impact the short and long-term IPO 
performance and tests the yearly sustainable long-term IPO performance. This study offers a 
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comparison between two Chinese stock markets, and comparisons between two countries. 
Also, this study uses a more robust empirical analysis, extending the commonly used OLS 
approach, with careful diagnostic testing and then applying a more appropriate model as 
appropriate.  
 
This thesis results have a number of important implications. The commonality of corporate 
governance variables associated with successful performance has implications for companies 
preparing to list, exchanges attracting companies to list, investors looking for successful 
listings and policy makers wanting an efficient capital market. The difference in variables 
similarly provides insight for companies, exchanges, investors, and policy analysts. This 
study also suggests some options for the government should place restrictions on property 
trading and encourage high net worth investment immigrants to invest beyond the property 
sector.  
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APPENDIX 
Table 12.1 Correlation Matrix for SHSE Long-Term Variables 
  yearly return tobinsq roa mda mdq mde pay 
yearly 
return 1 
      tobinsq 0.3868*** 1 
     
 
0 
      roa 0.2185*** 0.285*** 1 
    
 
0 0 
     mda 0.0455** -0.024 0.0472** 1 
   
 
0.0133 0.1921 0.0101 
    mdq 0.0723*** 0.0408** 0.0598*** -0.1386*** 1 
  
 
0.0001 0.0263 0.0011 0 
   mde 0.0638*** -0.0088 0.0803*** 0.2409*** -0.0441** 1 
 
 
0.0005 0.63 0 0 0.0162 
  pay 0.1699*** 0.0012 0.2925*** 0.1468*** 0.2087*** 0.2178*** 1 
 
0 0.9475 0 0 0 0 
 boe 0.068*** 0.0239 0.1073*** 0.1269*** -0.0321* 0.3912*** 0.182*** 
 
0.0002 0.1924 0 0 0.0809 0 0 
cmq 0.03 0.0225 0.0137 0.0023 0.3707*** -0.0286 0.0981*** 
 
0.1022 0.2199 0.455 0.8995 0 0.1192 0 
bos 0.014 -0.0861*** 0.0752*** 0.1543*** 0.0437** 0.0721*** 0.2049*** 
 
0.4464 0 0 0 0.0174 0.0001 0 
obo 0.0136 -0.2163*** 
-
0.0821*** 0.0125 0.0984*** 0.1094*** 0.2683*** 
 
0.4578 0 0 0.4945 0 0 0 
bof -0.0109 -0.0372** -0.0334* -0.0175 0.0113 0.0279 0.0577*** 
 
0.5516 0.0427 0.0689 0.3403 0.5372 0.1281 0.0017 
sos 0.0066 -0.0485*** 0.0271 0.0949*** 0.0715*** -0.0013 0.0779*** 
 
0.7205 0.0083 0.1396 0 0.0001 0.9434 0 
mpy 0.1437*** 0.0193 -0.0279 -0.002 0.082*** -0.0135 0.1965*** 
 
0 0.293 0.1281 0.9149 0 0.4616 0 
mpys 0.1487*** 0.0951*** 0.0394** 0.0479*** 0.0493*** 0.0203 0.1644*** 
 
0 0 0.0319 0.0091 0.0072 0.2696 0 
mos -0.0145 0.0351** 0.0358** -0.0865*** 0.0606*** 0.0636*** 0.1135*** 
 
0.4284 0.0561 0.0514 0 0.001 0.0005 0 
soe -0.0705*** -0.1228*** 0.0787*** 0.1096*** 0.0127 
-
0.0646*** 
-
0.1301*** 
 
0.0001 0 0 0 0.4883 0.0004 0 
lp -0.0783*** 0.0411** -0.0554** -0.1525*** -0.0595*** 
-
0.1429*** 
-
0.0728*** 
 
0 0.0253 0.0025 0 0.0012 0 0.0001 
us -0.199*** -0.0951*** 0.0495*** -0.06*** -0.0518*** 
-
0.2482*** -0.248*** 
 
0 0 0.007 0.0011 0.0048 0 0 
noc 0.0825*** -0.0877*** -0.0034 0.057*** 0.0863*** 0.1812*** 0.2891*** 
 
0 0 0.8514 0.0019 0 0 0 
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lsh -0.0039 -0.0331* 0.1888*** 0.0388** 0.0061 
-
0.1192*** 
-
0.1203*** 
 
0.8315 0.0719 0 0.0344 0.7414 0 0 
size 0.1366*** -0.2517*** 0.1794*** 0.2079*** 0.2142*** 0.0913*** 0.4686*** 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
beta -0.1772*** -0.2194*** 
-
0.2404*** -0.0395** -0.0963*** 0.0206 
-
0.1258*** 
 
0 0 0 0.0317 0 0.2615 0 
labour 0.0861*** -0.1355*** 0.1728*** 0.1023*** 0.0801*** 0.0274 0.1586*** 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0.1355 0 
pcl -0.0678*** 0.1699*** 0.0708*** -0.0858*** -0.0975*** 
-
0.2263*** 
-
0.3326*** 
 
0.0002 0 0.0001 0 0 0 0 
pcc 0.1033*** 0.2991*** 0.0645*** 0.0373** 0.0339* 0.0821*** 0.1101*** 
 
0 0 0.0004 0.0423 0.0648 0 0 
pctv 0.2159*** 0.3137*** 0.0692*** 0.0369** 0.042** 0.0903*** 0.1413*** 
 
0 0 0.0002 0.0447 0.0223 0 0 
pca 0.4096*** 0.3827*** 0.0771*** 0.0345* 0.0404** 0.0722*** 0.132*** 
 
0 0 0 0.0601 0.0276 0.0001 0 
pcas -0.0538*** 0.147*** 0.0722*** -0.0747*** -0.0718*** 
-
0.1915*** 
-
0.2735*** 
 
0.0034 0 0.0001 0 0.0001 0 0 
pcpe 0.0373** 0.2828*** 0.0583*** 0.0466** 0.0273 0.0927*** 0.1097*** 
 
0.042 0 0.0015 0.0111 0.1378 0 0 
          boe cmq bos obo bof sos mpy 
boe 1 
      cmq 0.0111 1 
     
 
0.5443 
      bos -0.0214 0.0498*** 1 
    
 
0.2434 0.0066 
     
obo 0.1274*** 0.0705*** 
-
0.0614*** 1 
   
 
0 0.0001 0.0008 
    bof 0.0941*** -0.0352* 0.1298*** 0.0353* 1 
  
 
0 0.0554 0 0.0548 
   sos -0.0881*** 0.0271 0.3687*** -0.0979*** -0.0396** 1 
 
 
0 0.1402 0 0 0.0311 
  mpy 0.0197 0.0277 -0.0183 0.1747*** 0.0435** -0.0361** 1 
 
0.2826 0.132 0.3185 0 0.0178 0.0495 
 mpys 0.028 0.0203 0.016 0.0599*** 0.0637*** 0.0372** 0.3824*** 
 
0.1273 0.2691 0.3836 0.0011 0.0005 0.0426 0 
mos 0.0741*** -0.04** -0.0438** 0.0868*** 0.01 
-
0.1117*** -0.0186 
 
0.0001 0.0295 0.0171 0 0.5875 0 0.3111 
soe -0.213*** -0.003 0.1407*** -0.1177*** -0.0602*** 0.2165*** 
-
0.1075*** 
 
0 0.8707 0 0 0.001 0 0 
lp -0.0469** -0.0287 
-
0.0769*** -0.1054*** 0.0185 
-
0.1241*** -0.0335* 
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0.0106 0.1181 0 0 0.3145 0 0.0679 
us -0.3265*** -0.054*** 0.0702*** -0.2711*** -0.0558*** 0.1042*** 
-
0.1836*** 
 
0 0.0033 0.0001 0 0.0024 0 0 
noc 0.1741*** 0.0635*** 0.1102*** 0.4807*** 0.0252 0.0333* 0.1364*** 
 
0 0.0005 0 0 0.1708 0.0696 0 
lsh -0.1564*** 0.0094 -0.0317* -0.1386*** -0.1109*** 0.0549*** 
-
0.0971*** 
 
0 0.6078 0.0844 0 0 0.0028 0 
size 0.0603*** 0.1099*** 0.3279*** 0.1055*** 0.0121 0.2861*** 0.1824*** 
 
0.001 0 0 0 0.5096 0 0 
beta 0.0358* -0.0704*** 
-
0.0787*** 0.0427** -0.0171 -0.0333* -0.0084 
 
0.0509 0.0001 0 0.0201 0.3521 0.0698 0.6475 
labour 0.06*** 0.0429** 0.1465*** 0.0295 -0.0578*** 0.2313*** 0.0117 
 
0.0011 0.0194 0 0.1084 0.0016 0 0.5225 
pcl -0.2475*** -0.0602*** -0.004 -0.6061*** -0.0635*** 0.0692*** 
-
0.1676*** 
 
0 0.001 0.829 0 0.0005 0.0002 0 
pcc 0.0825*** 0.0296 -0.0112 0.1408*** 0.0242 -0.0201 0.1287*** 
 
0 0.1073 0.5427 0 0.1884 0.2732 0 
pctv 0.0953*** 0.0311* -0.0065 0.1894*** 0.0266 -0.0243 0.1751*** 
 
0 0.0904 0.7252 0 0.1476 0.1856 0 
pca 0.0921*** 0.0199 -0.0239 0.0418** 0.0133 -0.0203 0.2231*** 
 
0 0.2794 0.1931 0.0228 0.4692 0.2703 0 
pcas -0.2151*** -0.0423** -0.0081 -0.5293*** -0.0563*** 0.0623*** 
-
0.2227*** 
 
0 0.0212 0.6576 0 0.0022 0.0007 0 
pcpe 0.1049** 0.0257*** 
-
0.0129*** 0.123** 0.0227 
-
0.0216*** 0.074*** 
 
0.042 0 0.0015 0.0111 0.1378 0 0 
  mpys mos soe lp us noc lsh 
mpys 1 
      mos -0.0201 1 
     
 
0.2737 
      soe -0.1267*** -0.2194*** 1 
    
 
0 0 
     
lp -0.0854*** -0.0292 
-
0.6439*** 1 
   
 
0 0.1123 0 
    us -0.2754*** -0.0341* 0.4851*** 0.2848*** 1 
  
 
0 0.0632 0 0 
   
noc 0.1363*** 0.0755*** 
-
0.0805*** -0.202*** -0.3331*** 1 
 
 
0 0 0 0 0 
  
lsh -0.0907*** -0.2139*** 0.4989*** -0.1403*** 0.4108*** 
-
0.2036*** 1 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
 size 0.1818*** -0.0823*** 0.132*** -0.1687*** -0.0601*** 0.1705*** 0.1335*** 
 
0 0 0 0 0.001 0 0 
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beta -0.01 0.0284 -0.0419** -0.0118 -0.0589*** -0.0105 
-
0.0908*** 
 
0.5862 0.1222 0.0224 0.5208 0.0013 0.5658 0 
labour 0.0645*** -0.0557*** 0.129*** -0.1425*** -0.0267 0.073*** 0.2195*** 
 
0.0004 0.0024 0 0 0.1465 0.0001 0 
pcl -0.1388*** -0.0669*** 0.161*** 0.2044*** 0.4492*** 
-
0.5842*** 0.2185*** 
 
0 0.0003 0 0 0 0 0 
pcc 0.1524*** 0.012 
-
0.0804*** -0.0534*** -0.1535*** 0.1812*** 
-
0.1295*** 
 
0 0.5136 0 0.0036 0 0 0 
pctv 0.1617*** 0.0172 -0.082*** -0.0635*** -0.1736*** 0.2073*** 
-
0.1346*** 
 
0 0.3477 0 0.0005 0 0 0 
pca 0.1958*** 0.0079 
-
0.0991*** -0.0589*** -0.1992*** 0.1364*** 
-
0.1139*** 
 
0 0.667 0 0.0013 0 0 0 
pcas -0.2055*** -0.0483 0.1456*** 0.1712*** 0.3952*** 
-
0.5069*** 0.1807*** 
 
0 0.0085 0 0 0 0 0 
pcpe 0.166*** -0.0051 
-
0.1244*** -0.0824*** -0.2497*** 0.1558*** 
-
0.1132*** 
 
0 0.7817 0 0 0 0 0 
          size beta labour pcl pcc pctv pca 
size 1 
      beta -0.1946*** 1 
     
 
0 
      labour 0.5788*** -0.1264*** 1 
    
 
0 0 
     pcl -0.1465*** -0.0309* -0.0406** 1 
   
 
0 0.0923 0.0271 
    pcc 0.0532*** 0.0203 0.0116 -0.2342*** 1 
  
 
0.0037 0.2691 0.527 0 
   pctv 0.0666*** 0.022 0.0168 -0.2261*** 0.9579*** 1 
 
 
0.0003 0.2318 0.3601 0 0 
  pca 0.0704*** 0.0147 0.0244 -0.1199*** 0.7043*** 0.854*** 1 
 
0.0001 0.4246 0.1838 0 0 0 
 
pcas -0.1238*** -0.0094 -0.037** 0.8769*** -0.1651*** 
-
0.1381*** 
-
0.0588*** 
 
0 0.6092 0.0439 0 0 0 0.0013 
pcpe 0.0641*** 0.016 0.0221 -0.1905*** 0.879*** 0.749*** 0.3946*** 
 
0.0005 0.3841 0.2288 0 0 0 0 
          pcas pcpe           
pcas 1 
      pcpe -0.1558*** 1 
       0             
Note: ***, **, and *, indicate that the p-value is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 12.2 Correlation Matrix for SHSE Short-Term Variables 
  firstdayreturn tobinsq roa mda mdq mde pay 
firstdayreturn 1 
      tobinsq 0.5324*** 1 
     
 
0 
      roa -0.0921* 0.3611*** 1 
    
 
0.0628 0 
     mda -0.0545 -0.022 -0.0637 1 
   
 
0.2718 0.6574 0.1987 
    mdq -0.0642 -0.0762 -0.0265 -0.2022*** 1 
  
 
0.1952 0.1241 0.5928 0 
   mde 0.0515 0.025 -0.0068 0.0332 0.0369 1 
 
 
0.2986 0.6148 0.8908 0.5037 0.4565 
  pay -0.2548*** -0.1973*** 0.0848* -0.0717 0.1693*** 0.0532 1 
 
0 0.0001 0.0867 0.1479 0.0006 0.2835 
 boe 0.0485 0.0051 -0.0063 -0.0214 0.0214 0.7478*** 0.0516 
 
0.3274 0.9188 0.8986 0.6666 0.6658 0 0.2982 
cmq 0.026 -0.0036 0.0059 0.0961* 0.2995*** 0.0047 0.05 
 
0.5995 0.9416 0.905 0.0521 0 0.9244 0.3132 
bos -0.1351*** -0.1725*** -0.0781 0.0975** 0.1277*** 0.0348 0.1785*** 
 
0.0062 0.0005 0.1146 0.0488 0.0097 0.4832 0.0003 
obo -0.2636*** -0.5515*** -0.1956*** -0.0711 0.1365*** -0.0727 0.3574*** 
 
0 0 0.0001 0.1514 0.0057 0.1423 0 
bof 0.0459 -0.0437 -0.0546 -0.019 -0.0191 -0.023 0.0458 
 
0.3542 0.3776 0.2702 0.7017 0.7004 0.6434 0.3553 
sos -0.0596 -0.0805 -0.115** 0.0814 0.0621 -0.002 0.0007 
 
0.2293 0.1042 0.02 0.1003 0.2098 0.9685 0.9891 
mpy -0.1251** -0.1846*** -0.0848* -0.1243** 0.0728 -0.0817* 0.1882*** 
 
0.0113 0.0002 0.0866 0.0119 0.1414 0.0989 0.0001 
mpys -0.0072 0.0597 0.0065 -0.0476 -0.0018 -0.0974** -0.0433 
 
0.8839 0.2284 0.8953 0.337 0.9713 0.049 0.3821 
mos -0.0954* -0.0524 0.0748 -0.1285*** 0.0048 0.0546 0.2155*** 
 
0.054 0.29 0.1308 0.0093 0.9223 0.2706 0 
soe 0.007 -0.1498*** -0.056 0.1522*** -0.0249 -0.0299 -0.1229** 
 
0.8884 0.0024 0.2586 0.002 0.615 0.5463 0.0129 
lp -0.0118 0.189*** 0.077 -0.1087** 0.004 0.007 0.1243** 
 
0.8126 0.0001 0.1198 0.028 0.936 0.8884 0.0119 
us -0.0713 0.1561*** 0.19*** 0.0076 -0.0103 -0.064 0.085* 
 
0.1499 0.0015 0.0001 0.8782 0.8354 0.1968 0.0862 
noc -0.1537*** -0.3166*** -0.0824* 0.0126 0.0555 -0.0386 0.1522*** 
 
0.0018 0 0.0962 0.7995 0.2626 0.4366 0.002 
lsh -0.0926* 0.0835* 0.1455*** 0.1051** -0.0243 -0.006 -0.1982*** 
 
0.0613 0.0919 0.0032 0.0337 0.6239 0.9037 0.0001 
size -0.4225*** -0.3508*** -0.0386 0.1042** 0.1491*** -0.0602 0.246*** 
 
0 0 0.4363 0.0352 0.0025 0.2241 0 
beta 0.3279*** 0.1036** -0.1443*** -0.0152 0.0515 -0.001 -0.1666*** 
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0 0.0362 0.0035 0.7586 0.2986 0.9845 0.0007 
labour -0.303*** -0.2143*** -0.0229 0.0934* 0.0279 -0.0058 -0.0466 
 
0 0 0.6438 0.0591 0.5737 0.9073 0.3467 
pcl 0.2981*** 0.6332*** 0.1586*** 0.0534 -0.1033** 0.0416 -0.2982*** 
 
0 0 0.0013 0.2817 0.0368 0.4014 0 
pcc 0.1128** 0.4544*** 0.1495*** 0.0188 -0.0644 0.0109 -0.175*** 
 
0.0225 0 0.0024 0.7045 0.1935 0.8259 0.0004 
pctv -0.1831*** 0.0953** 0.0845* -0.0215 0.0273 -0.119** 0.0025 
 
0.0002 0.054 0.0879 0.6643 0.5825 0.016 0.9593 
pca 0.2496*** 0.6072*** 0.1438*** 0.0316 -0.0834* -0.0065 -0.2649*** 
 
0 0 0.0036 0.5242 0.092 0.896 0 
pcas 0.1654*** 0.513*** 0.1454*** 0.0079 -0.0725 -0.0253 -0.2167*** 
 
0.0008 0 0.0032 0.8737 0.1435 0.6095 0 
pcpe 0.0455 0.2798*** 0.1063** 0.0106 -0.0429 0.0455 -0.079 
 
0.3585 0 0.0316 0.8301 0.3871 0.3587 0.1106 
          boe cmq bos obo bof sos mpy 
boe 1 
      cmq -0.0124 1 
     
 
0.803 
      bos 0.0166 0.0593 1 
    
 
0.7377 0.2318 
     obo -0.0619 0.096* 0.2244*** 1 
   
 
0.2113 0.0524 0 
    bof 0.0051 -0.0051 0.1878*** 0.0852* 1 
  
 
0.9181 0.9182 0.0001 0.0851 
   sos -0.0444 0.0373 0.3129*** -0.0541 0.0087 1 
 
 
0.3701 0.4514 0 0.2751 0.861 
  mpy -0.0126 -0.0192 -0.0638 0.1554*** -0.042 0.042 1 
 
0.8001 0.6984 0.198 0.0016 0.3974 0.3974 
 mpys -0.102** 0.0608 -0.0609 -0.101** 0.0032 0.1077** 0.3027*** 
 
0.0393 0.2196 0.2191 0.0411 0.949 0.0294 0 
mos 0.0428 -0.1109** 0.0413 0.1812*** 0.0563 -0.1247** 0.1028** 
 
0.388 0.0249 0.4044 0.0002 0.2561 0.0116 0.0377 
soe -0.0479 0.0848* 0.1135** 0.0492 -0.0098 0.215*** -0.0448 
 
0.3342 0.0868 0.0217 0.3206 0.8429 0 0.3665 
lp 0.0187 -0.0993** -0.0796 -0.0706 0.0189 -0.1618*** 0.0061 
 
0.7068 0.0449 0.1078 0.1541 0.7035 0.001 0.9023 
us -0.0975** -0.0424 0.0604 -0.1254** 0.0171 0.1471*** -0.0133 
 
0.0488 0.393 0.2228 0.0112 0.7301 0.0029 0.7885 
noc -0.0545 0.1125** 0.1869*** 0.4866*** 0.0268 0.0526 0.0687 
 
0.2712 0.0229 0.0001 0 0.5891 0.2886 0.1653 
lsh -0.0397 -0.0579 -0.0752 -0.1094** -0.0656 0.0292 -0.123** 
 
0.4229 0.243 0.1288 0.0269 0.1858 0.556 0.0128 
size -0.0475 0.0103 0.2775*** 0.0527 -0.0487 0.2782*** 0.1327*** 
 
0.3378 0.8355 0 0.2873 0.3258 0 0.0072 
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beta -0.0465 0.0595 -0.0039 -0.0387 0.0908* -0.0362 0.0011 
 
0.348 0.2298 0.9372 0.4353 0.0667 0.4648 0.9824 
labour 0.0129 -0.1069** 0.1178** -0.0183 -0.055 0.2219*** 0.0636 
 
0.7951 0.0307 0.0172 0.7126 0.2674 0 0.1992 
pcl 0.0411 -0.0468 -0.198*** -0.7395*** -0.1214** 0.005 -0.0967* 
 
0.4069 0.345 0.0001 0 0.0141 0.9204 0.0507 
pcc -0.0222 -0.0183 -0.1113** -0.4506*** -0.102** -0.0185 -0.0399 
 
0.6537 0.712 0.0244 0 0.0392 0.7096 0.4214 
pctv -0.1576*** 0.0033 0.0295 -0.0284 -0.0235 -0.0114 0.0645 
 
0.0014 0.9474 0.5515 0.567 0.6351 0.8182 0.1928 
pca -0.0038 -0.069 -0.1859*** -0.6805*** -0.0945* -0.0114 -0.1263** 
 
0.9391 0.1637 0.0002 0 0.0561 0.818 0.0106 
pcas -0.0776 -0.0755 -0.1983*** -0.5709*** -0.0884* -0.0515 -0.1733*** 
 
0.1173 0.1274 0.0001 0 0.0742 0.2991 0.0004 
pcpe 0.0275 0.0215 -0.0214 -0.204*** -0.08 -0.0079 0.037 
 
0.5789 0.6646 0.6666 0 0.1061 0.874 0.456 
          mpys mos soe lp us noc lsh 
mpys 1 
      mos -0.0791 1 
     
 
0.1101 
      soe 0.1212** -0.2985*** 1 
    
 
0.0141 0 
     lp -0.1247** 0.2155*** -0.9208*** 1 
   
 
0.0116 0 0 
    us 0.0035 0.0675 0.0954* 0.0948* 1 
  
 
0.944 0.173 0.0538 0.0555 
   noc -0.0479 0.0591 0.1182** -0.1191** -0.0698 1 
 
 
0.334 0.2333 0.0168 0.016 0.1591 
  lsh 0.0467 -0.2703*** 0.4434*** -0.325*** 0.2044*** -0.0827* 1 
 
0.3462 0 0 0 0 0.095 
 size 0.0866* -0.0768 0.2317*** -0.1543*** 0.299*** 0.077 0.1143** 
 
0.0803 0.1211 0 0.0017 0 0.1198 0.0207 
beta -0.0192 -0.0342 -0.007 0.0048 -0.0051 -0.0101 -0.0268 
 
0.6989 0.4899 0.8873 0.9221 0.9183 0.8387 0.5888 
labour 0.0311 -0.0818* 0.139*** -0.102** 0.0626 0.0039 0.2699*** 
 
0.5312 0.0984 0.0049 0.0393 0.2067 0.9375 0 
pcl 0.2033*** -0.1675*** -0.0192 0.0393 0.1799*** -0.4127*** 0.1359*** 
 
0 0.0007 0.6991 0.4279 0.0003 0 0.0059 
pcc 0.1494*** -0.0671 -0.0472 0.0587 0.1821*** -0.2136*** 0.068 
 
0.0024 0.1754 0.3407 0.2358 0.0002 0 0.1699 
pctv 0.0604 0.0396 -0.0967* 0.0881* 0.1403*** 0.0214 -0.0238 
 
0.2226 0.4245 0.0508 0.0752 0.0045 0.6663 0.6311 
pca 0.1611*** -0.1491*** -0.0307 0.0449 0.1717*** -0.4143*** 0.1055** 
 
0.0011 0.0025 0.5363 0.3648 0.0005 0 0.033 
pcas 0.045 -0.0921* -0.1028** 0.1349*** 0.1437*** -0.3584*** 0.0798 
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0.3639 0.0627 0.0376 0.0063 0.0036 0 0.1069 
pcpe 0.1506*** -0.0146 0.0088 -0.0135 0.1465*** -0.0383 0.0272 
 
0.0023 0.7683 0.8595 0.7855 0.003 0.4395 0.5836 
          size beta labour pcl pcc pctv pca 
size 1 
      beta -0.2213*** 1 
     
 
0 
      labour 0.5382*** -0.142*** 1 
    
 
0 0.004 
     pcl 0.0144 0.0481 0.0547 1 
   
 
0.772 0.3321 0.2701 
    pcc -0.0084 0.0422 0.0269 0.8209*** 1 
  
 
0.8653 0.3946 0.5876 0 
   pctv -0.0342 0.0382 -0.0199 0.2921*** 0.7362*** 1 
 
 
0.4909 0.4414 0.6889 0 0 
  pca -0.0051 0.0442 0.0058 0.94*** 0.7925*** 0.372*** 1 
 
0.9181 0.3721 0.9076 0 0 0 
 pcas -0.0502 0.0486 -0.0347 0.7404*** 0.7521*** 0.4757*** 0.8529*** 
 
0.3108 0.327 0.4846 0 0 0 0 
pcpe 0.0144 0.019 0.0431 0.6357*** 0.9135*** 0.7243*** 0.5465*** 
 
0.7714 0.7014 0.3849 0 0 0 0 
          pcas pcpe           
pcas 1 
      pcpe 0.4356*** 1 
       0             
Note: ***, **, and *, indicate that the p-value is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 12.3 Correlation Matrix for SZSE Long-Term Variables 
  yearlyreturn tobinsq roa mda mdq mde pay 
yearlyreturn 1 
      tobinsq 0.2785*** 1 
     
 
0 
      roa 0.2226*** 0.3335*** 1 
    
 
0 0 
     mda -0.0126 -0.0359 0.0872*** 1 
   
 
0.6702 0.2255 0.0032 
    
mdq 0.0476 0.0802*** 
-
0.0788*** 
-
0.1428*** 1 
  
 
0.1081 0.0068 0.0078 0 
   mde -0.0004 -0.0108 0.0955*** 0.3295*** 0.0138 1 
 
 
0.9893 0.7161 0.0012 0 0.6422 
  pay 0.0361 -0.037 0.2164*** 0.1365*** 0.0607** 0.2184*** 1 
 
0.2236 0.2127 0 0 0.0406 0 
 boe -0.0052 -0.0625** 0.1067*** 0.1594*** 0.0623** 0.4982*** 0.2222*** 
 
0.862 0.035 0.0003 0 0.0355 0 0 
cmq 0.0345 0.1067*** 0.0636** 0.0149 0.3742*** 0.096*** 0.1103*** 
 
0.2441 0.0003 0.0318 0.6164 0 0.0012 0.0002 
bos -0.0112 
-
0.1535*** 0.0349 0.071** 
-
0.0848*** 0.0448 0.1636*** 
 
0.7064 0 0.2396 0.0165 0.0042 0.1306 0 
obo 0.013 
-
0.2306*** -0.0194 -0.0255 0.0526 0.1394*** 0.3538*** 
 
0.6605 0 0.513 0.3902 0.0761 0 0 
bof 0.0169 0.0941*** 0.0642** -0.0267 -0.0275 -0.0024 0.0788*** 
 
0.5685 0.0015 0.0302 0.3676 0.3539 0.9346 0.0078 
sos 0.0136 
-
0.0948*** 0.0467 -0.0257 0.0034 -0.0197 -0.0076 
 
0.6468 0.0014 0.1152 0.3862 0.9083 0.5073 0.7966 
mpy 0.0669** -0.0395 -0.0362 -0.0273 0.0886*** -0.0053 0.1651*** 
 
0.024 0.1825 0.2217 0.3568 0.0028 0.8573 0 
mpys 0.0272 0.0536* 0.0245 0.0255 0.0257 0.0031 0.0929*** 
 
0.3598 0.0708 0.4091 0.39 0.3866 0.9157 0.0017 
mos 0.0118 0.1044*** 0.184*** 
-
0.0895*** 0.0035 0.0056 0.1271*** 
 
0.6916 0.0004 0 0.0025 0.9053 0.8497 0 
soe -0.0271 
-
0.1358*** -0.067** 0.0455 -0.0601** 
-
0.0852*** 
-
0.2271*** 
 
0.3613 0 0.0238 0.1249 0.0425 0.004 0 
lp -0.0494* 0.0973*** -0.0298 
-
0.1192*** 0.0624** 
-
0.0866*** 
-
0.1052*** 
 
0.0953 0.001 0.315 0.0001 0.0353 0.0034 0.0004 
us -0.076** -0.0271 -0.0399 
-
0.0963*** -0.0221 
-
0.2218*** 
-
0.3742*** 
 
0.0103 0.3611 0.1785 0.0011 0.4566 0 0 
boc 0.053* 
-
0.0854*** -0.0071 0.0957*** -0.0429 0.2208*** 0.2901*** 
 
0.0739 0.0039 0.812 0.0012 0.1481 0 0 
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lsh 0.0354 -0.0631** 0.0371 -0.049* -0.073** 
-
0.1189*** 
-
0.3067*** 
 
0.2328 0.0331 0.2107 0.0981 0.0138 0.0001 0 
size 0.0675** 
-
0.3328*** 0.0852*** 0.1934 -0.0035 0.1523*** 0.3964*** 
 
0.0227 0 0.004 0 0.9059 0 0 
beta -0.1934*** -0.234*** 
-
0.2606*** -0.0718** 0.0142 -0.0256 
-
0.0816*** 
 
0 0 0 0.0154 0.6326 0.3887 0.0058 
labour 0.0265 
-
0.2237*** 0.0793*** 0.1757*** 
-
0.0847*** 0.086*** 0.1252*** 
 
0.3711 0 0.0074 0 0.0042 0.0037 0 
pcl 0.1026*** 0.2586*** 0.1215*** 0.0501* 0.0605** 0.1773*** 0.3088*** 
 
0.0005 0 0 0.0909 0.0413 0 0 
pcc 0.0505* 0.3619*** 0.1264*** 0.0216 0.0389 0.1038*** 0.1689*** 
 
0.0885 0 0 0.4658 0.1896 0.0004 0 
pctv 0.0186 0.3028*** 0.1085*** 0.0147 0.0434 0.087*** 0.1578*** 
 
0.5314 0 0.0002 0.6195 0.1428 0.0033 0 
pca 0.0898*** 0.381*** 0.1257*** 0.0112 0.0342 0.0408 0.0867*** 
 
0.0024 0 0 0.7047 0.2492 0.1686 0.0034 
pcas 0.0719** 0.2522*** 0.0601** 0.0105 -0.0247 
-
0.1131*** 
-
0.1805*** 
 
0.0152 0 0.0425 0.7226 0.4055 0.0001 0 
pcpe 0.021 0.3172*** 0.1126*** 0.0254 0.0289 0.1182*** 0.1677*** 
 
0.4796 0 0.0001 0.3923 0.3291 0.0001 0 
          boe cmq bos obo bof sos mpy 
boe 1 
      cmq -0.0185 1 
     
 
0.5318 
      bos 0.0816*** -0.0368 1 
    
 
0.0059 0.215 
     obo 0.2461*** 0.0745** -0.0626** 1 
   
 
0 0.0119 0.0347 
    bof 0.0195 0.0314 0.1068*** 0.0338 1 
  
 
0.5109 0.29 0.0003 0.2548 
   sos -0.038 0.0662** 0.3024*** -0.089*** -0.0188 1 
 
 
0.2002 0.0255 0 0.0027 0.5269 
  mpy 0.0023 0.0464 -0.0378 0.2216*** 0.0867*** 0.0029 1 
 
0.9393 0.1172 0.2026 0 0.0034 0.9222 
 
mpys 0.0031 0.0805*** 
-
0.0892*** 0.1305*** 0.0447 -0.0243 0.366*** 
 
0.9178 0.0065 0.0026 0 0.1319 0.4132 0 
mos -0.03 0.0471 
-
0.1357*** 0.1632*** 0.0739** 
-
0.1835*** 0.0212 
 
0.3117 0.112 0 0 0.0127 0 0.4745 
soe -0.0679** 0.019 0.184*** 
-
0.2068*** -0.0308 0.2377*** -0.152*** 
 
0.0218 0.5227 0 0 0.299 0 0 
lp -0.1007*** -0.0243 -0.111*** -0.0658** 0.0409 - 0.0152 
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0.1729*** 
 
0.0007 0.4134 0.0002 0.0264 0.1682 0 0.6084 
us -0.2419*** 0.0098 0.0674** 
-
0.3206*** 0.0184 0.0611** 
-
0.1745*** 
 
0 0.7403 0.0229 0 0.5345 0.0392 0 
boc 0.2518*** 0.0063 0.0442 0.4902*** -0.0068 0.0125 0.277*** 
 
0 0.8321 0.1363 0 0.8195 0.6744 0 
lsh -0.1135*** -0.079*** 0.0593** 
-
0.2465*** -0.0464 0.0828*** 
-
0.1823*** 
 
0.0001 0.0077 0.0455 0 0.1177 0.0052 0 
size 0.1893*** 0.0617** 0.2761*** 0.0996*** 
-
0.1313*** 0.1925*** 0.1354*** 
 
0 0.0375 0 0.0008 0 0 0 
beta -0.0265 -0.0263 -0.0057 -0.0297 -0.0092 0.0321 -0.0038 
 
0.3713 0.3746 0.8481 0.316 0.7558 0.2793 0.8972 
labour 0.1734*** -0.0722** 0.2168*** 0.0303 
-
0.1556*** 0.0727** -0.0098 
 
0 0.0148 0 0.307 0 0.0142 0.7405 
pcl 0.2358*** 0.0705** 
-
0.0976*** 0.3321*** 0.0293 -0.0745** 0.2271*** 
 
0 0.0173 0.001 0 0.3235 0.0119 0 
pcc 0.1609*** 0.0423 -0.0538* 0.2109*** 0.0168 -0.0431 0.1069*** 
 
0 0.154 0.0697 0 0.5704 0.1464 0.0003 
pctv 0.1573*** 0.0372 -0.0459 0.2583*** 0.0152 -0.0385 0.146*** 
 
0 0.2092 0.1212 0 0.6095 0.1945 0 
pca 0.0832*** 0.0241 -0.0678** 0.0586** -0.0107 -0.0294 0.1694*** 
 
0.0049 0.4161 0.0221 0.0481 0.7189 0.3212 0 
pcas -0.1828*** -0.0063 -0.0373 
-
0.4822*** -0.0284 0.0032 
-
0.0871*** 
 
0 0.8312 0.209 0 0.338 0.9139 0.0033 
pcpe 0.1612*** 0.0415 -0.0444 0.1836*** 0.0256 -0.0437 0.0367 
 
0 0.1613 0.1338 0 0.3882 0.1405 0.2153 
          mpys mos soe lp us boc lsh 
mpys 1 
      mos -0.0106 1 
     
 
0.7196 
      
soe -0.1051*** 
-
0.3233*** 1 
    
 
0.0004 0 
     lp -0.0166 -0.0168 -0.618*** 1 
   
 
0.5749 0.5717 0 
    
us -0.1468*** 
-
0.0782*** 0.5446*** 0.2316*** 1 
  
 
0 0.0083 0 0 
   
boc 0.2187*** -0.0065 
-
0.2488*** -0.0689** 
-
0.4421*** 1 
 
 
0 0.827 0 0.02 0 
  
lsh -0.048 
-
0.2596*** 0.5503*** 
-
0.1339*** 0.4955*** 
-
0.2638*** 1 
 
0.1051 0 0 0 0 0 
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size 0.0886*** 
-
0.1457*** 0.1607*** 
-
0.2662*** 
-
0.1266*** 0.1474*** 0.1198*** 
 
0.0028 0 0 0 0 0 0.0001 
beta -0.0514* -0.0199 0.0222 -0.0121 0.0124 -0.0161 0.0061 
 
0.0832 0.5028 0.4546 0.683 0.6768 0.5865 0.838 
labour 0.0235 -0.104*** 0.116*** 
-
0.1607*** -0.0649** 0.0497* 0.1403*** 
 
0.4275 0.0004 0.0001 0 0.0284 0.0938 0 
pcl 0.2083*** 0.1083*** 
-
0.3135*** 
-
0.1026*** 
-
0.5125*** 0.4356*** 
-
0.2492*** 
 
0 0.0002 0 0.0005 0 0 0 
pcc 0.0746** 0.0743** 
-
0.2103*** -0.0467 
-
0.3162*** 0.238*** 
-
0.1768*** 
 
0.0118 0.0121 0 0.115 0 0 0 
pctv 0.0726** 0.0912*** 
-
0.1732*** -0.0276 
-
0.2452*** 0.2427*** 
-
0.1832*** 
 
0.0142 0.0021 0 0.3514 0 0 0 
pca 0.1292*** 0.068** 
-
0.1345*** -0.0183 
-
0.1846*** 0.1636*** 
-
0.1229*** 
 
0 0.0218 0 0.5368 0 0 0 
pcas -0.0172 
-
0.0923*** 0.0747** 0.0232 0.1116*** -0.235*** 0.1822*** 
 
0.561 0.0018 0.0117 0.4336 0.0002 0 0 
pcpe 0.054* 0.0459 
-
0.2172*** -0.0637** 
-
0.3498*** 0.2101*** 
-
0.1569*** 
 
0.0686 0.1212 0 0.0317 0 0 0 
  size beta labour pcl pcc pctv pca 
size 1 
      beta -0.082*** 1 
     
 
0.0056 
      labour 0.5976*** -0.091*** 1 
    
 
0 0.0021 
     pcl 0.1391*** -0.0662** 0.0303 1 
   
 
0 0.0255 0.3071 
    pcc 0.0683** -0.0437 0.0169 0.7111*** 1 
  
 
0.0211 0.1403 0.5685 0 
   pctv 0.0566* -0.0348 0.014 0.7308*** 0.9481*** 1 
 
 
0.0564 0.2402 0.6367 0 0 
  pca 0.0391 -0.0347 0.0079 0.694*** 0.7807*** 0.8589*** 1 
 
0.1869 0.2425 0.7912 0 0 0 
 
pcas -0.036 -0.0499* 0.0085 0.099*** 
-
0.0803*** 
-
0.1757*** -0.0087 
 
0.2242 0.0926 0.7742 0.0008 0.0067 0 0.7691 
pcpe 0.072** -0.0444 0.0188 0.5608*** 0.9073*** 0.7597*** 0.4657*** 
 
0.0151 0.1346 0.527 0 0 0 0 
  pcas pcpe           
pcas 1 
      pcpe -0.0581** 1 
       0.05             
Note: ***, **, and *, indicate that the p-value is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 12.4 Correlation Matrix for SZSE Short-Term Variables 
  firstdayreturn tobinsq roa mda mdq mde pay 
firstdayreturn 1 
      tobinsq 0.6652*** 1 
     
 
0 
      roa -0.0877 0.2474*** 1 
    
 
0.2991 0.003 
     mda 0.0331 -0.0164 -0.0921 1 
   
 
0.6954 0.8468 0.2756 
    mdq 0.0997 0.129 0.0573 -0.0886 1 
  
 
0.2377 0.1259 0.4981 0.2947 
   mde -0.0001 0.0289 0.0047 0.0064 0.0317 1 
 
 
0.9992 0.7329 0.9562 0.9395 0.7076 
  pay -0.004 -0.0237 0.1254 -0.0012 0.0208 -0.0345 1 
 
0.9628 0.7797 0.1371 0.9888 0.8062 0.6834 
 boe 0.017 0.0715 -0.0111 -0.041 -0.0292 0.8366*** -0.0355 
 
0.8411 0.3978 0.8958 0.6283 0.7303 0 0.6752 
cmq 0.063 0.1448* 0.2215*** -0.0241 0.4049*** 0.0308 0.1396* 
 
0.4567 0.0855 0.0081 0.7759 0 0.7163 0.0974 
bos 0.1361 0.0126 -0.072 0.0304 -0.0347 0.0808 0.0582 
 
0.1062 0.8815 0.3943 0.7195 0.6821 0.3392 0.4918 
obo -0.335*** -0.4252*** 0.1313 -0.1123 -0.059 0.1021 0.4716*** 
 
0 0 0.1193 0.1833 0.4852 0.2268 0 
bof 0.1137 0.0649 0.0175 -0.0141 0.1112 -0.0446 0.0677 
 
0.1777 0.443 0.8359 0.8678 0.1875 0.5981 0.4232 
sos 0.1154 0.0485 0.0167 -0.1092 0.0969 0.071 -0.1056 
 
0.1716 0.5662 0.8436 0.196 0.2511 0.401 0.211 
mpy 0.0966 -0.0552 0.0823 -0.0083 0.0538 -0.0496 0.063 
 
0.2528 0.5139 0.3302 0.9216 0.5246 0.5581 0.4561 
mpys 0.0916 0.0412 -0.1414* -0.0411 0.1169 0.0391 -0.0817 
 
0.2783 0.6265 0.0933 0.6276 0.1658 0.6445 0.3339 
mos -0.2664*** -0.257*** 0.1861** -0.1641* -0.008 -0.0521 0.2524 
 
0.0014 0.002 0.0266 0.051 0.9243 0.5378 0.0024 
soe 0.0889 0.1585* -0.0715 0.0609 -0.0308 0.1096 -0.2717*** 
 
0.2926 0.0596 0.3979 0.4717 0.7158 0.1943 0.0011 
lp -0.0014 -0.0032 0.0661 -0.055 0.0025 -0.0909 0.1204 
 
0.9866 0.9695 0.4345 0.5157 0.9768 0.2821 0.1536 
us 0.0255 0.1514* 0.0748 -0.0459 -0.1153 0.0444 -0.1857** 
 
0.7637 0.0721 0.3762 0.5878 0.1718 0.6 0.0269 
boc -0.2701*** -0.3098*** 0.0313 -0.0695 -0.0831 0.2501*** 0.1772** 
 
0.0011 0.0002 0.7113 0.411 0.3255 0.0027 0.0349 
lsh 0.0107 0.1122 -0.0489 -0.0124 -0.1143 -0.0925 -0.3643*** 
 
0.8995 0.1837 0.5637 0.8833 0.1754 0.2733 0 
size -0.1652** -0.2136** -0.1591* 0.1372 -0.01 -0.0427 0.0014 
 
0.0495 0.0107 0.0586 0.1034 0.9058 0.614 0.9864 
beta 0.0442 -0.104 -0.2064** 0.0076 -0.0315 0.1385 0.0559 
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0.6018 0.2182 0.0137 0.9281 0.71 0.1002 0.5088 
labour -0.2503*** -0.2422*** -0.096 0.1437* -0.1216 -0.059 -0.151* 
 
0.0027 0.0037 0.2556 0.088 0.1493 0.4857 0.0728 
pcl 0.3037*** 0.3801*** -0.1384 0.1497* 0.0862 -0.1327 -0.4006*** 
 
0.0002 0 0.1004 0.0754 0.3076 0.1155 0 
pcc 0.3669*** 0.3919*** -0.2812*** 0.0996 0.0458 0.1059 -0.2526*** 
 
0 0 0.0007 0.2381 0.5887 0.2097 0.0024 
pctv 0.2555*** 0.2211*** -0.2835*** 0.0069 -0.0131 0.2787*** 0.0022 
 
0.0021 0.0082 0.0006 0.9355 0.8768 0.0008 0.979 
pca 0.3635*** 0.3834*** -0.2867*** 0.0929 0.0411 0.124 -0.2336*** 
 
0 0 0.0005 0.2717 0.627 0.1414 0.0051 
pcas 0.3182*** 0.3911*** -0.1574* 0.1481* 0.0841 -0.1103 -0.3948*** 
 
0.0001 0 0.0614 0.0786 0.3199 0.1912 0 
pcpe 0.3698*** 0.4022*** -0.2711*** 0.1091 0.0524 0.0781 -0.2794*** 
 
0 0 0.0011 0.1961 0.5358 0.3556 0.0008 
          boe cmq bos obo bof sos mpy 
boe 1 
      cmq -0.0064 1 
     
 
0.9395 
      bos 0.015 0.0461 1 
    
 
0.8595 0.5858 
     obo 0.0452 0.0633 -0.0021 1 
   
 
0.5936 0.4541 0.9804 
    bof -0.0291 0.0666 0.0378 0.0602 1 
  
 
0.731 0.4313 0.6549 0.4764 
   sos 0.0122 0.1797** 0.2157*** -0.085 -0.0557 1 
 
 
0.8858 0.0323 0.0099 0.3148 0.5106 
  mpy -0.0902 0.0435 -0.0102 0.1189 0.1669** 0.1383 1 
 
0.2855 0.6069 0.9041 0.1586 0.0471 0.1007 
 mpys -0.0089 0.0167 0.0351 -0.0915 -0.0243 0.2331*** 0.2911*** 
 
0.9162 0.8437 0.678 0.2788 0.774 0.0052 0.0004 
mos -0.0552 0.0448 -0.0415 0.6211*** 0.1464* -0.2332*** 0.0804 
 
0.5144 0.5961 0.6241 0 0.0821 0.0052 0.3417 
soe 0.1362 -0.0015 0.0054 
-
0.4774*** -0.1439* 0.1936** -0.1129 
 
0.1059 0.9858 0.9493 0 0.0875 0.021 0.1811 
lp -0.1054 -0.01 -0.0169 0.2619*** 0.1555* -0.186** 0.0528 
 
0.2119 0.9062 0.842 0.0016 0.0647 0.0267 0.5326 
us 0.0519 0.108 -0.006 -0.1276 0.053 0.0532 -0.1052 
 
0.5395 0.2006 0.9439 0.1301 0.5312 0.5295 0.2128 
boc 0.2336*** -0.123 0.0013 0.5305*** -0.0754 -0.0345 0.078 
 
0.0051 0.1447 0.9877 0 0.3726 0.684 0.3565 
lsh -0.034 -0.0867 -0.027 
-
0.4687*** -0.1679** 0.0211 -0.1771** 
 
0.688 0.3048 0.7498 0 0.0458 0.803 0.035 
size -0.1176 -0.0289 0.2133** - -0.1846** 0.0979 -0.0322 
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0.2611*** 
 
0.1635 0.7327 0.0108 0.0017 0.0278 0.2464 0.704 
beta 0.1351 0.0356 0.0451 0.1063 -0.0563 0.0588 0.0167 
 
0.1088 0.6736 0.5941 0.2082 0.5059 0.4871 0.8432 
labour -0.0677 -0.1073 0.0948 -0.1287 -0.1125 0.0852 -0.0156 
 
0.4237 0.2038 0.262 0.127 0.1825 0.3131 0.854 
pcl -0.1227 -0.0098 -0.0066 
-
0.8936*** -0.0843 0.1064 -0.0661 
 
0.1457 0.9081 0.938 0 0.3188 0.2076 0.4343 
pcc 0.1333 -0.0672 0.0419 
-
0.7473*** -0.1058 0.1188 -0.18** 
 
0.1137 0.4266 0.6205 0 0.2102 0.1591 0.0321 
pctv 0.3096*** -0.0895 0.0676 
-
0.2644*** -0.0767 0.0752 -0.2024** 
 
0.0002 0.2895 0.4243 0.0015 0.364 0.3737 0.0157 
pca 0.1523* -0.0706 0.0451 
-
0.7164*** -0.1051 0.117 -0.1855** 
 
0.0704 0.4039 0.5942 0 0.2132 0.1656 0.0271 
pcas -0.0982 -0.0162 -0.0015 
-
0.9007*** -0.0887 0.1104 -0.0801 
 
0.2449 0.8481 0.9856 0 0.2937 0.1907 0.3434 
pcpe 0.1041 -0.0618 0.0369 
-
0.7888*** -0.1062 0.1208 -0.1706** 
 
0.2177 0.465 0.6632 0 0.2085 0.1523 0.0424 
          mpys mos soe lp us boc lsh 
mpys 1 
      mos -0.1032 1 
     
 
0.2215 
      soe 0.0604 -0.4219*** 1 
    
 
0.475 0 
     lp -0.0816 0.2048** -0.8449*** 1 
   
 
0.3341 0.0145 0 
    us -0.0353 0.071 0.2324*** 0.0883 1 
  
 
0.6768 0.4012 0.0054 0.2959 
   boc -0.1244 0.1769** -0.3104*** 0.3062*** -0.1307 1 
 
 
0.1403 0.0352 0.0002 0.0002 0.1211 
  
lsh -0.121 -0.4021*** 0.4938*** 
-
0.2343*** 0.2939*** -0.2485*** 1 
 
0.1515 0 0 0.005 0.0004 0.0029 
 
size 0.057 -0.2165*** 0.3547*** 
-
0.3394*** 0.0002 -0.1825** 0.2955*** 
 
0.5005 0.0096 0 0 0.9978 0.0297 0.0004 
beta -0.0589 0.02 0.0552 -0.0864 -0.0023 0.1976** -0.0973 
 
0.4862 0.8132 0.5141 0.3066 0.9786 0.0184 0.2492 
labour 0.113 -0.2001** 0.223*** 
-
0.2224*** 0.0096 -0.0284 0.3234*** 
 
0.1807 0.0169 0.0076 0.0078 0.9101 0.7372 0.0001 
pcl 0.2015** -0.6738*** 0.4839*** 
-
0.3013*** -0.0036 -0.576*** 0.4678*** 
 
0.0162 0 0 0.0003 0.9657 0 0 
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pcc 0.238*** -0.5855*** 0.443*** 
-
0.3119*** 0.0132 -0.4999*** 0.3102*** 
 
0.0043 0 0 0.0002 0.8765 0 0.0002 
pctv 0.1615** -0.2318*** 0.1993** -0.177** 0.0227 -0.1971** 0.0197 
 
0.0548 0.0055 0.0174 0.0351 0.7888 0.0187 0.8158 
pca 0.2353*** -0.5636*** 0.4286*** 
-
0.3052*** 0.0143 -0.4811*** 0.289*** 
 
0.0048 0 0 0.0002 0.8659 0 0.0005 
pcas 0.2106** -0.6815*** 0.4919*** 
-
0.3102*** -0.0019 -0.5825*** 0.4627*** 
 
0.0119 0 0 0.0002 0.9819 0 0 
pcpe 0.2404*** -0.6146*** 0.4617*** 
-
0.3199*** 0.0114 -0.5248*** 0.34*** 
 
0.004 0 0 0.0001 0.8931 0 0 
          size beta labour pcl pcc pctv pca 
size 1 
      beta -0.1113 1 
     
 
0.1874 
      labour 0.6023*** -0.1068 1 
    
 
0 0.2059 
     pcl 0.3451*** -0.1817** 0.1901** 1 
   
 
0 0.0305 0.0234 
    pcc 0.2755*** 0.0419 0.1111 0.7387*** 1 
  
 
0.0009 0.6204 0.1882 0 
   pctv 0.083 0.2304*** -0.014 0.1529* 0.779*** 1 
 
 
0.3261 0.0058 0.8687 0.0693 0 
  pca 0.2628*** 0.0603 0.1015 0.698*** 0.9983*** 0.8144*** 1 
 
0.0016 0.476 0.2294 0 0 0 
 pcas 0.3464*** -0.1622* 0.1865** 0.9974*** 0.7857*** 0.2243*** 0.7482*** 
 
0 0.0538 0.0263 0 0 0.0073 0 
pcpe 0.2929*** 0.0141 0.1247 0.7949*** 0.9962*** 0.7211*** 0.9893*** 
 
0.0004 0.8676 0.1392 0 0 0 0 
          pcas pcpe           
pcas 1 
      pcpe 0.8369*** 1 
       0             
Note: ***, **, and *, indicate that the p-value is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 12.5 Correlation Matrix for NZSE Long-Term Variables 
  yearlyreturn tobinsq roa mde mdp boe bos 
yearlyreturn 1 
      tobinsq 0.0959** 1 
     
 
0.033 
      roa 0.182*** -0.1388*** 1 
    
 
0 0.002 
     mde 0.1062** -0.0301 0.0371 1 
   
 
0.0182 0.5041 0.411 
    mdp 0.1726*** -0.2145*** 0.2433*** 0.1555*** 1 
  
 
0.0001 0 0 0.0005 
   boe 0.0893** -0.0302 0.042 0.4913*** 0.0732 1 
 
 
0.0474 0.5027 0.3512 0 0.1042 
  bos 0.1077** -0.1913*** 0.133*** -0.0372 0.389*** 0.0459 1 
 
0.0167 0 0.0031 0.4089 0 0.3082 
 obo 0.0641 -0.1077** 0.0884** -0.0073 0.2827*** 0.0202 0.1976*** 
 
0.1549 0.0166 0.0496 0.8717 0 0.6544 0 
bof 0.0112 -0.0894** 0.0833* -0.012 0.0441 0.0235 0.1548*** 
 
0.8037 0.0471 0.0643 0.7901 0.3281 0.6026 0.0006 
is 0.0582 0.1718*** 0.0367 0.0622 0.1482*** 0.0755* 0.0815* 
 
0.1963 0.0001 0.4152 0.1676 0.001 0.0936 0.0705 
mos -0.0527 0.2674*** -0.0486 -0.0684 -0.4541*** 0.0234 -0.2053*** 
 
0.2424 0 0.2813 0.129 0 0.6038 0 
lsh 0.0314 0.0898** 0.0485 0.0571 -0.0595 0.05 -0.1673*** 
 
0.4867 0.0461 0.2825 0.2051 0.187 0.2671 0.0002 
de -0.009 -0.0618 0.0284 0.0645 0.1018** 0.0958** 0.0944** 
 
0.842 0.1702 0.5282 0.1522 0.0237 0.0333 0.0359 
sal 0.0475 -0.0199 0.2927*** 0.243*** 0.2782*** 0.2382*** 0.2305*** 
 
0.2921 0.6597 0 0 0 0 0 
          obo bof is mos lsh de sal 
obo 1 
      bof -0.057 1 
     
 
0.2064 
      is 0.0362 -0.0344 1 
    
 
0.4215 0.4457 
     mos -0.3763*** 0.0312 0.0464 1 
   
 
0 0.4896 0.3037 
    lsh -0.2899*** -0.0827* 0.5637*** 0.393*** 1 
  
 
0 0.0664 0 0 
   de 0.0767* 0.058 -0.0559 0.1044** -0.1503*** 1 
 
 
0.0885 0.1978 0.2147 0.0203 0.0008 
  sal 0.0771* 0.111** 0.2055*** -0.0829* 0.0991** 0.2481*** 1 
  0.087 0.0136 0 0.0657 0.0276 0   
Note: ***, **, and *, indicate that the p-value is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 12.6 Correlation Matrix for NZSE Short-Term Variables 
  firstdayreturn tobinsq roa mde mdp boe bos 
firstdayreturn 1 
      tobinsq 0.0321 1 
     
 
0.7744 
      roa 0.1921* -0.0324 1 
    
 
0.0839 0.7726 
     mde 0.0019 -0.0778 0.0324 1 
   
 
0.9862 0.4874 0.7726 
    mdp 0.3139*** -0.0401 0.334*** -0.0362 1 
  
 
0.0041 0.7209 0.0022 0.7468 
   boe -0.1486 -0.0879 0.0521 0.318*** -0.1934* 1 
 
 
0.1828 0.4323 0.642 0.0036 0.0818 
  bos -0.0346 -0.208* 0.0301 -0.1548 0.3242*** -0.0359 1 
 
0.7575 0.0607 0.7883 0.165 0.003 0.7485 
 obo 0.1751 -0.1641 0.1547 0.0223 0.4341*** -0.0092 0.2422** 
 
0.1156 0.1408 0.1652 0.8423 0 0.9348 0.0284 
bof -0.0143 -0.0043 0.0141 -0.1263 0.1653 -0.1027 0.1683 
 
0.8987 0.9694 0.8997 0.2583 0.1378 0.3587 0.1308 
is 0.0088 0.1593 0.1116 0.0905 0.1186 0.1757 0.0883 
 
0.9375 0.1529 0.318 0.4187 0.2884 0.1144 0.4301 
mos -0.1554 0.4276*** 0.0058 -0.1541 
-
0.3957*** -0.0367 -0.2692** 
 
0.1632 0.0001 0.9588 0.167 0.0002 0.7436 0.0145 
lsh -0.054 0.1146 0.0606 -0.0213 -0.1828 0.0456 -0.1711 
 
0.6298 0.3053 0.5888 0.8493 0.1002 0.6843 0.1243 
de 0.048 -0.1165 0.2573** -0.1043 0.2298** -0.1156 0.0943 
 
0.6683 0.2972 0.0196 0.3508 0.0378 0.3009 0.3995 
sal 0.0098 -0.0852 0.333*** -0.0793 0.2536** -0.0907 0.2887*** 
 
0.9307 0.4468 0.0022 0.4789 0.0215 0.4176 0.0085 
          obo bof is mos lsh de sal 
obo 1 
      bof 0.0189 1 
     
 
0.8663 
      is 0.0884 -0.0976 1 
    
 
0.4296 0.383 
     mos -0.4953*** -0.035 0.0468 1 
   
 
0 0.7551 0.6761 
    lsh -0.3163*** -0.0707 0.5532*** 0.3614*** 1 
  
 
0.0038 0.5282 0 0.0009 
   de 0.2206** 0.0332 0.0978 -0.0663 -0.0166 1 
 
 
0.0464 0.7672 0.3821 0.5538 0.8822 
  sal 0.1851* -0.0622 -0.0966 -0.1968* -0.15 0.2894*** 1 
  0.0959 0.5786 0.388 0.0763 0.1787 0.0084   
Note: ***, **, and *, indicate that the p-value is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 12.7 IPOs Listed in SHSE  
Code IPOs Listing Date 
600195 中牧实业股份有限公司 7/01/1999 
600201 内蒙古金宇集团股份有限公司 15/01/1999 
600228 江西昌九生物化工股份有限公司 19/01/1999 
600167 联美控股股份有限公司 28/01/1999 
600266 北京城建投资发展股份有限公司 3/02/1999 
600007 中国国际贸易中心股份有限公司 12/03/1999 
600206 有研半导体材料股份有限公司 19/03/1999 
600209 罗顿发展股份有限公司 25/03/1999 
600200 江苏吴中实业股份有限公司 1/04/1999 
600175 美都控股股份有限公司 8/04/1999 
600173 卧龙地产集团股份有限公司 15/04/1999 
600176 中国玻纤股份有限公司 22/04/1999 
600359 新疆塔里木农业综合开发股份有限公司 29/04/1999 
600182 佳通轮胎股份有限公司 7/05/1999 
600203 福建福日电子股份有限公司 14/05/1999 
600193 厦门创兴置业股份有限公司 27/05/1999 
600202 哈尔滨空调股份有限公司 3/06/1999 
600190 锦州港股份有限公司 9/06/1999 
600185 西安格力地产股份有限公司 11/06/1999 
600141 湖北兴发化工集团股份有限公司 16/06/1999 
600208 新湖中宝股份有限公司 23/06/1999 
600205 山东铝业股份有限公司 30/06/1999 
600146 宁夏大元化工股份有限公司 7/07/1999 
600207 河南安彩高科股份有限公司 14/07/1999 
600211 西藏诺迪康药业股份有限公司 21/07/1999 
600006 东风汽车股份有限公司 27/07/1999 
600005 武汉钢铁股份有限公司 3/08/1999 
600003 东北高速公路股份有限公司 10/08/1999 
600212 山东江泉实业股份有限公司 17/08/1999 
600210 上海紫江企业集团股份有限公司 24/08/1999 
600213 扬州亚星客车股份有限公司 31/08/1999 
600215 长春经开(集团)股份有限公司 9/09/1999 
600197 新疆伊力特实业股份有限公司 16/09/1999 
600145 重庆四维控股（集团）股份有限公司 23/09/1999 
600220 江苏阳光股份有限公司 27/09/1999 
600149 华夏建通科技开发股份有限公司 14/10/1999 
600216 浙江医药股份有限公司 21/10/1999 
600222 河南竹林众生制药股份有限公司 5/11/1999 
600000 上海浦东发展银行股份有限公司 10/11/1999 
600226 浙江升华拜克生物股份有限公司 16/11/1999 
600268 国电南京自动化股份有限公司 18/11/1999 
600221 海南航空股份有限公司 25/11/1999 
600239 云南城投置业股份有限公司 2/12/1999 
600286 湖南国光瓷业集团股份有限公司 9/12/1999 
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600217 陕西秦岭水泥股份有限公司 16/12/1999 
600219 山东南山实业股份有限公司 23/12/1999 
600223 鲁商置业股份有限公司 13/01/2000 
600238 海南椰岛(集团)股份有限公司 20/01/2000 
600225 天津松江股份有限公司 27/01/2000 
600227 贵州赤天化股份有限公司 21/02/2000 
600500 中化国际（控股）股份有限公司 1/03/2000 
600229 青岛碱业股份有限公司 9/03/2000 
600236 广西桂冠电力股份有限公司 23/03/2000 
600230 沧州大化股份有限公司 6/04/2000 
600299 蓝星化工新材料股份有限公司 20/04/2000 
600008 北京首创股份有限公司 27/04/2000 
600231 凌源钢铁股份有限公司 11/05/2000 
600269 江西赣粤高速公路股份有限公司 18/05/2000 
600259 广晟有色金属股份有限公司 25/05/2000 
600256 新疆广汇实业股份有限公司 26/05/2000 
600258 北京首都旅游股份有限公司 1/06/2000 
600232 浙江金鹰股份有限公司 2/06/2000 
600233 大连大杨创世股份有限公司 8/06/2000 
600237 安徽铜峰电子股份有限公司 9/06/2000 
600257 湖南洞庭水殖股份有限公司 12/06/2000 
600234 太原天龙集团股份有限公司 15/06/2000 
600235 民丰特种纸股份有限公司 15/06/2000 
600248 陕西延长石油化建股份有限公司 22/06/2000 
600240 北京华业地产股份有限公司 28/06/2000 
600262 内蒙古北方重型汽车股份有限公司 30/06/2000 
600300 徐州维维食品饮料股份有限公司 30/06/2000 
600130 宁波波导股份有限公司 6/07/2000 
600260 湖北凯乐科技股份有限公司 6/07/2000 
600278 东方国际创业股份有限公司 12/07/2000 
600301 南宁化工股份有限公司 12/07/2000 
600296 兰州铝业股份有限公司 19/07/2000 
600261 浙江阳光集团股份有限公司 20/07/2000 
600289 亿阳信通股份有限公司 20/07/2000 
600263 路桥集团国际建设股份有限公司 25/07/2000 
600267 浙江海正药业股份有限公司 25/07/2000 
600277 内蒙古亿利能源股份有限公司 25/07/2000 
600279 重庆港九股份有限公司 31/07/2000 
600291 内蒙古西水创业股份有限公司 31/07/2000 
600275 湖北武昌鱼股份有限公司 10/08/2000 
600298 安琪酵母股份有限公司 18/08/2000 
600265 云南景谷林业股份有限公司 25/08/2000 
600287 江苏舜天股份有限公司 1/09/2000 
600282 南京钢铁股份有限公司 19/09/2000 
600293 湖北三峡新型建材股份有限公司 19/09/2000 
600246 北京万通地产股份有限公司 22/09/2000 
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600358 国旅联合股份有限公司 22/09/2000 
600280 南京中央商场股份有限公司 26/09/2000 
600308 山东华泰纸业股份有限公司 28/09/2000 
600276 江苏恒瑞医药股份有限公司 18/10/2000 
600283 钱江水利开发股份有限公司 18/10/2000 
600285 河南羚锐制药股份有限公司 18/10/2000 
600295 内蒙古鄂尔多斯羊绒制品股份有限公司 20/10/2000 
600366 宁波韵升（集团）股份有限公司 30/10/2000 
600292 重庆九龙电力股份有限公司 1/11/2000 
600290 华仪电气股份有限公司 6/11/2000 
600281 太原化工股份有限公司 9/11/2000 
600297 美罗药业股份有限公司 16/11/2000 
600243 青海华鼎实业股份有限公司 20/11/2000 
600255 安徽鑫科新材料股份有限公司 22/11/2000 
600247 吉林成城集团股份有限公司 23/11/2000 
600337 美克国际家具股份有限公司 27/11/2000 
600241 辽宁时代万恒股份有限公司 28/11/2000 
600288 大恒新纪元科技股份有限公司 29/11/2000 
600252 广西梧州中恒集团股份有限公司 30/11/2000 
600422 昆明制药股份有限公司 6/12/2000 
600242 中昌海运股份有限公司 7/12/2000 
600318 安徽巢东水泥股份有限公司 8/12/2000 
600333 长春燃气股份有限公司 11/12/2000 
600019 宝山钢铁股份有限公司 12/12/2000 
600302 西安标准工业股份有限公司 13/12/2000 
600316 江西洪都航空工业股份有限公司 15/12/2000 
600038 哈飞航空工业股份有限公司 18/12/2000 
600016 中国民生银行股份有限公司 19/12/2000 
600388 福建龙净环保股份有限公司 19/12/2000 
600307 甘肃酒钢集团宏兴钢铁股份有限公司 20/12/2000 
600368 广西五洲交通股份有限公司 21/12/2000 
600328 内蒙古兰太实业股份有限公司 22/12/2000 
600345 武汉长江通信产业集团股份有限公司 22/12/2000 
600323 南海发展股份有限公司 25/12/2000 
600339 新疆独山子天利高新技术股份有限公司 25/12/2000 
600303 辽宁曙光汽车集团股份有限公司 26/12/2000 
600306 沈阳商业城股份有限公司 26/12/2000 
600253 河南天方药业股份有限公司 27/12/2000 
600338 西藏珠峰工业股份有限公司 27/12/2000 
600270 中外运空运发展股份有限公司 28/12/2000 
600398 凯诺科技股份有限公司 28/12/2000 
600336 青岛澳柯玛股份有限公司 29/12/2000 
600399 抚顺特殊钢股份有限公司 29/12/2000 
600309 烟台万华聚氨酯股份有限公司 5/01/2001 
600400 江苏红豆实业股份有限公司 8/01/2001 
600369 西南证券股份有限公司 9/01/2001 
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600389 南通江山农药化工股份有限公司 10/01/2001 
600378 四川天一科技股份有限公司 11/01/2001 
600365 通化葡萄酒股份有限公司 15/01/2001 
600390 金瑞新材料科技股份有限公司 15/01/2001 
600326 西藏天路交通股份有限公司 16/01/2001 
600377 江苏宁沪高速公路股份有限公司 16/01/2001 
600330 天通控股股份有限公司 18/01/2001 
600382 广东明珠集团股份有限公司 18/01/2001 
600313 中垦农业资源开发股份有限公司 19/01/2001 
600305 江苏恒顺醋业股份有限公司 6/02/2001 
600332 广州药业股份有限公司 6/02/2001 
600037 北京歌华有线电视网络股份有限公司 8/02/2001 
600033 福建发展高速公路股份有限公司 9/02/2001 
600466 四川迪康科技药业股份有限公司 12/02/2001 
600386 北京巴士传媒股份有限公司 16/02/2001 
600312 河南平高电气股份有限公司 21/02/2001 
600558 四川大西洋焊接材料股份有限公司 27/02/2001 
600310 广西桂东电力股份有限公司 28/02/2001 
600550 保定天威保变电气股份有限公司 28/02/2001 
600335 鼎盛天工工程机械股份有限公司 5/03/2001 
600250 南京纺织品进出口股份有限公司 6/03/2001 
600010 内蒙古包钢钢联股份有限公司 9/03/2001 
600376 北京首都开发股份有限公司 12/03/2001 
600315 上海家化联合股份有限公司 15/03/2001 
600360 吉林华微电子股份有限公司 16/03/2001 
600393 广州东华实业股份有限公司 19/03/2001 
600518 康美药业股份有限公司 19/03/2001 
600367 贵州红星发展股份有限公司 20/03/2001 
600319 潍坊亚星化学股份有限公司 26/03/2001 
600396 沈阳金山能源股份有限公司 28/03/2001 
600363 江西联创光电科技股份有限公司 29/03/2001 
600383 金地（集团）股份有限公司 12/04/2001 
600356 牡丹江恒丰纸业股份有限公司 19/04/2001 
600381 青海贤成矿业股份有限公司 8/05/2001 
600568 中珠控股股份有限公司 18/05/2001 
600588 用友软件股份有限公司 18/05/2001 
600321 四川国栋建设股份有限公司 24/05/2001 
600528 中铁二局股份有限公司 28/05/2001 
600395 贵州盘江精煤股份有限公司 31/05/2001 
600329 天津中新药业集团股份有限公司 6/06/2001 
600380 健康元药业集团股份有限公司 8/06/2001 
600589 广东榕泰实业股份有限公司 12/06/2001 
600468 天津百利特精电气股份有限公司 15/06/2001 
600501 南京航天晨光股份有限公司 15/06/2001 
600488 天津天药药业股份有限公司 18/06/2001 
600311 甘肃荣华实业（集团）股份有限公司 26/06/2001 
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600419 新疆天宏纸业股份有限公司 28/06/2001 
600530 上海交大昂立股份有限公司 2/07/2001 
600372 中航航空电子设备股份有限公司 6/07/2001 
600385 山东金泰集团股份有限公司 23/07/2001 
600320 上海振华重工（集团）股份有限公司 5/08/2001 
600556 广西北生药业股份有限公司 7/08/2001 
600028 中国石油化工股份有限公司 8/08/2001 
600346 大连橡胶塑料机械股份有限公司 20/08/2001 
600569 安阳钢铁股份有限公司 20/08/2001 
600566 湖北洪城通用机械股份有限公司 22/08/2001 
600498 烽火通信科技股份有限公司 23/08/2001 
600418 安徽江淮汽车股份有限公司 24/08/2001 
600539 太原狮头水泥股份有限公司 24/08/2001 
600519 贵州茅台酒股份有限公司 27/08/2001 
600599 熊猫烟花集团股份有限公司 28/08/2001 
600508 上海大屯能源股份有限公司 29/08/2001 
600448 华纺股份有限公司 3/09/2001 
600596 浙江新安化工集团股份有限公司 6/09/2001 
600322 天津市房地产发展（集团）股份有限公司 10/09/2001 
600361 北京华联综合超市股份有限公司 29/11/2001 
600011 华能国际电力股份有限公司 6/12/2001 
600391 四川成发航空科技股份有限公司 12/12/2001 
600567 安徽山鹰纸业股份有限公司 18/12/2001 
600331 四川宏达股份有限公司 20/12/2001 
600548 深圳高速公路股份有限公司 25/12/2001 
600506 新疆库尔勒香梨股份有限公司 26/12/2001 
600523 贵州贵航汽车零部件股份有限公司 27/12/2001 
600520 铜陵三佳科技股份有限公司 8/01/2002 
600362 江西铜业股份有限公司 11/01/2002 
600379 陕西宝光真空电器股份有限公司 16/01/2002 
600555 上海九龙山股份有限公司 18/01/2002 
600317 营口港务股份有限公司 31/01/2002 
600583 海洋石油工程股份有限公司 5/02/2002 
600585 安徽海螺水泥股份有限公司 7/02/2002 
600509 新疆天富热电股份有限公司 28/02/2002 
600373 江西鑫新实业股份有限公司 4/03/2002 
600350 山东高速公路股份有限公司 18/03/2002 
600533 南京栖霞建设股份有限公司 28/03/2002 
600598 黑龙江北大荒农业股份有限公司 29/03/2002 
600036 招商银行股份有限公司 9/04/2002 
600456 宝鸡钛业股份有限公司 12/04/2002 
600428 中远航运股份有限公司 18/04/2002 
600486 江苏扬农化工股份有限公司 25/04/2002 
600415 浙江中国小商品城集团股份有限公司 9/05/2002 
600578 北京京能热电股份有限公司 10/05/2002 
600582 天地科技股份有限公司 15/05/2002 
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600536 中国软件与技术服务股份有限公司 17/05/2002 
600026 中海发展股份有限公司 23/05/2002 
600505 四川西昌电力股份有限公司 30/05/2002 
600529 山东省药用玻璃股份有限公司 3/06/2002 
600496 长江精工钢结构（集团）股份有限公司 5/06/2002 
600580 卧龙电气集团股份有限公司 6/06/2002 
600355 精伦电子股份有限公司 13/06/2002 
600510 黑牡丹（集团）股份有限公司 18/06/2002 
600426 山东华鲁恒升化工股份有限公司 20/06/2002 
600327 无锡商业大厦大东方股份有限公司 25/06/2002 
600595 河南中孚实业股份有限公司 26/06/2002 
600397 安源实业股份有限公司 2/07/2002 
600590 泰豪科技股份有限公司 3/07/2002 
600503 华丽家族股份有限公司 9/07/2002 
600593 大连圣亚旅游控股股份有限公司 11/07/2002 
600561 江西长运股份有限公司 16/07/2002 
600416 湘潭电机股份有限公司 18/07/2002 
600526 浙江菲达环保科技股份有限公司 22/07/2002 
600565 重庆市迪马实业股份有限公司 23/07/2002 
600531 河南豫光金铅股份有限公司 30/07/2002 
600592 福建龙溪轴承（集团）股份有限公司 5/08/2002 
600515 海南筑信投资股份有限公司 6/08/2002 
600579 青岛黄海橡胶股份有限公司 9/08/2002 
600586 山东金晶科技股份有限公司 15/08/2002 
600581 新疆八一钢铁股份有限公司 16/08/2002 
600553 河北太行水泥股份有限公司 22/08/2002 
600535 天津天士力制药股份有限公司 23/08/2002 
600597 光明乳业股份有限公司 28/08/2002 
600516 方大炭素新材料科技股份有限公司 30/08/2002 
600551 时代出版传媒股份有限公司 5/09/2002 
600357 承德新新钒钛股份有限公司 6/09/2002 
600577 铜陵精达特种电磁线股份有限公司 11/09/2002 
600587 山东新华医疗器械股份有限公司 12/09/2002 
600371 万向德农股份有限公司 16/09/2002 
600557 江苏康缘药业股份有限公司 18/09/2002 
600560 北京金自天正智能控制股份有限公司 19/09/2002 
600351 亚宝药业集团股份有限公司 26/09/2002 
600050 中国联合网络通信股份有限公司 9/10/2002 
600499 广东科达机电股份有限公司 10/10/2002 
600591 上海航空股份有限公司 11/10/2002 
600522 江苏中天科技股份有限公司 24/10/2002 
600559 河北衡水老白干酒业股份有限公司 29/10/2002 
600532 山东华阳科技股份有限公司 31/10/2002 
600571 杭州信雅达系统工程股份有限公司 1/11/2002 
600549 厦门钨业股份有限公司 7/11/2002 
600552 安徽方兴科技股份有限公司 8/11/2002 
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600353 成都旭光电子股份有限公司 20/11/2002 
600511 国药集团药业股份有限公司 27/11/2002 
600525 长园集团股份有限公司 2/12/2002 
600563 厦门法拉电子股份有限公司 10/12/2002 
600458 株洲时代新材料科技股份有限公司 19/12/2002 
600512 腾达建设集团股份有限公司 26/12/2002 
600030 中信证券股份有限公司 6/01/2003 
600012 安徽皖通高速公路股份有限公司 7/01/2003 
600272 上海开开实业股份有限公司 8/01/2003 
600538 北海国发海洋生物产业股份有限公司 14/01/2003 
600537 海通食品集团股份有限公司 23/01/2003 
600562 江苏高淳陶瓷股份有限公司 28/01/2003 
600408 山西安泰集团股份有限公司 12/02/2003 
600576 浙江万好万家实业股份有限公司 20/02/2003 
600573 福建省惠泉啤酒集团股份有限公司 26/02/2003 
600521 浙江华海药业股份有限公司 4/03/2003 
600370 江苏三房巷实业股份有限公司 6/03/2003 
600460 杭州士兰微电子股份有限公司 11/03/2003 
600513 江苏联环药业股份有限公司 19/03/2003 
600039 四川路桥建设股份有限公司 25/03/2003 
600575 芜湖港储运股份有限公司 28/03/2003 
600375 安徽星马汽车股份有限公司 1/04/2003 
600343 陕西航天动力高科技股份有限公司 8/04/2003 
600502 安徽水利开发股份有限公司 15/04/2003 
600481 江苏双良空调设备股份有限公司 22/04/2003 
600004 广州白云国际机场股份有限公司 28/04/2003 
600459 贵研铂业股份有限公司 16/05/2003 
600392 太原理工天成科技股份有限公司 29/05/2003 
600584 江苏长电科技股份有限公司 3/06/2003 
600251 新疆冠农果茸集团股份有限公司 9/06/2003 
600436 漳州片仔癀药业股份有限公司 16/06/2003 
600409 唐山三友化工股份有限公司 18/06/2003 
600433 广东冠豪高新技术股份有限公司 19/06/2003 
600490 上海中科合臣股份有限公司 26/06/2003 
600273 华芳纺织股份有限公司 27/06/2003 
600031 三一重工股份有限公司 3/07/2003 
600435 中兵光电科技股份有限公司 4/07/2003 
600439 河南瑞贝卡发制品股份有限公司 10/07/2003 
600271 航天信息股份有限公司 11/07/2003 
600423 柳州化工股份有限公司 17/07/2003 
600475 无锡华光锅炉股份有限公司 21/07/2003 
600425 新疆青松建材化工(集团)股份有限公司 24/07/2003 
600029 中国南方航空股份有限公司 25/07/2003 
600546 山煤国际能源集团股份有限公司 31/07/2003 
600352 浙江龙盛集团股份有限公司 1/08/2003 
600485 北京中创信测科技股份有限公司 7/08/2003 
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600020 河南中原高速公路股份有限公司 8/08/2003 
600489 中金黄金股份有限公司 14/08/2003 
600480 凌云工业股份有限公司 15/08/2003 
600348 山西国阳新能股份有限公司 21/08/2003 
600487 江苏亨通光电股份有限公司 22/08/2003 
600547 山东黄金矿业股份有限公司 28/08/2003 
600449 宁夏赛马实业股份有限公司 29/08/2003 
600462 延边石岘白麓纸业股份有限公司 3/09/2003 
600432 吉林吉恩镍业股份有限公司 5/09/2003 
600015 华夏银行股份有限公司 12/09/2003 
600429 北京三元食品股份有限公司 15/09/2003 
600478 湖南科力远新能源股份有限公司 18/09/2003 
600401 江苏申龙高科集团股份有限公司 24/09/2003 
600507 方大特钢科技股份有限公司 30/09/2003 
600403 南京欣网视讯科技股份有限公司 9/10/2003 
600517 上海置信电气股份有限公司 10/10/2003 
600406 国电南瑞科技股份有限公司 16/10/2003 
600469 风神轮胎股份有限公司 21/10/2003 
600021 上海电力股份有限公司 29/10/2003 
600184 湖北新华光信息材料股份有限公司 6/11/2003 
600477 浙江杭萧钢构股份有限公司 10/11/2003 
600900 中国长江电力股份有限公司 18/11/2003 
600527 江苏江南高纤股份有限公司 27/11/2003 
600545 新疆城建（集团）股份有限公司 3/12/2003 
600476 湖南湘邮科技股份有限公司 10/12/2003 
600570 恒生电子股份有限公司 16/12/2003 
600446 深圳市金证科技股份有限公司 24/12/2003 
600340 浙江国祥制冷工业股份有限公司 30/12/2003 
600540 新疆赛里木现代农业股份有限公司 7/01/2004 
600354 甘肃省敦煌种业股份有限公司 15/01/2004 
600249 柳州两面针股份有限公司 30/01/2004 
600387 浙江海越股份有限公司 18/02/2004 
600444 安徽国通高新管业股份有限公司 19/02/2004 
600325 珠海华发实业股份有限公司 25/02/2004 
600438 通威股份有限公司 2/03/2004 
600452 重庆涪陵电力实业股份有限公司 3/03/2004 
600470 安徽六国化工股份有限公司 5/03/2004 
600035 湖北楚天高速公路股份有限公司 10/03/2004 
600479 株洲千金药业股份有限公司 12/03/2004 
600284 上海浦东路桥建设股份有限公司 16/03/2004 
600463 北京空港科技园区股份有限公司 18/03/2004 
600594 贵州益佰制药股份有限公司 23/03/2004 
600543 甘肃莫高实业发展股份有限公司 24/03/2004 
600455 西安交大博通资讯股份有限公司 29/03/2004 
600405 北京动力源科技股份有限公司 1/04/2004 
600467 山东好当家海洋发展股份有限公司 5/04/2004 
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600960 山东滨州渤海活塞股份有限公司 7/04/2004 
600969 湖南郴电国际发展股份有限公司 8/04/2004 
600572 浙江康恩贝制药股份有限公司 12/04/2004 
600988 广州东方宝龙汽车工业股份有限公司 14/04/2004 
600976 武汉健民药业集团股份有限公司 19/04/2004 
600497 云南驰宏锌锗股份有限公司 20/04/2004 
600493 福建凤竹纺织科技股份有限公司 21/04/2004 
600986 科达集团股份有限公司 26/04/2004 
600410 北京华胜天成科技股份有限公司 27/04/2004 
600985 安徽雷鸣科化股份有限公司 28/04/2004 
600990 安徽四创电子股份有限公司 10/05/2004 
600114 宁波东睦新材料集团股份有限公司 11/05/2004 
600980 北矿磁材科技股份有限公司 12/05/2004 
600992 贵州钢绳股份有限公司 14/05/2004 
600993 马应龙药业集团股份有限公司 17/05/2004 
600967 包头北方创业股份有限公司 18/05/2004 
600491 龙元建设集团股份有限公司 24/05/2004 
600963 岳阳纸业股份有限公司 25/05/2004 
600495 晋西车轴股份有限公司 26/05/2004 
600483 福建南纺股份有限公司 31/05/2004 
600461 江西洪城水业股份有限公司 1/06/2004 
600997 开滦能源化工股份有限公司 2/06/2004 
600421 武汉国药科技股份有限公司 7/06/2004 
600966 山东博汇纸业股份有限公司 8/06/2004 
600975 湖南新五丰股份有限公司 9/06/2004 
600991 广汽长丰汽车股份有限公司 14/06/2004 
600995 云南文山电力股份有限公司 15/06/2004 
600420 上海现代制药股份有限公司 16/06/2004 
600962 国投中鲁果汁股份有限公司 22/06/2004 
600143 金发科技股份有限公司 23/06/2004 
600022 济南钢铁股份有限公司 29/06/2004 
600981 江苏开元股份有限公司 30/06/2004 
600982 宁波热电股份有限公司 6/07/2004 
600984 陕西建设机械股份有限公司 7/07/2004 
600965 河北福成五丰食品股份有限公司 13/07/2004 
600482 风帆股份有限公司 14/07/2004 
600983 合肥荣事达三洋电器股份有限公司 27/07/2004 
600973 宝胜科技创新股份有限公司 2/08/2004 
600987 浙江航民股份有限公司 9/08/2004 
600971 安徽恒源煤电股份有限公司 17/08/2004 
600978 广东省宜华木业股份有限公司 24/08/2004 
600961 株洲冶炼集团股份有限公司 30/08/2004 
600979 四川广安爱众股份有限公司 6/09/2004 
Source: Shanghai Stock Exchange www.sse.com.cn 
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Table 12.8 IPOs Listed in SZSE 
Code IPOs Listing Date 
000877 新疆天山水泥股份有限公司 7/01/1999 
000892 星美联合股份有限公司 15/01/1999 
000890 江苏法尔胜股份有限公司 19/01/1999 
000900 现代投资股份有限公司 28/01/1999 
000908 湖南天一科技股份有限公司 3/02/1999 
000928 中钢集团吉林炭素股份有限公司 12/03/1999 
000885 河南同力水泥股份有限公司 19/03/1999 
000917 湖南电广传媒股份有限公司 25/03/1999 
000901 航天科技控股集团股份有限公司 1/04/1999 
000902 中国服装股份有限公司 8/04/1999 
000903 昆明云内动力股份有限公司 15/04/1999 
000897 天津津滨发展股份有限公司 22/04/1999 
000905 厦门港务发展股份有限公司 29/04/1999 
000909 数源科技股份有限公司 7/05/1999 
000913 浙江钱江摩托股份有限公司 14/05/1999 
000911 南宁糖业股份有限公司 27/05/1999 
000912 四川泸天化股份有限公司 3/06/1999 
000915 山东山大华特科技股份有限公司 9/06/1999 
000925 浙江众合机电股份有限公司 11/06/1999 
000920 南方汇通股份有限公司 16/06/1999 
000922 阿城继电器股份有限公司 18/06/1999 
000926 湖北福星科技股份有限公司 18/06/1999 
000929 兰州黄河企业股份有限公司 23/06/1999 
000835 四川圣达实业股份有限公司 25/06/1999 
000910 大亚科技股份有限公司 30/06/1999 
000906 南方建材股份有限公司 7/07/1999 
000930 安徽丰原生物化学股份有限公司 12/07/1999 
000931 北京中关村科技发展(控股)股份有限公司 12/07/1999 
000921 海信科龙电器股份有限公司 13/07/1999 
000923 河北宣化工程机械股份有限公司 14/07/1999 
000918 嘉凯城集团股份有限公司 20/07/1999 
000090 深圳市天健（集团）股份有限公司 21/07/1999 
000927 天津一汽夏利汽车股份有限公司 27/07/1999 
000932 湖南华菱钢铁股份有限公司 3/08/1999 
000936 江苏华西村股份有限公司 10/08/1999 
000935 四川双马水泥股份有限公司 24/08/1999 
000933 河南神火煤电股份有限公司 31/08/1999 
000937 冀中能源股份有限公司 9/09/1999 
000950 重庆建峰化工股份有限公司 16/09/1999 
000939 武汉凯迪电力股份有限公司 23/09/1999 
000916 华北高速公路股份有限公司 27/09/1999 
000948 云南南天电子信息产业股份有限公司 14/10/1999 
000949 新乡化纤股份有限公司 21/10/1999 
000938 紫光股份有限公司 4/11/1999 
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000956 中国石化中原油气高新股份有限公司 10/11/1999 
000952 湖北广济药业股份有限公司 12/11/1999 
000919 金陵药业股份有限公司 18/11/1999 
000951 中国重汽集团济南卡车股份有限公司 25/11/1999 
000953 广西河池化工股份有限公司 2/12/1999 
000955 欣龙控股（集团）股份有限公司 9/12/1999 
000959 北京首钢股份有限公司 16/12/1999 
000958 石家庄东方热电股份有限公司 23/12/1999 
000957 中通客车控股股份有限公司 13/01/2000 
000962 宁夏东方钽业股份有限公司 20/01/2000 
000963 华东医药股份有限公司 27/01/2000 
000960 云南锡业股份有限公司 21/02/2000 
000961 江苏中南建设集团股份有限公司 1/03/2000 
000999 华润三九医药股份有限公司 9/03/2000 
000966 国电长源电力股份有限公司 16/03/2000 
000967 浙江上风实业股份有限公司 30/03/2000 
000965 天津天保基建股份有限公司 6/04/2000 
000970 北京中科三环高技术股份有限公司 20/04/2000 
000971 湖北迈亚股份有限公司 27/04/2000 
000070 深圳市特发信息股份有限公司 11/05/2000 
000978 桂林旅游股份有限公司 18/05/2000 
000973 佛山塑料集团股份有限公司 25/05/2000 
000301 江苏吴江中国东方丝绸市场股份有限公司 29/05/2000 
000969 安泰科技股份有限公司 29/05/2000 
000976 广东开平春晖股份有限公司 1/06/2000 
000975 南方科学城发展股份有限公司 8/06/2000 
000977 浪潮电子信息产业股份有限公司 8/06/2000 
000988 华工科技产业股份有限公司 8/06/2000 
000979 中弘地产股份有限公司 16/06/2000 
000980 黄山金马股份有限公司 16/06/2000 
000968 太原煤气化股份有限公司 22/06/2000 
000981 甘肃兰光科技股份有限公司 22/06/2000 
000989 九芝堂股份有限公司 28/06/2000 
000982 宁夏中银绒业股份有限公司 6/07/2000 
000990 诚志股份有限公司 6/07/2000 
000987 广州友谊集团股份有限公司 18/07/2000 
000996 中国中期投资股份有限公司 18/07/2000 
000096 深圳市广聚能源股份有限公司 24/07/2000 
000158 石家庄常山纺织股份有限公司 24/07/2000 
000983 山西西山煤电股份有限公司 26/07/2000 
000985 大庆华科股份有限公司 26/07/2000 
000099 中信海洋直升机股份有限公司 31/07/2000 
000993 福建闽东电力股份有限公司 31/07/2000 
000150 宜华地产股份有限公司 7/08/2000 
000995 甘肃皇台酒业股份有限公司 7/08/2000 
000997 福建新大陆电脑股份有限公司 7/08/2000 
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000151 中成进出口股份有限公司 6/09/2000 
000156 湖南嘉瑞新材料集团股份有限公司 6/09/2000 
000153 安徽丰原药业股份有限公司 20/09/2000 
000155 川化股份有限公司 26/09/2000 
000159 新疆国际实业股份有限公司 26/09/2000 
000972 新疆中基实业股份有限公司 26/09/2000 
000157 长沙中联重工科技发展股份有限公司 12/10/2000 
000869 烟台张裕葡萄酿酒股份有限公司 26/10/2000 
000488 山东晨鸣纸业集团股份有限公司 20/11/2000 
000998 袁隆平农业高科技股份有限公司 11/12/2000 
000726 鲁泰纺织股份有限公司 25/12/2000 
000725 京东方科技集团股份有限公司 12/01/2001 
000875 吉林电力股份有限公司 26/09/2002 
000100 TCL 集团股份有限公司 30/01/2004 
002001 浙江新和成股份有限公司 25/06/2004 
002002 江苏琼花高科技股份有限公司 25/06/2004 
002003 浙江伟星实业发展股份有限公司 25/06/2004 
002004 重庆华邦制药股份有限公司 25/06/2004 
002005 广东德豪润达电气股份有限公司 25/06/2004 
002006 浙江精功科技股份有限公司 25/06/2004 
002007 华兰生物工程股份有限公司 25/06/2004 
002008 深圳市大族激光科技股份有限公司 25/06/2004 
002009 江苏天奇物流系统工程股份有限公司 29/06/2004 
002010 浙江传化股份有限公司 29/06/2004 
002011 浙江盾安人工环境设备股份有限公司 5/07/2004 
002012 浙江凯恩特种材料股份有限公司 5/07/2004 
002013 湖北中航精机科技股份有限公司 5/07/2004 
002014 黄山永新股份有限公司 8/07/2004 
002015 江苏霞客环保色纺股份有限公司 8/07/2004 
002016 广东世荣兆业股份有限公司 8/07/2004 
002017 东信和平智能卡股份有限公司 13/07/2004 
002018 安徽华星化工股份有限公司 13/07/2004 
002019 浙江杭州鑫富药业股份有限公司 13/07/2004 
002020 浙江京新药业股份有限公司 15/07/2004 
002021 中捷缝纫机股份有限公司 15/07/2004 
002022 上海科华生物工程股份有限公司 21/07/2004 
002023 四川海特高新技术股份有限公司 21/07/2004 
002024 苏宁电器股份有限公司 21/07/2004 
002025 贵州航天电器股份有限公司 26/07/2004 
002026 山东威达机械股份有限公司 27/07/2004 
002027 七喜控股股份有限公司 4/08/2004 
002028 思源电气股份有限公司 5/08/2004 
002029 福建七匹狼实业股份有限公司 6/08/2004 
002030 中山大学达安基因股份有限公司 9/08/2004 
002031 广东巨轮模具股份有限公司 16/08/2004 
002032 浙江苏泊尔炊具股份有限公司 17/08/2004 
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002033 丽江玉龙旅游股份有限公司 25/08/2004 
002034 浙江美欣达印染集团股份有限公司 26/08/2004 
002035 中山华帝燃具股份有限公司 1/09/2004 
002036 宁波宜科科技实业股份有限公司 3/09/2004 
002037 贵州久联民爆器材发展股份有限公司 8/09/2004 
002038 北京双鹭药业股份有限公司 9/09/2004 
Source: Shenzhen Stock Exchange www.szse.cn 
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Table 12.9 IPOs Listed in NZSE 
Code IPOs Listing Date 
 AMP AMP Ltd  15/06/1998 
 SVN Sovereign Ltd  1/07/1998 
 AIA Auckland International Airport Ltd 28/07/1998 
 CNZ Capital Properties New Zealand Ltd  1/12/1998 
 NWL Nobilo Wines Ltd  18/12/1998 
 GRD Gold & Resource Developments NL  31/12/1998 
 CEN Contact Energy Ltd 11/05/1999 
 GMT Colonial First State Property Trust  3/06/1999 
 RYM Ryman Healthcare Ltd 29/06/1999 
 CHP  Calan Healthcare Properties Trust  7/09/1999 
 TWR Tower Ltd 28/09/1999 
 WPT WestpacTrust Investments Ltd 12/10/1999 
 NML National Mail New Zealand Ltd 23/03/2000 
 LPL Beauty Direct & Online Ltd  29/03/2000 
 TRS E-cademy Holdings Ltd  18/04/2000 
 GDC GDC Communications Ltd 26/04/2000 
 MOW Mowbray Collectables Ltd 26/04/2000 
 EVZ eVentures New Zealand Ltd 9/05/2000 
 NEW E-Opportunity Ltd  10/05/2000 
 FRU Frucor Beverages Group Ltd 13/06/2000 
 WID NZIJ.co.nz Ltd  26/06/2000 
 CYT Rocom Wireless Ltd  17/08/2000 
 PLS RetailX Ltd  1/09/2000 
 GEN Genesis Research & Development Corp Ltd 22/09/2000 
 VTL Vending Technologies Ltd  1/11/2000 
 SUB Submarines Australasia Ltd 8/11/2000 
 CTL Cadmus Technology Ltd 17/11/2000 
 CTG Cabletalk Group Ltd 22/11/2000 
 CGL The CACI Group Ltd 28/11/2000 
 CCG Compass Communications Group Ltd 29/11/2000 
 PWC Powerco Ltd 4/12/2000 
 SOE Software of Excellence International Ltd 15/12/2000 
 FIN Finzsoft Solutions Ltd 19/12/2000 
 CCC Mooring Systems Ltd 20/12/2000 
 BIO Australasian Property Holdings Ltd 21/12/2000 
 RHD Richmond Ltd  13/02/2001 
 WDT Wellington Drive Technologies Ltd 28/02/2001 
 RBC Rubicon Ltd 23/03/2001 
 KRK Kirkcaldie & Stains Ltd 14/05/2001 
 BLT BLIS Technologies Ltd 30/07/2001 
 WFD Wakefield Hospital Ltd 6/09/2001 
 FPA Fisher & Paykel Appliances Holdings Ltd 12/11/2001 
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KID Feverpitch International Ltd 14/12/2001 
 BGR Briscoe Group Ltd 14/12/2001 
 VEA Data Advantage Ltd  17/12/2001 
 PPP Pan Pacific Petroleum NL  14/01/2002 
 SRE Straightedge Ltd  22/04/2002 
 ALF Allied Farmers Ltd 9/05/2002 
 SKL Skellmax Industries Ltd 19/06/2002 
 VTX Vertex Group Holdings Ltd 1/07/2002 
 TUA Turners Auctions Ltd 4/10/2002 
 AMK AMP Reset Preferred Securities  29/10/2002 
 DOW Downer EDI Ltd  6/11/2002 
 BOZ Botry-Zen Ltd 20/11/2002 
 ING Paramount Property Trust  4/12/2002 
 ASB ASB Capital Ltd  11/12/2002 
 GEM Global Market Equity Securities Ltd 23/12/2002 
 PEB Pacific Edge Biotechnology Ltd 12/02/2003 
 PMN Promina Group Ltd  12/05/2003 
 NZX New Zealand Exchange Ltd 4/06/2003 
 URB Urbus Properties Ltd 21/07/2003 
 UTC Utilico Investment Trust plc  15/08/2003 
 PPG Postie Plus Group Ltd 2/09/2003 
 FRE Freightways Ltd 29/09/2003 
 FTB 42 Below Ltd 15/10/2003 
 SCY Smiths City Group Ltd 14/11/2003 
 SEK Seeka Kiwifruit Industries Ltd 14/11/2003 
 NWC The New Zealand Wine Company Ltd 14/11/2003 
 OBV Oyster Bay Marlborough Vineyards Ltd 14/11/2003 
 LBS Loan & Building Society 14/11/2003 
 CVT Comvita Ltd 14/11/2003 
 ZIN Zintel Communications Ltd 14/11/2003 
 RCL Repco Corporation Ltd  20/11/2003 
 WEL Wool Equities Ltd 20/11/2003 
 WTL Windflow Technology Ltd 2/12/2003 
 APX Austral Pacific Energy Ltd  6/01/2004 
 OGD Oceana Gold Ltd  18/03/2004 
 PGC Pyne Gould Corporation Ltd 30/03/2004 
 KFL Kingfish Ltd 31/03/2004 
 PBG Pacific Brands Ltd  2/04/2004 
 IIN iiNet Ltd  19/04/2004 
 LIC Livestock Improvement Corporation Ltd 19/04/2004 
 ATM A2 Corporation Ltd 21/04/2004 
 WSI New Zealand Wool Services International Ltd 3/05/2004 
 TTK TeamTalk Ltd 6/05/2004 
 MPM Mike Pero Mortgages Ltd 24/05/2004 
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FTX Feltex Carpets Ltd  4/06/2004 
 PPL Pumpkin Patch Ltd 9/06/2004 
 JWI Just Water International Ltd 15/06/2004 
 APN APN News & Media Ltd  21/06/2004 
 SAM Salvus Strategic Investments Ltd 8/07/2004 
 CBS Ashburton Building Society  
DFH Dominion Finance Holdings Ltd 14/07/2004 
 SDL Solution Dynamics Ltd 27/07/2004 
 MWL CanWest MediaWorks (NZ) Ltd 29/07/2004 
 SGL Speirs Group Ltd 17/08/2004 
 BBI (PIF) Prime Infrastructure  13/09/2004 
 MZY The NZX Australian MidCap Index Fund  27/09/2004 
 ARM Aurora Minerals Ltd  28/09/2004 
 TUR Turners & Growers Ltd 29/09/2004 
 STH Southern Travel Holdings Ltd 1/10/2004 
 NZF New Zealand Finance Holdings Ltd 6/10/2004 
 CDN Caledonia Investments PLC  1/11/2004 
 CNX Connexionz Ltd 19/11/2004 
 MVN Methven Ltd 30/11/2004 
 PEO People Telecom Ltd  3/12/2004 
 FNZ NZSX 50 Portfolio Index Fund 10/12/2004 
 SAT Satara Co-operative Group 13/12/2004 
 GLS Gullivers Travel Group Ltd 15/12/2004 
 EHF Eastern Hi Fi Group Ltd  15/12/2004 
 SLT(DEI) Deutsche Equity Income Trust plc  24/12/2004 
 Source: New Zealand Stock Exchange www.nzx.com 
 
